Volume I Part 16 (2/2)
These powers as proposed by the Const.i.tution were so extensive as to create alarm and opposition by some of the most influential men in many of the States. It is known that the objection of the patriot Samuel Adams was only overcome by an a.s.surance that such an amendment as the tenth would be adopted. Like opposition was by like a.s.surance elsewhere overcome. That article is in these words: ”The powers not delegated to the United States by the Const.i.tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people.”
Amendment, however, of the delegated powers was made more easy than it had been under the Confederation. Ratification by three fourths of the States was sufficient under the Const.i.tution for the adoption of an amendment to it. As this power of amendment threatens to be the Aaron's rod which will swallow up the rest, I propose to give it special examination. What is the Const.i.tution of the United States? The whole body of the instrument, the history of its formation and adoption, as well as the tenth amendment, added in an abundance of caution, clearly show it to be an instrument enumerating the powers delegated by the States to the Federal Government, their common agent. It is specifically declared that all which was not so delegated was reserved. On this ma.s.s of reserved powers, those which the States declined to grant, the Federal Government was expressly forbidden to intrude. Of what value would this prohibition have been, if three fourths of the States could, without the a.s.sent of a particular State, invade the domain which that State had reserved for its own exclusive use and control?
It has heretofore, I hope, been satisfactorily demonstrated that the States were sovereigns before they formed the Union, and that they have never surrendered their sovereignty, but [pg 196] have only intrusted by their common agent certain functions of sovereignty to be used for their common welfare.
Among the powers delegated was one to amend the Const.i.tution, which, it is submitted, was merely the power to amend the delegated grants, and these were obtained by the separate and independent action of each State acceding to the Union. When we consider how carefully each clause was discussed in the General Convention, and how closely each was scrutinized in the conventions of the several States, the conclusion can not be avoided that all was specified which it was intended to bestow, and not a few of the wisest in that day held that too much power had been conferred.
Aware of the imperfection of everything devised by man, it was foreseen that, in the exercise of the functions intrusted to the General Government, experience might reveal the necessity of modification-i.e., amendment-and power was therefore given to amend, in a certain manner, the delegated trusts so as to make them efficient for the purposes designed, or to prevent their misconstruction or abuse to the injury or oppression of any of the people. In support of this view I refer to the historical fact that the first ten amendments of the Const.i.tution, nearly coeval with it, all refer either to the powers delegated, or are directed to the greater security of the rights which were guarded by express limitations.
The distinction in the mind of the framers of the Const.i.tution between amendment and delegation of power seems to me clearly drawn by the fact that the Const.i.tution itself, which was a proposition to the States to grant enumerated powers, was only to have effect between the ratifying States; but the fifth article provided that amendments to the Const.i.tution might be adopted by three fourths of the States, and thereby be valid as part of the Const.i.tution. It thus appears that a smaller power was required for an amendment than for a grant, and the natural if not necessary conclusion is, that it was because an amendment must belong to, and grow out of, a grant previously made. If a so-called amendment could have been the means of obtaining a new power, is it to be supposed that those watchful guardians of community independence, for which [pg 197] the war of the Revolution had been fought, would have been reconciled to the adoption of the Const.i.tution, by the declaration that the powers not delegated are reserved to the States? Unless the power of amendment be confined to the grants of the Const.i.tution, there can be no security to the reserved rights of a minority less than a fourth of the States. I submit that the word ”amendment” necessarily implies an improvement upon something which is possessed, and can have no proper application to that which did not previously exist.
The apprehension that was felt of this power of amendment by the framers of the Const.i.tution is shown by the restrictions placed upon the exercise of several of the delegated powers. For example: power was given to admit new States, but no new State should be erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of those States; and the power to regulate commerce was limited by the prohibition of an amendment affecting, for a certain time, the migration or importation of persons whom any of the existing States should think proper to admit; and by the very important provision for the protection of the smaller States and the preservation of their equality in the Union, that the compact in regard to the members.h.i.+p of the two Houses of Congress should not be so amended that any ”State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.” These limitations and prohibitions on the power of amendment all refer to clauses of the Const.i.tution, to things which existed as part of the General Government; they were not needed, and therefore not to be found in relation to the reserved powers of the States, on which the General Government was forbidden to intrude by the ninth article of the amendments.
