Part 27 (1/2)
[Footnote 868: _Ibid._, v., 1292.]
[Footnote 869: _Ibid._, v., 287.]
[Footnote 870: _L. and P._, vi., 1479.]
[Footnote 871: _Ibid._, vi., 324.]
The great fear of Englishmen was lest Charles should ruin them by prohibiting the trade with Flanders. ”Their only comfort,” wrote Chapuys, ”is that the King persuades the people that it is not in your Majesty's power to do so.”[872] Henry had put the matter to a practical test, in the autumn of 1533, by closing the Staple at Calais.[873] It is possible that the dispute between him and the merchants, alleged as the cause for this step, was real; but the King could have provided his subjects with no more forcible object-lesson.
Distress was felt at once in Flanders; complaints grew so clamorous that the Regent sent an emba.s.sy post-haste to Henry to remonstrate, and to represent the closing of the Staple as an infraction of commercial treaties. Henry coldly replied that he had broken no treaties at all; it was merely a private dispute between his merchants and himself, in which foreign powers had no ground for intervention.
The envoys had to return, convinced against their will. The Staple at Calais was soon reopened, but the English King was able to (p. 309) demonstrate to his people that the Flemings ”could not do without England's trade, considering the outcry they made when the Staple of Calais was closed for only three months”.
[Footnote 872: _Ibid._, vi., 1460.]
[Footnote 873: _Ibid._, vi., 1510, 1523, 1571.]
Henry, indeed, might almost be credited with second-sight into the Emperor's mind. On 31st May, 1533, Charles's council discussed the situation.[874] After considering Henry's enormities, the councillors proceeded to deliberate on the possible remedies. There were three: justice, force and a combination of both. The objections to relying on methods of justice, that is, on the papal sentence, were, firstly, that Henry would not obey, and secondly, that the Pope was not to be trusted. The objections to the employment of force were, that war would imperil the whole of Europe, and especially the Emperor's dominions, and that Henry had neither used violence towards Catherine nor given Charles any excuse for breaking the Treaty of Cambrai.
Eventually, it was decided to leave the matter to Clement. He was to be urged to give sentence against Henry, but on no account to lay England under an interdict, as that ”would disturb her intercourse with Spain and Flanders. If, therefore, an interdict be resorted to, it should be limited to one diocese, or to the place where Henry dwells.”[875] Such an interdict might put a premium on a.s.sa.s.sination, but otherwise neither Henry nor his people were likely to care much about it. The Pope should, however, be exhorted to depose the English King; that might pave the way for Mary's accession and for the predominance in England of the Emperor's influence; but the execution of the sentence must not be entrusted to Charles.[876] It would (p. 310) be excellent if James V. or the Irish would undertake to beard the lion in his den, but the Emperor did not see his way clear to accepting the risk himself.
[Footnote 874: _L. and P._, vi., 568.]
[Footnote 875: _Ibid._, vi., 570.]
[Footnote 876: In January, 1534, Charles's amba.s.sador at Rome repudiated the Pope's statement that the Emperor had ever offered to a.s.sist in the execution of the Pope's sentence (_L. and P._, vii., 96).]
Charles was, indeed, afraid, not merely of Henry, but of Francis, who was meditating fresh Italian schemes; and various expedients were suggested to divert his attention in other directions. He might be a.s.sisted in an attack upon Calais. ”Calais,” was Charles's cautious comment, ”is better as it is, for the security of Flanders.”[877] The Pope hinted that the grant of Milan would win over Francis. It probably would; but Charles would have abandoned half a dozen aunts rather than see Milan in French possession. His real concern in the matter was not the injustice to Catherine, but the destruction of the prospect of Mary's succession. That was a tangible political interest, and Charles was much less anxious to have Henry censured than to have Mary's legitimate claim to the throne established.[878] He was a great politician, absolutely impervious to personal wrong when its remedy conflicted with political interests. ”Though the Emperor,” he said, ”is bound to the Queen, this is a private matter, and public considerations must be taken into account.” And public considerations, as he admitted a year later, ”compelled him to conciliate (p. 311) Henry”.[879] So he refused Chapuys' request to be recalled lest his presence in England should lead people to believe that Charles had condoned Henry's marriage with Anne Boleyn,[880] and dissuaded Catherine from leaving England.[881] The least hint to Francis of any hostile intent towards Henry would, thought Charles, be at once revealed to the English King, and the two would join in making war on himself. War he was determined to avoid, for, apart from the ruin of Flanders, which it would involve, Henry and Francis had long been intriguing with the Lutherans in Germany. A breach might easily precipitate civil strife in the Empire; and, indeed, in June, 1534, Wurtemberg was wrested from the Habsburgs by Philip of Hesse with the connivance of France. Francis, too, was always believed to have a working agreement with the Turk; Barbarossa was giving no little cause for alarm in the Mediterranean; while Henry on his part had established close relations with Lubeck and Hamburg, and was fomenting dissensions in Denmark, the crown of which he was offered but cautiously (p. 312) declined.[882]
[Footnote 877: _Ibid._, vi., 774. The sense of this pa.s.sage is spoilt in _L. and P._ by the comma being placed after ”better” instead of after ”is”.]
[Footnote 878: Control over England was the great objective of Habsburg policy. In 1513 Margaret of Savoy was pressing Henry to have the succession settled on his sister Mary, then betrothed to Charles himself (_ibid._, i., 4833).]
[Footnote 879: _L. and P._, vii., 229. All that Charles thought practicable was to ”embarra.s.s Henry in his own kingdom, and to execute what the Emperor wrote to the Irish chiefs” (_cf._ vii., 342, 353).]
