Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 115 (1/2)

Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously.

Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its cause.

_On the contrary,_ If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin.

_I answer that,_ In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on Matt. 7:18, ”A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit”: and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin.

The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes the sin, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2: If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a pa.s.sion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 7]

Whether a Circ.u.mstance Aggravates a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that a circ.u.mstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circ.u.mstance does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof.

Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circ.u.mstance.

Obj. 2: Further, a circ.u.mstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circ.u.mstance nowise aggravates a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from G.o.d). But circ.u.mstances affect sin on the part of the object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice.

_On the contrary,_ Ignorance of a circ.u.mstance diminishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circ.u.mstance, deserves to be forgiven (Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circ.u.mstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circ.u.mstance makes a sin more grievous.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1, 2), ”it is natural for a thing to be increased by that which causes it.” Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circ.u.mstance: because the fact that a man departs from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circ.u.mstances in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circ.u.mstances. This happens in three ways. First, in so far as a circ.u.mstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circ.u.mstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a circ.u.mstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. iii) that ”in taking his father's life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic.” Thirdly, a circ.u.mstance aggravates a sin by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circ.u.mstance: thus, taking another's property const.i.tutes the sin of theft; but if to this be added the circ.u.mstance that much is taken of another's property, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act.

Reply Obj. 1: Some circ.u.mstances do specify a moral act, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 10). Nevertheless a circ.u.mstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circ.u.mstance.

Reply Obj. 2: A circ.u.mstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it const.i.tutes the sin's species; because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin in relation to the malice of another circ.u.mstance.

Reply Obj. 3: Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circ.u.mstance. Therefore one may turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circ.u.mstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from G.o.d, to Whom man ought to be united by right reason.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 8]

Whether Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of Its Causing More Harm?

Objection 1: It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 5). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm.

Obj. 2: Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor.

Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm G.o.d, according to Job 35:6, 8: ”If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? ... Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee.” If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous than sins against G.o.d or oneself.

Obj. 3: Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace.

Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): ”Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes the integrity of nature.” Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as it does more harm.