Part 16 (1/2)
On the following day this was annulled, and the Admiral was directed not to proceed beyond Besika Bay[157]. The original order was the cause of the resignation of Lord Carnarvon. The retirement of Lord Derby was also announced, but he afterwards withdrew it, probably on condition that the fleet did not enter the Sea of Marmora.
[Footnote 157: For the odd mistake in a telegram, which caused the original order, see _Sir Stafford Northcote, Earl of Iddesleigh_, by Andrew Lang, vol. ii. pp. 111-112.]
Light was thus thrown on the dissensions in the Cabinet, and the vacillations in British policy. Disraeli once said in his whimsical way that there were six parties in the Ministry. The first party wanted immediate war with Russia; the second was for war in order to save Constantinople; the third was for peace at any price; the fourth would let the Russians take Constantinople and _then_ turn them out; the fifth wanted to plant the cross on the dome of St. Sofia; ”and then there are the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who desire to see something done, but don't know exactly what[158].” The coupling of himself with the amiable Sir Stafford Northcote is a good instance of Disraelian irony. It is fairly certain that he was for war with Russia; that Lord Carnarvon const.i.tuted the third party, and Lord Derby the fourth.
[Footnote 158: _Ibid_. pp. 105-106. For the telegrams between the First Lord of the Admiralty, W.H. Smith, and Admiral Hornby, see _Life and Times of W.H. Smith_, by Sir H. Maxwell, vol. i. chap. xi.]
On the day after the resignation of Lord Carnarvon, the British Cabinet heard for the first time what were the demands of Russia. They included the formation of a Greater Bulgaria, ”within the limits of the Bulgarian nationality,” practically independent of the Sultan's direct control; the entire independence of Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro; a territorial and pecuniary indemnity to Russia for the expenses of the war; and ”an ulterior understanding for safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits.”
The extension of Bulgaria to the sh.o.r.es of the Aegean seemed at that time a mighty triumph for Russian influence; but it was the last item, vaguely foreshadowing the extension of Russian influence to the Dardanelles, that most aroused the alarm of the British Cabinet. Russian control of those straits would certainly have endangered Britain's connections with India by way of the Suez Ca.n.a.l, seeing that we then had no foothold in Egypt. Accordingly, on January 28, the Ministry proposed to Parliament the voting of an additional sum of 6,000,000 towards increasing the armaments of the country. At once there arose strong protests against this proposal, especially from the districts then suffering from the prolonged depression of trade. The outcry was very natural; but none the less it can scarcely be justified in view of the magnitude of the British interests then at stake. Granted that the views of the Czar were pacific, those of his generals at the seat of war were very much open to question[159]. The long coveted prize of Constantinople, or the Dardanelles, was likely to tempt them to disregard official orders from St. Petersburg, unless they knew that any imprudent step would bring on a European war. In any case, the vote of 6,000,000 was a precautionary measure; and it probably had the effect of giving pause to the enthusiasts at the Russian headquarters.
[Footnote 159: See the compromising revelations made by an anonymous Russian writer in the _Revue de Paris_ for July 15, 1897. The auth.o.r.ess, ”O.K.,” in her book, _The Friends and Foes of Russia_ (pp. 240-241), states that only the autocracy could have stayed the Russian advance on Constantinople. General U.S. Grant told her that if he had had such an order, he would have put it in his pocket and produced it again when in Constantinople.]
The preliminary bases of peace between Russia and Turkey were signed at Adrianople (Jan. 31) on the terms summarised above, except that the Czar's Ministers now withdrew the obnoxious clause about the Straits. A line of demarcation was also agreed on between the hostile forces; it pa.s.sed from Derkos, a lake near the Black Sea, to the north of Constantinople, in a southerly direction by the banks of the Karasou stream as far as the Sea of Marmora. This gave to the Russians the lines of Tchekmedje, the chief natural defence of Constantinople, and they occupied this position on February 6. This fact was reported by Mr.
