Part 10 (1/2)
Probably the one thing about the Paris Peace negotiations that is sure to interest the average American most at this late date is the matter of how we came to pay that twenty millions. It was this way. On October 27th, the Commission wired Was.h.i.+ngton:
Last night Spanish amba.s.sador called upon Mr. Reid.
It seems they talked long and earnestly far into the night, trying to find a way which would prevent the conference from resulting in sudden disruption, and consequent resumption of the war. Mr. Reid made plain the inflexible determination of the American people not to a.s.sume the Cuban debt. The Amba.s.sador said: ”Montero Rios [146] could not return to Madrid now if known to have accepted entire Cuban indebtedness,”
and asked delay to see ”if some concessions elsewhere might not be found which would save Spanish Commissioners from utter repudiation at home.” There is no doubt that the talk we are now considering was a ”heart-to-heart” affair, probably quite informal. Yet it is one of the most important talks that have occurred between any two men in this world in the last fifty years. Mr. Reid finally threw out a hint to the effect that as the preponderance of American public sentiment seemed rather inclined to retain the Philippines, ”It was possible,”
he said, ”but not probable that out of these conditions the Spanish Commissioners might find something either in territory or debt [147]
which might seem to their people at least like a concession.!” [148]
It was the leaven of this hint that leavened the whole loaf. There was doubtless much informal parleying after that, but finally, the American Commissioners, having become satisfied that Spanish honor would not be offended by an offer having the substance, if not the form, of charity, and being very tired of Spain's sparring for wind in the hope of a European coalition against us should war be resumed, submitted the following proposal:
The Government of the United States is unable to modify the proposal heretofore made for the cession of the entire archipelago of the Philippine Islands, but the American Commissioners are authorized to offer to Spain, in case the cession should be agreed to, the sum of $20,000,000.
This alluring offer was accompanied with the stern announcement that
Upon the acceptance * * * of the proposals herein made * * *
but not otherwise, it will be possible * * * to proceed to the consideration * * * of other matters.
Also, our Commissioners wired Was.h.i.+ngton:
If the Spanish Commissioners refuse our proposition * * * nothing remains except to close the negotiations.
This was very American and very final. Was.h.i.+ngton answered: ”Your proposed action approved.”
November 29th, Mr. Day wired Mr. Hay:
Spanish Commissioners at to-day's conference presented a definite and final acceptance of our last proposition.
And that is how that twenty millions found its way into the treaty--not forgetting the prayers and other contemporaneous activities of Archbishop Chapelle.
After the tremendous eight weeks' tension had relaxed, and before the final reduction to writing of all the details, we see this dear little telegram, from Secretary of State Hay, himself a writer of note, come bravely paddling into port, where it was cordially received by both sides, taken in out of the wet, and put under the shelter of the treaty:
Mr. Hay to Mr. Day: In renewing conventional arrangements do not lose sight of copyright agreement.
And here is the last act of the drama: