Part 10 (1/2)

Neither then nor later did the Americans perceive much useful to be learned from Iwo Jima and its notorious killing grounds-Turkey k.n.o.b, the Amphitheater, Charlie-Dog Ridge, the Meat Grinder-save about man's capacity to inflict and endure suffering. The experience renewed the usual fierce criticism from the army about the Marines' allegedly sacrificial tactics. Maj.-Gen. Joseph Swing of the 11th Airborne Division, for instance, wrote an angry letter home on 8 March in response to rumours that Nimitz rather than MacArthur was to command the invasion of j.a.pan. Swing regarded the admiral as standard-bearer for Marine methods which he held in low esteem: ”It makes me sick520 when I read about the casualties on Iwo Jima. It can be done more scientifically. We laugh at the fruitless method of the j.a.p in his banzai attacks and yet allow that fanatic”-he referred to Lt.-Gen. Holland Smith of the Marines-”to barge in using up men as if they were a dime a dozen.” when I read about the casualties on Iwo Jima. It can be done more scientifically. We laugh at the fruitless method of the j.a.p in his banzai attacks and yet allow that fanatic”-he referred to Lt.-Gen. Holland Smith of the Marines-”to barge in using up men as if they were a dime a dozen.”

There were those, including Holland Smith, who persuaded themselves that a longer preliminary bombardment of Iwo Jima would have made the early days, especially, less costly. There was agreement that more heavy artillery was needed, especially eight-inch howitzers. Yet there is no reason to suppose that any alternative tactical method would have changed anything, in that close and densely fortified area. Many Marines argued that the only effective means of shortening the battle would have been to pump poison gas into the j.a.panese underground complexes. They derided the bra.s.s in Was.h.i.+ngton for being squeamish about such methods. Even Nimitz later expressed regret that gas was not used.

Though it often seemed to the Americans that the battle would never end, they prevailed at last, occupying the entire wretched island. A Marine had fallen for every j.a.panese, a most unusual balance of loss in Pacific battles. On 26 March, some 350 j.a.panese staged a final banzai charge in the north-west. Startled Americans found themselves fighting hand-to-hand with swordsmen. The a.s.sault was broken up, the j.a.panese killed. General Kuribayas.h.i.+ emerged from his headquarters bunker one night, marvelling to see that the trees and foliage which had once covered the hillside were all gone, leaving only blackened rock and scorched stumps. He sent a last signal to Horie, his staff officer on neighbouring Chichi Jima: ”It's five days since we ate or drank, but our spirits are still high, and we shall fight to the last.” Then, on 27 March, he and his staff killed themselves. The senior naval officer, Admiral Tos.h.i.+nosuke Ichimaru, walked at the head of sixty men into the path of American machine guns outside his cave-yet survived, probably to his own disappointment. Having failed to get the enemy to kill him, he shot himself soon after Kuribayas.h.i.+'s death.

In the struggle for Iwo Jima 6,821 U.S. Marines and 363 navy men died. A further 17,372 were wounded. Such a toll would have seemed negligible to the Red Army, fighting the Germans in Europe, but represented an extraordinary intensity of loss for a battle conducted over an area only a third the size of Manhattan Island. More than one in three of the Marines committed became casualties, including nineteen of the original twenty-four battalion commanders. In Maj. Albert a.r.s.enault's battalion, 760 men were killed or wounded. The 5th Division had required twenty-two transports to bring its men to the island, but was carried away in just eight. All but a few hundred of the 21,000 defenders perished.

