Part 3 (1/2)

Nor is there anything wildly improbable in the story. Smollett had been in a debtor's prison himself, and very likely had heard the story at first hand, for many equally extraordinary stories in real life are well authenticated.

There was the strange case of the lady who married a man under sentence of death to get rid of her debts, and was greatly upset when her husband was respited and sent to the colonies. But perhaps one of the most curious stories is that of the dear old blind spinster of Clerkenwell, with a fortune of a thousand pounds, who took a deep interest in the career of an industrious shoemaker's apprentice and made him presents of clothes and a watch and lent him ten pounds. When he was out of his articles and was about to go home to Leicesters.h.i.+re and settle down there, he was arrested for the loan and the attorney's bill of costs and the ”garnish” at the lock-up to which he was taken. After a few days the kind-hearted lady visited him and offered him three alternatives. He might pay the money; go to the debtor's prison for the rest of his life; or marry her. He chose the last alternative and was kept in the sponging house until his wedding day.

These stories are but a sample of the iniquities that were going on in that day, and yet then, as now, the feeling of legislators and business men seems to have been that it was dangerous to trade and business to sweep this horrible system away, so blind are people to the wrongs they see every day, so dull are ears to cries of pain and distress that are continuous and never cease. It would seem as though the conscience of mankind can only be startled into action by some catastrophe, some tragedy obviously brought about by bad government and bad laws, and not until then will it translate its knowledge of evil into demand for reform.

The tragedies of imprisonment for debt occurred, but they took place behind closed doors and the world only heard of them by slow degrees. At length, however, the constant repet.i.tion of the miseries of the poor debtors who languished in prison, wasting their lives and eating out their hearts in despair, began slowly to convince the man in the street that there really was something wrong with the world and that the cup of human misery of some of their fellow creatures was slopping over into the saucer of despair. Timid reformers began to think something might be done. The arguments then, as now, were all one way, but then, as now, there was no one to listen to them. Good men had raised their voices to point out the wrong-doing that was going on, and the unnecessary wretchedness that was being caused, but nothing much came of it. There were a few desultory and ineffective movements towards discharging poor debtors, but the matter did not greatly interest mankind, and there seemed to the eighteenth century mind no very clear reason why a debtor once in prison for debt should ever be released. To-day, in the same way, it is difficult to persuade the average citizen that there is any injustice in a debtor being sent to prison for debt. The att.i.tude of mind about the thing is not greatly altered, though happily the amount of injustice and wrong-doing has been lessened.

It was not, indeed, until the beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria, a time of great hope for the poor and distressed, a period which has not inaptly been called ”the springtime of social reform,” that any practical movement was made. I myself keep March 31st as the birthday of the movement for the abolition of imprisonment for debt, but anyway it is a red-letter day in the history of English literature and worthy of great honour. For on that day, in the year 1836, the first number of ”Pickwick,”

appeared and there is no doubt that the account of the Fleet prison in that volume has made it the popular text-book of legal reform in these matters. If ”Pickwick” in 1836 was not the _causa causans_ of Lord Cottenham's Bill to amend the law of insolvency which was introduced in December, 1837, there is no doubt that d.i.c.kens' stories of the cruelty of imprisonment for debt supplied the motive power necessary to pa.s.s it by rousing the public conscience to insist upon something being done.

The point of particular reform aimed at by the Bill was to abolish what was called arrest on mesne process. It is an absurd term, and it was a still more absurd thing. The wonder is that it had survived as long as it did. Mesne process, translated into English, means middle process, and the idea was to lock a defendant up in the middle of the trial and keep him there in case it turned out at the end of the proceedings that he owed the money. It was as popular with the sharks of the eighteenth century as the present imprisonment is with the moneylenders and tally-men of to-day. Any person who would make an affidavit that another owed him twenty pounds or more could lock him up pending the trial and, unless the victim could find the money and pay it into Court, he remained in the sponging house until the trial came on. Harry Warrington was served so, if you remember. Two gentlemen came from over the way, ”one of them takes a strip of paper out of his pocket and, putting his hand upon Mr. Warrington's shoulder, declares him his prisoner. A hackney coach is called and poor Harry goes to sleep in Chancery Lane.” Certainly Harry owed the money and had been reckless and extravagant enough, but even then the method of arrest strikes us to-day as a little high-handed. Nor was it always made use of with honesty. To bold rascals it was a very perfect machine for the wickedest blackmail. An affidavit of debt--and eighteenth century affidavits were no nearer the truth than those of the present century--was all that was required, and if in the end the affidavit was found to be false, the only remedy was to prosecute the swearer of it--if you could find him.

