Part 6 (1/2)
A hen's egg, for example, as soon as the hen begins to sit, sets to work immediately to do as nearly as may be what the two eggs from which its father and mother were hatched did when hens began to sit upon them. The inference would seem almost irresistible,--that the second egg remembers the course pursued by the eggs from which it has sprung, and of whose present ident.i.ty it is unquestionably a part- phase; it also seems irresistibly forced upon us to believe that the intensity of this memory is the secret of its easy action.
It has, I believe, been often remarked, that a hen is only an egg's way of making another egg. Every creature must be allowed to ”run”
its own development in its own way; the egg's way may seem a very roundabout manner of doing things; but it IS its way, and it is one of which man, upon the whole, has no great reason to complain. Why the fowl should be considered more alive than the egg, and why it should be said that the hen lays the egg, and not that the egg lays the hen, these are questions which lie beyond the power of philosophic explanation, but are perhaps most answerable by considering the conceit of man, and his habit, persisted in during many ages, of ignoring all that does not remind him of himself, or hurt him, or profit him; also by considering the use of language, which, if it is to serve at all, can only do so by ignoring a vast number of facts which gradually drop out of mind from being out of sight. But, perhaps, after all, the real reason is, that the egg does not cackle when it has laid the hen, and that it works towards the hen with gradual and noiseless steps, which we can watch if we be so minded; whereas, we can less easily watch the steps which lead from the hen to the egg, but hear a noise, and see an egg where there was no egg. Therefore, we say, the development of the fowl from the egg bears no sort of resemblance to that of the egg from the fowl, whereas, in truth, a hen, or any other living creature, is only the primordial cell's way of going back upon itself.
But to return. We see an egg, A, which evidently knows its own meaning perfectly well, and we know that a twelvemonth ago there were two other such eggs, B and C, which have now disappeared, but from which we know A to have been so continuously developed as to be part of the present form of their ident.i.ty. A's meaning is seen to be precisely the same as B and C's meaning; A's personal appearance is, to all intents and purposes, B and C's personal appearance; it would seem, then, unreasonable to deny that A is only B and C come back, with such modification as they may have incurred since their disappearance; and that, in spite of any such modification, they remember in A perfectly well what they did as B and C.
We have considered the question of personal ident.i.ty so as to see whether, without abuse of terms, we can claim it as existing between any two generations of living agents (and if between two, then between any number up to infinity), and we found that we were not only at liberty to claim this, but that we are compelled irresistibly to do so, unless, that is to say, we would think very differently concerning personal ident.i.ty than we do at present. We found it impossible to hold the ordinary common sense opinions concerning personal ident.i.ty, without admitting that we are personally identical with all our forefathers, who have successfully a.s.similated outside matter to themselves, and by a.s.similation imbued it with all their own memories; we being nothing else than this outside matter so a.s.similated and imbued with such memories. This, at least, will, I believe, balance the account correctly.
A few remarks upon the a.s.similation of outside matter by living organisms may perhaps be hazarded here.
As long as any living organism can maintain itself in a position to which it has been accustomed, more or less nearly, both in its own life and in those of its forefathers, nothing can harm it. As long as the organism is familiar with the position, and remembers its antecedents, nothing can a.s.similate it. It must be first dislodged from the position with which it is familiar, as being able to remember it, before mischief can happen to it. Nothing can a.s.similate living organism.
On the other hand, the moment living organism loses sight of its own position and antecedents, it is liable to immediate a.s.similation, and to be thus familiarised with the position and antecedents of some other creature. If any living organism be kept for but a very short time in a position wholly different from what it has been accustomed to in its own life, and in the lives of its forefathers, it commonly loses its memories completely, once and for ever; but it must immediately acquire new ones, for nothing can know nothing; everything must remember either its own antecedents, or some one else's. And as nothing can know nothing, so nothing can believe in nothing.
A grain of corn, for example, has never been accustomed to find itself in a hen's stomach--neither it nor its forefathers. For a grain so placed leaves no offspring, and hence cannot transmit its experience. The first minute or so after being eaten, it may think it has just been sown, and begin to prepare for sprouting, but in a few seconds, it discovers the environment to be unfamiliar; it therefore gets frightened, loses its head, is carried into the gizzard, and comminuted among the gizzard stones. The hen succeeded in putting it into a position with which it was unfamiliar; from this it was an easy stage to a.s.similating it entirely. Once a.s.similated, the grain ceases to remember any more as a grain, but becomes initiated into all that happens to, and has happened to, fowls for countless ages. Then it will attack all other grains whenever it sees them; there is no such persecutor of grain, as another grain when it has once fairly identified itself with a hen.