It was six weeks before American troops addressed themselves systematically to clearing the caves in which such survivors as Harunori Ohkos.h.i.+ clung on. First, they tried teargas. Then they sent captured j.a.panese to broadcast by loudspeaker, who sometimes called on men by name to come out. One POW approached Ohkos.h.i.+'s tunnel entrance, bearing water and chocolate, only to be shot by the occupants. ”We were doing him a favour,” claimed Ohkos.h.i.+ laconically. ”His honour was lost.” On 7 May, in bright suns.h.i.+ne, men of the army's 147th Infantry poured a hideous c.o.c.ktail. They pumped 700 gallons of salt water into one of the biggest tunnel complex entrances, then added 110 gallons of gasoline and 55 of oil. The deadly flow, ignited by flamethrower, raced through the underground pa.s.sages, starting a string of ammunition fires, incinerating many j.a.panese and causing others to kill themselves amid the choking, clogging smoke. Some men embraced each other, then pulled pins on grenades held between their bodies. Ohkos.h.i.+ finished off several dying men with his pistol. Yet after three months of subterranean animal existence, he decided that he himself would rather die in the sun. The Americans had sealed the tunnel entrances, but by frenzied labour some j.a.panese clawed pa.s.sages to the surface. Ohkos.h.i.+ was the first to burst forth, like a s.h.a.ggy, blackened mole. He was at once seen and shot by an American, and fell writhing with two bullets in the leg. His surviving companions were more fortunate-or not, as the case might be-and were captured uninjured. Nursing shame and exhaustion, they were taken away into captivity. When Ohkos.h.i.+ saw his own features in a mirror on Guam, he did not recognise the skeletal ruin of a human being which he represented. A U.S. officer's report on the episode concluded dryly: ”Fifty-four were eventually taken into custody with some difficulty. Two of these subsequently committed suicide.”

Captain Kouichi Ito, an army officer521 who remained a lifelong student of j.a.pan's wartime campaigns, believed that Iwo Jima was the best-conducted defensive operation of the j.a.panese war, much more impressive militarily than the defence of Guadalca.n.a.l, or the subsequent action in which he himself partic.i.p.ated on Okinawa. Yet it would be mistaken to suppose that most j.a.panese defenders of the island found their experience, or their sacrifice, acceptable. A survivor from the 26th Tank Regiment, Lieutenant Yamasaki, wrote afterwards to the widow of his commanding officer, in a letter which reflected a sense of the futility of what he and his comrades had endured: ”In ancient times who remained a lifelong student of j.a.pan's wartime campaigns, believed that Iwo Jima was the best-conducted defensive operation of the j.a.panese war, much more impressive militarily than the defence of Guadalca.n.a.l, or the subsequent action in which he himself partic.i.p.ated on Okinawa. Yet it would be mistaken to suppose that most j.a.panese defenders of the island found their experience, or their sacrifice, acceptable. A survivor from the 26th Tank Regiment, Lieutenant Yamasaki, wrote afterwards to the widow of his commanding officer, in a letter which reflected a sense of the futility of what he and his comrades had endured: ”In ancient times522 our ancestors said: ' our ancestors said: 'Bus.h.i.+do, the way of the warrior, is to die.' This may have sounded wonderful to knights of old, but represents too easy a path. For both the living and the dead Iwo Jima was, I think, the worst of battlefields. Casual words about 'bus.h.i.+do' did not apply, for modern war does not make matters so easy. Unfeeling metal is mightier than warriors' flesh. Where, when, how, who died n.o.body knew. They just fell by the wayside.”

When Marine veterans got back to Hawaii, one group marched triumphantly down the street waving a j.a.panese skull and taunting local j.a.panese-Americans: ”There's your uncle523 on the pole!” The experience of Iwo Jima had drained some survivors of all human sensitivity. Was the island worth the American blood sacrifice? Some historians highlight a simple statistic: more American aircrew landed safely on its airstrips in damaged or fuelless B-29s than Marines died in seizing it. This calculation of profit and loss, first offered after the battle to a.s.suage public anger about the cost of taking Iwo Jima, ignores the obvious fact that, if the strips had not been there, fuel margins would have been increased, some aircraft would have reached the Marianas, some crews could have been rescued from the sea. Even if Iwo Jima had remained in j.a.panese hands, it could have contributed little further service to the homeland's air defence. The Americans made no important use of its bases for offensive operations. on the pole!” The experience of Iwo Jima had drained some survivors of all human sensitivity. Was the island worth the American blood sacrifice? Some historians highlight a simple statistic: more American aircrew landed safely on its airstrips in damaged or fuelless B-29s than Marines died in seizing it. This calculation of profit and loss, first offered after the battle to a.s.suage public anger about the cost of taking Iwo Jima, ignores the obvious fact that, if the strips had not been there, fuel margins would have been increased, some aircraft would have reached the Marianas, some crews could have been rescued from the sea. Even if Iwo Jima had remained in j.a.panese hands, it could have contributed little further service to the homeland's air defence. The Americans made no important use of its bases for offensive operations.

