Part 1 (1/2)
The American Indian as Partic.i.p.ant in the Civil War.
by Annie Heloise Abel.
I. THE BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE, OR ELKHORN, AND ITS MORE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS
The Indian alliance, so a.s.siduously sought by the Southern Confederacy and so laboriously built up, soon revealed itself to be most unstable.
Direct and unmistakable signs of its instability appeared in connection with the first real military test to which it was subjected, the Battle of Pea Ridge or Elkhorn, as it is better known in the South, the battle that stands out in the history of the War of Secession as being the most decisive victory to date of the Union forces in the West and as marking the turning point in the political relations.h.i.+p of the State of Missouri with the Confederate government.
In the short time during which, following the removal of General Fremont, General David Hunter was in full command of the Department of the West--and it was practically not more than one week--he completely reversed the policy of vigorous offensive that had obtained under men, subordinate to his predecessor.[1] In southwest Missouri, he abandoned the advanced position of the Federals and fell back upon Sedalia and Rolla, railway termini. That he did this at the suggestion of President Lincoln[2] and with the tacit approval of General McClellan[3] makes no
[Footnote 1: _The Century Company's War Book_, vol. i, 314-315.]
[Footnote 2: _Official Records_, first ser., vol. iii, 553-554.
Hereafter, except where otherwise designated, the _first series_ will always be understood.]
[Footnote 3:--Ibid., 568.]
difference now, as it made no difference then, in the consideration of the consequences; yet the consequences were, none the less, rather serious. They were such, in fact, as to increase very greatly the confusion on the border and to give the Confederates that chance of recovery which soon made it necessary for their foes to do the work of Nathaniel Lyon all over again.
It has been most truthfully said[4] that never, throughout the period of the entire war, did the southern government fully realize the surpa.s.singly great importance of its Trans-Mississippi District; notwithstanding that when that district was originally organized,[5]
in January, 1862, some faint idea of what it might, peradventure, accomplish did seem to penetrate,[6] although ever so vaguely, the minds of those then in authority. It was organized under pressure from the West as was natural, and under circ.u.mstances to which meagre and tentative reference has already been made in the first volume of this work.[7] In the main, the circ.u.mstances were such as developed out of the persistent refusal of General McCulloch to cooperate with General Price.
There was much to be said in justification of McCulloch's obstinacy.
To understand this it is well to recall that, under the plan, lying back of this first
[Footnote 4: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 781-782; Edwards, _Shelby and His Men_, 105.]
[Footnote 5:--Ibid., vol. viii, 734.]
[Footnote 6: It is doubtful if even this ought to be conceded in view of the fact that President Davis later admitted that Van Dorn entered upon the Pea Ridge campaign for the sole purpose of effecting ”a diversion in behalf of General Johnston” [_Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government_, vol. ii, 51]. Moreover, Van Dorn had scarcely been a.s.signed to the command of the Trans-Mississippi District before Beauregard was devising plans for bringing him east again [Greene, _The Mississippi_, II; Roman, _Military Operations of General Beauregard_, vol. i, 240-244].]
[Footnote 7: Abel, _American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist_, 225-226 and _footnote_ 522.]
appointment to the Confederate command, was the expectation that he would secure the Indian Territory. Obviously, the best way to do that was to occupy it, provided the tribes, whose domicile it was, were willing. But, if the Cherokees can be taken to have voiced the opinion of all, they were not willing, notwithstanding that a sensationally reported[8] Federal activity under Colonel James Montgomery,[9] in the neighborhood of the frontier posts, Cobb, Arbuckle, and Was.h.i.+ta, was designed to alarm them and had notably influenced, if it had not actually inspired, the selection and appointment of the Texan ranger.[10]
Unable, by reason of the Cherokee objection thereto, to enter the Indian country; because entrance in the face of that objection would inevitably force the Ross faction of the Cherokees and, possibly also, Indians of other tribes into the arms of the Union, McCulloch intrenched himself on its northeast border, in Arkansas, and there awaited a more favorable opportunity for accomplis.h.i.+ng his main purpose. He seems to have desired the Confederate government to add the contiguous portion of Arkansas to his command, but in that he was disappointed.[11] Nevertheless, Arkansas early interpreted his presence in the state to imply that he was there primarily for her defence and, by the middle of June, that idea had so far gained general acceptance that C.C. Danley, speaking for the Arkansas Military Board, urged President Davis ”to meet
[Footnote 8: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 679.]
[Footnote 9: The name of Montgomery was not one for even Indians to conjure with. James Montgomery was the most notorious of bushwhackers.
For an account of some of his earlier adventures, see Spring, _Kansas_, 241, 247-250, and for a characterization of the man himself, Robinson, _Kansas Conflict_, 435.]
[Footnote 10: _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 682.]
[Footnote 11: Snead, _Fight for Missouri_, 229-230.]
the exigent necessities of the State” by sending a second general officer there, who should command in the northeastern part.[12]
McCulloch's relations with leading Confederates in Arkansas seem to have been, from the first, in the highest degree friendly, even cordial, and it is more than likely that, aside from his unwillingness to offend the neutrality-loving Cherokees, the best explanation for his eventual readiness to make the defence of Arkansas his chief concern, instead of merely a means to the accomplishment of his original task, may be found in that fact. On the twenty-second of May, the Arkansas State Convention instructed Brigadier-general N. Bart Pearce, then in command of the state troops, to cooperate with the Confederate commander ”to the full extent of his ability”[13] and, on the twenty-eighth of the same month, the Arkansas Military Board invited that same person, who, of course, was Ben McCulloch, to a.s.sume command himself of the Arkansas local forces.[14] Sympathetic understanding of this variety, so early established, was bound to produce good results and McCulloch henceforth identified himself most thoroughly with Confederate interests in the state in which he was, by dint of untoward circ.u.mstances, obliged to bide his time.