Part 2 (1/2)

3 For we coled triangle, or a quarter-tone, or a semi-tone, but by a certain tradition of art we learn each of these things And thus those who know theood and evil, and nobleness and baseness, and the seemly and the unseemly, and happiness and misfortune, and what is our concern and what is not, and what ought to be done and what not-who hath cos? Thus we all use these terms, and endeavor to fit our natural conceptions to every several thing _He did well, rightly, not rightly, he failed, he succeeded, he is unrighteous, he is righteous_-which of us spareth to use terms like these? Which of us will defer the use of thenorant eometry or music? But this is the reason of it: we coht by Nature sos we have added thereto our own conceit[2] _For how_, saith one, _do I not knohat is noble and what is base_? Have I not the notion of it? Truly _And do I not apply it to things severally?_ You do apply it _Do I not, then, apply it rightly?_ But here lies the whole question, and here conceit entereth in For setting out froo on by a false application to that which is disputed For if, in addition to those things, they had gained also this power of application, ould then hinder thehtly the natural conceptions to things severally, tell me, whence have you this assurance?

--”Because it seems so to me”

But to another it seeht or not?

--”He doth think it”

Can ye, then, both be rightly applying the conceptions in matters wherein your opinions contradict each other?

--”We cannot”

Have you, then, aught better to show for your application, or aught above this, that it seemeth so to you? But what else doth a ht? And doth this rule suffice for him?

--”It doth not suffice”

Co What is this?

4 Behold, the beginning of philosophy is the observation of how men contradict each other, and the search whence cometh this contradiction, and the censure and mistrust of bare opinion And it is an inquiry into that which seehtly seems; and the discovery of a certain rule, even as we have found a balance for weights, and a plu of philosophy Are all things right to all to whoht?

--”Nay, then, not all things, but those that seeht”

And why to you yptians? Why , then, doth not for every hts or measures doth the bare appearance content us, but for each case we have discovered so? And how could it be that there were no evidence or discovery of things the most necessary for men? There is, then, a rule And wherefore do we not seek it, and find it, and, having found it, henceforth use it without transgression, and not so er without it? For this it is, I think, that when it is discovered cureth of theiralone; so that henceforth, setting out froanized body of natural conceptions in all our several dealings

5 What is the subject about which we are inquiring? Pleasure? Submit it to the rule, cast it into the scales Now the Good ht to trust in it? _Truly_ And we ought to have faith in it? _We ought_ And ought we to trust in anything which is unstable? _Nay_ And hath pleasure any stability? _It hath not_ Take it, then, and fling it out of the scales, and set it far away froht, and one balance doth not suffice, then take another Is it right to be elated in what is good?

_Yea_ And is it right to be elated then in the presence of a pleasure?

See to it that thou say not it is right; or I shall not hold thee worthy even of the balance[3] Thus are things judged and weighed, when the rules are held in readiness And the aim of philosophy is this, to examine and establish the rules And to use theood man

CHAPTER II

ON THE NATURAL CONCEPTIONS

1 The natural conceptions are common to all men, and one cannot contradict another For which of us but affirms that the Good is profitable, and that we should choose it, and in all circumstances follow and pursue it? Which of us but affir? Where, then, doth the contradiction arise?

Concerning the application of the natural conceptions to things severally When one saith, _He did well, he is a worthy man_, and another, _Nay, but he did foolishly_, then there is a contradiction a men, one with another And there is the sayptians and the Rohteous should be preferred to all things and in all cases pursued, but whether this be righteous or unrighteous, to eat the flesh of swine And ye can discover the saaaht and fair come to pass?

--”That should it”

And what sayest thou, Achilles, Doth it not please thee that what is fair and right should be done?