Part 12 (2/2)
The Conference therefore speedily came to an end (Jan. 20). It had served its purpose. It had fooled Europe[112].
[Footnote 112: See Parl. Papers (1878), Turkey, No. 2, p. 114, for the const.i.tution; and p. 302 for Lord Salisbury's criticisms on it; also _ibid_, pp. 344-345, for Turkey's final rejection of the proposals of the Powers.]
The responsibility for this act of cynical defiance must be a.s.signed to one man. The Sultan had never before manifested a desire for any reform whatsoever; and it was not until December 19, 1876, that he named as Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha, who was known to have long been weaving const.i.tutional schemes. This Turkish Sieyes was thrust to the front in time to promulgate that fundamental reform. His tenure of power, like that of the French const.i.tution-monger in 1799, ended when the scheme had served the purpose of the real controller of events. Midhat obviously did not see whither things were tending. On January 24, 1877, he wrote to Sad Pasha, stating that, according to the Turkish amba.s.sador at London (Musurus Pasha), Lord Derby congratulated the Sublime Porte on the dissolution of the Conference, ”which he considers a success for Turkey[113].”
[Footnote 113: _Life of Midhat Pasha_, by Midhat Ali (1903), p. 142.
Musurus must have deliberately misrepresented Lord Derby.]
It therefore only remained to set the const.i.tution in motion. After six days, when no sign of action was forthcoming, Midhat wrote to the Sultan in urgent terms, reminding him that their object in promulgating the const.i.tution ”was certainly not merely to find a solution of the so-called Eastern Question, nor to seek thereby to make a demonstration that should conciliate the sympathies of Europe, which had been estranged from us.” This Note seems to have irritated the Sultan. Abdul Hamid, with his small, nervous, exacting nature, has always valued Ministers in proportion to their obedience, not to their power of giving timely advice. In every independent suggestion he sees the germ of opposition, and perhaps of a palace plot. He did so now. By way of reply, he bade Midhat come to the Palace. Midhat, fearing a trap, deferred his visit, until he received the a.s.surance that the order for the reforms had been issued. Then he obeyed the summons; at once he was apprehended, and was hurried to the Sultan's yacht, which forthwith steamed away for the Aegean (Feb. 5). The fact that he remained above its waters, and was allowed to proceed to Italy, may be taken as proof that his zeal for reform had been not without its uses in the game which the Sultan had played against the Powers. The Turkish Parliament, which a.s.sembled on March 1, acted with the subservience that might have been expected after this lesson. The Sultan dissolved it on the outbreak of war, and thereafter gave up all pretence of const.i.tutional forms. As for Midhat, he was finally lured back to Turkey and done to death. Such was the end of the Turkish const.i.tution, of the Turkish Parliament, and of their contriver[114].
[Footnote 114: _Life of Midhat Pasha_, chaps. v.-vii. For the Sultan's character and habits, see an article in the _Contemporary Review_ for December 1896, by D. Kelekian.]
Even the dissolution of the Conference of the Powers did not bring about war at once. It seems probable that the Czar hoped much from the statesmanlike conduct of Lord Salisbury at Constantinople, or perhaps he expected to secure the carrying out of the needed reforms by means of pressure from the Three Emperors' League (see Chapter XII.). But, unless the Russians gave up all interest in the fate of her kinsmen and co-religionists in Turkey, war was now the more probable outcome of events. Alexander had already applied to Germany for help, either diplomatic or military; but these overtures, of whatever kind, were declined by Bismarck--so he declared in his great speech of February 6, 1888. Accordingly, the Czar drew closer to Austria, with the result that the Reichstadt agreement of July 8, 1876, now a.s.sumed the form of a definitive treaty signed at Vienna between the two Powers on January 15, 1877.
The full truth on this subject is not known. M. elie de Cyon, who claims to have seen the doc.u.ment, states that Austria undertook to remain neutral during the Russo-Turkish War, that she stipulated for a large addition of territory if the Turks were forced to quit Europe; also that a great Bulgaria should be formed, and that Servia and Montenegro should be extended so as to become conterminous. To the present writer this account appears suspect. It is inconceivable that Austria should have a.s.sented to an expansion of these princ.i.p.alities which would bar her road southward to Salonica[115].
