Part I (Prima Pars) Part 145 (1/2)
Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between ”likeness” and ”image.” For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we have said above (A. 1): and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that ”the spirit”
(namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of G.o.d. ”But the other parts of man,” belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the body, ”are in the opinion of some made to G.o.d's likeness.” In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of G.o.d is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings.
But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies ”an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man.” In the same sense ”likeness” is said to belong to ”the love of virtue”: for there is no virtue without love of virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: ”Likeness” is not distinct from ”image” in the general notion of ”likeness” (for thus it is included in ”image”); but so far as any ”likeness” falls short of ”image,” or again, as it perfects the idea of ”image.”
Reply Obj. 2: The soul's essence belongs to the ”image,” as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.
Reply Obj. 3: Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural ”likeness” exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term ”image” from one point of view and from another the term ”likeness.”
Reply Obj. 4: Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of ”image”; but love of virtue belongs to ”likeness,” as virtue itself belongs to likeness.
_______________________
QUESTION 94
OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT (In Four Articles)
We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning the first there are two things to be considered:
(1) The condition of man as to his intellect;
(2) the condition of man as to his will.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of G.o.d?
(2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?
(3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?
(4) Whether he could err or be deceived?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 1]
Whether the First Man Saw G.o.d Through His Essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first man saw G.o.d through His Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. But the first man, ”while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): ”If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!” Therefore the first man in paradise saw G.o.d through His Essence.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that ”the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain.” But our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore man saw G.o.d through His Essence.
Obj. 3: Further, the vision of G.o.d in His Essence is whereby G.o.d is seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence ”saw G.o.d immediately,” as the Master of the Sentences a.s.serts (Sent.
iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw G.o.d through His Essence.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): ”That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural.” But to see G.o.d through His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see G.o.d through His Essence.
_I answer that,_ The first man did not see G.o.d through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw G.o.d in a vision, when ”G.o.d cast a deep sleep upon Adam” (Gen. 2:21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beat.i.tude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence has the same relation to G.o.d as a man has to beat.i.tude. Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beat.i.tude, since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness.
Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of G.o.d can willingly turn away from G.o.d, which means to sin. Hence all who see G.o.d through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of G.o.d, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see G.o.d through His Essence.
Nevertheless he knew G.o.d with a more perfect knowledge than we do now.