Part 12 (1/2)
Fearing that the water on the bar at the entrance of the harbor was not of sufficient depth to admit the pa.s.sage of the largest s.h.i.+ps of the French fleet without much difficulty and danger, Was.h.i.+ngton had turned his attention to other objects which might be eventually pursued.
General Sullivan, who commanded the troops in Rhode Island, was directed (July 21, 1778) to prepare for an enterprise against Newport, and Lafayette was detached with two brigades to join him at Providence. The next day Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton returned to camp with the final determination of the Count D'Estaing to relinquish the meditated attack on the fleet in the harbor of New York, in consequence of the impracticability of pa.s.sing the bar.
General Greene was immediately ordered to Rhode Island, of which State he was a native, and Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens was directed to attach himself to the French admiral and to facilitate all his views by procuring whatever might give them effect, after which he was to act with the army under Sullivan.
Writing to the President of Congress (August 3, 1778), Was.h.i.+ngton says: ”As the army was encamped and there was no great prospect of a sudden removal, I judged it advisable to send General Greene to the eastward on Wednesday last, being fully persuaded his services, as well in the quartermaster line as in the field, would be of material importance in the expedition against the enemy in that quarter. He is intimately acquainted with the whole of that country, and, besides, he has an extensive interest and influence in it. And, in justice to General Greene, I take occasion to observe that the public is much indebted to him for his judicious management and active exertions in his present department. When he entered upon it, he found it in a most confused, distracted, and dest.i.tute state. This, by his conduct and industry, has undergone a very happy change and such as enabled us, with great facility, to make a sudden move, with the whole army and baggage, from Valley Forge, in pursuit of the enemy, and to perform a march to this place. In a word, he has given the most general satisfaction, and his affairs carry much the face of method and system. I also consider it as an act of justice to speak of the conduct of Colonel Wadsworth, commissary-general. He has been indefatigable in his exertions to provide for the army, and, since his appointment, our supplies of provision have been good and ample.”
We copy this extract from Was.h.i.+ngton's correspondence because it does justice to Greene and gives us information of the favorable change which had taken place in the condition of the army since its dreary sojourn at Valley Forge.
The resolution being taken to proceed against Rhode Island, the fleet got under way and on the 25th of July (1778) appeared off Newport and cast anchor about five miles from that place; soon after which General Sullivan visited D'Estaing and concerted with him a plan of operations.
The fleet was to enter the harbor and land the French troops on the west side of the island, a little to the north of Dyer's Island. The Americans were to land at the same time on the opposite coast under cover of the guns of a frigate.
A delay of several days now took place on account of the tardiness of the neighboring militia in joining Sullivan's army.
As the militia of New Hamps.h.i.+re and Ma.s.sachusetts approached, Sullivan joined Greene at Tiverton and it was agreed with the admiral that the fleet should enter the main channel immediately (August 8th), and that the descent should be made the succeeding day. The French fleet pa.s.sed the British batteries and entered the harbor without receiving or doing any considerable damage.
The militia not arriving precisely at the time they were expected, Sullivan could not hazard the movement which had been concerted, and stated to the Count the necessity of postponing it till the next day.
Meanwhile the preparations for the descent being perceived, General Pigot drew the troops which had been stationed on the north end of the island into the lines at Newport.
On discovering this circ.u.mstance the next morning, Sullivan determined to avail himself of it and to take immediate possession of the works which had been abandoned. The whole army crossed the east pa.s.sage and landed on the north end of Rhode Island. This movement gave great offense to D'Estaing who resented the indelicacy supposed to have been committed by Sullivan in landing before the French and without consulting him.
Unfortunately some difficulties on subjects of mere punctilio had previously arisen. D'Estaing was a land as well as sea officer, and held the high rank of lieutenant-general in the service of France. Sullivan being only a major-general, some misunderstanding on this delicate point had been apprehended, and Was.h.i.+ngton had suggested to him the necessity of taking every precaution to avoid it. This, it was supposed, had been effected in their first conference, in which it was agreed that the Americans should land first, after which the French should land to be commanded by D'Estaing in person. The motives for this arrangement are not stated. Either his own after-reflections or the suggestions of others dissatisfied D'Estaing with it and he insisted that the descent should be made on both sides of the island precisely at the same instant, and that one wing of the American army should be attached to the French and land with them. He also declined commanding in person and wished Lafayette to take charge of the French troops as well as of the Americans attached to them.
It being feared that this alteration of the plan might endanger both its parts D'Estaing was prevailed on to reduce his demand from one wing of the American army to 1,000 militia. When afterward Sullivan crossed over into the island before the time to which he had himself postponed the descent, and without giving previous notice to the count of this movement, considerable excitement was manifested. The count refused to answer Sullivan's letter, and charged Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury, who delivered it, with being more an American than a Frenchman.