[Footnote 115: elie de Cyon, _Histoire de l'Entente franco-russe_, chap, i.; and in _Nouvelle Revue_ for June 1, 1887. His account bears obvious signs of malice against Germany and Austria.]
Another and more probable version was given by the Hungarian Minister, M. Tisza, during the course of debates in the Hungarian Delegations in the spring of 1887, to this effect:--(1) No Power should claim an exclusive right of protecting the Christians of Turkey, and the Great Powers should p.r.o.nounce on the results of the war; (2) Russia would annex no land on the right (south) bank of the Danube, would respect the integrity of Roumania, and refrain from touching Constantinople; (3) if Russia formed a new Slavonic State in the Balkans, it should not be at the expense of non-Slavonic peoples; and she would not claim special rights over Bulgaria, which was to be governed by a prince who was neither Russian nor Austrian; (4) Russia would not extend her military operations to the districts west of Bulgaria. These were the terms on which Austria agreed to remain neutral; and in certain cases she claimed to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina[116].
[Footnote 116: Debidour, _Hist. diplomatique de l'Europe_ (1814-1878), vol. ii. p. 502.] Doubtless these, or indeed any, concessions to Austria were repugnant to Alexander II. and Prince Gortchakoff; but her neutrality was essential to Russia's success in case war broke out; and the Czar's Government certainly acted with much skill in securing the friendly neutrality of the Power which in 1854 had exerted so paralysing a pressure on the Russian operations on the Lower Danube.
Nevertheless, Alexander II. still sought to maintain the European Concert with a view to the exerting of pacific pressure upon Turkey.
Early in March he despatched General Ignatieff on a mission to the capitals of the Great Powers; except at Westminster, that envoy found opinion favourable to the adoption of some form of coercion against Turkey, in case the Sultan still hardened his heart against good advice.
Even the Beaconsfield Ministry finally agreed to sign a Protocol, that of March 31, 1877, which recounted the efforts of the six Great Powers for the improvement of the lot of the Christians in Turkey, and expressed their approval of the promises of reform made by that State on February 13, 1876. Pa.s.sing over without notice the new Turkish Const.i.tution, the Powers declared that they would carefully watch the carrying out of the promised reforms, and that, if no improvement in the lot of the Christians should take place, ”they [the Powers] reserve to themselves to consider in common as to the means which they may deem best fitted to secure the wellbeing of the Christian populations, and the interests of the general peace[117].” This final clause contained a suggestion scarcely less threatening than that with which the Berlin Memorandum had closed; and it is difficult to see why the British Cabinet, which now signed the London Protocol, should have wrecked that earlier effort of the Powers. In this as in other matters it is clear that the Cabinet was swayed by a ”dual control.”
[Footnote 117: Parl. Papers, Turkey, No. 9 (1877), p. 2.]
But now it was all one whether the British Government signed the Protocol or not. Turkey would have none of it. Despite Lord Derby's warning that ”the Sultan would be very unwise if he would not endeavour to avail himself of the opportunity afforded him to arrange a mutual disarmament,” that potentate refused to move a hair's-breadth from his former position. On the 12th of April the Turkish amba.s.sador announced to Lord Derby the final decision of his Government: ”Turkey, as an independent State, cannot submit to be placed under any surveillance, whether collective or not. . . . No consideration can arrest the Imperial Government in their determination to protest against the Protocol of the 31st March, and to consider it, as regards Turkey, as devoid of all equity, and consequently of all binding character.” Lord Derby thereupon expressed his deep regret at this decision, and declared that he ”did not see what further steps Her Majesty's Government could take to avert a war which appeared to have become inevitable[118].”
[Footnote 118: Parl. Papers, Turkey, No. 15 (1877), pp. 354-355.]