Yet to say this is to ignore the fact that in every campaign in every war, sacrifices are routinely made that are out of all proportion to the significance of objectives. Unless Nimitz had made an implausible decision, to forgo land engagement while the army fought for the Philippines, to await the collapse of the enemy through bombing, blockade, industrial and human starvation, the a.s.sault on Iwo Jima was almost inevitable. Whether wisely or no, the enemy valued the island, and took great pains for its defence. It would have required a strategic judgement of remarkable forbearance to resist the urge to destroy the garrison of the rock, a rare solid foothold in the midst of the ocean. If some historians judge that America's warlords erred in taking Iwo Jima, the commitment seemed natural in the context of the grand design for America's a.s.sault on the j.a.panese homeland.

ELEVEN.

Blockade: War Underwater

BY EARLY 1945, j.a.pan's ability to provide raw materials for its industries, and even to feed itself, was fatally crippled. The nation could import by sea no more than a fraction of its requirements. An invisible ring of steel extended around the waters of the home islands, created by the submarines of the U.S. Navy. In the course of 1944, a large part of j.a.pan's merchant s.h.i.+pping, and especially of its tanker fleet, was dispatched to the sea bottom by a force which gained less contemporary prominence, and indeed subsequent historical attention, than the Marines on Iwo Jima or Nimitz's carrier task groups. Yet it imposed economic strangulation on j.a.pan in a fas.h.i.+on Germany's U-boats had been unable to inflict on Britain. An April report by MacArthur's staff concluded: ”The entire question of j.a.panese 1945, j.a.pan's ability to provide raw materials for its industries, and even to feed itself, was fatally crippled. The nation could import by sea no more than a fraction of its requirements. An invisible ring of steel extended around the waters of the home islands, created by the submarines of the U.S. Navy. In the course of 1944, a large part of j.a.pan's merchant s.h.i.+pping, and especially of its tanker fleet, was dispatched to the sea bottom by a force which gained less contemporary prominence, and indeed subsequent historical attention, than the Marines on Iwo Jima or Nimitz's carrier task groups. Yet it imposed economic strangulation on j.a.pan in a fas.h.i.+on Germany's U-boats had been unable to inflict on Britain. An April report by MacArthur's staff concluded: ”The entire question of j.a.panese524 merchant s.h.i.+pping requirements may soon be academic, if losses continue at anything like the present rate. That this possibility has occurred to the j.a.panese is indicated by a Tokyo broadcast on 17 February, in which the j.a.panese forces in China and other overseas garrisons were warned that they might have to operate without help from the homeland.” Only 1.6 percent of the U.S. Navy's wartime strength-16,000 men-served in its submarines. Yet these accounted for 55 percent of all j.a.pan's wartime s.h.i.+pping losses, 1,300 vessels including a battles.h.i.+p, eight carriers and eleven cruisers, a total of 6.1 million tons. The achievement of America's submarines reached its apogee in October 1944, when they sank 322,265 tons of enemy vessels. merchant s.h.i.+pping requirements may soon be academic, if losses continue at anything like the present rate. That this possibility has occurred to the j.a.panese is indicated by a Tokyo broadcast on 17 February, in which the j.a.panese forces in China and other overseas garrisons were warned that they might have to operate without help from the homeland.” Only 1.6 percent of the U.S. Navy's wartime strength-16,000 men-served in its submarines. Yet these accounted for 55 percent of all j.a.pan's wartime s.h.i.+pping losses, 1,300 vessels including a battles.h.i.+p, eight carriers and eleven cruisers, a total of 6.1 million tons. The achievement of America's submarines reached its apogee in October 1944, when they sank 322,265 tons of enemy vessels.

For those who manned the navy's crowded, stinking underwater torpedo platforms, the exhilaration of hunting prey was matched by the terrors experienced when they themselves became the hunted. Cmdr. Richard O'Kane's experience of forty-eight hours off the Philippines in October 1944 was not untypical. His submarine, Tang Tang, on its fifth war patrol, was operating alone in the Formosa Channel. Off Turnabout Island in the early hours of the twenty-fourth, first day of the Leyte Gulf battle and fourth after MacArthur's landing, he spotted a j.a.panese reinforcement convoy: four freighters with planes on deck, a transport, a destroyer and some smaller escorts. In a few devastating minutes, O'Kane fired torpedoes which sank three freighters. The surviving freighter and destroyer closed on the surfaced submarine in an attempt to ram. Tang Tang slipped between them-and the two j.a.panese s.h.i.+ps collided. O'Kane fired four more torpedoes from his stern tubes, which missed, then cleared the area at full speed. slipped between them-and the two j.a.panese s.h.i.+ps collided. O'Kane fired four more torpedoes from his stern tubes, which missed, then cleared the area at full speed.

