Part 4 (1/2)

Thereafter, Riley introduced rules. He ordered the vacant admiral's cabin217 to be converted into an aircrew club, complete with to be converted into an aircrew club, complete with Esquire Esquire pin-ups and c.o.c.ktail tables. Inside, any aviator was eligible for two drinks a night, provided he was not scheduled to fly. Cmdr. Bill Widhelm, operations officer of Task Force 58, complained bitterly about discrimination between officers and men in the allocation of alcohol: ”There are men out there pin-ups and c.o.c.ktail tables. Inside, any aviator was eligible for two drinks a night, provided he was not scheduled to fly. Cmdr. Bill Widhelm, operations officer of Task Force 58, complained bitterly about discrimination between officers and men in the allocation of alcohol: ”There are men out there218 on those s.h.i.+ps that haven't had a foot on sh.o.r.e for a year. I don't see why we can't do like the British, give those enlisted men a grog. Pilots get it. I had it. But those enlisted men never get it.” on those s.h.i.+ps that haven't had a foot on sh.o.r.e for a year. I don't see why we can't do like the British, give those enlisted men a grog. Pilots get it. I had it. But those enlisted men never get it.”

Cmdr. Jim Lamade of Hanc.o.c.k Hanc.o.c.k sought discretion to fine aviators for misdemeanours, because traditional navy punishments held no meaning for them: ”These young pilots...are not naval officers as we know a naval officer. They're just flying because it's their job...Discipline...means nothing to them. If you say, 'We'll ground this pilot,' well...they don't want to go to combat anyhow, so they'd just as soon be grounded...they will lay around the bunk room all day and read...But if you take some money away from them, they will feel that.” sought discretion to fine aviators for misdemeanours, because traditional navy punishments held no meaning for them: ”These young pilots...are not naval officers as we know a naval officer. They're just flying because it's their job...Discipline...means nothing to them. If you say, 'We'll ground this pilot,' well...they don't want to go to combat anyhow, so they'd just as soon be grounded...they will lay around the bunk room all day and read...But if you take some money away from them, they will feel that.”

Likewise Cmdr. Jim Mini of Ess.e.x Ess.e.x: ”The boys in a squadron219 these days don't have the navy as a career. There's a problem of leaders.h.i.+p; you have to have the boys like you. You can't lean on being a commander and saying, 'You'll do this or else.' You have to present it to the boys in an attractive fas.h.i.+on...I can safely say that if [the tour] had been much longer, we would have had trouble, and the boys would have broken down more than they did.” A high proportion of aviators caused disciplinary problems, declared a navy report: ”The very exacting nature these days don't have the navy as a career. There's a problem of leaders.h.i.+p; you have to have the boys like you. You can't lean on being a commander and saying, 'You'll do this or else.' You have to present it to the boys in an attractive fas.h.i.+on...I can safely say that if [the tour] had been much longer, we would have had trouble, and the boys would have broken down more than they did.” A high proportion of aviators caused disciplinary problems, declared a navy report: ”The very exacting nature220 of flight duties has combined with the youth and frequent irresponsibility of flying officers to create difficulties which a special board was created to police.” Fliers' letters home displayed carelessness about security; they broke the rules by keeping diaries; and ”drink is often an issue.” of flight duties has combined with the youth and frequent irresponsibility of flying officers to create difficulties which a special board was created to police.” Fliers' letters home displayed carelessness about security; they broke the rules by keeping diaries; and ”drink is often an issue.”

Flying combat planes from carriers was one of the most thrilling, yet also most stressful, a.s.signments of the war. Ted Winters remarked of some of their long, long sorties: ”It isn't a question of how much gasoline, it's how long you can keep your f.a.n.n.y on that seat.” It was an inherently hazardous activity to operate a plane from a cramped and perpetually s.h.i.+fting ocean platform, even before the enemy became involved. ”We learned to listen221 for the slightest change in the sound of the engine which might reveal a loss of power,” wrote a pilot. ”We always welcomed a moderate wind which increased the air flow over the flightdeck. Five to ten knots made the difference between a comfortable take-off and 'sweating it out.'” for the slightest change in the sound of the engine which might reveal a loss of power,” wrote a pilot. ”We always welcomed a moderate wind which increased the air flow over the flightdeck. Five to ten knots made the difference between a comfortable take-off and 'sweating it out.'”

