Part 3 (1/2)
Q Terrace in front of the building on the river-bank.
R The St Lawrence river.
From Laverdiere's _Champlain_ in M'Gill University Library]
{65}
Out of this deadly danger Champlain escaped through the confession of a vacillating spirit named Natel, who regretted his share in the plot, but, once involved, had fears of the poniard. Finally he confessed to Testu, the pilot, who immediately informed Champlain. Questioned as to the motive, Natel replied that 'nothing had impelled them, except that they had imagined that by giving up the place into the hands of the Basques or Spaniards they might all become rich, and that they did not want to go back to France.' Duval, with five others, was then seized and taken to Tadoussac. Later in the summer Pontgrave brought the prisoners back to Quebec, where evidence was taken before a court-martial consisting of Champlain, Pontgrave, a captain, a surgeon, a first mate, a second mate, and some sailors. The sentence condemned four to death, of whom three were afterwards sent to France and put at the discretion of De Monts. Duval was 'strangled and hung at Quebec, and his head was put on the end of a pike, to be set in the most conspicuous place on our fort, that he might serve as an example to those who remained, leading them to deport themselves correctly in future, in the discharge of their {66} duty; and that the Spaniards and Basques, of whom there were large numbers in the country, might not glory in the event.'
It will be seen from the recital of Duval's conspiracy that Champlain was fortunate to escape the fate of Hudson and La Salle. While this _cause celebre_ was running its course to a tragic end, the still more famous _habitation_ grew day by day under the hands of busy workmen.
As fruits of a crowded and exciting summer Champlain could point to a group of three two-storeyed buildings. 'Each one,' he says, 'was three fathoms long and two and a half wide. The storehouse was six fathoms long and three wide, with a fine cellar six feet deep. I had a gallery made all round our buildings, on the outside, at the second storey, which proved very convenient. There were also ditches, fifteen feet wide and six deep. On the outer side of the ditches I constructed several spurs, which enclosed a part of the dwelling, at the points where we placed our cannon. Before the habitation there is a place four fathoms wide and six or seven long, looking out upon the river-bank. Surrounding the habitation are very good gardens.'
Three dwellings of eighteen by fifteen feet each were a sufficiently modest starting-point {67} for continental ambitions, even when supplemented by a storehouse of thirty-six feet by eighteen. In calling the gardens very good Champlain must have been speaking with relation to the circ.u.mstances, or else they were very small, for there is abundant witness to the sufferings which Quebec in its first twenty years might have escaped with the help of really abundant gardens. At St Croix and Port Royal an attempt had been made to plant seeds, and at Quebec Champlain doubtless renewed the effort, though with small practical result. The point is important in its bearing on the nature of the settlement. Quebec, despite such gardens as surrounded the _habitation_, was by origin an outpost of the fur trade, with a small, floating, and precarious population. Louis Hebert, the first real colonist, did not come till 1617.
Lacking vegetables, Quebec fed itself in part from the river and the forest. But almost all the food was brought from France. At times there was game, though less than at Port Royal. The river supplied eels in abundance, but when badly cooked they caused a fatal dysentery.
The first winter was a repet.i.tion of the horrors experienced at St Croix, with even a higher death-rate. Scurvy began {68} in February and lasted till the end of April. Of the eighteen whom it attacked, ten died. Dysentery claimed others. On June 5, 1609, word came that Pontgrave had arrived at Tadoussac. Champlain's comment is eloquent in its brevity. 'This intelligence gave me much satisfaction, as we entertained hopes of a.s.sistance from him. Out of the twenty-eight at first forming our company only eight remained, and half of these were ailing.'
The monopoly granted to De Monts had now reached its close, and trade was open to all comers. From 1609 until 1613 this unrestricted compet.i.tion ran its course, with the result that a larger market was created for beaver skins, while nothing was done to build up New France as a colony. On the whole, the most notable feature of the period is the establishment of close personal relations between Champlain and the Indians. It was then that he became the champion of the Algonquins and Hurons against the Iroquois League or Five Nations, inaugurating a policy which was destined to have profound consequences.
The considerations which governed Champlain in his dealings with the Indians lay quite outside the rights and wrongs of their tribal {69} wars. His business was to explore the continent on behalf of France, and accordingly he took conditions as he found them. The Indians had souls to be saved, but that was the business of the missionaries. In the state of nature all savages were much like wild animals, and alliance with one nation or another was a question which naturally settled itself upon the basis of drainage basins. Lands within the Laurentian watershed were inhabited mainly by Algonquins and Hurons, whose chief desire in life was to protect themselves from the Iroquois and avenge past injuries. The Five Nations dwelt far south from the Sault St Louis and did not send their furs there for the annual barter.
Champlain, ever in quest of a route to the East, needed friends along the great rivers of the wilderness. The way to secure them, and at the same time to widen the trading area, was to fight for the savages of the St Lawrence and the Ottawa against those of the Mohawk.
And Champlain was a good ally, as he proved in the forest wars of 1609 and 1615. With all their shortcomings, the Indians knew how to take the measure of a man. The difference between a warrior and a trader was {70} especially clear to their untutored minds, they themselves being much better fighters than men of commerce. Champlain, like others, suffered from their caprice, but they respected his bravery and trusted his word.
In the next chapter we shall attempt to follow Champlain through the wilderness, accompanied by its inhabitants, who were his guides and friends. For the present we must pursue the fortunes of Quebec, whose existence year by year hung upon the risk that court intrigue would prevail against the determination of two brave men.
From 1608 till 1611 De Monts had two partners, named Collier and Legendre, both citizens of Rouen. It was with the money of these three that the post at Quebec had been built and equipped. Champlain was their lieutenant and Pontgrave the commander of their trading s.h.i.+ps.