The next night, in the same hunting ground, he encountered the largest convoy he had ever seen, ”a solid line of pips across the screen.” An escort rashly switched on its searchlight, illuminating a transport. O'Kane sank this, together with a tanker which blew up, leaving the surviving vessels milling in chaos. Two hours after midnight, however, Tang Tang's luck changed drastically. One of its torpedoes fired at a transport ran amok, circled, and by fantastic ill-luck struck the surfaced submarine abreast of the aft torpedo room. Following the explosion, O'Kane himself and two sailors with him in the conning tower were thrown alive into the water, and retrieved by the j.a.panese. Tang Tang, mortally damaged, plunged 180 feet to the sea bottom. The men in the hull somehow succeeded in closing the conning-tower hatch. Some thirty surviving officers and men reached the temporary safety of the forward torpedo room, where choking smoke from burning doc.u.ments soon rendered half of them unconscious.

For the next four hours, j.a.panese escorts depth-charged ineffectually. At 0600, some men began to escape using Momsen Lung breathing apparatus, of whom eight reached the surface. Five were still clinging to a buoy when a j.a.panese s.h.i.+p picked them up four hours later. The surviving Americans were trussed and laid on deck, then kicked and clubbed by burnt and injured enemy sailors who had suffered grievously from their torpedoes. Statistics may help to explain such behaviour: in the course of the war 116,000 of 122,000 seamen serving j.a.pan's pre-war merchant fleet were killed or wounded, most by American submarines. Yos.h.i.+o Otsu, a survivor of a stricken merchantman, was enraged to find himself under fire from American planes: ”Seeing no one on board525, they strafed those in the water. The swine! Not satisfied with sinking the s.h.i.+p, they must kill those swimming in the sea! Was this being done by human beings? We were utterly helpless.” Seven officers and seventy-one men were lost with Tang Tang, which had accounted for 22,000 tons of j.a.panese s.h.i.+pping.

EVERY NATION'S soldiers instinctively believe that wars are won by engaging the armies of the enemy and seizing terrain. Yet the most critical single contribution to the American defeat of j.a.pan was made far out of sight of any general, or indeed admiral. The j.a.panese empire was uniquely vulnerable to blockade. Its economy was dependent upon fuel and raw materials s.h.i.+pped from China, Malaya, Burma and the Netherlands East Indies. Yet, unlike the British, who faced a similar threat to their Atlantic lifeline, the j.a.panese failed to equip themselves with a credible anti-submarine force to defend their commerce. Here was one of the major causes of j.a.pan's downfall. The admirals of the Imperial Navy fixed their minds almost exclusively upon power projection by surface and air forces. Vice-Admiral Inoue s.h.i.+geyos.h.i.+ was one of the few pre-war j.a.panese naval officers who urged dismissing the concept of ”decisive battle” between surface wars.h.i.+ps. Instead, he proposed planning for a submarine war against commerce, together with a long amphibious and air campaign in the central Pacific. His views were thrust aside. With extraordinary myopia, the j.a.panese failed to address the obvious likelihood that their enemies might also project naval power through a submarine offensive. j.a.pan possessed only a tiny force of anti-submarine escorts, whose technology and tactics remained primitive. soldiers instinctively believe that wars are won by engaging the armies of the enemy and seizing terrain. Yet the most critical single contribution to the American defeat of j.a.pan was made far out of sight of any general, or indeed admiral. The j.a.panese empire was uniquely vulnerable to blockade. Its economy was dependent upon fuel and raw materials s.h.i.+pped from China, Malaya, Burma and the Netherlands East Indies. Yet, unlike the British, who faced a similar threat to their Atlantic lifeline, the j.a.panese failed to equip themselves with a credible anti-submarine force to defend their commerce. Here was one of the major causes of j.a.pan's downfall. The admirals of the Imperial Navy fixed their minds almost exclusively upon power projection by surface and air forces. Vice-Admiral Inoue s.h.i.+geyos.h.i.+ was one of the few pre-war j.a.panese naval officers who urged dismissing the concept of ”decisive battle” between surface wars.h.i.+ps. Instead, he proposed planning for a submarine war against commerce, together with a long amphibious and air campaign in the central Pacific. His views were thrust aside. With extraordinary myopia, the j.a.panese failed to address the obvious likelihood that their enemies might also project naval power through a submarine offensive. j.a.pan possessed only a tiny force of anti-submarine escorts, whose technology and tactics remained primitive.

