Part I (Prima Pars) Part 61 (2/2)

Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d and the divine essence are the same, as is clear from what is above explained (Q. 3, A. 3). But, as was shown, it is true to say that ”G.o.d begets G.o.d.” Therefore this is also true: ”Essence begets essence.”

Obj. 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.

Obj. 5: Further, the essence is ”a thing begetting,” because the essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not begetting, the essence will be ”a thing begetting,” and ”not begetting”: which cannot be.

Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): ”The Father is the principle of the whole G.o.dhead.” But He is principle only by begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the G.o.dhead.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): ”Nothing begets itself.” But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only, since nothing exists in G.o.d as distinguished from the divine essence.

Therefore the essence does not beget essence.

_I answer that,_ Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in a.s.serting that as we can say ”G.o.d begot G.o.d,” so we can say ”Essence begot essence”: considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity G.o.d is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its signification as above stated (A. 4). Now although ”G.o.d” is really the same as ”G.o.dhead,” nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same. For since this word ”G.o.d” signifies the divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, ”G.o.d,” as, for instance, we can say ”G.o.d is begotten” or is ”Begetter,” as above explained (A. 4). The word ”essence,”

however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the _supposita._

Reply Obj. 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal names; as when we find ”essence from essence”; or ”wisdom from wisdom”; we should take the sense to be, _the Son_ who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom.

Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong to _supposita._ So ”nature from nature,” and ”wisdom from wisdom” are less inexact than ”essence from essence.”

Reply Obj. 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally; whereas G.o.d begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either directly or accidentally.

Reply Obj. 3: Although G.o.d and the divine essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.

Reply Obj. 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of ident.i.ty by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different. This objection would hold good as regards things which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.

Reply Obj. 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the light of _suppositum,_ whereas the adjective indicates something added to the _suppositum._ Therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the _suppositum_ implied in the substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the ”essence is begetting”; yet we can say that the ”essence is a thing begetting,” or that it is ”G.o.d begetting,” if ”thing” and G.o.d stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no contradiction in saying that ”essence is a thing begetting,” and ”a thing not begetting”; because in the first case ”thing” stands for person, and in the second it stands for the essence.

Reply Obj. 6: So far as G.o.dhead is one in several _supposita,_ it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when we say, ”the Father is the principle of the whole G.o.dhead,” the term G.o.dhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the whole G.o.dhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 6]

Whether the Persons Can Be Predicated of the Essential Terms?

Objection 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, ”G.o.d is three persons”; or ”G.o.d is the Trinity.” For it is false to say, ”man is every man,” because it cannot be verified as regards any particular subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man. In the same way this proposition, ”G.o.d is the Trinity,” cannot be verified of any one of the _supposita_ of the divine nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, ”G.o.d is the Trinity,” is false.

Obj. 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication; as when I say, ”animal is man”; for it is accidental to animal to be man. But this name ”G.o.d” as regards the three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this name ”G.o.d,” except in an accidental sense.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii, in coena Domini], ”We believe that one G.o.d is one divinely named Trinity.”

_I answer that,_ As above explained (A. 5), although adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to the real ident.i.ty of essence and person. The divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the essence as if we were to say, ”The essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost.” And because this word ”G.o.d”

can of itself stand for the essence, as above explained (A. 4, ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, ”The essence is the three persons”; so likewise it is true to say, ”G.o.d is the three persons.”

Reply Obj. 1: As above explained this term ”man” can of itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the universal human nature. So it is false to say, ”Man is every man”; because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. On the contrary, this word ”G.o.d” can of itself be taken for the divine essence. So, although to say of any of the _supposita_ of the divine nature, ”G.o.d is the Trinity,” is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the divine essence. This was denied by Porreta.n.u.s because he did not take note of this distinction.

Reply Obj. 2: When we say, ”G.o.d,” or ”the divine essence is the Father,” the predication is one of ident.i.ty, and not of the lower in regard to a higher species: because in G.o.d there is no universal and singular. Hence, as this proposition, ”The Father is G.o.d” is of itself true, so this proposition ”G.o.d is the Father” is true of itself, and by no means accidentally.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 7]

Whether the Essential Names Should Be Appropriated to the Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, ”careless words involve risk of heresy” [*In substance Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons.

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