Beyond combat casualties, the log of a Marine Corsair squadron on Ess.e.x Ess.e.x showed that during a typical fortnight, one plane ”splashed” taking off on each of two successive days; on the second of these, another plane crashed on landing. Three days later, one Corsair was lost at sea. Thereafter, three more went into the sea at two-day intervals. Hard deck landings damaged airframes. Sherwin Goodman, an Avenger gunner showed that during a typical fortnight, one plane ”splashed” taking off on each of two successive days; on the second of these, another plane crashed on landing. Three days later, one Corsair was lost at sea. Thereafter, three more went into the sea at two-day intervals. Hard deck landings damaged airframes. Sherwin Goodman, an Avenger gunner222, suffered a typical mishap one morning when the flight deck hydraulic catapult failed in mid-launch. His plane slumped into the sea. Seconds later, the huge s.h.i.+p pa.s.sed close enough to strike the sinking Avenger a glancing blow. A destroyer retrieved the crew intact, however, collecting the usual six gallons of ice-cream ransom for returning them to their carrier, and to operations.

”Oh I'd rather be a bellhop than a flyer on a flattop,” the pilots sang, ”with my hand around a bottle not around the G.o.dd.a.m.n throttle.” Unpredicted violent weather could write off whole squadrons of aircraft, because it made navigation problematic. Error meant a descent into the sea when gas ran out. As on sh.o.r.e, almost every aviator wanted to be a ”fighter jock,” with the thrill of engaging enemy aircraft in the war's best carrier fighter, the Grumman h.e.l.lcat. It is intoxicating to go into battle knowing that your own side possesses much better trained, and thus more proficient, pilots than the enemy. By late 1944, the average j.a.panese flier had just forty flying hours' experience before entering combat. His American counterpart had at least 525 hours, and it showed. In the last phase of the war, U.S. carrier fighters were inflicting amazingly disproportionate losses on their failing foes. Commander Winters: ”Most of our kills were223 from the rear end. [The j.a.panese] are scared to death of the Grummans. Only when they outnumber you terrifically will they even stay near you. They will make pa.s.ses, but stay far away and scram when you turn on them.” Such cautious enemy behaviour seemed a long march from the kamikaze spirit, of which so much would be heard in 1945. from the rear end. [The j.a.panese] are scared to death of the Grummans. Only when they outnumber you terrifically will they even stay near you. They will make pa.s.ses, but stay far away and scram when you turn on them.” Such cautious enemy behaviour seemed a long march from the kamikaze spirit, of which so much would be heard in 1945.

Flying became more hazardous, however, when planes were committed to ground strafing or s.h.i.+p attacks. Low-level dive-bomber and torpedo-carrier missions remained gruelling to the end. Lamade of Hanc.o.c.k Hanc.o.c.k was shocked by the intensity of the j.a.panese barrage as he and his men dive-bombed targets around Hong Kong. With unusual sophistication, enemy anti-aircraft gunners followed the American planes down almost to ground level, from 15,000 feet to 8,000, then 3,000. ”From pull-out, I looked back was shocked by the intensity of the j.a.panese barrage as he and his men dive-bombed targets around Hong Kong. With unusual sophistication, enemy anti-aircraft gunners followed the American planes down almost to ground level, from 15,000 feet to 8,000, then 3,000. ”From pull-out, I looked back224 and saw five planes of my group going down in flames. We're going to have to figure out some way to combat that AA,” Lamade told navy debriefers. ”After that attack, Admiral McCain said he was very sorry we had lost so many pilots. I told him we...can't go on fighting j.a.ps continually without suffering some losses.” and saw five planes of my group going down in flames. We're going to have to figure out some way to combat that AA,” Lamade told navy debriefers. ”After that attack, Admiral McCain said he was very sorry we had lost so many pilots. I told him we...can't go on fighting j.a.ps continually without suffering some losses.”