At the outbreak of war, the United States possessed the finest submarines in the world, the 1,500-ton Tambor Tambor cla.s.s, later refined as the cla.s.s, later refined as the Gato Gato and and Balao Balao cla.s.ses. These had air-conditioning-a priceless virtue in the tropics-a top speed close to twenty-one knots, a range of 10,000 miles, and the ability to crash-dive in thirty-five seconds. Yet for almost two torrid years their effectiveness was crippled: first, by chronic torpedo technical failure; second, by over-cautious commanders-30 percent were removed by the end of 1942; and third, by a doctrinal preoccupation with sinking enemy wars.h.i.+ps which almost matched that of the j.a.panese. Ronald Spector has remarked cla.s.ses. These had air-conditioning-a priceless virtue in the tropics-a top speed close to twenty-one knots, a range of 10,000 miles, and the ability to crash-dive in thirty-five seconds. Yet for almost two torrid years their effectiveness was crippled: first, by chronic torpedo technical failure; second, by over-cautious commanders-30 percent were removed by the end of 1942; and third, by a doctrinal preoccupation with sinking enemy wars.h.i.+ps which almost matched that of the j.a.panese. Ronald Spector has remarked526 on the irony that the U.S., which joined World War I in large measure out of revulsion towards Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, entered World War II committed to wage such a campaign. Yet while the U.S. Navy had no moral scruple about sinking unarmed merchant s.h.i.+ps, until relatively late in the war it regarded these as a lesser target priority than the j.a.panese fleet. on the irony that the U.S., which joined World War I in large measure out of revulsion towards Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, entered World War II committed to wage such a campaign. Yet while the U.S. Navy had no moral scruple about sinking unarmed merchant s.h.i.+ps, until relatively late in the war it regarded these as a lesser target priority than the j.a.panese fleet.

In February 1944, the U.S. Navy's submarine operational textbook Current Doctrine Current Doctrine was extensively rewritten. The new manual devoted much more attention than earlier editions to the blockade of commerce. Yet a remarkable number of its pages still concerned procedures for submarines operating in support of surface wars.h.i.+ps, in a fleet action. The cult of the ”decisive battle” exercised a febrile influence on American as well as j.a.panese naval imaginations. ”It is the opinion of most submarine officers that any combatant s.h.i.+p is worth a full nest torpedo salvo,” declared Chapter 2 of the 1944 was extensively rewritten. The new manual devoted much more attention than earlier editions to the blockade of commerce. Yet a remarkable number of its pages still concerned procedures for submarines operating in support of surface wars.h.i.+ps, in a fleet action. The cult of the ”decisive battle” exercised a febrile influence on American as well as j.a.panese naval imaginations. ”It is the opinion of most submarine officers that any combatant s.h.i.+p is worth a full nest torpedo salvo,” declared Chapter 2 of the 1944 Doctrine Doctrine-implying that a merchant s.h.i.+p might not be. To the end of the war, submarine captains' accounts of their successes dwelt most proudly upon sinkings of wars.h.i.+ps, rather than cargo vessels. Only in 1944, after more than two years of American involvement in the war, were submarine captains explicitly directed to target enemy tankers.

Even at this relatively late stage, Doctrine Doctrine included oddly anachronistic pa.s.sages: ”In battle, submarines may, through threat or actual attack, serve as the anvil against which own battle line may attack enemy battle line.” Here was an injunction which sounds more relevant to Nelson's navy than Nimitz's. included oddly anachronistic pa.s.sages: ”In battle, submarines may, through threat or actual attack, serve as the anvil against which own battle line may attack enemy battle line.” Here was an injunction which sounds more relevant to Nelson's navy than Nimitz's. Doctrine Doctrine's foreword a.s.serted grudgingly: ”During probable long periods before fleet action occurs, submarines may usefully be employed in the following tasks: (a) Patrol (including commerce destruction) (b) Scouting (c) Screening,” and so on. Yet, while America's carrier-led surface forces turned the tide of the Pacific war at Midway and the Coral Sea, then progressively destroyed the j.a.panese fleet, it was the undersea flotillas which struck at the heart of j.a.pan's war-making capacity. If the U.S. Navy had addressed itself earlier in the war to systematic blockade, j.a.pan's collapse might have been significantly accelerated. As it was, only in 1944 did America's commerce campaign begin in earnest, after torpedo shortcomings had been belatedly addressed, and deployments were better directed.