At this time a British fleet appeared which, after sailing close into the land and communicating with General Pigot, withdrew some distance and came to anchor off Point Judith, just without the narrow inlet leading into the harbor.
After it had been ascertained that the destination of the Count D'Estaing was America, he was followed by a squadron of twelve s.h.i.+ps of the line under Admiral Byron who was designed to relieve Lord Howe, that n.o.bleman having solicited his recall. The vessels composing this squadron meeting with weather unusually bad for the season, and being separated in different storms, arrived, after lingering through a tedious pa.s.sage in various degrees of distress, on different and remote parts of the American coast. Between the departure of D'Estaing from the Hook on the 23d of July (1778) and the 30th of that month, four s.h.i.+ps of sixty-four and fifty guns arrived at Sandy Hook.
This addition to the British fleet, though it left Lord Howe considerably inferior to the Count D'Estaing, determined him to attempt the relief of Newport. He sailed from New York on the 6th of August and on the 9th appeared in sight of the French fleet before intelligence of his departure could be received by the admiral.
At the time of his arrival the wind set directly into the harbor so that it was impossible to get out of it, but it s.h.i.+fted suddenly to the northeast the next morning and the count determined to stand out to sea and give battle. Previous to leaving port (August 10th) he informed General Sullivan that on his return he would land his men as that officer should advise.
Not choosing to give the advantage of the weather-gauge Lord Howe also weighed anchor and stood out to sea. He was followed by D'Estaing, and both fleets were soon out of sight.
The militia were now arrived and Sullivan's army amounted to 10,000 men. Notwithstanding some objections made by Lafayette to his commencing operations before the return of D'Estaing, Sullivan determined to commence the siege immediately. Before this determination could be executed a furious storm blew down all the tents, rendered the arms unfit for immediate use, and greatly damaged the ammunition, of which fifty rounds had just been delivered to each man. The soldiers having no shelter suffered extremely, and several perished in the storm which continued three days. On the return of fair weather the siege was commenced and continued without any material circ.u.mstance for several days.
As no intelligence had been received from the admiral the situation of the American army was becoming very critical. On the evening of the 19th their anxieties were relieved for a moment by the reappearance of the French fleet.
The two admirals, desirous the one of gaining and the other of retaining the advantage of the wind, had employed two days in maneuvering without coming to action. Toward the close of the second they were on the point of engaging when they were separated by the violent storm which had been so severely felt on sh.o.r.e and which dispersed both fleets. Some single vessels afterward fell in with each other, but no important capture was made, and both fleets retired in a very shattered condition, the one to the harbor of New York and the other to that of Newport.
A letter was immediately dispatched by D'Estaing to Sullivan, informing him that, in pursuance of orders from the King and of the advice of all his officers, he had taken the resolution to carry the fleet to Boston.
His instructions directed him to sail for Boston should his fleet meet with any disaster or should a superior British fleet appear on the coast.
To be abandoned by the fleet in such critical circ.u.mstances and not only deprived of the brilliant success which they thought within their reach, but exposed to imminent hazard, caused much disappointment, irritation, and alarm in the American camp. Lafayette and Greene were dispatched to D'Estaing to remonstrate with him on the subject and to press his cooperation and a.s.sistance for two days only, in which time they flattered themselves the most Brilliant success would crown their efforts. But the count was not popular in the fleet; he was a military officer as well as a naval commander, and was considered as belonging to the army rather than to the navy. The officers of the sea service looked on him with a jealous and envious eye and were willing to thwart him as far as they were able with safety to themselves. When, on the pressing application of Lafayette and Greene, he again submitted the matter to their consideration, they took advantage of the letter of the admiral's instructions and unanimously adhered to their former resolution, sacrificing the service of their prince to their own petty jealousies and animosities. D'Estaing, therefore, felt himself constrained to set sail for Boston.
The departure of the French marine force left Sullivan's army in a critical situation. It was in a firm reliance on the cooperation of the French fleet that the expedition was undertaken, and its sudden and unexpected departure not only disappointed the sanguine hopes of speedy success, but exposed the army to much hazard, for the British troops under General Pigot might have been reinforced and the fleet might have cut off Sullivan's retreat.
The departure of the French fleet greatly discouraged the American army, and in a few days Sullivan's force was considerably diminished by desertion. On the 26th of August he therefore resolved to raise the siege and retreat to the north end of the island, and took the necessary precautions for the successful execution of that movement.
In the night of the 28th, Sullivan silently decamped and retired un.o.bserved. Early in the morning the British discovered his retreat and instantly commenced a pursuit. They soon overtook the light troops who covered the retreat of the American army, and who continued skirmis.h.i.+ng and retreating till they reached the north end of the island, where the army occupied a strong position at a place where the British formerly had a fortified post, the works of which had been strengthened during the two preceding days. There a severe conflict for about half an hour ensued, when the combatants mutually withdrew from the field. The loss of the armies was nearly equal, amounting to between two and three hundred killed or wounded in the course of the day.