Layard, Sir Henry Elliot's successor at Constantinople, in alarmist terms, and it had the effect of stilling the opposition at Westminster to the vote of credit. Though official a.s.surances of a rea.s.suring kind came from Prince Gortchakoff at St. Petersburg, the British Ministry on February 7 ordered a part of the Mediterranean fleet to enter the Sea of Marmora for the defence of British interests and the protection of British subjects at Constantinople. The Czar's Government thereupon declared that if the British fleet steamed up the Bosporus, Russian troops would enter Constantinople for the protection of the Christian population.
This rivalry in philanthropic zeal was not pushed to its logical issue, war. The British fleet stopped short of the Bosporus, but within sight of the Russian lines. True, these were pushed eastwards slightly beyond the limits agreed on with the Turks; but an arrangement was arrived at between Lord Derby and Prince Gortchakoff (Feb. 19) that the Russians would not occupy the lines of Bulair close to Constantinople, or the Peninsula of Gallipoli commanding the Dardanelles, provided that British forces were not landed in that important strait[160]. So matters rested, both sides regarding each other with the sullenness of impotent wrath.
As Bismarck said, a war would have been a fight between an elephant and a whale.
[Footnote 160: Hertslet, iv. p. 2670.]
The situation was further complicated by an invasion of Thessaly by the Greeks (Feb. 3); but they were withdrawn at once on the urgent remonstrance of the Powers, coupled with a promise that the claims of Greece would be favourably considered at the general peace[161].
[Footnote 161: L. Sergeant, _Greece in the Nineteenth Century_ (1897), ch. xi.]
In truth, all the racial hatreds, aspirations, and ambitions that had so long been pent up in the south-east of Europe now seemed on the point of bursting forth and overwhelming civilisation in a common ruin. Just as the earth's volcanic forces now and again threaten to tear their way through the crust, so now the immemorial feuds of Moslems and Christians, of Greeks, Servians, Bulgars, Wallachs, and Turks, promised to desolate the slopes of the Balkans, of Rhodope and the Pindus, and to spread the lava tide of war over the half of the Continent. The Russians and Bulgars, swarming over Roumelia, glutted their revenge for past defeats and ma.s.sacres by outrages well-nigh as horrible as that of Batak. At once the fierce Moslems of the Rhodope Mountains rose in self-defence or for vengeance. And while the Russian eagles perforce checked their flight within sight of Stamboul, the Greeks and Armenians of that capital--nay, the very occupants of the foreign emba.s.sies--trembled at sight of the l.u.s.t of blood that seized on the vengeful Ottomans.
Nor was this all. Far away beyond the northern horizon the war cloud hung heavily over the Carpathians. The statesmen of Vienna, fearing that the terms of their bargain with Russia were now forgotten in the intoxication of her triumph, determined to compel the victors to lay their spoils before the Great Powers. In haste the Austrian and Hungarian troops took station on the great bastion of the Carpathians, and began to exert on the military situation the pressure which had been so fatal to Russia in her Turkish campaign of 1854.
But though everything betokened war, there were forces that worked slowly but surely for a pacific settlement. However threatening was the att.i.tude of Russia, her rulers really desired peace. The war had shown once again the weakness of that Power for offence. Her strength lies in her boundless plains, in the devotion of her millions of peasants to the Czar, and in the patient, stubborn strength which is the outcome of long centuries of struggle with the yearly tyrant, winter. Her weakness lies in the selfishness, frivolity, corruption, and narrowness of outlook of her governing cla.s.s--in short, in their incapacity for organisation.
Against the steady resisting power of her peasants the great Napoleon had hurled his legions in vain. That campaign of 1812 exhibited the strength of Russia for defence. But when, in fallacious trust in that precedent, she has undertaken great wars far from her base, failure has nearly always been the result. The pathetic devotion of her peasantry has not made up for the mental and moral defects of her governing cla.s.ses. This fact had fixed itself on every competent observer in 1877.
