Part I (Prima Pars) Part 47 (1/2)
(3) Whether in G.o.d there can be several relations distinct from each other?
(4) The number of these relations.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 1]
Whether There Are Real Relations in G.o.d?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in G.o.d.
For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), ”All possible predicaments used as regards the G.o.dhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated relatively.” But whatever really exists in G.o.d can be predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, ”Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is the relation of the same to the same.” But a relation of this kind is only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations, but are formed only by the mind.
Obj. 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a principle. But to say that G.o.d is the principle of creatures does not import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity in G.o.d is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same reason to the other relations in G.o.d.
Obj. 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation in G.o.d, consequent upon generation, are only logical relations.
_On the contrary,_ The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation existed in G.o.d, it would follow that G.o.d is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy.
_I answer that,_ relations exist in G.o.d really; in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quant.i.ty and quality, in their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the ident.i.ty of the same nature, as above explained (Q. 27, AA. 2, 4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.
Reply Obj. 1: Relations.h.i.+p is not predicated of G.o.d according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not wish to exclude relation in G.o.d; but he wished to show that it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of relation to another.
Reply Obj. 2: The relation signified by the term ”the same” is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing; because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically.
Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of ident.i.ty, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of ident.i.ty.
Reply Obj. 3: As the creature proceeds from G.o.d in diversity of nature, G.o.d is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will, as is above explained (Q. 14, AA. 3, 4; Q. 19, A. 8).
Therefore there is no real relation in G.o.d to the creature; whereas in creatures there is a real relation to G.o.d; because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails dependence on G.o.d. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.
Reply Obj. 4: Relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in G.o.d.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 2]
Whether Relation in G.o.d Is the Same As His Essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that ”not all that is said of G.o.d is said of His substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not refer to the substance.” Therefore the relation is not the divine essence.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, ”every relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is a man, and slave is a man.” Therefore, if relations exist in G.o.d, there must be something else besides relation in G.o.d. This can only be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.
Obj. 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially itself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and self-subsisting (Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore relation is not the divine essence.
_On the contrary,_ Everything which is not the divine essence is a creature. But relation really belongs to G.o.d; and if it is not the divine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: ”Let us adore the distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty.”
_I answer that,_ It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims.
For he said that the divine relations are a.s.sistant, or externally affixed.
To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident; which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that of _relation,_ as in quant.i.ty and quality, even the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for quant.i.ty is called the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be ”a.s.sistant,” and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree considered relation in the former mode only.