A case that Lord Denman mentioned in the debates in 1837 created a good deal of uneasiness in the public mind. A certain Portuguese n.o.bleman, the Duke de Cadaval, on landing at Falmouth, or when he was residing at Plymouth, was arrested on a pretended debt, thrown into prison, and obliged to pay a large sum of money to procure his release. He afterwards recovered in an action for malicious arrest heavy damages, but he never received a penny of them, nor is there any record that the false witnesses were punished for perjury. There are many stories of this kind, and it was an obvious result of the system of arrest on mesne process. One would have thought that there would have been no difficulty about abolis.h.i.+ng a legal machinery that brought about such injustice, but, in truth and fact, it was quite otherwise. Indeed, the people who wanted to abolish the excellent and business-like system were regarded as very pestilent and turbulent busy-bodies by the average citizen.

Another incident of imprisonment for debt at this date was that if a creditor preferred to issue a _ca. sa._ to a _fi. fa._ and took the body of the debtor in preference to the property of the debtor, he thereby discharged the debtor. If, therefore, the debtor preferred imprisonment to paying his debts, the law afforded the creditor no other remedy. There were instances of debtors remaining in prison for over twenty years well able to pay their debts, but preferring to live in luxury within the rules of the prison. _Re Pickwick_ is perhaps the popular leading case on this point. But whilst we remember with pleasure how the law enabled our dear friend to outwit for a time those wily attorneys Dodson and Fogg, do not let us forget the terrible sights he saw in the Fleet.

The Chancery prisoner, the fortunate legatee whose lawyers had had the thousand pounds legacy, and who was in the Fleet, mending shoes for twenty years because the loom of the law had woven a shroud of costs round him and buried him in prison--he was no fiction. His heart was broken when his child died and he could not kiss him in his coffin. There he remained living a solitary lingering death, lonely amid the noise and riot of the Fleet, until G.o.d gave him his discharge. This and many another case was before My Lords and known to the intelligent Commons when the question of the abolition of arrest on mesne process came up for discussion in 1837.

It is to Lord Cottenham, as I have said, that we owe the statute which, to use Mr. Atlay's phrase, ”abolished the bane of Mr. Micawber's existence, imprisonment for debt on mesne process.” Nor must it be thought that it was done without a struggle. Lord Lyndhurst said, and no doubt truly, that, judging from the pet.i.tions, he should be within the truth in saying that the Bill was very unpopular. The pet.i.tions were at least ten to one against the Bill. There was no more enthusiasm about mitigating imprisonment for debt then than there is to-day. The history of these things is always the same; the traders objected to the abolition of imprisonment for debt, the newspaper proprietors strenuously opposed the reduction of the Stamp Acts, the doctors fought against national insurance. Yet, when the horrible thing is done, we find them smugly prospering on the reform.

Lord Brougham, who from the very first had always held instinctively the true faith in these matters, pointed out to a reluctant House how credit was imprudently given to the real injury of the customer who is induced to buy what he cannot pay for, and to the injury of those who do pay what they do owe, but who pay the dearer in proportion to the bad debts which the tradesman is led to let others contract with him. Further, he emphasised the wrong done by clothing an insolvent person with an appearance of credit by lending him more goods which serve as a bait or decoy to others that have not yet trusted him. He laid down the principle that debt should never be treated as a crime and still less as a crime to be punished at the sole will and pleasure of the creditor, and eloquently called upon the peers to wipe out this foul stain from our civil code.

Arrest on mesne process was abolished, not ungrudgingly it is true, but it came to an end, and a commission was set up in 1839 to inquire and report upon the whole system of imprisonment for debt. This commission ultimately reported in favour of abolition. In 1844 another Bill was introduced to distinguish between cases where it could be shown that the debtor was an innocent fool and not a culpable contumacious defrauder. It was not of much avail as a social reform, but may be fairly described, perhaps, as a worthy effort. The brightest reading in its history for us to-day is the debate in which Lord Brougham, with savage eloquence, rubs it in--the modern slang expresses Brougham's method so accurately--and jeers at the opponents of imprisonment for debt now that all their Ca.s.sandra prophecies over the abolition of imprisonment by mesne process have proved themselves to be worthless. Abolition of this system had not diminished credit, and had not raised any difficulty in citizens obtaining credit. Then, as now, these were the trade arguments against reform solemnly used by business men, officials and lawyers, and though, on each occasion when the reform has taken place, they have been found to be the hollowest nonsense, yet they are repeated to the reformers of to-day with the same pompous effrontery with which they were offered to Lord Brougham.

