Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 4 (1/2)
Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Anything Above the Natural Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now matters of faith, surpa.s.s man's natural reason, since they are things unseen as stated above (Q. 1, A. 4). Therefore to believe seems unnecessary for salvation.
Obj. 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to a.s.sent to matters, wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true or false, according to Job 12:11: ”Doth not the ear discern words?”
Now a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our judgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such matters. Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation.
Obj. 3: Further, man's salvation rests on G.o.d, according to Ps.
36:39: ”But the salvation of the just is from the Lord.” Now ”the invisible things” of G.o.d ”are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity,” according to Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not necessary for man's salvation, that he should believe certain things.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): ”Without faith it is impossible to please G.o.d.”
_I answer that,_ Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we find that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature, one of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement, while the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature.
Thus water by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the earth), while according to the movement of the moon, it moves round the centre by ebb and flow. In like manner the planets have their proper movements from west to east, while in accordance with the movement of the first heaven, they have a movement from east to west.
Now the created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to G.o.d, since other creatures do not attain to the universal, but only to something particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness either in _being_ only, as inanimate things, or also in _living,_ and in _knowing singulars,_ as plants and animals; whereas the rational nature, in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being.
Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which it acquires through a supernatural partic.i.p.ation of Divine goodness. Hence it was said above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8) that man's ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of G.o.d: to which vision man cannot attain unless he be taught by G.o.d, according to John 6:45: ”Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to Me.” Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by little and little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that ”it behooves a learner to believe.”
Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly happiness, he must first of all believe G.o.d, as a disciple believes the master who is teaching him.
Reply Obj. 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher nature, natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as man a.s.sents to first principles, by the natural light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this way, by the light of faith which G.o.d bestows on him, a man a.s.sents to matters of faith and not to those which are against faith.
Consequently ”there is no” danger or ”condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus,” and whom He has enlightened by faith.
Reply Obj. 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things of G.o.d in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to G.o.d from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): ”Many things are shown to thee above the understandings of man.”
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 4]
Whether It Is Necessary to Believe Those Things Which Can Be Proved by Natural Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in G.o.d's works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices.
Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can be known by natural reason.
Obj. 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the object of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Since therefore all things that can be known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.
Obj. 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the others should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is not necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason.
_On the contrary,_ It is necessary to believe that G.o.d is one and incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.
_I answer that,_ It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of G.o.d, is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by until late in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of G.o.d. The second reason is, in order that the knowledge of G.o.d may be more general.
For many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either through dullness of mind, or through having a number of occupations, and temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom would be altogether deprived of the knowledge of G.o.d, unless Divine things were brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The third reason is for the sake of cert.i.tude. For human reason is very deficient in things concerning G.o.d. A sign of this is that philosophers in their researches, by natural investigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge of G.o.d, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, as it were, by G.o.d Himself Who cannot lie.
Reply Obj. 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind for the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved by reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed.
Reply Obj. 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and about the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can be an object of faith for another, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 5).
Reply Obj. 3: Although all things that can be known by science are of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to beat.i.tude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.