Part 2 (1/2)
[Ill.u.s.tration: Figure 14--U. S. ARTILLERY TYPES (1861-1865). a--Siege mortar, b--8-inch siege howitzer, c--24-pounder siege gun, d--8-inch Columbiad, e--3-inch wrought-iron rifle, f--10-inch Rodman.]
Siege and garrison cannon included 24-pounder and 8-inch bronze howitzers (fig. 14b), a 10-inch bronze mortar (fig. 14a), 12-, 18-, and 24-pounder iron guns (fig. 14c) and later the 4-1/2-inch cast-iron rifle. With the exception of the new 3-inch wrought-iron rifle (fig.
14e), field artillery cannon were bronze: 6- and 12-pounder guns, the 12-pounder Napoleon gun-howitzer, 12-pounder mountain howitzer, 12-, 24-, and 32-pounder field howitzers, and the little Coehorn mortar (fig. 39). A machine gun invented by Dr. Richard J. Gatling became part of the artillery equipment during the war, but was not much used.
Reminiscent of the ancient ribaudequin, a repeating cannon of several barrels, the Gatling gun could fire about 350 shots a minute from its 10 barrels, which were rotated and fired by turning a crank. In Europe it became more popular than the French mitrailleuse.
The smaller smoothbores were _effective_ with case shot up to about 600 or 700 yards, and _maximum_ range of field pieces went from something less than the 1,566-yard solid-shot trajectory of the Napoleon to about 2,600 yards (a mile and a half) for a 6-inch howitzer. At Chancellorsville, one of Stonewall Jackson's guns fired a shot which bounded down the center of a roadway and came to rest a mile away. The performance verified the drill-book tables. Maximum ranges of the larger pieces, however, ran all the way from the average 1,600 yards of an 18-pounder garrison gun to the well over 3-mile range of a 12-inch Columbiad firing a 180-pound sh.e.l.l at high elevation. A 13-inch seacoast mortar would lob a 200-pound sh.e.l.l 4,325 yards, or almost 2-1/2 miles. The sh.e.l.l from an 8-inch howitzer carried 2,280 yards, but at such extreme ranges the guns could hardly be called accurate.
On the battlefield, Napoleon's artillery tactics were no longer practical. The infantry, armed with its own comparatively long-range firearm, was usually able to keep artillery beyond case-shot range, and cannon had to stand off at such long distances that their primitive ammunition was relatively ineffective. The result was that when attacking infantry moved in, the defending infantry and artillery were still fresh and unshaken, ready to pour a devastating point-blank fire into the a.s.saulting lines. Thus, in spite of an intensive 2-hour bombardment by 138 Confederate guns at the crisis of Gettysburg, as the gray-clad troops advanced across the field to close range, double canister and concentrated infantry volleys cut them down in ma.s.ses.
Field artillery smoothbores, under conditions prevailing during the war, generally gave better results than the smaller-caliber rifle. A 3-inch rifle, for instance, had twice the range of a Napoleon; but in the broken, heavily wooded country where so much of the fighting took place, the superior range of the rifle could not be used to full advantage. Neither was its relatively small and sometimes defective projectile as damaging to personnel as case or grape from a larger caliber smoothbore. At the first battle of Mana.s.sas (July 1861) more than half the 49 Federal cannon were rifled; but by 1863, even though many more rifles were in service, the majority of the pieces in the field were still the old reliable 6- and 12-pounder smoothbores.
It was in siege operations that the rifles forced a new era. As the smoke cleared after the historic bombardment of Fort Sumter in 1861, military men were already speculating on the possibilities of the newfangled weapon. A Confederate 12-pounder Blakely had pecked away at Sumter with amazing accuracy. But the first really effective use of the rifles in siege operations was at Fort Pulaski (1862). Using 10 rifles and 26 smoothbores, General Gillmore breached the 7-1/2-foot-thick brick walls in little more than 24 hours. Yet his batteries were a mile away from the target! The heavier rifles were converted smoothbores, firing 48-, 64-, and 84-pound James projectiles that drove into the fort wall from 19 to 26 inches at each fair shot.
The smoothbore Columbiads could penetrate only 13 inches, while from this range the ponderous mortars could hardly hit the fort. A year later, Gillmore used 100-, 200-, and 300-pounder Parrott rifles against Fort Sumter. The big guns, firing from positions some 2 miles away and far beyond the range of the fort guns, reduced Sumter to a smoking ma.s.s of rubble.
The range and accuracy of the rifles startled the world. A 30-pounder (4.2-inch) Parrott had an amazing carry of 8,453 yards with 80-pound hollow shot; the notorious ”Swamp Angel” that fired on Charleston in 1863 was a 200-pounder Parrott mounted in the marsh 7,000 yards from the city. But strangely enough, neither rifles nor smoothbores could destroy earthworks. As was proven several times during the war, the defenders of a well-built earthwork were able to repair the trifling damage done by enemy fire almost as soon as there was a lull in the shooting. Learning this lesson, the determined Confederate defenders of Fort Sumter in 1863-64 refused to surrender, but under the most difficult conditions converted their ruined masonry into an earthwork almost impervious to further bombardment.