We may remark in pa.s.sing, that if anything be once familiarised with anything, it is content. The only things we really care for in life are familiar things; let us have the means of doing what we have been accustomed to do, of dressing as we have been accustomed to dress, of eating as we have been accustomed to eat, and let us have no less liberty than we are accustomed to have, and last, but not least, let us not be disturbed in thinking as we have been accustomed to think, and the vast majority of mankind will be very fairly contented--all plants and animals will certainly be so. This would seem to suggest a possible doctrine of a future state; concerning which we may reflect that though, after we die, we cease to be familiar with ourselves, we shall nevertheless become immediately familiar with many other histories compared with which our present life must then seem intolerably uninteresting.
This is the reason why a very heavy and sudden shock to the nervous system does not pain, but kills outright at once; while one with which the system can, at any rate, try to familiarise itself is exceedingly painful. We cannot bear unfamiliarity. The part that is treated in a manner with which it is not familiar cries immediately to the brain--its central government--for help, and makes itself generally as troublesome as it can, till it is in some way comforted.
Indeed, the law against cruelty to animals is but an example of the hatred we feel on seeing even dumb creatures put into positions with which they are not familiar. We hate this so much for ourselves, that we will not tolerate it for other creatures if we can possibly avoid it. So again, it is said, that when Andromeda and Perseus had travelled but a little way from the rock where Andromeda had so long been chained, she began upbraiding him with the loss of her dragon, who, on the whole, she said, had been very good to her. The only things we really hate are unfamiliar things, and though nature would not be nature if she did not cross our love of the familiar with a love also of the unfamiliar, yet there can be no doubt which of the two principles is master.
Let us return, however, to the grain of corn. If the grain had had presence of mind to avoid being carried into the gizzard stones, as many seeds do which are carried for hundreds of miles in birds'
stomachs, and if it had persuaded itself that the novelty of the position was not greater than it could very well manage to put up with--if, in fact, it had not known when it was beaten--it might have stuck in the hen's stomach and begun to grow; in this case it would have a.s.similated a good part of the hen before many days were over; for hens are not familiar with grains that grow in their stomachs, and unless the one in question was as strongminded for a hen, as the grain that could avoid being a.s.similated would be for a grain, the hen would soon cease to take an interest in her antecedents. It is to be doubted, however, whether a grain has ever been grown which has had strength of mind enough to avoid being set off its balance on finding itself inside a hen's gizzard. For living organism is the creature of habit and routine, and the inside of a gizzard is not in the grain's programme.
Suppose, then, that the grain, instead of being carried into the gizzard, had stuck in the hen's throat and choked her. It would now find itself in a position very like what it had often been in before.
That is to say, it would be in a damp, dark, quiet place, not too far from light, and with decaying matter around it. It would therefore know perfectly well what to do, and would begin to grow until disturbed, and again put into a position with which it might, very possibly, be unfamiliar.
The great question between vast ma.s.ses of living organism is simply this: ”Am I to put you into a position with which your forefathers have been unfamiliar, or are you to put me into one about which my own have been in like manner ignorant?” Man is only the dominant animal on the earth, because he can, as a general rule, settle this question in his own favour.
The only manner in which an organism, which has once forgotten its antecedents, can ever recover its memory, is by being a.s.similated by a creature of its own kind; one, moreover, which knows its business, or is not in such a false position as to be compelled to be aware of being so. It was, doubtless, owing to the recognition of this fact, that some Eastern nations, as we are told by Herodotus, were in the habit of eating their deceased parents--for matter which has once been a.s.similated by any ident.i.ty or personality, becomes for all practical purposes part of the a.s.similating personality.
The bearing of the above will become obvious when we return, as we will now do, to the question of personal ident.i.ty. The only difficulty would seem to lie in our unfamiliarity with the real meanings which we attach to words in daily use. Hence, while recognising continuity without sudden break as the underlying principle of ident.i.ty, we forget that this involves personal ident.i.ty between all the beings who are in one chain of descent, the numbers of such beings, whether in succession, or contemporaneous, going for nothing at all. Thus we take two eggs, one male and one female, and hatch them; after some months the pair of fowls so hatched, having succeeded in putting a vast quant.i.ty of grain and worms into false positions, become full-grown, breed, and produce a dozen new eggs.
Two live fowls and a dozen eggs are the present phase of the personality of the two original eggs. They are also part of the present phase of the personality of all the worms and grain which the fowls have a.s.similated from their leaving the eggsh.e.l.l; but the personalities of these last do not count; they have lost their grain and worm memories, and are instinct with the memorises of the whole ancestry of the creature which has a.s.similated them.