We now come to 1869, in which year the present state of the law was created, and it is this law which seems to me so unjust to wage earners and poor people who are in debt, placing them as it does in conjunction with the Bankruptcy Laws in such a wholly inferior position to that of the well-to-do citizens. In order to understand the exact legal position it is, I fear, necessary to deal with the matter in some little detail.

The intention of the Legislature at the time seems to have been right enough. It was desired, no doubt, that a fraudulent debtor should be punished and that an honest debtor should not. If a means could be invented to carry out this principle no one would utter a word against it.

A fraudulent debtor is, I take it, a man who, having ample means over and above the reasonable necessities of himself and his family, conceals them or places them in fict.i.tious names and then defrauds his debtor and refuses to pay him.

I should be in favour of more stringent measures being taken against the fraudulent debtor, for one meets him every day, well-to-do and smiling, with a bill of sale on his furniture and everything in his wife's name.

But he is the curled darling of the law. He makes use of the law to protect himself and his frauds, and the Debtors Act, which was intended to abolish imprisonment for debt, has no terrors for him, whilst under its provisions hundreds of weekly wage earners are imprisoned.

As Sir George Jessel said, the real intention of the Debtors Act, 1869, was to abolish imprisonment for debt for honest debtors and to retain the right of judges to punish fraudulent debtors. Many of the sections of the Act are framed, and to some extent a.s.sist, in the excellent aim of making it hot for the naughty and wicked debtor who has cheated or defrauded his creditors. Why is such a person punished? asks the Master of the Rolls. I give the answer in his own words. ”Simply because he is a dishonest man.

He need not perhaps be called a thief in so many words, but he is a man who takes or keeps money belonging to other people, and he is punished accordingly.” Instances of such are defaulting trustees and similar misdemeanants, and, so far as the Act provides for their punishment, we have no quarrel with it.

Now no one would contend that the system of imprisonment for debt as carried out in the County Courts is a system directed in the main against dishonest men. Improvident, careless, foolish and childlike these poor defendants in the County Court may fairly be described; but if a day of judgment audit could be carried out, and a balance struck on the item of ”honesty” as between the working-men debtors and the cla.s.s of traders who give them credit, I make little doubt which cla.s.s, as a cla.s.s, would show the better figures. No, we do not imprison in the County Court for dishonesty _per se_; dishonesty may or may not be a feature of any particular case, but it is not an essential.

The order for imprisonment is made under section 5 of the Debtors Act, 1869. That is the tally-man's charter. I am sorry to bore anyone with all these sections and statutes, but there is such a lot of inaccuracy written and talked about the matter that it is best to set down the actual enactment. We must remember then that the Act, being an Act for the abolition of imprisonment for debt, had begun by enacting in the fourth section that ”with the exceptions hereinafter mentioned no person shall be arrested or imprisoned for making default in payment of a sum of money.”

These last words state quite clearly the true principle of what the law ought to be. Unfortunately for the poor the special exception made for them has only too truly proved the rule.

The opponents of abolition were but too successful in their endeavours to make inroads upon the thoroughness of the proposed reform, and one of the exceptions was called ”a saving power of committal for small debts.” It might have been better described perhaps ”as a saving power to imprison poor debtors.” This is the famous section 5 of the Debtors Act, 1869, over which so much controversy has since arisen, on the working of which two important commissions have sat and reported, and under which we may proudly claim to be one of the last civilised countries that clings to a system of imprisonment for debt.

It is necessary to set out the section at some length, for it has a googlie element about it and is not so innocent as it appears on the surface. It first sets out ”that any Court may commit to prison for six weeks any person who makes default in the payment of a debt or instalment due in pursuance of a judgment.” That, of course, is plain sailing imprisonment for debt. Then, however, follows the sub-section--I again apologise for troubling you with all this, but it is really a good citizen's duty to understand it--which causes all the worry. It is enacted in sub-section (2) ”that such jurisdiction shall only be exercised where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the person making default either has _or has had_ since the date of the order or judgment the means to pay the sum in respect of which he has made default and has refused or neglected or refuses or neglects to pay the same.”

It is the words that I have printed in italics that hit the poor man and the weekly wage earner, for of course it is generally provable that, although he has no present means to pay a debt, he _has had_ since the judgment means to pay which he has spent on the maintenance of his family, or, if you will, on beer or tobacco, or picture palaces, or, in a word, as good solvent middle cla.s.s people would say--improvidently.

The further matters enacted are all sensible enough, granted you approve of the main principle of imprisonment for small debtors. They deal with proof of means of the person making default, allowing such proof to be given in such manner as the Court thinks just, and for these purposes the debtor and any witnesses may be summoned and examined on oath according to the prescribed rules.