Volume I Part 20 (2/2)
In accordance with this requirement of the Const.i.tution, the Congress, on the 15th of February-before my arrival at Montgomery-pa.s.sed a resolution declaring ”that it is the sense of this Congress that a commission of three persons be appointed by the President-elect, as early as may be convenient after his inauguration, and sent to the Government of the United States of America, for the purpose of negotiating friendly relations between that Government and the Confederate States of America, and for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the two Governments, upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith.”127
Persistent and to a great extent successful efforts were made to inflame the minds of the people of the Northwestern States by representing to them that, in consequence of the separation of the States, they would lose the free navigation of the Mississippi River. At that early period in the life of the Confederacy, the intercourse between the North and South had been so little interrupted, that the agitators, whose vocation it was [pg 245] to deceive the ma.s.ses of the people, could not, or should not, have been ignorant that, as early as the 25th of February, 1861, an act was pa.s.sed by the Confederate Congress, and approved by the President, ”to declare and establish the free navigation of the Mississippi River.” That act began with the announcement that ”the peaceful navigation of the Mississippi River is hereby declared free to the citizens of any of the States upon its borders, or upon the borders of its navigable tributaries,” and its provisions secure that freedom for ”all s.h.i.+ps, boats, or vessels,” with their cargoes, ”without any duty or hindrance, except light-money, pilotage, and other like charges.”128
By an act approved on the 26th of February, all laws which forbade the employment in the coasting-trade of vessels not enrolled or licensed, and all laws imposing discriminating duties on foreign vessels or goods imported in them, were repealed.129 These acts and all other indications manifest the well-known wish of the people of the Confederacy to preserve the peace and encourage the most unrestricted commerce with all nations, surely not least with their late a.s.sociates, the Northern States. Thus far, the hope that peace might be maintained was predominant; perhaps, the wish was father to the thought that there would be no war between the States lately united. Indeed, all the laws enacted during the first session of the Provisional Congress show how consistent were the purposes and actions of its members with their original avowal of a desire peacefully to separate from those with whom they could not live in tranquillity, albeit the Government had been established to promote the common welfare. Under this state of feeling the Government of the Confederacy was inst.i.tuted.
My own views and inclinations, as has already been fully shown, were in entire accord with the disposition manifested by the requirement of the Provisional Const.i.tution and the resolution of the Congress above recited, for the appointment of a commission to negotiate friendly relations with the United States and an equitable and peaceable settlement of all questions which would necessarily arise under the new relations of the States toward [pg 246] one another. Next to the organization of a Cabinet, that of such a commission was accordingly one of the very first objects of attention. Three discreet, well-informed, and distinguished citizens were selected as said Commissioners, and accredited to the President of the Northern States, Mr. Lincoln, to the end that by negotiation all questions between the two Governments might be so adjusted as to avoid war, and perpetuate the kind relations which had been cemented by the common trials, sacrifices, and glories of the people of all the States. If sectional hostility had been engendered by dissimilarity of inst.i.tutions, and by a mistaken idea of moral responsibilities, and by irreconcilable creeds-if the family could no longer live and grow harmoniously together-by patriarchal teaching older than Christianity, it might have been learned that it was better to part, to part peaceably, and to continue, from one to another, the good offices of neighbors who by sacred memories were forbidden ever to be foes. The nomination of the members of the commission was made on the 25th of February-within a week after my inauguration-and confirmed by Congress on the same day. The Commissioners appointed were Messrs. A. B. Roman, of Louisiana; Martin J. Crawford, of Georgia; and John Forsyth, of Alabama. Mr. Roman was an honored citizen, and had been Governor of his native State. Mr. Crawford had served with distinction in Congress for several years. Mr. Forsyth was an influential journalist, and had been Minister to Mexico under appointment of Mr. Pierce near the close of his term, and continued so under that of Mr. Buchanan. These gentlemen, moreover, represented the three great parties which had ineffectually opposed the sectionalism of the so-called ”Republicans.” Ex-Governor Roman had been a Whig in former years, and one of the ”Const.i.tutional Union,” or Bell-and-Everett, party in the canva.s.s of 1860. Mr. Crawford, as a State-rights Democrat, had supported Mr. Breckinridge; and Mr. Forsyth had been a zealous advocate of the claims of Mr. Douglas. The composition of the commission was therefore such as should have conciliated the sympathy and cooperation of every element of conservatism with which they might have occasion to deal. Their commissions authorized and empowered [pg 247] them, ”in the name of the Confederate States, to meet and confer with any person or persons duly authorized by the Government of the United States, being furnished with like power and authority, and with him or them to agree, treat, consult, and negotiate” concerning all matters in which the parties were both interested. No secret instructions were given them, for there was nothing to conceal. The objects of their mission were open and avowed, and its inception and conduct throughout were characterized by frankness and good faith. How this effort was received, how the Commissioners were kept waiting, and, while fair promises were held to the ear, how military preparations were pushed forward for the unconst.i.tutional, criminal purpose of coercing States, let the shameful record of that transaction attest.