THE CHANGE INTO MODERN ARTILLERY
With Rodman's gun, the muzzle-loading smoothbore was at the apex of its development. Through the years great progress had been made in mobility, organization, and tactics. Now a new era was beginning, wherein artillery surpa.s.sed even the decisive role it had under Gustavus Adolphus and Napoleon. In spite of new infantry weapons that forced cannon ever farther to the rear, artillery was to become so deadly that its fire caused over 75 percent of the battlefield casualties in World War I.
Many of the vital changes took place during the latter years of the 1800's, as rifles replaced the smoothbores. Steel came into universal use for gun founding; breech and recoil mechanisms were perfected; smokeless powder and high explosives came into the picture. Hardly less important was the invention of more efficient sighting and laying mechanisms.
The changes did not come overnight. In Britain, after breechloaders had been in use almost a decade, the ordnance men went back to muzzle-loading rifles; faulty breech mechanisms caused too many accidents. Not until one of H.M.S. _Thunderer's_ guns was inadvertently double-loaded did the English return to an improved breechloader.
The steel breechloaders of the Prussians, firing two rounds a minute with a percussion sh.e.l.l that broke into about 30 fragments, did much to defeat the French (1870-71). At Sedan, the greatest artillery battle fought prior to 1914, the Prussians used 600 guns to smother the French army. So thoroughly did these guns do their work that the Germans annihilated the enemy at the cost of only 5 percent casualties. It was a demonstration of using great ma.s.ses of guns, bringing them quickly into action to destroy the hostile artillery, then thoroughly ”softening up” enemy resistance in preparation for the infantry attack. While the technical progress of the Prussian artillery was considerable, it was offset in large degree by the counter-development of field entrenchment.
As the technique of forging large ma.s.ses of steel improved, most nations adopted built-up (reinforcing hoops over a steel tube) or wire-wrapped steel construction for their cannon. With the advent of the metal cartridge case and smokeless powder, rapid-fire guns came into use. The new powder, first used in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78), did away with the thick white curtain of smoke that plagued the gunner's aim, and thus opened the way for production of mechanisms to absorb recoil and return the gun automatically to firing position.
Now, gunners did not have to lay the piece after every shot, and the rate of fire increased. s.h.i.+elds appeared on the gun--protection that would have been of little value in the days when gunners had to stand clear of a back-moving carriage.
During the early 1880's the United States began work on a modern system of seacoast armament. An 8-inch breech-loading rifle was built in 1883, and the disappearing carriage, giving more protection to both gun and crew, was adopted in 1886. Only a few of the weapons were installed by 1898; but fortunately the overwhelming naval superiority of the United States helped bring the War with Spain to a quick close.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Figure 15--Ranges.]
During this war, United States forces were equipped with a number of British 2.95-inch mountain rifles, which, incidentally, served as late as World War II in the pack artillery of the Philippine Scouts.
Within the next few years the antiquated pieces such as the 3-inch wrought-iron rifle, the 4.2-inch Parrott siege gun, converted Rodmans, and the 15-inch Rodman smoothbore were finally pushed out of the picture by new steel guns. There were small-caliber rapid-fire guns of different types, a Hotchkiss 1.65-inch mountain rifle, and Hotchkiss and Gatling machine guns. The basic pieces in field artillery were 3.2- and 3.6-inch guns and a 3.6-inch mortar. Siege artillery included a 5-inch gun, 7-inch howitzers, and mortars. In seacoast batteries were 8-, 10-, 12-, 14-, and 16-inch guns and 12-inch mortars of the primary armament; intermediate rapid-fire guns of 4-, 4.72-, 5-, and 6-inch calibers; and 6- and 15-pounder rapid-fire guns in the secondary armament.
The j.a.panese showed the value of the French system of indirect laying (aiming at a target not visible to the gunner) during the Russo-j.a.panese War (1904-05). Meanwhile, the French 75-mm. gun of 1897, firing 6,000 yards, made all other field artillery cannon obsolete. In essence, artillery had a.s.sumed the modern form. The next changes were wrought by startling advances in motor transport, signal communications, chemical warfare, tanks, aviation, and ma.s.s production.
GUNPOWDER
Black powder was used in all firearms until smokeless and other type propellants were invented in the latter 1800's. ”Black” powder (which was sometimes brown) is a mixture of about 75 parts saltpeter (pota.s.sium nitrate), 15 parts charcoal, and 10 parts sulphur by weight. It will explode because the mixture contains the necessary amount of oxygen for its own combustion. When it burns, it liberates smoky gases (mainly nitrogen and carbon dioxide) that occupy some 300 times as much s.p.a.ce as the powder itself.
Early European powder ”recipes” called for equal parts of the three ingredients, but gradually the amount of saltpeter was increased until Tartaglia reported the proportions to be 4-1-1. By the late 1700's ”common war powder” was made 6-1-1, and not until the next century was the formula refined to the 75-15-10 composition in majority use when the newer propellants arrived on the scene.
As the name suggests, this explosive was originally in the form of powder or dust. The primitive formula burned slowly and gave low pressures--fortunate characteristics in view of the barrel-stave construction of the early cannon. About 1450, however, powder makers began to ”corn” the powder. That is, they formed it into larger grains, with a resulting increase in the velocity of the shot. It was ”corned” in fine grains for small arms and coa.r.s.e for cannon.