Part 33 (2/2)
SIR,
I have here, according to your Request, given you my _present_ Thoughts of the _general State of Things_ in the Universe. Such as they are, you have them, and are welcome to 'em; and if they yield you any Pleasure or Satisfaction, I shall think my Trouble sufficiently compensated. I know my Scheme will be liable to many Objections from a less discerning Reader than your self; but it is not design'd for those who can't understand it. I need not give you any Caution to distinguish the hypothetical Parts of the Argument from the conclusive: You will easily perceive what I design for Demonstration, and what for Probability only.
The whole I leave entirely to you, and shall value my self more or less on this account, in proportion to your Esteem and Approbation.
Sect. I. _Of_ Liberty _and_ Necessity
I. _There is said to be a_ First Mover, _who is called_ G.o.d, _Maker of the Universe._
II. _He is said to be all-wise, all-good, all powerful._
These two Propositions being allow'd and a.s.serted by People of almost every Sect and Opinion; I have here suppos'd them granted, and laid them down as the Foundation of my Argument; What follows then, being a Chain of Consequences truly drawn from them, will stand or fall as they are true or false.
III. _If He is all-good, whatsoever He doth must be good._
IV. _If He is all-wise, whatsoever He doth must be wise._
The Truth of these Propositions, with relation to the two first, I think may be justly call'd evident; since, either that infinite Goodness will act what is ill, or infinite Wisdom what is, not wise, is too glaring a Contradiction not to be perceiv'd by any Man of common Sense, and deny'd as soon as understood.
V. _If He is all-powerful, there can be nothing either existing or acting in the Universe_ against _or_ without _his Consent, and what He consents to must be good, because He is good, therefore_ Evil _doth not exist._
_Unde Malum?_ has been long a Question, and many of the Learned have perplex'd themselves and Readers to little Purpose in Answer to it. That there are both Things and Actions to which we give the Name of _Evil_, is not here deny'd, as _Pain_, _Sickness_, _Want_, _Theft_, _Murder_, &c. but that these and the like are not in reality _Evils_, _Ills_, or _Defects_ in the Order of the Universe, is demonstrated in the next Section, as well as by this and the following Proposition. Indeed, to suppose any Thing to exist or be done, _contrary_ to the Will of the Almighty, is to suppose him not almighty; or that Something (the Cause of _Evil_) is more mighty than the Almighty; an Inconsistence that I think no One will defend: And to deny any Thing or Action, which he consents to the existence of, to be good, is entirely to destroy his two Attributes of _Wisdom_ and _Goodness_.
_There is nothing done in the Universe_, say the Philosophers, _but what G.o.d either does, or_ permits _to be done_. This, as He is Almighty, is certainly true: But what need of this Distinction between _doing_ and _permitting_? Why, first they take it for granted that many Things in the Universe exist in such a Manner as is not for the best, and that many Actions are done which ought not to be done, or would be better undone; these Things or Actions they cannot ascribe to G.o.d as His, because they have already attributed to Him infinite Wisdom and Goodness; Here then is the Use of the Word _Permit_; He _permits_ them to be done, _say they_. But we will reason thus: If G.o.d permits an Action to be done, it is because he wants either _Power_ or _Inclination_ to hinder it; in saying he wants _Power_, we deny Him to be _almighty_; and if we say He wants _Inclination_ or _Will_, it must be, either because He is not Good, or the Action is not _evil_, (for all Evil is contrary to the Essence of _Infinite Goodness_.) The former is inconsistent with his before-given Attribute of Goodness, therefore the latter must be true.
It will be said, perhaps, that _G.o.d permits evil Actions to be done, for_ wise _Ends and Purposes_. But this Objection destroys itself; for whatever an infinitely good G.o.d hath wise Ends in suffering to _be_, must be good, is thereby made good, and cannot be otherwise.
VI. _If a Creature is made by G.o.d, it must depend upon G.o.d, and receive all its Power from Him, with which Power the Creature can do nothing contrary to the Will of G.o.d, because G.o.d is Almighty; what is not contrary to His Will, must be agreeable to it; what is agreeable to it, must be good, because He is Good; therefore a Creature can do nothing but what is good._
This Proposition is much to the same Purpose with the former, but more particular; and its Conclusion is as just and evident. Tho' a Creature may do many Actions which by his Fellow Creatures will be nam'd _Evil_, and which will naturally and necessarily cause or bring upon the Doer, certain _Pains_ (which will likewise be call'd _Punishments_;) yet this Proposition proves, that he cannot act what will be in itself really Ill, or displeasing to G.o.d. And that the painful Consequences of his evil Actions (_so call'd_) are not, as indeed they ought not to be, _Punishments_ or Unhappinesses, will be shewn hereafter.
