Part I (Prima Pars) Part 172 (1/2)

Reply Obj. 2: In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained princ.i.p.ally through the grace of G.o.d, secondarily through the guardians.h.i.+p of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings 6:16), Eliseus said to his servant: ”Fear not, for there are more with us than with them.”

Reply Obj. 3: The a.s.sault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in a.s.sailing men.

But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 2]

Whether to Tempt Is Proper to the Devil?

Objection 1: It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil.

For G.o.d is said to tempt, according to Gen. 22:1, ”G.o.d tempted Abraham.” Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt G.o.d, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt.

Obj. 2: Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.

Obj. 3: Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears from what has been said above (Q. 111, A. 2), it seems that it is not in their province to tempt.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Thess. 3:5): ”Lest perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you”: to which the gloss adds, ”that is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt.”

_I answer that,_ To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.

From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for the sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to tempt G.o.d; for man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an experiment of G.o.d's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be his proper office to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he does this as minister of the devil. G.o.d is said to tempt that He may know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. Hence it is written (Deut. 13:3): ”The Lord your G.o.d trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him.”

The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity: of which things the devil also makes use in tempting.

Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of man G.o.d alone knows, Who is the ”weigher of spirits” (Prov. 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more p.r.o.ne to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most p.r.o.ne.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated above (Q. 111, A. 3), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can nevertheless be inclined.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 3]

Whether All Sins Are Due to the Temptation of the Devil?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that ”the mult.i.tude of demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others.”

And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that ”all malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil.”

Obj. 2: Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of the Jews (John 8:44): ”You are of your father the devil.” But this was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation.

Therefore every sin is due to the devil's instigation.

Obj. 3: Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are deputed to a.s.sail men. But every good thing we do is due to the suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the instigation of the devil.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): ”Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from the movement of our free-will.”

_I answer that,_ One thing can be the cause of another in two ways; directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there resulted a p.r.o.neness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.

But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were no devil, men would have the desire for food and love and such like pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to curb this appet.i.te and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates ”through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our first parents,” as Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii).

Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.