Part 39 (1/2)

”One man killed a rebel by striking him with the b.u.t.t of his gun, which he broke; but, being unwilling to stop his work, he loaded and fired three times before he could get a better gun; the first time not being cautious, the rebound of his gun badly cut his lip.

”When the troops were in the ditch, three rebels came to one man, and ordered him to surrender. His gun being loaded, he shot one and bayoneted another; and, forgetting he could bayonet the third, he turned the b.u.t.t of his gun, and knocked him down.”

General Sturgis was severely criticised by the press immediately after the affair. Historians since the war have followed up these criticisms.

He has been accused of incompetency, rashness and drunkenness, none of which it is the purpose of this volume to endorse. Possibly his reports furnish a sufficient explanation for the disaster, which it is hoped they do, inasmuch as he is not charged with either treason or cowardice.

[_General Sturgis' Report, No. 1._]

”HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, COLLIERSVILLE, TENN., June 12, 1864.

”GENERAL:--I have the honor to report that we met the enemy in position and in heavy force about 10 A. M. on the 10th instant at Brice's Cross-Roads on the Ripley and Fulton road and about six miles northwest of Guntown, Miss. A severe battle ensued which lasted until about 4 P. M., when I regret to say my lines were compelled to give way before the overwhelming numbers by which they were a.s.sailed at every point. To fall back at this point was more than ordinarily difficult as there was a narrow valley in our rear through which ran a small creek crossed by a single narrow bridge.

The road was almost impa.s.sable by reason of the heavy rains which had fallen for the previous ten days and the consequence was that the road soon became jammed by the artillery and ordnance wagons. This gradually led to confusion and disorder.

”In a few minutes, however, I succeeded in establis.h.i.+ng two colored regiments in line of battle in a wood on this side of the little valley. These troops stood their ground well and checked the enemy for a time. The check, however, was only temporary and this line in turn gave way. My troops were seized with a panic and became absolutely uncontrollable. One and a half miles in rear by dint of great exertion and with pistol in hand, I again succeeded in checking up the flying column and placing it in line of battle.

”This line checked the enemy for ten or fifteen minutes only, when it again gave way and my whole army became literally an uncontrollable mob. Nothing now remained to do but allow the retreat to continue and endeavor to force it gradually into some kind of shape. The night was exceedingly dark, the roads almost impa.s.sable and the hope of saving my artillery and wagons altogether futile, so I ordered the artillery and wagons to be destroyed. The latter were burned and the former dismantled and spiked, that is all but six pieces which we succeeded in bringing off in safety. By 7 A.

M. next morning we reached Ripley (nineteen miles). Here we re-organized and got into very respectable shape. The retreat was continued, pressed rapidly by the enemy. Our ammunition soon gave out, this the enemy soon discovered and pressed the harder. Our only hope now lay in continuing the retreat which we did to this place, where we arrived about 7 o'clock this morning.

”My losses in material of war was severe, being 16 guns and some 130 wagons. The horses of the artillery and mules of the train we brought away. As my troops became very greatly scattered and are constantly coming in in small parties, I am unable to estimate my loss in killed and wounded. I fear, however, it will prove severe, probably ten or twelve hundred. While the battle lasted it was well contested and I think the enemy's loss in killed and wounded will not fall short of our own.

”This, general, is a painful record, and yet it was the result of a series of unfortunate circ.u.mstances over which human ingenuity could have no control.

”The unprecedented rains so delayed our march across a desert country that the enemy had ample time to acc.u.mulate an overwhelming force in our front, and kept us so long in an exhausted region as to so starve and weaken our animals that they were unable to extricate the wagons and artillery from the mud.

”So far as I know every one did his duty well, and while they fought no troops ever fought better. The colored troops deserve great credit for the manner in which they stood to their work.

”This is a hasty and rather incoherent outline of our operations, but I will forward a more minute account as soon as the official reports can be received from division commanders.

”I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

”S. D. STURGIS,

”_Brig.-Gen. Commanding._

”To Maj.-Gen. C. C. WASHBURN, Commanding District W. Tenn.”

An extract from a letter from Colonel Arthur T. Reeve, who commanded the 55th Colored Infantry in this fight, reads:

”Our (the Federal) command having been moved up on double-quick--a distance of about five miles--immediately before their arrival on the field and the consequent fact that this arm of our force went into the engagement very seriously blown, in fact, very nearly exhausted by heat and fatigue, with their ranks very much drawn out, were whipped in detail and overwhelmed by the very brilliant and vigorous a.s.saults of your forces. When the engagement first began I was at the rear of the Federal column, in command of the train guard, and hence pa.s.sed over the ground on the way to the battle-field after the balance of the army had pa.s.sed, and am able to speak advisedly of the extreme exhaustion of the infantry, as I pa.s.sed large numbers entirely prostrated by heat and fatigue, who did not reach the field of battle and must have fallen into your hands after the engagement.”

[_General Sturgis' Report, No. 2._]

”MEMPHIS, TENN., June 24, 1864.

”Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the expedition which marched from near La Fayette, Tenn., under my command on the 2nd instant. This expedition was organized and fitted out under the supervision of the major general commanding the District of West Tennessee and I a.s.sumed command of it on the morning of the 2nd of June, near the town of La Fayette, Tenn., in pursuance of Special Orders, No. 38, dated Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, Memphis, May 31, 1864, and which were received by me on the 1st inst. The strength of the command in round numbers was about 8,000 men,' (which included the following Phalanx regiments: 59th Regt., 61st Regt., 68th Regt., Battery I, 2nd Artillery, (Light,) 2 pieces.)

”My supply train, carrying rations for 18 days, consisted of 181 wagons, which with the regimental wagons made up a train of some 250 wagons. My instructions were substantially as follows, viz: To proceed to Corinth, Mississippi by way of Salem and Ruckersville, capture any force that might be there, then proceed south, destroying the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Tupelo and Okolona and as far as possible towards Macon and Columbus with a portion of my force, thence to Grenada and back to Memphis. A discretion was allowed me as to the details of the movement where circ.u.mstances might arise which could not have been antic.i.p.ated in my instructions. Owing to some misunderstanding on the part of the quartermaster, as to the point on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at which some forage was to have been deposited from the cars, there was some little delay occasioned in getting the column in motion.

”The following incidents of the march are taken from the journal kept from day to day by one of my staff, Capt. W. C.

Rawolle, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G.:

”'Wednesday, June 1st.--Expedition started from Memphis and White's Station toward La Fayette.

”'Thursday, June 2nd.--The general and staff left Memphis on the 5 o'clock A. M. train and established headquarters at Leaks' House, near La Fayette, and a.s.sumed command. Cavalry moved to the intersection of State line and Early Grove roads, six miles from La Fayette. It rained at intervals all day and part of the night.