Nevertheless, the late learned Author of _The Religion of Nature_, (which I send you herewith) has given us a Rule or Scheme, whereby to discover which of our Actions ought to be esteem'd and denominated _good_, and which _evil_; It is in short this, ”Every Action which is done according to _Truth_, is good; and every Action contrary to Truth, is evil: To act according to Truth is to use and esteem every Thing as what it is, &c. Thus if _A_ steals a Horse from _B_, and rides away upon him, he uses him not as what he is in Truth, _viz._ the Property of another, but as his own, which is contrary to Truth, and therefore _evil_.” But, as this Gentleman himself says, (Sect. I. Prop. VI.) ”In order to judge rightly what any Thing is, it must be consider'd, not only what it is in one Respect, but also what it may be in any other Respect; and the whole Description of the Thing ought to be taken in: So in this Case it ought to be consider'd, that _A_ is naturally a _covetous_ Being, feeling an Uneasiness in the want of _B's_ Horse, which produces an Inclination for stealing him, stronger than his Fear of Punishment for so doing. This is _Truth_ likewise, and _A_ acts according to it when he steals the Horse. Besides, if it is prov'd to be a _Truth_, that _A_ has not Power over his own Actions, it will be indisputable that he acts according to Truth, and impossible he should do otherwise.
I would not be understood by this to encourage or defend Theft; 'tis only for the sake of the Argument, and will certainly have no _ill Effect_. The Order and Course of Things will not be affected by Reasoning of this Kind; and 'tis as just and necessary, and as much according to Truth, for _B_ to dislike and punish the Theft of his Horse, as it is for _A_ to steal him.
VII. _If the Creature is thus limited in his Actions, being able to do only such Things as G.o.d would have him to do, and not being able to refuse doing what G.o.d would have done; then he can have no such Thing as Liberty, Free-will or Power to do or refrain an Action._
By _Liberty_ is sometimes understood the Absence of Opposition; and in this Sense, indeed, all our Actions may be said to be the Effects of our Liberty: But it is a Liberty of the same Nature with the Fall of a heavy Body to the Ground; it has Liberty to fall, that is, it meets with nothing to hinder its Fall, but at the same Time it is necessitated to fall, and has no Power or Liberty to remain suspended.
But let us take the Argument in another View, and suppose ourselves to be, in the common sense of the Word, _Free Agents_. As Man is a Part of this great Machine, the Universe, his regular Acting is requisite to the regular moving of the whole. Among the many Things which lie before him to be done, he may, as he is at Liberty and his Choice influenc'd by nothing, (for so it must be, or he is not at Liberty) chuse any one, and refuse the rest. Now there is every Moment something _best_ to be done, which is alone then _good_, and with respect to which, every Thing else is at that Time _evil_. In order to know which is best to be done, and which not, it is requisite that we should have at one View all the intricate Consequences of every Action with respect to the general Order and Scheme of the Universe, both present and future; but they are innumerable and incomprehensible by any Thing but Omniscience. As we cannot know these, we have but as one Chance to ten thousand, to hit on the right Action; we should then be perpetually blundering about in the Dark, and putting the Scheme in Disorder; for every wrong Action of a Part, is a Defect or Blemish in the Order of the Whole. Is it not necessary then, that our Actions should be over-rul'd and govern'd by an all-wise Providence?--How exact and regular is every Thing in the _natural_ World! How wisely in every Part contriv'd! We cannot here find the least Defect! Those who have study'd the mere animal and vegetable Creation, demonstrate that nothing can be more harmonious and beautiful!
All the heavenly Bodies, the Stars and Planets, are regulated with the utmost Wisdom! And can we suppose less Care to be taken in the Order of the _moral_ than in the _natural_ System? It is as if an ingenious Artificer, having fram'd a curious Machine or Clock, and put its many intricate Wheels and Powers in such a Dependance on one another, that the whole might move in the most exact Order and Regularity, had nevertheless plac'd in it several other Wheels endu'd with an independent _Self-Motion_, but ignorant of the general Interest of the Clock; and these would every now and then be moving wrong, disordering the true Movement, and making continual Work for the Mender: which might better be prevented, by depriving them of that Power of Self-Motion, and placing them in a Dependance on the regular Part of the Clock.
VIII. _If there is no such Thing as Free-Will in Creatures, there can be neither Merit nor Demerit in Creatures._
IX. _And therefore every Creature must be equally esteem'd by the Creator._
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