Part 15 (1/2)

THE CAMPAIGN was the first of the Pacific war to which the Royal Navy made a modest contribution. Hitherto, the British Eastern Fleet had merely conducted tip-and-run raids against j.a.panese installations in the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Now four British carriers, along with two battles.h.i.+ps, five cruisers and escorts, began to operate against j.a.panese airfields on Formosa, and suffered their share of a.s.saults from kamikazes. ”Task Force 57,” as Vice-Admiral Bernard Rawlings's force was known, represented an attempt to satisfy Winston Churchill's pa.s.sionate desire for Britain to play a visible part in the defeat of j.a.pan. Its beginnings were inauspicious. Admiral King was bitterly hostile to any British presence in the Pacific, on both nationalistic and logistical grounds. It required the president's personal intervention to force the U.S. Navy to accede to the prime minister's wishes. was the first of the Pacific war to which the Royal Navy made a modest contribution. Hitherto, the British Eastern Fleet had merely conducted tip-and-run raids against j.a.panese installations in the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Now four British carriers, along with two battles.h.i.+ps, five cruisers and escorts, began to operate against j.a.panese airfields on Formosa, and suffered their share of a.s.saults from kamikazes. ”Task Force 57,” as Vice-Admiral Bernard Rawlings's force was known, represented an attempt to satisfy Winston Churchill's pa.s.sionate desire for Britain to play a visible part in the defeat of j.a.pan. Its beginnings were inauspicious. Admiral King was bitterly hostile to any British presence in the Pacific, on both nationalistic and logistical grounds. It required the president's personal intervention to force the U.S. Navy to accede to the prime minister's wishes.

Thereafter, in the first months of 1945 it proved embarra.s.singly hard to muster a British fleet for Pacific service. The Royal Navy, like its parent nation, was overstretched and war-weary. Australia's shameless dock labour unions delayed the deployment of both wars.h.i.+ps and the fleet train of supply s.h.i.+ps. When Rawlings's s.h.i.+ps finally joined Spruance, they were hampered by design unfitness for tropical conditions, which inflicted chronic hards.h.i.+p on crews. British Seafire and Firefly aircraft were too delicate for heavy labour, and British carriers embarked far fewer planes than their American counterparts. s.h.i.+ps like Ill.u.s.trious Ill.u.s.trious had been fighting since 1939, and were troubled by old wounds-in mid-April, the carrier was obliged to sail home. Rawlings's fleet struggled to keep up with its vastly more powerful allies. In an early series of air strikes, the British lost forty-one aircraft in 378 sorties, a casualty rate which would have been deemed disastrous even by Bomber Command. Sir Bruce Fraser wrote later in his dispatch: ”There can be little doubt had been fighting since 1939, and were troubled by old wounds-in mid-April, the carrier was obliged to sail home. Rawlings's fleet struggled to keep up with its vastly more powerful allies. In an early series of air strikes, the British lost forty-one aircraft in 378 sorties, a casualty rate which would have been deemed disastrous even by Bomber Command. Sir Bruce Fraser wrote later in his dispatch: ”There can be little doubt772 that the Americans are much quicker than we are at learning the lessons of war and applying them to their s.h.i.+ps and their tactics...As a result the British fleet is seldom spectacular, never really modern...” that the Americans are much quicker than we are at learning the lessons of war and applying them to their s.h.i.+ps and their tactics...As a result the British fleet is seldom spectacular, never really modern...”

A British war correspondent, David Divine, joined the battles.h.i.+p King George V King George V after weeks aboard after weeks aboard Lexington Lexington, which refuelled and resupplied at sea in winds of up to Force 6, in a fas.h.i.+on reflecting the superb professionalism of the 1945 U.S. Navy. Now, Divine watched in dismay as ”KGV went up astern went up astern of one rusty old tanker, which appeared to be manned by two Geordie mates and twenty consumptive Chinamen, and it took us, I think, an hour and a half to pick up a single buoyed pipe-line, fiddling around under our bows.” Replenishment operations at sea remained an embarra.s.sment for the British. In a placid sea, an American carrier refuelled in two hours. A British one required all day. A proud service found itself struggling to play a bit part in a vast American drama. Vice-Admiral Rawlings wrote later of the ”admiration and...it must be admitted...envy” with which he followed the sinking of of one rusty old tanker, which appeared to be manned by two Geordie mates and twenty consumptive Chinamen, and it took us, I think, an hour and a half to pick up a single buoyed pipe-line, fiddling around under our bows.” Replenishment operations at sea remained an embarra.s.sment for the British. In a placid sea, an American carrier refuelled in two hours. A British one required all day. A proud service found itself struggling to play a bit part in a vast American drama. Vice-Admiral Rawlings wrote later of the ”admiration and...it must be admitted...envy” with which he followed the sinking of Yamato Yamato. Flying mishaps inflicted an alarming rate of attrition-in their first twelve strike days, nineteen British planes were lost to flak, twenty-eight in accidents.