In view of the small territory of the New England States, comparatively to that of the Middle and Southern States, and the probability of the creation of new States in the large Territory of some of these latter, it might well have been antic.i.p.ated that in the course of time the New England States would become less than one fourth of the members of the Union. Nothing is less likely than that the watchful patriots of that region [pg 198] would have consented to a form of government which should give to a majority of three fourths of the States the power to deprive them of their dearest rights and privileges. Yet to this extremity the new-born theory of the power of amendment would go. Against this insidious a.s.sault, this wooden horse which it is threatened to introduce into the citadel of our liberties, I have sought to warn the inheritors of our free inst.i.tutions, and earnestly do invoke the resistance of all true patriots.
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PART III.
SECESSION AND CONFEDERATION.
CHAPTER I.
Opening of the New Year.-The People in Advance of their Representatives.-Conciliatory Conduct of Southern Members of Congress.-Sensational Fictions.-Misstatements of the Count of Paris.-Obligations of a Senator.-The Southern Forts and a.r.s.enals.-Pensacola Bay and Fort Pickens.-The Alleged ”Caucus” and its Resolutions.-Personal Motives and Feelings.-The Presidency not a Desirable Office.-Letter from the Hon. C. C. Clay.
With the failure of the Senate Committee of Thirteen to come to any agreement, the last reasonable hope of a pacific settlement of difficulties within the Union was extinguished in the minds of those most reluctant to abandon the effort. The year 1861 opened, as we have seen, upon the spectacle of a general belief, among the people of the planting States, in the necessity of an early secession, as the only possible alternative left them.
It has already been shown that the calmness and deliberation, with which the measures requisite for withdrawal were adopted and executed, afford the best refutation of the charge that they were the result of haste, pa.s.sion, or precipitation. Still more contrary to truth is the a.s.sertion, so often recklessly made and reiterated, that the people of the South were led into secession, against their will and their better judgment, by a few ambitious and discontented politicians.
The truth is, that the Southern people were in advance of their representatives throughout, and that these latter were not [pg 200] agitators or leaders in the popular movement. They were in harmony with its great principles, but their influence, with very few exceptions, was exerted to restrain rather than to accelerate their application, and to allay rather than to stimulate excitement. As sentinels on the outer wall, the people had a right to look to them for warning of approaching danger; but, as we have seen, in that last session of the last Congress that preceded the disruption, Southern Senators, of the cla.s.s generally considered extremists, served on a committee of pacification, and strove earnestly to promote its objects. Failing in this, they still exerted themselves to prevent the commission of any act that might result in bloodshed.
Invention has busied itself, to the exhaustion of its resources, in the creation of imaginary ”cabals,” ”conspiracies,” and ”intrigues,” among the Senators and Representatives of the South on duty in Was.h.i.+ngton at that time. The idle gossip of the public hotels, the sensational rumors of the streets, the canards of newspaper correspondents-whatever was floating through the atmosphere of that anxious period-however lightly regarded at the moment by the more intelligent, has since been drawn upon for materials to be used in the construction of what has been widely accepted as authentic history. Nothing would seem to be too absurd for such uses. Thus, it has been gravely stated that a caucus of Southern Senators, held in the early part of January, ”resolved to a.s.sume to themselves the political power of the South”; that they took entire control of all political and military operations; that they issued instructions for the pa.s.sage of ordinances of secession, and for the seizure of forts, a.r.s.enals, and custom-houses; with much more of the like groundless fiction. A foreign prince, who served for a time in the Federal Army, and has since undertaken to write a history of ”The Civil War in America”-a history the incomparable blunders of which are redeemed from suspicion of willful misstatement only by the writer's ignorance of the subject-speaks of the Southern representatives as having ”kept their seats in Congress in order to be able to paralyze its action, forming, at the same time, a center whence they issued directions to their friends in the South to complete the dismemberment of [pg 201] the republic.”108 And again, with reference to the secession of several States, he says that ”the word of command issued by the committee at Was.h.i.+ngton was promptly obeyed.”109
Statements such as these are a travesty upon history. That the representatives of the South held conference with one another and took counsel together, as men having common interests and threatened by common dangers, is true, and is the full extent of the truth. That they communicated to friends at home information of what was pa.s.sing is to be presumed, and would have been most obligatory if it had not been that the published proceedings rendered such communication needless. But that any such man, or committee of men, should have undertaken to direct the mighty movement then progressing throughout the South, or to control, through the telegraph and the mails, the will and the judgment of conventions of the people, a.s.sembled under the full consciousness of the dignity of that sovereignty which they represented, would have been an extraordinary degree of folly and presumption.