To beat flak, pilots learned to dive faster and more steeply than they had ever trained for. c.o.c.kpit gla.s.s fogged with the dramatic change of atmosphere as they pulled out of a descent and soared upwards after releasing bombs. As ever in combat, the men who survived were those who were determined but careful: ”We had four or five pilots who were over-eager,” Fred Bakutis of Enterprise Enterprise told debriefers. ”They were excellent boys, very energetic and hard to hold down. It is these people who generally don't come back, because they are so anxious to do damage to the j.a.ps that they take risks beyond reason.” Yet there were also shy pilots, content to release their bombs and swing away towards safety with a carelessness of aim that exasperated their commanders. And because these were very young, sometimes wild young men, they were sometimes reckless in the use of their lethal weapons. Senior officers were irked by the frequency with which American planes misidentified as j.a.panese were shot down by ”friendly fire” from combat air patrols. A pair of bored pilots unable to identify an enemy target might work off their frustration on a Filipino fis.h.i.+ng boat or lumbering cart ash.o.r.e. told debriefers. ”They were excellent boys, very energetic and hard to hold down. It is these people who generally don't come back, because they are so anxious to do damage to the j.a.ps that they take risks beyond reason.” Yet there were also shy pilots, content to release their bombs and swing away towards safety with a carelessness of aim that exasperated their commanders. And because these were very young, sometimes wild young men, they were sometimes reckless in the use of their lethal weapons. Senior officers were irked by the frequency with which American planes misidentified as j.a.panese were shot down by ”friendly fire” from combat air patrols. A pair of bored pilots unable to identify an enemy target might work off their frustration on a Filipino fis.h.i.+ng boat or lumbering cart ash.o.r.e.

The job n.o.body wanted was night operations. Take-offs and landings in darkness were more hazardous, the monotony of patrols usually unrelieved by action. If a pilot made a poor deck approach in daylight, he was ”waved off” to try again, but in darkness he had to land and take the consequences, rather than hazard the s.h.i.+p by having it switch its landing lights on again. ”What the boys want to do225,” said a night-fighter squadron commander, Turner Caldwell of Independence Independence, ”is to get into a day fighter squadron or a day torpedo squadron and get to be aces and sink j.a.p carriers and that sort of thing. And so we have to give them inducements of various kinds because they are kids and they don't understand enough about the military life to know that this stuff has to be done. All they know is that they don't want to do it.”

While the carrier crews might remain at sea for years on end, the men of the air groups knew that they were only pa.s.sing visitors. If injury or death spared them, they were rotated ash.o.r.e after six months' duty. After two combat tours, a.s.serted a navy report, pilots ”lose their daring226...feel they have done their parts and other pilots who have not fought should take over the burden.” One pool of replacement pilots was held ash.o.r.e on Guam. A second group waited on fleet supply s.h.i.+ps, condemned to weeks of crucifying boredom before being abruptly informed one morning that their turn had come, and transs.h.i.+pped by breeches buoy to join an air group. Some replacements idled at sea for months before reaching a carrier. ”Upon arrival,” complained a squadron CO, ”they were practically worthless, because they had forgotten everything they had been taught.” It was tough for a man to be pitchforked among strangers, beside whom within hours he was expected to fly and die. ”All of a sudden,” said Jim Lamade of Hanc.o.c.k Hanc.o.c.k, ”they're expected to go ahead and hit the ball right smack on with a combat fighting squadron...those boys get discouraged and you can't blame them.” Some such men reported sick. Flight surgeons felt obliged to be harsh. ”Combat fatigue is a word we use227 continuously,” said Lamade, ”and n.o.body knows what it means. It covers a mult.i.tude of sins. I think it ought to be thrown out of our language.” continuously,” said Lamade, ”and n.o.body knows what it means. It covers a mult.i.tude of sins. I think it ought to be thrown out of our language.”