The Royal Navy discovered that its most significant a.s.sets in Pacific combat were its carriers' armoured flight decks. The extra weight reduced their complement of aircraft, but rendered them astonis.h.i.+ngly resistant to kamikazes, in contrast to their fir-decked American counterparts. When a Zero dived vertically onto the carrier Indefatigable Indefatigable on 1 April, its aircraft were able to resume landing within an hour. Though HMS on 1 April, its aircraft were able to resume landing within an hour. Though HMS Formidable Formidable suffered damage and fifty casualties when it was. .h.i.t on 4 May, the s.h.i.+p was soon operational again. On 9 May, suffered damage and fifty casualties when it was. .h.i.t on 4 May, the s.h.i.+p was soon operational again. On 9 May, Victorious Victorious was. .h.i.t twice and was. .h.i.t twice and Formidable Formidable a second time, by kamikazes which eluded patrolling British fighters. Here too, the Royal Navy found that inexperience cost dear. Fraser's Seafires and h.e.l.lcats shot down a steady stream of intruding j.a.panese, but lacked the ma.s.s which the Americans possessed, together with the refined fighter-direction skills. There was a further twist to British tribulations when the Canadian government announced that only those of its citizens who chose to do so need continue to serve against the j.a.panese once the war against Germany was over. Despite offers of increased pay, 605 ratings of Rawlings's Canadian-crewed cruiser a second time, by kamikazes which eluded patrolling British fighters. Here too, the Royal Navy found that inexperience cost dear. Fraser's Seafires and h.e.l.lcats shot down a steady stream of intruding j.a.panese, but lacked the ma.s.s which the Americans possessed, together with the refined fighter-direction skills. There was a further twist to British tribulations when the Canadian government announced that only those of its citizens who chose to do so need continue to serve against the j.a.panese once the war against Germany was over. Despite offers of increased pay, 605 ratings of Rawlings's Canadian-crewed cruiser Uganda Uganda insisted upon exercising their right to go home. Only with difficulty was the s.h.i.+p persuaded to stay on station until a relief arrived. insisted upon exercising their right to go home. Only with difficulty was the s.h.i.+p persuaded to stay on station until a relief arrived.

The British Pacific Fleet's difficulties mounted with every week of operations. Crew morale suffered from the heat, discomfort and overcrowding: ”Except for those engaged774 in flying operations, it was proving to be a dull war.” At the end of April, Admiral King renewed his efforts to remove the Royal Navy from operations against j.a.pan by dispatching Fraser's s.h.i.+ps to support the Australian landings on Borneo. This proposal was defeated only by direct British appeals to MacArthur and Kinkaid. At the end of May, to the acute embarra.s.sment of Fraser and the British government, battle damage, crew exhaustion and mechanical failures obliged Rawlings's squadron to withdraw to Sydney for extended repairs. When TF57 departed, it had completed just eleven air-strike days, dropping 546 tons of bombs and firing 632 rockets. It claimed 57 enemy aircraft destroyed, for the loss of 203: 32 to suicide attacks; 30 in a hangar fire; 33 to enemy flak or fighters; 61 in deck landing accidents; and 47 to ”other causes.” It was a sorry story, indeed one of the most inglorious episodes of the Royal Navy's wartime history. The misfortunes of the fleet reflected the fact that Britain, after almost six years of war, was simply too poor and too exhausted to sustain such a force alongside the United States armada. A British squadron returned to Halsey's command only in the last days of July. in flying operations, it was proving to be a dull war.” At the end of April, Admiral King renewed his efforts to remove the Royal Navy from operations against j.a.pan by dispatching Fraser's s.h.i.+ps to support the Australian landings on Borneo. This proposal was defeated only by direct British appeals to MacArthur and Kinkaid. At the end of May, to the acute embarra.s.sment of Fraser and the British government, battle damage, crew exhaustion and mechanical failures obliged Rawlings's squadron to withdraw to Sydney for extended repairs. When TF57 departed, it had completed just eleven air-strike days, dropping 546 tons of bombs and firing 632 rockets. It claimed 57 enemy aircraft destroyed, for the loss of 203: 32 to suicide attacks; 30 in a hangar fire; 33 to enemy flak or fighters; 61 in deck landing accidents; and 47 to ”other causes.” It was a sorry story, indeed one of the most inglorious episodes of the Royal Navy's wartime history. The misfortunes of the fleet reflected the fact that Britain, after almost six years of war, was simply too poor and too exhausted to sustain such a force alongside the United States armada. A British squadron returned to Halsey's command only in the last days of July.

