Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 123 (1/2)

is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on (Q. 84, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2: ”Concupiscence of the eyes” does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power.

Reply Obj. 3: The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in _Metaph._ i: and so its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm.

x.x.xiii).

Reply Obj. 4: Avoidance of evil is caused by the appet.i.te for good, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 39, A. 2); and so those pa.s.sions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 6]

Whether Sin Is Alleviated on Account of a Pa.s.sion?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of pa.s.sion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now pa.s.sion is a cause of sin, as stated (A. 5). Therefore the more intense the pa.s.sion, the greater the sin. Therefore pa.s.sion does not diminish sin, but increases it.

Obj. 2: Further, a good pa.s.sion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil pa.s.sion does to sin. Now a good pa.s.sion increases merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil pa.s.sion also increases rather than diminishes a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the pa.s.sion that impels the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act.

Therefore pa.s.sion aggravates a sin.

_On the contrary,_ The pa.s.sion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12).

_I answer that,_ Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while pa.s.sion is a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te. Now the sensitive appet.i.te can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according as a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above (AA. 1, 2; Q. 10, A.

3); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a pa.s.sion being aroused in the sensitive appet.i.te.

Accordingly if we take pa.s.sion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a pa.s.sion, the more is it voluntary and under our control.

In this respect pa.s.sion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness.

On the other hand, a consequent pa.s.sion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Pa.s.sion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else--accidentally, i.e. beside his intention.

Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause.

Reply Obj. 2: A good pa.s.sion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well, rather by his pa.s.sion than by the judgment of his reason, such a pa.s.sion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the movement of the will incited by the pa.s.sion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement, as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 7]

Whether Pa.s.sion Excuses from Sin Altogether?

Objection 1: It would seem that pa.s.sion excuses from sin altogether.

For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a pa.s.sion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to Gal. 5:17: ”The flesh l.u.s.teth against the spirit ... so that you do not the things that you would.” Therefore pa.s.sion excuses from sin altogether.

Obj. 2: Further, pa.s.sion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 76, A. 3). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 8). Therefore pa.s.sion excuses from sin altogether.

Obj. 3: Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does pa.s.sion, which is a disease of the soul.