The Russian Government took the same view of the case, and on April 7-19, 1877, stated in a despatch that, as a pacific solution of the Eastern Question was now impossible, the Czar had ordered his armies to cross the frontiers of Turkey. The official declaration of war followed on April 12-24. From the point of view of Lord Derby this seemed ”inevitable.” Nevertheless, on May 1 he put his name to an official doc.u.ment which reveals the curious dualism which then prevailed in the Beaconsfield Cabinet. This reply to the Russian despatch contained the a.s.sertion that the last answer of the Porte did not remove all hope of deference on its part to the wishes and advice of Europe, and ”that the decision of the Russian Government is not one which can have their concurrence or approval.” We shall not be far wrong in a.s.suming that, while the hand that signed this doc.u.ment was the hand of Derby, the spirit behind it was that of Beaconsfield.
In many quarters the action of Russia was stigmatised as the outcome of ambition and greed, rendered all the more odious by the cloak of philanthropy which she had hitherto worn. The time has not come when an exhaustive and decisive verdict can be given on this charge. Few movements have been free from all taint of meanness; but it is clearly unjust to rail against a great Power, because, at the end of a war which entailed frightful losses and a serious though temporary loss of prestige, it determined to exact from the enemy the only form of indemnity which was forthcoming, namely, a territorial indemnity.
Russia's final claims, as will be seen, were open to criticism at several points; but the censure just referred to is puerile. It accords, however, with most of the criticisms pa.s.sed in London ”club-land,” which were remarkable for their purblind cynicism.
No one who has studied the ma.s.s of correspondence contained in the Blue-books relating to Turkey in 1875-77 can doubt that the Emperor Alexander II. displayed marvellous patience in face of a series of brutal provocations by Moslem fanatics and the clamour of his own people for a liberating crusade. Bismarck, who did not like the Czar, stated that he did not want war, but waged it ”under stress of Panslavist influence[119].” That some of his Ministers and Generals had less lofty aims is doubtless true; but practically all authorities are now agreed that the maintenance of the European Concert would have been the best means of curbing those aims. Yet, despite the irritating conduct of the Beaconsfield Cabinet, the Emperor Alexander sought to re-unite Europe with a view to the execution of the needed reforms in Turkey. Even after the successive rebuffs of the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum by Great Britain and of the suggestions of the Powers at Constantinople by Turkey, he succeeded in restoring the semblance of accord between the Powers, and of leaving to Turkey the responsibility of finally and insolently defying their recommendations. A more complete diplomatic triumph has rarely been won. It was the reward of consistency and patience, qualities in which the Beaconsfield Cabinet was signally lacking.
[Footnote 119: _Bismarck: his Reflections and Reminiscences_, vol. ii.
p. 259 (Eng. ed.).] We may notice one other criticism: that Russia's agreement with Austria implied the pre-existence of aggressive designs.
This is by no means conclusive. That the Czar should have taken the precaution of coming to the arrangement of January 1877 with Austria does not prove that he was desirous of war. The att.i.tude of Turkey during the Conference at Constantinople left but the slightest hope of peace. To prepare for war in such a case is not a proof of a desire for war, but only of common prudence.
Certain writers in France and Germany have declared that Bismarck was the real author of the Russo-Turkish War. The dogmatism of their a.s.sertions is in signal contrast with the thinness of their evidence[120]. It rests mainly on the statement that the Three Emperors'
League (see Chapter XII.) was still in force; that Bismarck had come to some arrangement for securing gains to Austria in the south-east as a set-off to her losses in 1859 and 1866; that Austrian agents in Dalmatia had stirred up the Herzegovina revolt of 1875; and that Bismarck and Andra.s.sy did nothing to avert the war of 1877. Possibly he had a hand in these events--he had in most events of the time; and there is a suspicious pa.s.sage in his Memoirs as to the overtures made to Berlin in the autumn of 1876. The Czar's Ministers wished to know whether, in the event of a war with Austria, they would have the support of Germany. To this the Chancellor replied, that Germany could not allow the present equilibrium of the monarchical Powers to be disturbed: ”The result . . .
was that the Russian storm pa.s.sed from Eastern Galicia to the Balkans[121].” Thereafter Russia came to terms with Austria as described above.
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