OKINAWA was declared secure on 22 June, eighty-two days after the landings of Buckner's a.s.sault force. The U.S. Navy had lost 4,907 men killed, the army 4,675, the Marines 2,928. Another 36,613 men had been wounded ash.o.r.e, over 8,000 at sea. A further 36,000 soldiers and Marines became non-battle casualties, many of them combat-fatigue cases. Buckner was unable to celebrate the victory he had yearned for. A j.a.panese sh.e.l.l killed him, unmourned, in the last days. His j.a.panese counterpart, Gen. Misomu Us.h.i.+jima, also perished. He and his chief of staff committed ritual suicide in their headquarters cave on 22 June. Nine of his staff officers shot themselves. Dispute persists about how many Okinawan civilians died, because it is uncertain how many were evacuated before the battle began. Estimates range from 30,000 to 100,000, together with around 70,000 of the island's defenders. About 1,900 kamikazes died in their a.s.saults on the U.S. fleet off the island. A total of 7,401 j.a.panese surrendered, almost half of these local Okinawan conscripts. was declared secure on 22 June, eighty-two days after the landings of Buckner's a.s.sault force. The U.S. Navy had lost 4,907 men killed, the army 4,675, the Marines 2,928. Another 36,613 men had been wounded ash.o.r.e, over 8,000 at sea. A further 36,000 soldiers and Marines became non-battle casualties, many of them combat-fatigue cases. Buckner was unable to celebrate the victory he had yearned for. A j.a.panese sh.e.l.l killed him, unmourned, in the last days. His j.a.panese counterpart, Gen. Misomu Us.h.i.+jima, also perished. He and his chief of staff committed ritual suicide in their headquarters cave on 22 June. Nine of his staff officers shot themselves. Dispute persists about how many Okinawan civilians died, because it is uncertain how many were evacuated before the battle began. Estimates range from 30,000 to 100,000, together with around 70,000 of the island's defenders. About 1,900 kamikazes died in their a.s.saults on the U.S. fleet off the island. A total of 7,401 j.a.panese surrendered, almost half of these local Okinawan conscripts.

Some j.a.panese officers, including Kouichi Ito, retained a lifelong conviction that Us.h.i.+jima had been mistaken to allow the Americans an unopposed landing on Okinawa. Yet, given the overwhelming power of the amphibious force, it is hard to believe that any j.a.panese deployment could have prevented American a.s.sault units from getting ash.o.r.e, or indeed from conquering the island. The defenders could aspire only to what they accomplished-the extraction of a bitter price for American victory. The only tactical option which Buckner never explored, and which might have enabled his forces to prevail more quickly, was that of launching attacks in darkness. The difficulty, however, is that night operations demand exceptionally high motivation and tactical skills, to prevent those carrying them out from simply disappearing, ”going to ground,” rather than pressing home an a.s.sault. It is doubtful that Tenth Army possessed such qualities.

Photo Insert Two KAMIKAZE.

A j.a.panese pilot prepares for his final mission.

A suicide plane narrowly misses the U.S. carrier Sangamon Sangamon off Okinawa. off Okinawa.

The USS Franklin Franklin afire. afire.

ASh.o.r.e ON O OKINAWA.

Marines in one of the innumerable b.l.o.o.d.y a.s.saults.

Civilians await their fate.

A Marine helps a woman and her baby to safety-most often, such people died.

j.a.pANESE S SAMURAI, E EAGER AND O OTHERWISE.

Tos.h.i.+o Hijikata.

Yos.h.i.+hiro Minamoto.

Haruki Iki.

Renichi Sugano on a locomotive of the notorious Burma Railway.

Harunori Ohkos.h.i.+ as a teenage volunteer on his way to Iwo Jima, amid a grave but proud family group.

Kisao Ebisawa, the frustrated Okinawa suicidalist.

Tos.h.i.+haru Konada, who hoped to pilot a kaiten kaiten human torpedo against the allied invasion fleet. human torpedo against the allied invasion fleet.

Yos.h.i.+ko Has.h.i.+moto (second row, right) (second row, right) with her family, who paid a terrible price for the 9 March 1945 USAAF firebombing of Tokyo. With their parents are Chieko with her family, who paid a terrible price for the 9 March 1945 USAAF firebombing of Tokyo. With their parents are Chieko (second row, left), (second row, left), Hisae Hisae ( front row, centre) ( front row, centre) and Etsuko and Etsuko ( front row, right) ( front row, right).

Hachiro Miyas.h.i.+ta, who dispatched many suicide missions.

One of Miyas.h.i.+ta's own photographs of a sombre young pilot watching the fuelling for his plane's last flight.

USAAF B-29s release incendiaries over j.a.pan in May 1945.

USAAF B-29s formidable commander, Major-General Curtis LeMay.

CHINESE.

Bai Jingfan, her husband and other guerrillas.

Li Guilin.

Zhuan Fengxiang and her husband.

Liu Danhua.

Weng Shan, proud in his American uniform.

”Tieizi”-Li Dongguan.

Australians search enemy corpses for doc.u.ments in northern Borneo, June 1945.

Mountbatten, astride a captured j.a.panese gun, addresses British troops in Burma.

THREE OF S SLIM'S S SOLDIERS John Randle.

Brian Aldiss ( far right). ( far right).

Derek Horsford.

KEY F FIGURES IN THE F FINAL A ACT.

The Big Three at Potsdam.

Henry Stimson.

Leslie Groves and Robert Oppenheimer.

Hirohito.