We cannot, perhaps, strictly say that the two fowls and the dozen new eggs actually ARE the two original eggs; these two eggs are no longer in existence, and we see the two birds themselves which were hatched from them. A bird cannot be called an egg without an abuse of terms.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful how far we should not say this, for it is only with a mental reserve--and with no greater mental reserve-- that we predicate absolute ident.i.ty concerning any living being for two consecutive moments; and it is certainly as free from quibble to say to two fowls and a dozen eggs, ”you are the two eggs I had on my kitchen shelf twelve months ago,” as to say to a man, ”you are the child whom I remember thirty years ago in your mother's arms.” In either case we mean, ”you have been continually putting other organisms into a false position, and then a.s.similating them, ever since I last saw you, while nothing has yet occurred to put YOU into such a false position as to have made you lose the memory of your antecedents.”
It would seem perfectly fair, therefore, to say to any egg of the twelve, or to the two fowls and the whole twelve eggs together, ”you were a couple of eggs twelve months ago; twelve months before that you were four eggs;” and so on, ad infinitum, the number neither of the ancestors nor of the descendants counting for anything, and continuity being the sole thing looked to. From daily observation we are familiar with the fact that ident.i.ty does both unite with other ident.i.ties, so that a single new ident.i.ty is the result, and does also split itself up into several ident.i.ties, so that the one becomes many. This is plain from the manner in which the male and female s.e.xual elements unite to form a single ovum, which we observe to be instinct with the memories of both the individuals from which it has been derived; and there is the additional consideration, that each of the elements whose fusion goes to make up the impregnate ovum, is held by some to be itself composed of a fused ma.s.s of germs, which stand very much in the same relation to the spermatozoon and ovum, as the living cellular units of which we are composed do to ourselves-- that is to say, are living independent organisms, which probably have no conception of the existence of the spermatozoon nor of the ovum, more than the spermatozoon or ovum have of theirs.
This, at least, is what I gather from Mr. Darwin's provisional theory of Pangenesis; and, again, from one of the concluding sentences in his ”Effects of Cross and Self Fertilisation,” where, asking the question why two s.e.xes have been developed, he replies that the answer seems to lie ”in the great good which is derived from the fusion of two somewhat differentiated individuals. With the exception,” he continues, ”or the lowest organisms this is possible only by means of the s.e.xual elements--THESE CONSISTING OF CELLS SEPARATED FROM THE BODY” (i.e., separated from the bodies of each parent) ”CONTAINING THE GERMS OF EVERY PART” (i.e., consisting of the seeds or germs from which each individual cell of the coming organism will be developed--these seeds or germs having been shed by each individual cell of the parent forms), ”AND CAPABLE OF BEING FUSED COMPLETELY TOGETHER” (i.e., so at least I gather, capable of being fused completely, in the same way as the cells of our own bodies are fused, and thus, of forming a single living personality in the case of both the male and female element; which elements are themselves capable of a second fusion so as to form the impregnate ovum). This single impregnate ovum, then, is a single ident.i.ty that has taken the place of and come up in the room of two distinct personalities, each of whose characteristics it, to a certain extent, partakes, and which consist, each one of them, of the fused germs of a vast ma.s.s of other personalities.
As regards the dispersion of one ident.i.ty into many, this also is a matter of daily observation in the case of all female creatures that are with egg or young; the ident.i.ty of the young with the female parent is in many respects so complete, as to need no enforcing, in spite of the entrance into the offspring of all the elements derived from the male parent, and of the gradual separation of the two ident.i.ties, which becomes more and more complete, till in time it is hard to conceive that they can ever have been united.
Numbers, therefore, go for nothing; and, as far as ident.i.ty or continued personality goes, it is as fair to say to the two fowls, above referred to, ”you were four fowls twelve months ago,” as it is to say to a dozen eggs, ”you were two eggs twelve months ago.” But here a difficulty meets us; for if we say, ”you were two eggs twelve months ago,” it follows that we mean, ”you are now those two eggs;”
just as when we say to a person, ”you were such and such a boy twenty years ago,” we mean, ”you are now that boy, or all that represents him;” it would seem, then, that in like manner we should say to the two fowls, ”you ARE the four fowls who between them laid the two eggs from which you sprung.” But it may be that all these four fowls are still to be seen running about; we should be therefore saying, ”you two fowls are really not yourselves only, but you are also the other four fowls into the bargain;” and this might be philosophically true, and might, perhaps, be considered so, but for the convenience of the law courts.