Squadron commanders found that the strain of leading their men in combat left them little patience or energy for routine duties back on the s.h.i.+p. They complained about bureaucracy and paperwork. A CO was exasperated to find that after some of his men hit the airfield of neutral Portuguese Macao by mistake, a court of inquiry was convened. Planes, by contrast, were casually expendable. Salt corroded paintwork, yet the remedy was always in short supply, because n.o.body cared to store large quant.i.ties of notoriously flammable paint aboard a carrier. If an airframe was badly damaged, or a plane completed eight months' service, it was most often tipped overboard. With American factories producing new aircraft by the thousand, a worn one seemed worth little.

There were accidents, always accidents. When tired young men were pus.h.i.+ng themselves and their equipment to the limits, mistakes were inevitable. The guns of aircraft parked on flight decks were triggered, injuring neighbouring planes and people. Badly battle-damaged planes were discouraged from landing on their carriers, to avoid messing up flight decks. Ditching in the sea was an almost routine occupational hazard. Destroyers shadowed carriers during flight operations, to retrieve waterlogged fliers. As long as pilots were lucky, and ensured that their c.o.c.kpit hoods were locked open to avoid plunging to the bottom with their planes, they could expect to survive an ocean landing. Ninety-nine men in Jim Lamade's air group endured the experience, most with an insouciance conceivable only at such a time and place.

Fred Bakutis of Enterprise Enterprise spent a week on a raft in the Sulu Sea after coming down in the Surigao Strait. Comrades dropped him a two-man life raft. ”That plus my own one-man raft made my seven-day tour of duty out there pretty pleasant,” he told his debriefers with studied nonchalance. ”The weather was pretty good spent a week on a raft in the Sulu Sea after coming down in the Surigao Strait. Comrades dropped him a two-man life raft. ”That plus my own one-man raft made my seven-day tour of duty out there pretty pleasant,” he told his debriefers with studied nonchalance. ”The weather was pretty good228 except at night when it rained pretty hard. I had lots of water, using my one-man raft as a water wagon. My food consisted of minnows, seaweed, candy rations. My main problem in the raft was to stay comfortable. The hands became very sore-and also my rear end.” On Bakutis's seventh night adrift, he was wakened from a doze by the sound of diesels, and for a few heart-stopping moments feared that a j.a.panese vessel was approaching. Instead, however, to his infinite relief an American submarine loomed out of the darkness. except at night when it rained pretty hard. I had lots of water, using my one-man raft as a water wagon. My food consisted of minnows, seaweed, candy rations. My main problem in the raft was to stay comfortable. The hands became very sore-and also my rear end.” On Bakutis's seventh night adrift, he was wakened from a doze by the sound of diesels, and for a few heart-stopping moments feared that a j.a.panese vessel was approaching. Instead, however, to his infinite relief an American submarine loomed out of the darkness.

The submarine rescue service, often operating close insh.o.r.e amid treacherous shoals or under j.a.panese fire, received the grat.i.tude of every American flier. Together with ”dumbo” amphibians and patrolling destroyers, the submarines achieved miracles in saving hundreds of precious aircrew from sea, sharks and the enemy. Cmdr. Ernie Snowden of Lexington Lexington's Air Group 16 paid warm tribute to the submariners: ”If they had wheels I think they would climb right up over the beach and pick us up. We have nothing but praise for them.” On 10 October 1944, for instance, twenty-one aircraft were shot down attacking the Ryukyu Islands. Yet only eleven pilots and crewmen were lost, the remainder being rescued, six of them off Okinawa by a single submarine, Sterlet Sterlet. When Lt. Robert Nelson crashed229 in Kagos.h.i.+ma Bay off Kyushu, his dinghy began to drift insh.o.r.e. A tiny cruiser-based Kingfisher seaplane landed alongside him, and Nelson clung to its float while it taxied several miles across the water to rendezvous with a submarine-adding a torpedo-bomber crew to its burden on the way. in Kagos.h.i.+ma Bay off Kyushu, his dinghy began to drift insh.o.r.e. A tiny cruiser-based Kingfisher seaplane landed alongside him, and Nelson clung to its float while it taxied several miles across the water to rendezvous with a submarine-adding a torpedo-bomber crew to its burden on the way.