[Footnote 880: _Ibid._, vi., 351. Charles's conduct is a striking vindication of Wolsey's foresight in 1528, when he told Campeggio that the Emperor would not wage war over the divorce of Catherine, and said there would be a thousand ways of keeping on good terms with him (Ehses, _Romische Dok.u.mente_, p. 69; _L. and P._, iv., 4881). Dr. Gairdner thinks Wolsey was insincere in this remark (_English Hist.
Rev._, xii., 242), but he seems to have gauged Charles V.'s character and embarra.s.sments accurately.]
[Footnote 881: _L. and P._, vi., 863. Her departure would have prejudiced Mary's claim to the throne, but Charles's advice was particularly callous in view of the reports which Chapuys was sending Charles of her treatment.]
[Footnote 882: _L. and P._, vii., 737, 871, 957-58, and vol. viii., _pa.s.sim_; _cf._ C.F. Wurm, _Die politischen Beziehungen Heinrichs VIII. zu Mercus Meyer und Jurgen Wullenwever_, Hamburg, 1852.]
This incurable jealousy between Francis and Charles made the French King loth to weaken his friends.h.i.+p with Henry. The English King was careful to impress upon the French amba.s.sador that he could, in the last resort, make his peace with Charles by taking back Catherine and by restoring Mary to her place in the line of succession.[883] Francis had too poignant a recollection of the results of the union between Henry and Charles from 1521 to 1525 ever to risk its renewal. The age of the crusades and chivalry was gone; commercial and national rivalries were as potent in the sixteenth century as they are to-day. Then, as in subsequent times, mutual suspicions made impossible an effective concert of Europe against the Turk. The fall of Rhodes and the death of one of Charles's brothers-in-law at Mohacz and the expulsion of another from the throne of Denmark had never been avenged, and, in 1534, the Emperor was compelled to evacuate Coron.[884] If Europe could not combine against the common enemy of the Faith, was it likely to combine against one who, in spite of all his enormities, was still an orthodox Christian? And, without a combination of princes to execute them, papal censures, excommunications, interdicts, and all the spiritual paraphernalia, served only to probe the hollowness of papal pretensions, and to demonstrate the deafness of Europe to the calls of religious enthusiasm. In Spain, at least, it might have been thought that every sword would leap from its scabbard at a summons (p. 313) from Charles on behalf of the Spanish Queen. ”Henry,” wrote Chapuys, ”has always fortified himself by the consent of Parliament.”[885] It would be well, he thought, if Charles would follow suit, and induce the Cortes of Aragon and Castile, ”or at least the grandees,” to offer their persons and goods in Catherine's cause. Such an offer, if published in England, ”will be of inestimable service”. But here comes the proof of Charles's pitiful impotence; in order to obtain this public offer, the Emperor was ”to give them privately an exemption from such offer and promise of persons and goods”. It was to be one more pretence like the others, and unfortunately for the Pope and for the Emperor, Henry had an inconvenient habit of piercing disguises.
[Footnote 883: _L. and P._, vi., 1572.]
[Footnote 884: _Ibid._, vii., 670.]
[Footnote 885: _L. and P._, vi., 720.]
The strength of Henry's position at home was due to a similar lack of unity among his domestic enemies. If the English people had wished to depose him, they could have effected their object without much difficulty. In estimating the chances of a possible invasion, it was pointed out how entirely dependent Henry was upon his people: he had only one castle in London, and only a hundred yeomen of the guard to defend him.[886] He would, in fact, have been powerless against a united people or even against a partial revolt, if well organised and really popular. There was chronic discontent throughout the Tudor period, but it was sectional. The remnants of the old n.o.bility always hated Tudor methods of government, and the poorer commons were sullen at their ill-treatment by the lords of the land; but there was no concerted basis of action between the two. The dominant cla.s.s (p. 314) was commercial, and it had no grievance against Henry, while it feared alike the lords and the lower orders. In the spoliation of the Church temporal lords and commercial men, both of whom could profit thereby, were agreed; and nowhere was there much sympathy with the Church as an inst.i.tution apart from its doctrine. Chapuys himself admits that the act, depriving the clergy of their profits from leases, was pa.s.sed ”to please the people”;[887] and another conservative declared that, if the Church were deprived of all its temporal goods, many would be glad and few would bemoan.[888] Sympathy with Catherine and hatred of Anne were general, but people thought, like Charles, that these were private griefs, and that public considerations must be taken into account. Englishmen are at all times reluctant to turn out one Government until they see at least the possibility of another to take its place, and the only alternative to Henry VIII. was anarchy. The opposition could not agree on a policy, and they could not agree on a leader. There were various grandchildren of Edward IV. and of Clarence, who might put forward distant claims to the throne; and there were other candidates in whose mult.i.tude lay Henry's safety. It was quite certain that the pus.h.i.+ng of any one of these claimants would throw the rest on Henry's side. James V., whom at one time Chapuys favoured, knew that a Scots invasion would unite the whole of England against him; and Charles was probably wise in rebuking his amba.s.sador's zeal, and in thinking that any attempt on his own part would be more disastrous to himself than to Henry.[889] For all (p. 315) this, the English King was, as Chapuys remarks, keeping a very watchful eye on the countenance of his people,[890] seeing how far he could go and where he must stop, and neglecting no precaution for the peace and security of himself and his kingdom. Acts were pa.s.sed to strengthen the navy, improvements in arms and armament were being continually tested, and the fortifications at Calais, on the Scots Borders and elsewhere were strengthened. Wales was reduced to law and order, and, through the intermediation of Francis, a satisfactory peace was made with Scotland.[891]
[Footnote 886: _Ibid._, vi., App. 7.]