The absurdity of the statement is further evident from a consideration of the fact that the movements which culminated in the secession of the several States began before the meeting of Congress. They were not inaugurated, prosecuted, or controlled by the Senators and Representatives in Congress, but by the Governors, Legislatures, and finally by the delegates of the people in conventions of the respective States. I believe I may fairly claim to have possessed a full share of the confidence of the people of the State which I in part represented; and proof has already been furnished to show how little effect my own influence could have upon their action, even in the negative capacity of a brake upon the wheels, by means of which it was hurried on to consummation.
As for the imputation of holding our seats as a vantage-ground in plotting for the dismemberment of the Union-in connection with which the Count of Paris does me the honor to single out my name for special mention-it is a charge so dishonorable, if true, to its object-so disgraceful, if false, to its [pg 202] author-as to be outside of the proper limit of discussion. It is a charge which no accuser ever made in my presence, though I had in public debate more than once challenged its a.s.sertion and denounced its falsehood. It is enough to say that I always held, and repeatedly avowed, the principle that a Senator in Congress occupied the position of an amba.s.sador from the State which he represented to the Government of the United States, as well as in some sense a member of the Government; and that, in either capacity, it would be dishonorable to use his powers and privileges for the destruction or for the detriment of the Government to which he was accredited. Acting on this principle, as long as I held a seat in the Senate, my best efforts were directed to the maintenance of the Const.i.tution, the Union resulting from it, and to make the General Government an effective agent of the States for its prescribed purpose. As soon as the paramount allegiance due to Mississippi forbade a continuance of these efforts, I withdrew from the position. To say that during this period I did nothing secretly, in conflict with what was done or professed openly, would be merely to a.s.sert my own integrity, which would be worthless to those who may doubt it, and superfluous to those who believe in it. What has been said on the subject for myself, I believe to be also true of my Southern a.s.sociates in Congress.
With regard to the forts, a.r.s.enals, etc., something more remains to be said. The authorities of the Southern States immediately after, and in some cases a few days before, their actual secession, took possession (in every instance without resistance or bloodshed) of forts, a.r.s.enals, custom-houses, and other public property within their respective limits. I do not propose at this time to consider the question of their right to do so; that may be more properly done hereafter. But it may not be out of place briefly to refer to the statement, often made, that the absence of troops from the military posts in the South, which enabled the States so quietly to take such possession, was the result of collusion and prearrangement between the Southern leaders and the Federal Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, of Virginia. It is a sufficient answer to this allegation to state the fact that the absence of troops from these posts, instead [pg 203] of being exceptional, was, and still is, their ordinary condition in time of peace. At the very moment when these sentences are being written (in 1880), although the army of the United States is twice as large as in 1860; although four years of internal war and a yet longer period of subsequent military occupation of the South have habituated the public to the presence of troops in their midst, to an extent that would formerly have been startling if not offensive; although allegations of continued disaffection on the part of the Southern people have been persistently reiterated, for party purposes-yet it is believed that the forts and a.r.s.enals in the States of the Gulf are in as defenseless a condition, and as liable to quiet seizure (if any such purpose existed), as in the beginning of the year 1861. Certainly, those within the range of my personal information are occupied, as they were at that time, only by ordnance-sergeants or fort-keepers.