During an air battle off Iwo Jima, j.a.panese Zero pilot Kunio Iwas.h.i.+ta was astonished when the surface of the sea was suddenly broken by a long black shape, as an American submarine surfaced to pick up a ditched pilot. An American flying boat, apparently bent on the same mission, was shot down by j.a.panese fighters. Iwas.h.i.+ta said: ”We were amazed to see the Americans230 taking so much trouble about their people. n.o.body provided that sort of service for us.” An extreme example of ”force protection” was displayed on 16 September 1944, when Ensign Harold Thompson ditched three hundred yards off Waisile, while strafing j.a.panese barges in his h.e.l.lcat. A Catalina dropped a life raft which Thompson boarded, only to find himself drifting relentlessly towards a pier. Two other h.e.l.lcats were shot down trying to protect him by strafing the sh.o.r.eline-one pilot was killed, the second rescued by a ”dumbo.” Thompson moored his raft to a chain of j.a.panese barges, and two American PT-boats raced in to rescue him. Their first attempt was frustrated by coastal gunfire, but after Avengers dropped smoke floats to mask their approach, a boat s.n.a.t.c.hed Thompson just as the j.a.panese closed in on him. More than fifty aircraft were involved in the rescue, ”which sure was a wonderful show taking so much trouble about their people. n.o.body provided that sort of service for us.” An extreme example of ”force protection” was displayed on 16 September 1944, when Ensign Harold Thompson ditched three hundred yards off Waisile, while strafing j.a.panese barges in his h.e.l.lcat. A Catalina dropped a life raft which Thompson boarded, only to find himself drifting relentlessly towards a pier. Two other h.e.l.lcats were shot down trying to protect him by strafing the sh.o.r.eline-one pilot was killed, the second rescued by a ”dumbo.” Thompson moored his raft to a chain of j.a.panese barges, and two American PT-boats raced in to rescue him. Their first attempt was frustrated by coastal gunfire, but after Avengers dropped smoke floats to mask their approach, a boat s.n.a.t.c.hed Thompson just as the j.a.panese closed in on him. More than fifty aircraft were involved in the rescue, ”which sure was a wonderful show231 to watch,” said Thompson, back on his carrier to watch,” said Thompson, back on his carrier Santee Santee.

Destroyers traditionally extracted ”ransom” for every flier they sent back. ”Rescued pilots were prized possessions,” wrote a destroyer officer. ”Before returning them, we would strip them232 of all their fancy clothes-silk scarf maps, survival kits with great knives, compa.s.ses and magnifying gla.s.ses, and their pistol. Then we would ask the carrier to send over all the geedunk-ice cream-they had, plus a minimum of two movies our crew hadn't seen.” of all their fancy clothes-silk scarf maps, survival kits with great knives, compa.s.ses and magnifying gla.s.ses, and their pistol. Then we would ask the carrier to send over all the geedunk-ice cream-they had, plus a minimum of two movies our crew hadn't seen.”

At sea in the Pacific, by the fall of 1944 the might of the U.S. Navy was unchallengeable. That is to say, no rational adversary would have precipitated a headlong confrontation with such forces as Nimitz now deployed. The summer clashes, the ”Great Marianas Turkey Shoot,” had fatally crippled j.a.panese air power. Only the j.a.panese navy, in the mood of fatalism and desperation which afflicted its upper ranks, could still have sought a ”decisive encounter” against such odds. The struggle for the Philippines was to provide the setting not only for America's major land campaign of the Pacific war, but also for the largest sea battle the world would ever know.