After four years of experience Collier and Legendre found the results unsatisfactory. 'They were unwilling,' says Champlain, 'to continue in the a.s.sociation, as there was no commission forbidding others from going to the new discoveries and trading with the inhabitants of the country. Sieur de Monts, seeing this, bargained with them for what remained at the settlement at Quebec, {71} in consideration of a sum of money which he gave them for their share.'
Thus the intrepid De Monts became sole proprietor of the _habitation_, and whatever cl.u.s.tered round it, at the foot of Cape Diamond. But the property was worthless if the fur trade could not be put on a stable basis. Quebec during its first three years had been a disappointment because, contrary to expectation, it gave its founders no advantage over their compet.i.tors which equalled the cost of maintenance. De Monts was still ready to a.s.sist Champlain in his explorations, but his resources, never great, were steadily diminis.h.i.+ng, and while trade continued unprofitable there were no funds for exploration. Moreover, the a.s.sa.s.sination of Henry IV in 1610 weakened De Monts at court.
Whatever Henry's shortcomings as a friend of Huguenots and colonial pioneers, their chances had been better with him than they now were with Marie de Medicis.[1] Champlain states that De Monts' engagements did not permit him to prosecute his interests at court. {72} Probably his engagements would have been less pressing had he felt more sure of favour. In any event, he made over to Champlain the whole conduct of such negotiations as were called for by the unsatisfactory state of affairs on the St Lawrence.
Champlain went to France. What follows is an illuminating comment upon the conditions that prevailed under the Bourbon monarchy. As Champlain saw things, the merchants who clamoured for freedom of trade were greedy pot-hunters. 'All they want,' he says, 'is that men should expose themselves to a thousand dangers to discover peoples and territories, that they themselves may have the profit and others the hards.h.i.+p. It is not reasonable that one should capture the lamb and another go off with the fleece. If they had been willing to partic.i.p.ate in our discoveries, use their means and risk their persons, they would have given evidence of their honour and n.o.bleness, but, on the contrary, they show clearly that they are impelled by pure malice that they may enjoy the fruit of our labours equally with ourselves.'
Against folk of this sort Champlain felt he had to protect the national interests which were so dear to him and De Monts. As things then {73} went, there was only one way to secure protection. At Fontainebleau a great n.o.ble was not habituated to render help without receiving a consideration. But protection could be bought by those who were able to pay for it.
The patron selected by Champlain was the Comte de Soissons, a Bourbon by lineage and first cousin of Henry IV. His kins.h.i.+p to the boy-king gave him, among other privileges, the power to exact from the regent gifts and offices as the price of his support. Possessing this leverage, Soissons caused himself to be appointed viceroy of Canada, with a twelve-year monopoly of the fur trade above Quebec. The monopoly thus re-established, its privileges could be sublet, Soissons receiving cash for the rights he conceded to the merchants, and they taking their chance to turn a profit out of the transaction.
Such at least was the theory; but before Soissons could turn his post into a source of revenue he died. Casting about for a suitable successor, Champlain selected another prince of the blood--Henri de Bourbon, Prince de Conde, who duly became viceroy of Canada and holder of the monopoly in succession to his uncle, the Comte de Soissons.
The part of Champlain in these transactions {74} is very conspicuous, and justly so. There was no advantage in being viceroy of Canada unless the post produced a revenue, and before the viceroy could receive a revenue some one was needed to organize the chief Laurentian traders into a company strong enough to pay Soissons or Conde a substantial sum. Champlain was convinced that the stability of trade (upon which, in turn, exploration depended) could be secured only in this way. It was he who memorialized President Jeannin[2]; enlisted the sympathy of the king's almoner, Beaulieu; appealed to the royal council; proposed the office of viceroy to Soissons; and began the endeavour to organize a new trading company. Considering that early in 1612 he suffered a serious fall from his horse, this record of activity is sufficiently creditable for one twelvemonth. Meanwhile the Indians at Sault St Louis grieved at his absence, and his enemies told them he was dead.
[Ill.u.s.tration: HENRI DE BOURBON, PRINCE DE CONDe, VICEROY OF NEW FRANCE. From Laverdiere's _Champlain_ in M'Gill University Library.]
It was not until 1614 that the new programme in its entirety could be carried out. {75} This time the delay came, not from the court, but from the merchants. Negotiations were in progress when the s.h.i.+ps sailed for the voyage of 1613, but Champlain could not remain to conclude them, as he felt that he must keep faith with the Indians.
However, on his return to France that autumn, he resumed the effort, and by the spring of 1614 the merchants of Rouen, St Malo, and La Roch.e.l.le had been brought to terms among themselves as partic.i.p.ants in a monopoly which was leased from the viceroy. Conde received a thousand crowns a year, and the new company also agreed to take out six families of colonists each season. In return it was granted the monopoly for eleven years. De Monts was a member of the company and Quebec became its headquarters in Canada. But the moving spirit was Champlain, who was appointed lieutenant to the viceroy with a salary and the right to levy for his own purposes four men from each s.h.i.+p trading in the river.
Once more disappointment followed. Save for De Monts, Champlain's company was not inspired by Champlain's patriotism. During the first three years of its existence the obligation to colonize was wilfully disregarded, while in the fourth year the treatment accorded {76} Louis Hebert shows that good faith counted for as little with the fur traders when they acted in a.s.sociation as when they were engaged in cut-throat compet.i.tion.
Champlain excepted, Hebert was the most admirable of those who risked death in the attempt to found a settlement at Quebec. He was not a Norman peasant, but a Parisian apothecary. We have already seen that he took part in the Acadian venture of De Monts and Poutrincourt.