Part 40 (2/2)
territorially in conjunction, and to consult with him he journeyed to Bonham.[862]
Viewed in the light of subsequent events, the journey was productive of more evil than good. With Steele absent, the command in Indian Territory devolved upon Cooper[863] and Cooper employed the occasion to ingratiate himself with the Indians, to increase his influence with them, and to undermine the man who he still insisted had supplanted him. When Steele returned from Texas he noticed very evident signs of insubordination. There were times when he found it almost impossible to locate Cooper within the limits of the command or to keep in touch with him. Cooper was displaying great activity, was making plans to recover Fort Smith, and conducting himself generally in a very independent way. October had, however, brought a change in the status of Fort Smith; for General Smith had completely detached the commands of Indian Territory and Arkansas from each other.[864] It was not to Holmes that Steele reported thenceforth but to Smith direct. Taken in connection with the need that soon arose, on account of the chaos in northern Texas, for McCulloch[865] to become absorbed in home affairs, the
[Footnote 862 His destination was apparently to be Shreveport, the department headquarters [Crosby to Bankhead, September 23, 1863.
_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268. p. 251].]
[Footnote 863: Cooper's headquarters, in the interval, were to be at Fort Was.h.i.+ta [Ibid.,], where a company of Ba.s.s's regiment had been placed in garrison [Duval to Cooper, July 15, 1863, Ibid., p. 145].]
[Footnote 864: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1045.]
[Footnote 865: McCulloch was being greatly embarra.s.sed by the rapid spread of unionist sentiment and by desertions from his army. The expedient of furloughing was restarted to. To his credit, be it said, that no embarra.s.sments, no dawning of the idea that he was fighting in a failing cause, could make him forget the ordinary dictates of humanity. His scornful repudiation of Quantrill and his methods was characteristic of the man. For that repudiation, see, particularly, McCulloch to Turner, October 22, 1863, Ibid., vol. xxvi. part ii, 348.]
separation from Arkansas left Indian Territory stranded.
Fort Smith, moreover, was about to become Blunt's headquarters and it was while he was engaged in transferring his effects from Fort Scott to that place that the ma.s.sacre of Baxter Springs occurred, Blunt arriving upon the scene too late to prevent the murderous surprise having its full effect. The Baxter Springs ma.s.sacre was another guerrilla outrage, perpetrated by Quantrill and his band[866] who, their b.l.o.o.d.y work accomplished at the Federal outpost, pa.s.sed on down through the Cherokee Nation, killing outright whatever Indians or negroes they fell in with. It was their boast that they never burdened themselves with prisoners. The gang crossed the Arkansas about eighteen miles above Fort Gibson[867] and arrived at Cooper's camp on the Canadian, October twelfth.[868]
Scarcely had Blunt established his headquarters at Fort Smith, when political influences long hostile to him, Schofield at their head,[869] had acc.u.mulated force
[Footnote 866: Quantrill's bold dash from the Missouri to the Canadian had been projected in a spirit of bravado, deviltry, and downright savagery, and had undoubtedly been incited by the execution of Ewing's notorious order, _Number Eleven_ [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 473]. That order, as modified by Schofield, had authorized the depopulating of those counties of Missouri, Jackson, Ca.s.s, Bates, and a part of Vernon, where the guerrillas were believed to have their chief recruiting stations and where secessionist feeling had always been dominant. It was at once retaliatory and precautionary and on a par with the instructions for the removal of the Acadians on the eve of the breaking out of the French and Indian War. The banished Missourians have, however, as yet found no Longfellow to sentimentalize over them or to idealize, in a story of _Evangeline_, their misfortunes and their character. History has been spared the consequent and inevitable distortion.]
[Footnote 867: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 224.]
[Footnote 868: Quantrill to Price, October 13, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 700-701.]
[Footnote 869: In the matter of domestic politics in Kansas, particularly as they were shaped by the excitement over the guerrilla outrages, Schofield belonged to the party of _Moderates_, ”Paw Paws” as its members were called in derision, (cont.)]
sufficient to effect his removal. He was relieved, under Schofield's orders of October 19, and Brigadier-general John McNeil then a.s.sumed command of the District of the Frontier.[870] Colonel Phillips continued in charge at Fort Gibson,[871] his presence being somewhat of a rea.s.surance to the Cherokees, who, appreciating Blunt's energetic administration, regretted his recall.[872]
Had the Federal Cherokees been authoritatively apprised of the real situation in the Indian Territory farther south, they need never have been anxious as to the safety of Fort Gibson. Steele's situation was peculiarly complex. As private personage and as commander he elicits commiseration. Small and incapable was his force,[873] intriguing and intractable were his
[Footnote 869: (cont.) and Blunt, like Lane, Wilder, and others, to that of the _Extremists_, or _Radicals_. Of the Extremists the ”Red Legs” were the active wing, those who indulged in retaliatory and provocative outrages. Schofield's animosity against Blunt, to some extent richly deserved, amounted almost to a persecution. He inst.i.tuted an investigation of the District of the Frontier and it was upon the basis of the findings of the committee of investigation that he ordered Blunt's retirement [Schofield to Townsend, October 3, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 595-597; Blunt to Curtis, November 30, 1864, Ibid., vol. xli, part iv, 727-729]. For evidence of continued animosity see the correspondence of Champion Vaughan, Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 738, 742.]
[Footnote 870: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 666.]
[Footnote 871: For the condition and movements of the Indian Brigade from November 20, 1863, to December 20, 1863, see _Daily Conservative_, January 3, 1864.]
[Footnote 872: The resolutions, commendatory of his work, to which Blunt refers in his letter to Curtis of November 30, were pa.s.sed by the Cherokee National Council, October 20, 1863. The text of them is to be found, as also Chief Christie's letter of transmittal, in _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 790-791.]
[Footnote 873: Steele reported that on October first he had ”Seminoles, 106; Chickasaws, 208; Creeks, 305; Choctaws, 1,024; Choctaw militia, 200, and whites, 999” [_Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part i, 34]. Concerning the condition of his entire command, the best understanding can be obtained from the inspection report of Smith's a.s.sistant inspector-general, W.C. Schaumburg, [Ibid., part ii, 1049-1053], October 26, 1863. Schaumburg exhibits conditions as simply deplorable, Indians poorly mounted, ignorant of drill, dest.i.tute of suitable (cont.)]
subordinates. Of the white force Magruder[874] was doing his utmost to deprive him, and of the Indian Steele found it next to impossible to keep account. Insignificant as it was, it was yet scattered here, there, and everywhere,[875] Cooper conniving at its desultory dispersion. Instead of strengthening his superior's hands, Cooper was, in fact, steadily weakening them and all for his own advancement. He disparaged Steele's work, discredited it with the Indians,[876] and, whenever possible, allowed a false construction to be put upon his acts. In connection with the movements of the white troops, is a case in point to be found. Rumor had it that Bankhead's brigade, now Gano's,[877] was to be called away for coast defence. Cooper knew perfectly well that such was not Steele's intention and yet he suffered
[Footnote 873: (cont.) arms; posts dilapidated; and prominent tribesmen, like Colonel Tandy Walker, indulging in petty graft, drawing government rations for members of their families and for their negro slaves. McCulloch was also of the opinion that conditions in Indian Territory were pretty bad [_Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part i, 1065], and that the red men were absolutely unreliable [Ibid., vol. xxvi, part ii, 378].]
[Footnote 874: For Magruder's insolent and overbearing att.i.tude towards Steele, see his correspondence in Ibid., part ii.
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