This became the submarines' year of triumph. In 520 war patrols, 6,092 torpedoes were fired. The j.a.panese merchant fleet lost 212,907 tons of s.h.i.+pping in July; 245,348 in August; 181,363 in September. Sinkings declined to 103,836 tons in December, only because the enemy began to run out of s.h.i.+ps to attack. In 1944 as a whole, American submarines dispatched over 600 j.a.panese s.h.i.+ps, totalling 2.7 million tons-more than the combined totals for 1942 and 1943. j.a.pan's bulk imports fell by 40 percent. A hundred American submarines operated out of Pearl Harbor and advanced bases at Eniwetok, Majuro and Guam, a further forty from Australia. Pearl's boats worked patrol zones around j.a.pan and the Philippines with such nicknames as ”Hit Parade,” ”Marus' Morgue” and ”Convoy College.” Fremantle-and Brisbane-based boats operated in the South China Sea and off the Netherlands East Indies.

Submariners complained that the navy library at Pearl would never lend its best movies to their boats, because these were either kept out for the sixty-day duration of a patrol, or never returned at all. In the course of the war, Germany lost 781 submarines, j.a.pan 128. By contrast, the j.a.panese navy sank only 41 American submarines, 18 percent of those which saw combat duty. Six more were lost accidentally on Pacific patrols. Even these relatively modest casualties meant that 22 percent of all American sailors who experienced submarine operations perished-375 officers and 3,131 enlisted men-the highest loss rate of any branch of the wartime U.S. armed forces. Yet there was never a shortage of volunteers for the submarine service, with its extraordinary pride and buccaneering spirit. It was not merely extra money-a 50 percent increase on base pay, matching the premium paid to aviators-which kept crews coming. It was their just conviction that they were an elite. It is a tribute to the quality of personnel that, by August 1945, almost half of all surviving enlisted men from the December 1941 U.S. submarine service had been commissioned.

The long pa.s.sage from home base to a patrol area, cruising on the surface at fifteen knots, was seldom hazardous, and gave crews a chance to shake down. A quarter of the eighty-odd sailors in a boat on each mission were newcomers, replacing experienced hands sent on leave, transferred to training duties or a.s.signed to new commissions. Freshmen had to master the delicate art of using submarine toilets inside a pressure hull: ”It was hard to flush527 below a hundred feet and keep a clean face,” wrote one. Even submariners sometimes got seasick, as did aviators whom they rescued. Overcrowding was worst in the early days of a patrol, because every square inch of s.p.a.ce, including sleeping s.p.a.ces and shower stalls, was crammed with supplies. Submarine food was famously the best in the navy, and some boats carried a baker as well as a cook. Crews needed every small indulgence that could be provided, to compensate for the discomforts of two months aboard a giant sealed cigar tube packed with machinery, fuel and explosives, dominated by the stench of the ”three Fs”-Feet, Farts and Fannies. ”We were essentially a steel bubble below a hundred feet and keep a clean face,” wrote one. Even submariners sometimes got seasick, as did aviators whom they rescued. Overcrowding was worst in the early days of a patrol, because every square inch of s.p.a.ce, including sleeping s.p.a.ces and shower stalls, was crammed with supplies. Submarine food was famously the best in the navy, and some boats carried a baker as well as a cook. Crews needed every small indulgence that could be provided, to compensate for the discomforts of two months aboard a giant sealed cigar tube packed with machinery, fuel and explosives, dominated by the stench of the ”three Fs”-Feet, Farts and Fannies. ”We were essentially a steel bubble528, with only one small hole left for the furiously probing fingers of the sea-the conning tower hatch,” in the words of a submarine officer.

