Part 10 (1/2)

The following paragraph, taken from a current magazine, shows how this kind of evidence may be handled very effectively:--

A sharp controversy has been raging in the European press over the question whether Gambetta secretly visited Bismarck in 1878. Francis Laur, Gambetta's literary executor, has published an article a.s.serting that he did, and giving details (rather vague, it must be admitted) of the conversation between the two statesmen. But he offers not a sc.r.a.p of doc.u.mentary proof. He is not even sure whether the interview took place at Friedrichsruh or at Varzin. This is rather disconcerting, especially in view of the fact that Bismarck never made the slightest reference in his reminiscences or letters to the visit of Gambetta, if it occurred, and that the minute Busch never mentioned it. [Footnote: The Nation, September 5, 1907]

ARGUMENT FROM AUTHORITY.

There is a particular kind of evidence frequently available for debaters and argumentative writers known as _argument from authority._ This evidence consists of the opinions and decisions of men who are recognized, to some extent at least, as authorities on the subjects of which they speak. An eminent scientist might explain with unquestioned certainty the operation of certain natural phenomena. A business man of wide experience and with well recognized insight into national conditions might speak authoritatively on the causes of business depressions. In religious matters the Bible is the highest authority for orthodox Christians; the Koran, for Mohammedans. In legal affairs the highest authorities are court decisions, opinions of eminent jurists, and the Const.i.tution. If a certain college president is considered an authority in the matter of college discipline, then a quotation from him on the evils of hazing becomes valuable evidence for the affirmative of the proposition, ”Hazing should be abolished in all colleges.” If the arguer wishes to strengthen his evidence, he may do so by giving the president's reasons for condemning hazing; but he then departs from pure argument from authority. Pure argument from authority does not consist of a statement of the reasons involved; it a.s.serts that something is true because some one who is acknowledged to be an authority on that subject says it is true.

Argument from authority differs from other evidence in that it involves not merely investigation but also the exercise of a high degree of judgment. The statement that in 1902, in the United Kingdom, two hundred and ninety-five communities of from 8,000 to 25,000 inhabitants were without street-car lines is not argument from authority; the discovery of this truth involved merely investigation.

On the other hand, if some reputable statesman or business man should say that street-car facilities in the United States excelled those of England, this evidence would be argument from authority; only through both investigation and judgment could such a statement be evolved.

This kind of evidence is very strong when those addressed have confidence in the integrity, ability, and judgment of the person quoted. If, however, they do not know him, or if they do not consider him reliable, the evidence is of little value. Therefore, the test that an arguer should apply before using this kind of evidence is as follows:--

_Is the witness an acknowledged authority on the subject about which he speaks?_

Sometimes a short statement showing why the witness quoted is able to speak wisely and conclusively will render the evidence more valuable in the eyes of the audience. In the following example, notice how Judge James H. Blount used ”authority” in proving that the Filipinos desired self-government:--

Senator Dubois, of Idaho, who was a member of the Congressional party that visited the Philippines, has since said in the New York ”Independent”: All the Filipinos, with the exception of those who were holding positions under and drawing salaries from our Government, favor a government of their own. There is scarcely an exception among them.... There is n.o.body in the islands, no organization of any kind or description, which favors the policy of our Government toward them.

Senator Newlands, of Nevada, also a member of the Congressional party aforesaid, has declared, in the number of this Review for December, 1905, that practically the whole people desire independence.

Congressman Parsons, also a member of the same party, has since said: ”There is no question that all the Filipino parties are now in favor of independence.”

Captain J. A. Moss, of the Twenty-fourth Infantry, a member of General Corbin's staff, is quoted by Mr. Bryan, in the ”Commoner” of April 27th, 1906, as saying in an article published in a Manila paper while Mr. Bryan was in the islands, with reference to the wishes of ”the great majority” of Filipinos, that ”to please them, we cannot get out of the islands too soon.” [Footnote: North American Review, Vol.

CLx.x.xIV, p. 136.]

II. REASONING.

As has been said, proof consists of evidence and reasoning. Evidence has been considered first because this order corresponds to the way in which proof is usually generated; obviously, the discovery of facts precedes the process of reasoning which shows their significance. In some instances, however, this order is reversed: a man may form a theory and then hunt for the facts on which to base it; but in general, facts precede inferences.

Since all people when they reason do not reach the same conclusion, it is very essential for a student to investigate the various processes of reasoning. Given exactly the same evidence, some men will draw one conclusion, some another. A current periodical recognizes this fact when it says:--

How widely divergent may be conclusions drawn from the same source can be judged by contrasting these two statements: Messrs. Clark and Edgar declare that ”where munic.i.p.al owners.h.i.+p has been removed from the realm of philosophic discussion and put to the test of actual experience it has failed ingloriously”; Professor Parsons and Mr.

Bemis on the contrary a.s.sert, to use Professor Parsons' words, ”it is not public owners.h.i.+p, but private owners.h.i.+p, that is responsible for our periodic crisis and the ruin of our industries,” and ”it is not impossible that the elimination of the public service corporations through public owners.h.i.+p is one of the things that would do more to help along the process of making our cities fit.” [Footnote: Outlook, July 27, 1907.]

Because of the divergencies in the results produced by reasoning, a student should study with considerable care the various processes of arriving at a conclusion, so that he may be able to tell what methods are strong, what are weak, and what are fallacious.

According to a common cla.s.sification, there are two methods of reasoning: the inductive process, and the deductive process.

1. INDUCTIVE REASONING. When one carefully investigates his reasons for believing as he does, he often finds that he accepts a certain statement as true because he is familiar with many specific instances that tend to establish its truth. The belief that prussic acid is poisonous is based upon the large number of instances in which its deadly effect has been apparent. The fact that railroad men are exposed to injury is unquestioned because every one is familiar with the many accidents that occur each year. The statement that water freezes at thirty-two degrees Fahrenheit has been proved true by innumerable tests. This process of reasoning by which, from many specific instances, the truth of a general statement is established, is called _induction._

An example of inductive reasoning is found in the following pa.s.sage:--

Does the closing of the saloons affect appreciably the amount of drunkenness in the community? A comparison of the same town or city in successive years--one year under one system, and the next year under the other--furnishes a basis for accurate judgment. Evidence of this sort is all one way, and it seems to be conclusive.

The tables prepared by the Ma.s.sachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor, in 1905, under special instructions from the legislature, show that in Haverhill the average number of arrests per month under license was 81.63, under no-license, 26.50; in Lynn, under license, 315, under no-license, 117.63; in Medford, under license, 20.12, under no-license, 13.25; in Pittsfield, under license, 93.25, under no-license, 36.75; and in Salem, under license, 140.50, under no-license, 29.63. Such comparisons might be multiplied, but it is unnecessary. There is no escaping the conclusion that the closing of the saloons, under the Local Option system, does sensibly diminish the volume of drunkenness. [Footnote: Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XC, p. 437.]

In using inductive reasoning, one must always be on his guard against drawing conclusions too hastily. It is never correct to conclude from a consideration of only a few instances that a general truth has been discovered. Further examination may show that the opinion first formed will not hold. Some people call all men dishonest because several acquaintances have not kept faith with them. Others are ready to believe that because they have made money in the stock market all can do likewise. Most superst.i.tions arise through generalization from too few instances: those who have several times met misfortune on the thirteenth day of the month are apt to say that the thirteenth is always an unlucky day. Such reasoning as this shows the weakness of inductive argument: a conclusion is worthless if it is drawn from too few examples.

Professor Fred Lewis Pattee, in writing on _Errors in Reasoning_, says:--