CHAPTER FIVE.

America's Return to the Philippines

1. Peleliu

MACARTHUR left Hawaii on 27 July 1944 confident that he had secured endors.e.m.e.nt of his commitment to retake the Philippines. Nonetheless, when the American and British chiefs of staff met at Quebec on 11 September to open the Octagon strategic conference, plans were still on the table not only for landings in November on Mindanao, thereafter on Leyte and Luzon, but alternatively for seizing Formosa and the port of Amoy on the Chinese mainland. In the days that followed, however, the a.s.sembled U.S. leaders-for the British were not consulted about this exclusively American issue-found themselves confronted by new circ.u.mstances. During planning for Third Fleet's left Hawaii on 27 July 1944 confident that he had secured endors.e.m.e.nt of his commitment to retake the Philippines. Nonetheless, when the American and British chiefs of staff met at Quebec on 11 September to open the Octagon strategic conference, plans were still on the table not only for landings in November on Mindanao, thereafter on Leyte and Luzon, but alternatively for seizing Formosa and the port of Amoy on the Chinese mainland. In the days that followed, however, the a.s.sembled U.S. leaders-for the British were not consulted about this exclusively American issue-found themselves confronted by new circ.u.mstances. During planning for Third Fleet's233 autumn operations, Halsey and his staff had agreed that in future, instead of merely addressing predetermined objectives, they would search for opportunities. In pursuit of this policy the fast carriers were now roaming the western Pacific, launching ma.s.sive a.s.saults on j.a.pan's surviving air forces. Off the southern Philippines on 12 September, 2,400 American sorties accounted for some two hundred j.a.panese aircraft in the sky and on the ground. autumn operations, Halsey and his staff had agreed that in future, instead of merely addressing predetermined objectives, they would search for opportunities. In pursuit of this policy the fast carriers were now roaming the western Pacific, launching ma.s.sive a.s.saults on j.a.pan's surviving air forces. Off the southern Philippines on 12 September, 2,400 American sorties accounted for some two hundred j.a.panese aircraft in the sky and on the ground.

At noon on the thirteenth the admiral signalled a report to Nimitz, who speedily forwarded it to Quebec, that j.a.panese resistance was feeble. Halsey, unaware that the enemy was deliberately husbanding resources for a ”decisive battle” on the Philippines, urged fast-forwarding the strategic programme. He proposed cancelling all preliminary island landings, and staging a speedy a.s.sault on Leyte. This was Halsey's most influential intervention of the war. Such a change of plans was complex, but perfectly feasible in a theatre where every man and ton of supplies earmarked for s.h.i.+pment to one objective could be redirected to beaches elsewhere, by a nation which now possessed mastery of the ocean and the sky above.

MacArthur was at sea and observing wireless silence, but his staff immediately accepted Halsey's proposal as a means of foreclosing the Formosa-Philippines debate. The general, once back in communication, hastened to add his endors.e.m.e.nt. He said nothing of his intelligence staff's well-justified belief that the j.a.panese defenders of Leyte were stronger than Halsey recognised. Much more serious, he made no mention of his engineers' opinion that it would be hard to build good airfields on the island, and almost impossible in the imminent monsoon months. Over the thirty months since he himself had escaped from Bataan, MacArthur's personal interrogations of every American who escaped from the Philippines ”revealed the concern of a man234 whose yearning to get back to his beloved 'second homeland' had become virtually an obsession,” in the words of a biographer. The general had no intention of advertising any impediment to its fulfilment. whose yearning to get back to his beloved 'second homeland' had become virtually an obsession,” in the words of a biographer. The general had no intention of advertising any impediment to its fulfilment.