Once they reached their appointed operational areas, boats awaited either radio intelligence of an enemy s.h.i.+pping movement, or a chance visual sighting. American submarines in the Pacific not only spent almost every night on the surface, but could also take risks in daylight. The j.a.panese never matched the Allies' formidable radar-equipped anti-submarine air forces. ”We had almost disdain for the threat529 which aircraft posed for submarines,” wrote an American captain. ”This was more a mark of j.a.pan's inferiority in anti-submarine warfare, of her poor airborne electronics, than a tribute to our boldness.” which aircraft posed for submarines,” wrote an American captain. ”This was more a mark of j.a.pan's inferiority in anti-submarine warfare, of her poor airborne electronics, than a tribute to our boldness.”

j.a.panese pilot Masas.h.i.+ko Ando agreed. He flew anti-submarine patrols out of Cam Ranh Bay, Indochina. Only once in all their years of patrolling did his crew sight an American submarine. Flying at 6,000 feet off the coast of Indonesia one day in May 1945, they glimpsed a wake far below. As they descended, with intense excitement they identified a submarine proceeding heedless on the surface. They fell steeply from the sky behind it, closing fast until the conning-tower lookouts spotted them, leapt for the hatches, and began a crash dive. At 600 feet, Ando released his depth charge. Triumphantly, he and his crew watched a great spout of water ascend from the explosion point, close to where the submarine had disappeared. They flew home to report that they had achieved a sinking. Only after the war did they learn that the American vessel had suffered merely superficial damage. This was a characteristic experience for j.a.panese anti-submarine patrols.

On the boats, hour after hour, often day after day, lookouts scanned empty horizons, while in the hull the crew went about their domestic routines. Watchkeepers at the hydroplanes maintained trim, technicians performed maintenance, off-duty men played chess or cribbage, or more often slept. Even when there was no enemy in sight, conning a submarine was a relentlessly demanding activity, especially in shallow waters. Diving officers and planesmen ended their watches exhausted by the strain of maintaining the boat's delicate balance in swells or stiff currents. In the engine and battery compartments, amazing feats of improvisation were performed by electricians and engineers. When Pampanito Pampanito sprung a ”squeaking leak” in her forward trim tank, two men made a hazardous entry into the tank. A third, an amateur diver, finally repaired the leak underwater using a face mask. Without such ingenuity, on a sixty-day patrol glitches and breakdowns were liable to render a boat toothless, or even doomed. sprung a ”squeaking leak” in her forward trim tank, two men made a hazardous entry into the tank. A third, an amateur diver, finally repaired the leak underwater using a face mask. Without such ingenuity, on a sixty-day patrol glitches and breakdowns were liable to render a boat toothless, or even doomed.

Informality was the rule in all things save operational disciplines. Men manned their stations in shorts, affected beards if they chose. They ate when they could, or when they felt like it: submarines operated an ”open icebox” policy. There was a little authorised drinking. Each boat was issued six bottles of medicinal alcohol, which one unpopular captain reserved for himself. Some crewmen smuggled liquor aboard, or made their own. Pampanito Pampanito suffered an engine-room fire when a raisin-jack still overturned. Most radio operators monitored the daily news transmitted in Morse by RCA, and compiled a s.h.i.+p's newspaper. Some captains imposed their own whimsical disciplines: for instance, Sam Dealey suffered an engine-room fire when a raisin-jack still overturned. Most radio operators monitored the daily news transmitted in Morse by RCA, and compiled a s.h.i.+p's newspaper. Some captains imposed their own whimsical disciplines: for instance, Sam Dealey530 of of Harder Harder prohibited pin-ups, and would allow no ”dirty talk” among his crew. prohibited pin-ups, and would allow no ”dirty talk” among his crew.

After hours or days of monotony and discomfort, routine would suddenly be interrupted by the heart-stopping moan of the klaxon, ”Aa-oogah, aa-oo-gah,” and the broadcast order: ”Clear the bridge! Dive! Dive!” War is full of exclamation marks, and submariners experienced more of them than most. A sudden descent might be prompted by a sighting of an enemy aircraft, or a glimpse of funnel smoke. Since a submarine could move more swiftly than most convoys, it was normal procedure to shadow enemy merchant vessels until they could be engaged in darkness. Once night fell, it was often possible to attack on the surface, the preferred option. A submarine manoeuvred to achieve a position ahead of the target, which was tracked on the control-room TDC-Torpedo Data Computer, an early a.n.a.logue computer resembling a vertical pinball machine.