Volume I Part 12 (1/2)

Their ideas were in entire accord with those of Vattel, who, in his chapter ”Of Nations or Sovereign States,” writes, ”Every nation that governs itself, under what form soever, without any dependence on foreign power, is a sovereign state.”71

In another part of the same chapter he gives a lucid statement of the nature of a confederate republic, such as ours was designed to be. He says:

”Several sovereign and independent states may unite themselves together by a perpetual confederacy, without each in particular ceasing to be a perfect state. They will form together a federal republic: the deliberations in common will offer no violence to the sovereignty of each member, though they may, in certain respects, put some restraint on the exercise of it, in virtue of voluntary engagements. A person does not cease to be free and independent, when he is obliged to fulfill the engagements into which he has very willingly entered.”72

What this celebrated author means here by a person, is explained by a subsequent pa.s.sage: ”The law of nations is the law of sovereigns; states free and independent are moral persons.”73

Footnote 60: (return) ”Principes du Droit Politique,” chap. v, section I; also, chap. vii, section 1.

Footnote 61: (return) Ibid., chap. vii, section 12.

Footnote 62: (return) ”Rebellion Record,” vol. i, Doc.u.ments, p. 211.

Footnote 63: (return) Elliott's ”Debates,” vol. iii, p. 114, edition of 1836.

Footnote 64: (return) ”Federalist,” No. xl.

Footnote 65: (return) Ibid, No. lx.x.xi.

Footnote 66: (return) See Elliott's ”Debates,” vol. v, p. 266.

Footnote 67: (return) Ibid., vol. ii, p. 443.

Footnote 68: (return) See ”Life of Gouverneur Morris,” vol. iii, p. 193.

Footnote 69: (return) See ”Writings of John Adams,” vol. vii, letter of Roger Sherman.

Footnote 70: (return) See Eliott's ”Debates,” vol. ii, p. 197.

Footnote 71: (return) ”Law of Nations,” Book I, chap. i, section 4.

Footnote 72: (return) Ibid., section 10.

Footnote 73: (return) Ibid., section 12.

[pg 146]

CHAPTER IX.

The same Subject continued.-The Tenth Amendment.-Fallacies exposed.-”Const.i.tution,” ”Government,” and ”People” distinguished from each other.-Theories refuted by Facts.-Characteristics of Sovereignty.-Sovereignty identified.-Never thrown away.

If any lingering doubt could have existed as to the reservation of their entire sovereignty by the people of the respective States, when they organized the Federal Union, it would have been removed by the adoption of the tenth amendment to the Const.i.tution, which was not only one of the amendments proposed by various States when ratifying that instrument, but the particular one in which they substantially agreed, and upon which they most urgently insisted. Indeed, it is quite certain that the Const.i.tution would never have received the a.s.sent and ratification of Ma.s.sachusetts, New Hamps.h.i.+re, New York, North Carolina, and perhaps other States, but for a well-grounded a.s.surance that the substance of this amendment would be adopted as soon as the requisite formalities could be complied with. That amendment is in these words:

”The powers not delegated to the United States by the Const.i.tution nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

The full meaning of this article may not be as clear to us as it was to the men of that period, on account of the confusion of ideas by which the term ”people”-plain enough to them-has since been obscured, and also the ambiguity attendant upon the use of the little conjunction or, which has been said to be the most equivocal word in our language, and for that reason has been excluded from indictments in the English courts. The true intent and meaning of the provision, however, may be ascertained from an examination and comparison of the terms in which it was expressed by the various States which proposed it, and whose ideas it was intended to embody.

Ma.s.sachusetts and New Hamps.h.i.+re, in their ordinances of [pg 147] ratification, expressing the opinion ”that certain amendments and alterations in the said Const.i.tution would remove the fears and quiet the apprehensions of many of the good people of this Commonwealth [State (New Hamps.h.i.+re)], and more effectually guard against an undue administration of the Federal Government,” each recommended several such amendments, putting this at the head in the following form:

”That it be explicitly declared that all powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Const.i.tution are reserved to the several States, to be by them exercised.”