In Quebec, after hasty consultation the American chiefs of staff set a target date of 20 October for a landing on Leyte. Admiral King's persistent arguments against following this with a move to Luzon, the main Philippine island, were overruled. The navy withdrew its support for attacking Formosa when it became plain that a landing there was logistically impossible before March 1945, and would require much larger ground forces than were available. The Philippines, by contrast, were immediately accessible. Planning for Leyte began at MacArthur's new headquarters on the banks of Lake Sentani, in the Cyclops Mountains above Hollandia, New Guinea. Once the decision was made to retake the Philippines, there was neither logic in nor resources for an early a.s.sault on Formosa. Since the seizure of Formosa was essential to any landing on the China coast that too was now ruled out. As the U.S. Navy's great historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote, ”The two rival roads were...converging235 on Leyte.” All intervening operations were cancelled, save two. First, on 15 September almost 20,000 men landed on the island of Morotai, south-east of the Philippines, and secured its airfield against negligible opposition. By late October, Morotai was crowded with U.S. aircraft waiting to rebase on Leyte. Second, Nimitz and MacArthur shared a conviction that it was important to seize the tiny Palau Islands, of which Peleliu was the key, and to secure their airfields, before a.s.saulting Leyte. on Leyte.” All intervening operations were cancelled, save two. First, on 15 September almost 20,000 men landed on the island of Morotai, south-east of the Philippines, and secured its airfield against negligible opposition. By late October, Morotai was crowded with U.S. aircraft waiting to rebase on Leyte. Second, Nimitz and MacArthur shared a conviction that it was important to seize the tiny Palau Islands, of which Peleliu was the key, and to secure their airfields, before a.s.saulting Leyte.

The Palau invasion convoys were already several days at sea, carrying Maj.-Gen. William Rupertus's 1st Marine Division 2,100 miles from Guadalca.n.a.l. The lumbering landing s.h.i.+ps averaged a speed of only 7.7 knots, even slower than the 12.1 knots of the transports. Brig.-Gen. O. P. Smith, a.s.sistant commander of the division, pa.s.sed the voyage reading a couple of novels from his s.h.i.+p's library: A Yankee from Mount Olympus A Yankee from Mount Olympus and and The Late George Apley The Late George Apley. Tranquillity aboard was marred by the skipper's insistence on issuing orders and admonishments by loudhailer from the bridge. Smith failed to make friends with the s.h.i.+p's dog, ”an aloof c.o.c.ker spaniel236 who refused to notice anyone except the captain.” Approaching the Palaus, even veterans of Pacific landings were awed by the size of the force a.s.sembled-some 868 s.h.i.+ps, 129 in the a.s.sault element. Submarine chasers guided the fleet, destroyers guarded it, sweepers cleared mines in its path. Behind these came a great flock of command, survey, repair and hospital s.h.i.+ps, anti-submarine net-layers, oilers, salvage vessels, tugs, floating dry docks, a dredger, PT-boats, a floating derrick, LSTs, DUKWs, LSDs, cargo s.h.i.+ps and 770 small landing craft for 1st Marine Division, together with as many again for the army's 81st Division, joining the Marines from Pearl Harbor. Such was the scale on which the United States launched even a modest Pacific amphibious landing in the autumn of 1944. who refused to notice anyone except the captain.” Approaching the Palaus, even veterans of Pacific landings were awed by the size of the force a.s.sembled-some 868 s.h.i.+ps, 129 in the a.s.sault element. Submarine chasers guided the fleet, destroyers guarded it, sweepers cleared mines in its path. Behind these came a great flock of command, survey, repair and hospital s.h.i.+ps, anti-submarine net-layers, oilers, salvage vessels, tugs, floating dry docks, a dredger, PT-boats, a floating derrick, LSTs, DUKWs, LSDs, cargo s.h.i.+ps and 770 small landing craft for 1st Marine Division, together with as many again for the army's 81st Division, joining the Marines from Pearl Harbor. Such was the scale on which the United States launched even a modest Pacific amphibious landing in the autumn of 1944.