Footnote 124: (return) Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, Confederate States of America, p. 27.
Footnote 125: (return) Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, Confederate States of America, pp. 27, 28.
Footnote 126: (return) See Provisional Const.i.tution, Appendix K, in loco.
Footnote 127: (return) Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, Confederate States of America, p. 92.
Footnote 128: (return) Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, Confederate States of America, pp. 36-38.
Footnote 129: (return) Ibid., p. 38.
CHAPTER VIII.
The Peace Conference.-Demand for ”a Little Bloodletting.”-Plan proposed by the Conference.-Its Contemptuous Reception and Treatment in the United States Congress.-Failure of Last Efforts at Reconciliation and Reunion.-Note.-Speech of General Lane, of Oregon.
While the events which have just been occupying our attention were occurring, the last conspicuous effort was made within the Union to stay the tide of usurpation which was driving the Southern States into secession. This effort was set on foot by Virginia, the General a.s.sembly of which State, on the 19th of January, 1861, adopted a preamble and resolutions, deprecating disunion, and inviting all such States as were willing to unite in an earnest endeavor to avert it by an adjustment of the then existing controversies to appoint commissioners to meet in Was.h.i.+ngton, on the 4th of February, ”to consider, and, if practicable, agree upon some suitable adjustment.” Ex-President John Tyler, and Messrs. William C. Rives, John W. Brockenbrugh, George W. Summers, and James A. Seddon-five of the most distinguished citizens of the State-were appointed to represent Virginia in the proposed conference. If [pg 248] they could agree with the Commissioners of other States upon any plan of settlement requiring amendments to the Federal Const.i.tution, they were instructed to communicate them to Congress, with a view to their submission to the several States for ratification.
The ”border States” in general promptly acceded to this proposition of Virginia, and others followed, so that in the ”Peace Congress,” or conference, which a.s.sembled, according to appointment, on the 4th, and adjourned on the 27th of February, twenty-one States were eventually represented, of which fourteen were Northern, or ”non-slaveholding,” and seven slaveholding States. The six States which had already seceded were of course not of the number represented; nor were Texas and Arkansas, the secession of which, although not consummated, was obviously inevitable. Three of the Northwestern States-Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota-and the two Pacific States-Oregon and California-also held aloof from the conference. In the case of these last two, distance and lack of time perhaps hindered action. With regard to the other three, their reasons for declining to partic.i.p.ate in the movement were not officially a.s.signed, and are therefore only subjects for conjecture. Some remarkable revelations were afterward made, however, with regard to the action of one of them. It appears, from correspondence read in the Senate on the 27th of February, that the two Senators from Michigan had at first opposed the partic.i.p.ation of that State in the conference, on the ground that it was, as one of them expressed it, ”a step toward obtaining that concession which the imperious slave power so insolently demands.”130-that is to say, in plain terms, they objected to it because it might lead to a compromise and pacification. Finding, however, that most of the other Northern States were represented-some of them by men of moderate and conciliatory temper-that writer had subsequently changed his mind, and at a late period of the session of the conference recommended the sending of delegations of ”true, unflinching men,” who would be ”in favor of the Const.i.tution as it is”-that is, who would [pg 249] oppose any amendment proposed in the interests of harmony and pacification.
The other Senator exhibits a similar alarm at the prospect of compromise and a concurrent change of opinion. He urges the sending of ”stiff-backed” men, to thwart the threatened success of the friends of peace, and concludes with an expression of the humane and patriotic sentiment that ”without a little bloodletting” the Union would not be ”worth a rush.”131 With such unworthy levity did these leaders of sectional strife express their exultation in the prospect of the conflict, which was to drench the land with blood and enshroud thousands of homes in mourning!
