Part I (Prima Pars) Part 176 (1/2)
Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): ”The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed.” Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate ”is a disposition inherent to changeable things.” But all creatures are changeable, and G.o.d alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 2). Therefore fate is in all things.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that ”some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by G.o.d. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by G.o.d, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): viz. that ”those things which are nigh to G.o.d have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate.” Hence it is clear that ”the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate”; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.
Reply Obj. 1: All the things mentioned in this pa.s.sage are done by G.o.d by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.
Reply Obj. 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
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QUESTION 117
OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (In Four Articles)
We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge?
(2) Whether man can teach an angel?
(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?
(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 1]
Whether One Man Can Teach Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (Matt. 22:8): ”Be not you called Rabbi”: on which the gloss of Jerome says, ”Lest you give to men the honor due to G.o.d.”
Therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to G.o.d. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is.
Obj. 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man.
Obj. 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know.
If of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7): ”Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle ... a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth.”
_I answer that,_ On this question there have been various opinions.
For Averroes, commenting on _De Anima_ iii, maintains that all men have one pa.s.sive intellect in common, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2).
From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the ident.i.ty of the thing known: for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one pa.s.sive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2).
Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the partic.i.p.ation of separate forms, as stated above (Q. 84, AA. 3, 4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a partic.i.p.ation of separate substances. But against this we have proved above (Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 3) that the pa.s.sive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).