There were, however, some exceptions to this general rule-especially in the defensive works of the harbor of Charleston, the forts at Key West and the Dry Tortugas, and those protecting the entrance of Pensacola Bay. The events which occurred in Charleston Harbor will be more conveniently noticed hereafter. The island forts near the extreme southern point of Florida were too isolated and too remote from population to be disturbed at that time; but the situation long maintained at the mouth of Pensacola Bay affords a signal ill.u.s.tration of the forbearance and conciliatory spirit that animated Southern counsels. For a long time, Fort Pickens, on the island of Santa Rosa, at the entrance to the harbor, was occupied only by a small body of Federal soldiers and marines-less than one hundred, all told. Immediately opposite, and in possession of the other two forts and the adjacent navy-yard, was a strong force of volunteer troops of Florida and Alabama (which might, on short notice, have been largely increased), ready and anxious to attack and take possession of Fort Pickens. That they could have done so is unquestionable, and, if mere considerations of military advantage had been consulted, it would surely have been done. But the love of peace and the purpose to preserve it, together with a revulsion from the thought of engaging in fraternal strife, were [pg 204] more potent than considerations of probable interest. During the anxious period of uncertainty and apprehension which ensued, the efforts of the Southern Senators in Was.h.i.+ngton were employed to dissuade (they could not command) from any aggressive movement, however justifiable, that might lead to collision. These efforts were exerted through written and telegraphic communications to the Governors of Alabama and Florida, the Commander of the Southern troops, and other influential persons near the scene of operations. The records of the telegraph-office, if preserved, will no doubt show this to be a very moderate statement of those efforts. It is believed that by such influence alone a collision was averted; and it is certain that its exercise gave great dissatisfaction at the time to some of the ardent advocates of more active measures. It may be that they were right, and that we, who counseled delay and forbearance, were wrong. Certainly, if we could have foreseen the ultimate failure of all efforts for a peaceful settlement, and the perfidy that was afterward to be practiced in connection with them, our advice would have been different.
Certain resolutions, said to have been adopted in a meeting of Senators held on the evening of the 5th of January,110 have been magnified, by the representations of artful commentators on the events of the period, into something vastly momentous.
The significance of these resolutions was the admission that we could not longer advise delay, and even that was unimportant [pg 205] under the circ.u.mstances, for three of the States concerned had taken final action on the subject before the resolutions could have been communicated to them. As an expression of opinion, they merely stated that of which we had all become convinced by the experience of the previous month-that our long-cherished hopes had proved illusory-that further efforts in Congress would be unavailing, and that nothing remained, except that the States should take the matter into their own hands, as final judges of their wrongs and of the measure of redress. They recommended the formation of a confederacy among the seceding States as early as possible after their secession-advice the expediency of which could hardly be questioned, either by friend or foe. As to the ”instructions” asked for with regard to the propriety of continuing to hold their seats, I suppose it must have been caused by some diversity of opinion which then and long afterward continued to exist; and the practical value of which must have been confined to Senators of States which did not actually secede. For myself, I can only say that no advice could have prevailed on me to hold a seat in the Senate after receiving notice that Mississippi had withdrawn from the Union. The best evidence that my a.s.sociates thought likewise is the fact that, although no instructions were given them, they promptly withdrew on the receipt of official information of the withdrawal of the States which they represented.
It will not be amiss here briefly to state what were my position and feelings at the period now under consideration, as they have been the subject of gross and widespread misrepresentation. It is not only untrue, but absurd, to attribute to me motives of personal ambition to be gratified by a dismemberment of the Union. Much of my life had been spent in the military and civil service of the United States. Whatever reputation I had acquired was identified with their history; and, if future preferment had been the object, it would have led me to cling to the Union as long as a shred of it should remain. If any, judging after the event, should a.s.sume that I was allured by the high office subsequently conferred upon me by the people of the Confederate States, the answer to any such conclusion [pg 206] has been made by others, to whom it was well known, before the Confederacy was formed, that I had no desire to be its President. When the suggestion was made to me, I expressed a decided objection, and gave reasons of a public and permanent character against being placed in that position.
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