On the morning of 15 September, amid a calm sea, a glittering array of bra.s.s watched from the command s.h.i.+p Mount McKinley Mount McKinley as shoals of landing craft headed for the sh.o.r.e. Peleliu had received three days of intensive gunfire from five battles.h.i.+ps, five heavy cruisers and seventeen other vessels, which periodically ceased fire only to make s.p.a.ce for air attacks. Vice-Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, the bombardment commander, declared: ”We have run out of targets.” Nine miles offsh.o.r.e the c.o.c.ky naval skipper of Col. ”Chesty” Puller's transport enquired, as Puller's men clambered into their landing craft, whether the Marine would be returning on board for his dinner. The colonel responded testily that he expected to be fighting for several days. Surely not, said the sailor. The navy's bombardment would ”allow the regiment to walk to its objective unmolested.” If that proved so, said Puller, the captain should come ash.o.r.e that afternoon, join the Marines for a meal, and collect some souvenirs. Rupertus, the operational commander, had no experience of a heavily opposed landing, and was himself blithely confident. Four days, he said, should suffice to clear the island. As the Americans approached Peleliu, smoke from the bombardment shrouded the higher ground inland. Rocket s.h.i.+ps fired ripples of projectiles ahead of the infantry pitching in their landing craft, then turned aside to open the pa.s.sage for the a.s.sault waves. AA guns on the s.h.i.+ps fired airburst sh.e.l.ls at rocks behind the landing places. ”Chesty” Puller told his men with characteristic theatricality: ”You will take no prisoners, you will kill every yellow as shoals of landing craft headed for the sh.o.r.e. Peleliu had received three days of intensive gunfire from five battles.h.i.+ps, five heavy cruisers and seventeen other vessels, which periodically ceased fire only to make s.p.a.ce for air attacks. Vice-Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, the bombardment commander, declared: ”We have run out of targets.” Nine miles offsh.o.r.e the c.o.c.ky naval skipper of Col. ”Chesty” Puller's transport enquired, as Puller's men clambered into their landing craft, whether the Marine would be returning on board for his dinner. The colonel responded testily that he expected to be fighting for several days. Surely not, said the sailor. The navy's bombardment would ”allow the regiment to walk to its objective unmolested.” If that proved so, said Puller, the captain should come ash.o.r.e that afternoon, join the Marines for a meal, and collect some souvenirs. Rupertus, the operational commander, had no experience of a heavily opposed landing, and was himself blithely confident. Four days, he said, should suffice to clear the island. As the Americans approached Peleliu, smoke from the bombardment shrouded the higher ground inland. Rocket s.h.i.+ps fired ripples of projectiles ahead of the infantry pitching in their landing craft, then turned aside to open the pa.s.sage for the a.s.sault waves. AA guns on the s.h.i.+ps fired airburst sh.e.l.ls at rocks behind the landing places. ”Chesty” Puller told his men with characteristic theatricality: ”You will take no prisoners, you will kill every yellow237 son-of-a-b.i.t.c.h, and that's it.” son-of-a-b.i.t.c.h, and that's it.”

The Marines. .h.i.t the beaches at 0832. There were no j.a.panese in their immediate vicinity. Within minutes, however, the invaders found themselves under heavy sh.e.l.lfire, which wrecked dozens of amphibious vehicles, and made the men reluctant to forsake cover and advance beyond the beach. Medical corpsman Bill Jenkins's unit suffered its first casualty seconds after disembarking. It was ”Pop” Lujack, the oldest man in the company, ”a guy I thought a lot of238, and it hurt me badly when I saw he was. .h.i.t. I didn't know any better but he was. .h.i.t in the head and practically the whole back of his head was shot off, and I was laying down there trying to fix him up. One of the guys came up and said, 'Doc, get out of there, he's dead.' ''