Part 19 (1/2)
[Footnote 505: Ibid., Nos. 72-76, 2034.]
[Footnote 506: Ibid., Nos. 2034, 2044, 2047, 2052, 2103.]
[Footnote 507: Ibid., Nos. 2278, 2398, 2416, 2500.]
[Footnote 508: Ibid., 1693-96, Nos. 634, 635, 1009, 1236.]
[Footnote 509: C.S.P. Colon., 1693-96, Nos. 778, 876; Archives Coloniales, Corresp. Gen. de St. Dom. III. Letter of Duca.s.se, 30 March 1694.]
[Footnote 510: C.S.P. Colon., 1693-96, Nos. 1109, 1236 (i.).]
[Footnote 511: Ibid., Nos. 1074, 1083, 1106, 1109, 1114, 1121, 1131, 1194, 1236; Charlevoix, I. x. p. 256 _ff._; Stowe MSS., 305 f., 205 b; Ducere: Les corsaires sous l'ancien regime, p. 142.]
[Footnote 512: The number of white men on the island at this time was variously estimated from 2000 to 2400 men. (C.S.P. Colon., 1693-96, Nos.
1109 and 1258.)]
[Footnote 513: C.S.P. Colon, 1693-96, No. 1516.]
[Footnote 514: Ibid., Nos. 207, 876, 1004.]
[Footnote 515: C.S.P. Colon., 1693-96, Nos. 1946, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1983, 2022. According to Charlevoix, it was the dalliance and cowardice of Laurens de Graff, who was in command at Cap Francois, and feared falling into the hands of his old enemies the English and Spaniards, which had much to do with the success of the invasion. After the departure of the allies Laurens was deprived of his post and made captain of a light corvette. (Charlevoix, I. x. p. 266 _ff._)]
[Footnote 516: Ducere, _op. cit._ p. 148.]
[Footnote 517: Narrative of de Pointis.]
[Footnote 518: Narrative of de Pointis; C.S.P. Colon., 1696-97, No.
824.]
[Footnote 519: Narrative of de Pointis; C.S.P. Colon., 1696-97, No.
868.]
[Footnote 520: Narrative of de Pointis.]
[Footnote 521: C.S.P. Colon., 1696-97, Nos. 373-376, 413, 661, 769.]
[Footnote 522: Ibid., Nos. 715, 868.]
[Footnote 523: C.S.P. Colon., 1696-97, Nos. 375, 453.]
[Footnote 524: Ibid., 944. 978.]
[Footnote 525: The mouth of the harbour, called Boca Chica, was defended by a fort with 4 bastions and 33 guns; but the guns were badly mounted on flimsy carriages of cedar, and were manned by only 15 soldiers.