The Emperor Alexander knew it only too well. Now, early in 1878, it was fairly certain that his army would succ.u.mb under the frontal attacks of Turks and British, and the onset of the Austrians on their rear.
Therefore when, on Feb. 4, the Hapsburg State proposed to refer the terms of peace to a Conference of the Powers at Vienna, the consent of Russia was almost certain, provided that the prestige of the Czar remained unimpaired. Three days later the place of meeting was changed to Berlin, the Conference also becoming a Congress, that is, a meeting where the chief Ministers of the Powers, not merely their Amba.s.sadors, would take part. The United Kingdom, France, and Italy at once signified their a.s.sent to this proposal. As for Bismarck, he promised in a speech to the Reichstag (Feb. 19) that he would act as an ”honest broker”
between the parties most nearly concerned. There is little doubt that Russia took this in a sense favourable to her claims, and she, too, consented.
Nevertheless, she sought to tie the hands of the Congress by binding Turkey to a preliminary treaty signed on March 3 at San Stefano, a village near to Constantinople. The terms comprised those stated above (p. 225), but they also stipulated the cession of frontier districts to Servia and Montenegro, while Russia was to acquire the Roumanian districts east of the River Pruth, Roumania receiving the Dobrudscha as an equivalent. Most serious of all was the erection of Bulgaria into an almost independent Princ.i.p.ality, extending nearly as far south as Midia (on the Black Sea), Adrianople, Salonica, and beyond Ochrida in Albania.
As will be seen by reference to the map (p. 239), this Princ.i.p.ality would then have comprised more than half of the Balkan Peninsula, besides including districts on the aegean Sea and around the town of Monastir, for which the Greeks have never ceased to cherish hopes. A Russian Commissioner was to supervise the formation of the government for two years; all the fortresses on the Danube were to be razed, and none others constructed; Turkish forces were required entirely to evacuate the Princ.i.p.ality, which was to be occupied by Russian troops for a s.p.a.ce of time not exceeding two years.
On her side, Turkey undertook to grant reforms to the Armenians, and protect them from Kurds and Circa.s.sians, Russia further claimed 1,410,000,000 roubles as war indemnity, but consented to take the Dobrudscha district (offered to Roumania, as stated above), and in Asia the territories of Batoum, Kars, Ardahan, and Bayazid, in lieu of 1,100,000,000 roubles. The Porte afterwards declared that it signed this treaty under persistent pressure from the Grand Duke Nicholas and General Ignatieff, who again and again declared that otherwise the Russians would advance on the capital[162].
[Footnote 162: For the text of the treaty see Parl. Papers, Turkey, No.
22 (1878); also _The European Concert in the Eastern Question_ by T.E.
Holland, pp. 335-348.]
At once, from all parts of the Balkan Peninsula, there arose a chorus of protests against the Treaty of San Stefano. The Mohammedans of the proposed State of Bulgaria protested against subjection to their former helots. The Greeks saw in the treaty the death-blow to their hopes of gaining the northern coasts of the Aegean and a large part of Central Macedonia. They fulminated against the Bulgarians as ignorant peasants, whose cause had been taken up recently by Russia for her own aggrandis.e.m.e.nt[163]. The Servians were equally indignant. They claimed, and with justice, that their efforts against the Turks should be rewarded by an increase of territory which would unite to them their kinsfolk in Macedonia and part of Bosnia, and place them on an equality with the upstart State of Bulgaria. Whereas the treaty a.s.signed to these proteges of Russia districts inhabited solely by Servians, thereby barring the way to any extension of that Princ.i.p.ality.
[Footnote 163: Parl. Papers, Turkey, No. 31 (1878), Nos. 6-17, and enclosures; _L'h.e.l.lenisme et la Macedonie_, by N. Kasasis (Paris, 1904); L. Sergeant, _op. cit._ ch. xii.]