It is needless to follow the course of the deliberations of the Peace Conference. It included among its members many men of distinction and eminent ability, and some of unquestionable patriotism, from every part of the Union. The venerable John Tyler presided, and took an active and ardent interest in the [pg 250] efforts made to effect a settlement and avert the impending disasters. A plan was finally agreed upon by a majority of the States represented, for certain amendments to the Federal Const.i.tution, which it was hoped might be acceptable to all parties and put an end to further contention. In its leading features this plan resembled that of Mr. Crittenden, heretofore spoken of, which was still pending in the Senate, though with some variations, which were regarded as less favorable to the South. It was reported immediately to both Houses of the United States Congress. In the Senate, Mr. Crittenden promptly expressed his willingness to accept it as a subst.i.tute for his own proposition, and eloquently urged its adoption. But the arrogance of a sectional majority inflated by recent triumph was too powerful to be allayed by the appeals of patriotism or the counsels of wisdom. The plan of the Peace Conference was treated by the majority with the contemptuous indifference shown to every other movement for conciliation. Its mere consideration was objected to by the extreme radicals, and, although they failed in this, it was defeated on a vote, as were the Crittenden propositions.
With the failure of these efforts, which occurred on the eve of the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, and the accession to power of a party founded on a basis of sectional aggression, and now thoroughly committed to its prosecution and perpetuation, expired the last hopes of reconciliation and union.
Note.-In the course of the debate in the Senate on these grave propositions, a manly and eloquent speech was made on the 2d of March, 1861, by the Hon. Joseph Lane, a Senator from Oregon, who had been the candidate of the Democratic State-rights party for the Vice-Presidency of the United States, in the canva.s.s of 1860. Some pa.s.sages of this speech seem peculiarly appropriate for insertion here. General Lane was replying to a speech of Mr. Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, afterward President of the United States:
”Mr. President, the Senator from Tennessee complains of my remarks on his speech. He complains of the tone and temper of what I said. He complains that I replied at all, as I was a Northern Senator. Mr. President, I am a citizen of this Union and a [pg 251] Senator of the United States. My residence is in the North, but I have never seen the day, and I never shall, when I will refuse justice as readily to the South as to the North. I know nothing but my country, the whole country, the Const.i.tution, and the equality of the States-the equal right of every man in the common territory of the whole country; and by that I shall stand.
”The Senator complains that I replied at all, as I was a Northern Senator, and a Democrat whom he had supported at the last election for a high office. Now, I was, as I stated at the time, surprised at the Senator's speech, because I understood it to be for coercion, as I think it was understood by almost everybody else, except, as we are now told, by the Senator himself; and I still think it amounted to a coercion speech, notwithstanding the soft and plausible phrases by which he describes it-a speech for the execution of the laws and the protection of the Federal property. Sir, if there is, as I contend, the right of secession, then, whenever a State exercises that right, this Government has no laws in that State to execute, nor has it any property in any such State that can be protected by the power of this Government. In attempting, however, to subst.i.tute the smooth phrases 'executing the laws' and 'protecting public property' for coercion, for civil war, we have an important concession: that is, that this Government dare not go before the people with a plain avowal of its real purposes and of their consequences. No, sir; the policy is to inveigle the people of the North into civil war, by masking the design in smooth and ambiguous terms.”-(”Congressional Globe,” second session, Thirty-sixth Congress, p. 1347.)
Footnote 130: (return) See letter of Hon. S. K. Bingham to Governor Blair, of Michigan, in ”Congressional Globe,” second session, Thirty-sixth Congress, Part II, p. 1247.
Footnote 131: (return) See ”Congressional Globe,” ut supra. As this letter, last referred to, is brief and characteristic of the temper of the typical so-called Republicans of the period, it may be inserted entire:
”Was.h.i.+ngton, February 11, 1861.
”My dear Governor: Governor Bingham and myself telegraphed you on Sat.u.r.day, at the request of Ma.s.sachusetts and New York, to send delegates to the Peace or Compromise Congress. They admit that we were right, and that they were wrong; that no Republican State should have sent delegates; but they are here, and can not get away; Ohio, Indiana, and Rhode Island are caving in, and there is danger of Illinois; and now they beg us, for G.o.d's sake, to come to their rescue, and save the Republican party from rupture. I hope you will send stiff-backed men, or none. The whole thing was gotten up against my judgment and advice, and will end in thin smoke. Still, I hope, as a matter of courtesy to some of our erring brethren, that you will send the delegates.
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