Part 26 (1/2)

The Franco-Russian _entente_ ripened into an alliance in the year 1895.

So, at least, we may judge from the reference to Russia as ”notre allie”

by the Prime Minister, M. Ribot, in the debate of June 10, 1895.

Nicholas II., at the time of his visit to Paris in 1896, proclaimed his close friends.h.i.+p with the Republic; and during the return visit of President Faure to Cronstadt and St. Petersburg he gave an even more significant sign that the two nations were united by something more than sentiment and what Carlyle would have called the cash-nexus. On board the French wars.h.i.+p _Pothuau_ he referred in his farewell speech to the ”nations amies et alliees” (August 26, 1897).

The treaty has never been made public, but a version of it appeared in the _Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung_ of September 21, 1901, and in the Paris paper, _La Liberte_ five days later. Mr. Henry Norman gives the following summary of the information there unofficially communicated.

After stating that the treaty contains no direct reference to Germany, he proceeds: ”It declares that if either nation is attacked, the other will come to its a.s.sistance with the whole of its military and naval forces, and that peace shall only be concluded in concert and by agreement between the two. No other _casus belli_ is mentioned, no term is fixed to the duration of the treaty, and the whole instrument consists of only a few clauses[273].”

[Footnote 273: H. Norman, M.P., _All the Russias_, p. 390 (Heinemann, 1902). See the articles on the alliance as it affects Anglo-French relations by M. de Pressense in the _Nineteenth Century_ for February and November 1896; also Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's _The Nation's Awakening_, ch. v.]

Obviously France and Russia cannot help one another with all their forces unless the common foe were Germany, or the Triple Alliance as a whole. In that case alone would such a clause be operative. The pressure of France and Russia on the flanks of the German Empire would be terrible; and it is inconceivable that Germany would attack France, knowing that such action would bring the weight of Russia upon her weakest frontier. It is, however, conceivable that the three central allies might deem the strain of an armed peace to be unendurable and attack France or Russia. To such an attack the Dual Alliance would oppose about equal forces, though now hampered by the weakening of the Empire in the Far East.

Another account, also unofficial and discreetly vague, was given to the world by a diplomatist at the time when the Armenian outrages had for a time quickened the dull conscience of Christendom[274]. a.s.suming that the Sick Man of the East was at the point of death, the anonymous writer hinted at the profitable results obtainable by the Continental States if, leaving England out of count, they arranged the Eastern Question _a l'aimable_ among themselves. The Dual Alliance, he averred, would not meet the needs of the situation; for it did not contemplate the part.i.tion of Turkey or a general war in the East.

[Footnote 274: _L'Alliance Franco-russe devant la Crise Orientale_, par un Diplomate etranger. (Paris, Plon. 1897).]

Both parties [France and Russia] have examined the course to be taken in the case of aggression by one or more members of the Triple Alliance; an understanding has been arrived at on the great lines of general policy; but of necessity they did not go further. If the Russian Government could not undertake to place its sword at the service of France with a view to a revision of the Treaty of Frankfurt--a demand, moreover, which France did not make--it cannot claim that France should mobilise her forces to permit it to extend its territory in Europe or in Asia. They know that very well on the banks of the Neva.

To this interesting statement we may add that France and Russia have been at variance on the Eastern Question. Thus, when, in order to press her rightful claims on the Sultan, France determined to coerce him by the seizure of Mitylene, if need be, the Czar's Government is known to have discountenanced this drastic proceeding. Speaking generally, it is open to conjecture whether the Dual Alliance refers to other than European questions. This may be inferred from the following fact. On the announcement of the Anglo-j.a.panese compact early in 1902, by which England agreed to intervene in the Far Eastern Question if another Power helped Russia against j.a.pan, the Governments of St. Petersburg and Paris framed a somewhat similar convention whereby France definitely agreed to take action if Russia were confronted by j.a.pan and a European or American Power in these quarters. No such compact would have been needed if the Franco-Russian alliance had referred to the problems of the Far East.

Another ”disclosure” of the early part of 1904 is also noteworthy. The Paris _Figaro_ published official doc.u.ments purporting to prove that the Czar Nicholas II., on being sounded by the French Government at the time of the Fashoda incident, declared his readiness to abide by his engagements in case France took action against Great Britain. The _Figaro_ used this as an argument in favour of France actively supporting Russia against j.a.pan, if an appeal came from St. Petersburg.

This contention would now meet with little support in France. The events of the Russo-j.a.panese War and the ma.s.sacre of workmen in St. Petersburg on January 22, 1905, have visibly strained Franco-Russian relations.

This is seen in the following speech of M. Anatole France on February 1, 1905, with respect to his interview with the Premier, M. Combes:--

At the beginning of this war I had heard it said very vaguely that there existed between France and Russia firm and fast engagements, and that, if Russia came to blows with a second Power, France would have to intervene. I asked M. Combes, then Prime Minister, whether anything of the kind existed. M.

Combes thought it due to his position not to give a precise answer; but he declared to me in the clearest way that so long as he was Minister we need not fear that our sailors and our soldiers would be sent to j.a.pan. My own opinion is that this folly is not to be apprehended under any Ministry. (_The Times_. February 3.)

At present, then, everything tends to show that the Franco-Russian alliance refers solely to European questions and is merely a defensive agreement in view of a possible attack from one or more members of the Triple Alliance. Seeing that the purely defensive character of the latter has always been emphasised, doubts are very naturally expressed in many quarters as to the use of these alliances. The only tangible advantage gained by any one of the five Powers is that Russia has had greater facilities for raising loans in France and in securing her hold on Manchuria. On the other hand, Frenchmen complain that the alliance has entailed an immense financial responsibility, which is dearly bought by the cessation of those irritating frontier incidents of the Schnaebele type which they had to put up with from Bismarck in the days of their isolation[275].

[Footnote 275: See an article by Jules Simon in the _Contemporary Review_, May 1894.]

Italy also questions the wisdom of her alliance with the Central Powers which brings no obvious return except in the form of slightly enhanced consideration from her Latin sister. In cultured circles on both sides of the Maritime Alps there is a strong feeling that the present international situation violates racial instincts and tradition; and, as we have already seen, Italy's att.i.tude towards France is far different now from what it was in 1882. It is now practically certain that Italians would not allow the King's Government to fight France in the interests of the Central Powers. Their feelings are quite natural. What have Italians in common with Austrians and Prussians? Little more, we may reply, than French republicans with the subjects of the Czar. In truth both of these alliances rest, not on whole-hearted regard or affection, but on fear and on the compulsion which it exerts.

To this fact we may, perhaps, largely attribute the _malaise_ of Europe.

The Greek philosopher Empedocles looked on the world as the product of two all-pervading forces, love and hate, acting on blind matter: love brought cognate particles together and held them in union; hate or repulsion kept asunder the unlike or hostile elements. We may use the terms of this old cosmogony in reference to existing political conditions, and a.s.sert that these two elemental principles have drawn Europe apart into two hostile ma.s.ses; with this difference, that the allies for the most part are held together, not so much by mutual regard as by hatred of their opposites. From this somewhat sweeping statement we must mark off one exception. There were two allies who came together with the ease which betokens a certain amount of affinity. Thanks to the statesmanlike moderation of Bismarck after Koniggratz, Austria willingly entered into a close compact with her former rival. At least that was the feeling among the Germans and Magyars of the Dual Monarchy. The Austro-German alliance, it may be predicted, will hold good while the Dual Monarchy exists in its present form; but even in that case fear of Russia is the one great binding force where so much else is centrifugal.

If ever the Empire of the Czar should lose its prestige, possibly the two Central Powers would drift apart.

Although there are signs of weakness in both alliances, they will doubtless remain standing as long as the need which called them into being remains. Despite all the efforts made on both sides, the military and naval resources of the two great leagues are approximately equal. In one respect, and in one alone, Europe has benefited from these well-matched efforts. The uneasy truce that has been dignified by the name of peace since the year 1878 results ultimately from the fact that war will involve the conflict of enormous citizen armies of nearly equal strength.

So it has come to this, that in an age when the very conception of Christendom has vanished, and ideal principles have been well-nigh crushed out of life by the pressure of material needs, peace again depends on the once-derided principle of the balance of power. That it should be so is distressing to all who looked to see mankind win its way to a higher level of thought on international affairs. The level of thought in these matters could scarcely be lower than it has been since the Armenian ma.s.sacres. The collective conscience of Europe is as torpid as it was in the eighteenth century, when weak States were crushed or part.i.tioned, and armed strength came to be the only guarantee of safety.

At the close of this volume we shall glance at some of the influences which the Tantalus toil of the European nations has exerted on the life of our age. It is not for nothing that hundreds of millions of men are ever striving to provide the sinews of war, and that rulers keep those sinews in a state of tension. The result is felt in all the other organs of the body politic. Certainly the governing cla.s.ses of the Continent must be suffering from atrophy of the humorous instinct if they fail to note the practical nullity of the efforts which they and their subjects have long put forth. Perhaps some statistical satirist of the twentieth century will a.s.sess the economy of the process which requires nearly twelve millions of soldiers for the maintenance of peace in the most enlightened quarter of the globe.

NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION

In the _Echo de Paris_ of July 3, 1905, the Comte de Nion published doc.u.ments which further prove the importance of the services rendered by Great Britain to France at the time of the war scare of May 1875. They confirm the account as given in this chapter, but add a few more details. See, too, corroborative evidence in the _Times_ for July 4, 1905.