Part 8 (2/2)

5 Varying situations continuously from that limit situation to our own would force us to make explicit the underlying rationale of ent.i.tlements and to consider whether ent.i.tlement considerations lexicographically precede the considerations of the usual theories of distributive justice, so that the Varying situations continuously from that limit situation to our own would force us to make explicit the underlying rationale of ent.i.tlements and to consider whether ent.i.tlement considerations lexicographically precede the considerations of the usual theories of distributive justice, so that the slightest slightest strand of ent.i.tlement outweighs the considerations of the usual theories of distributive justice. strand of ent.i.tlement outweighs the considerations of the usual theories of distributive justice.

6 See the selection from John Henry MacKay's novel, See the selection from John Henry MacKay's novel, The Anarchists. The Anarchists. reprinted in Leonard Krimmerman and Lewis Perry, eds., reprinted in Leonard Krimmerman and Lewis Perry, eds., Patterns Patterns of of Anarchy Anarchy (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966), in which an individualist anarchist presses upon a communist anarchist the following question: ”Would you, in the system of society which you call 'free Communism' prevent individuals from exchanging their labor among themselves by means of their own medium of exchange? And further: Would you prevent them from occupying land for the purpose of personal use?” The novel continues: ”[the] question was not to be escaped. If he answered 'Yes!' he admitted that society had the right of control over the individual and threw overboard the autonomy of the individual which he had always zealously defended; if on the other hand, he answered 'No!' he admitted the right of private property which he had just denied so emphatically.... Then he answered 'In Anarchy any number of men must have the right of forming a voluntary a.s.sociation, and so realizing their ideas in practice. Nor can I understand how any one could justly be driven from the land and house which he uses and occupies ... every serious man must declare himself: for Socialism, and thereby for force and against liberty, or for Anarchism, and thereby for liberty and against force.' ” In contrast, we find Noam Chomsky writing, ”Any consistent anarchist must oppose private owners.h.i.+p of the means of production,” ”the consistent anarchist then ... will be a socialist ... of a particular sort.” Introduction to Daniel Guerin, (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966), in which an individualist anarchist presses upon a communist anarchist the following question: ”Would you, in the system of society which you call 'free Communism' prevent individuals from exchanging their labor among themselves by means of their own medium of exchange? And further: Would you prevent them from occupying land for the purpose of personal use?” The novel continues: ”[the] question was not to be escaped. If he answered 'Yes!' he admitted that society had the right of control over the individual and threw overboard the autonomy of the individual which he had always zealously defended; if on the other hand, he answered 'No!' he admitted the right of private property which he had just denied so emphatically.... Then he answered 'In Anarchy any number of men must have the right of forming a voluntary a.s.sociation, and so realizing their ideas in practice. Nor can I understand how any one could justly be driven from the land and house which he uses and occupies ... every serious man must declare himself: for Socialism, and thereby for force and against liberty, or for Anarchism, and thereby for liberty and against force.' ” In contrast, we find Noam Chomsky writing, ”Any consistent anarchist must oppose private owners.h.i.+p of the means of production,” ”the consistent anarchist then ... will be a socialist ... of a particular sort.” Introduction to Daniel Guerin, Anarchism: From Theory to Practice Anarchism: From Theory to Practice (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pages xiii, xv. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pages xiii, xv.

7 Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Holden-Day, Inc., 1970, chaps. 6 and 6 *. Holden-Day, Inc., 1970, chaps. 6 and 6 *.

8 Oppression will be less noticeable if the background inst.i.tutions do not prohibit certain actions that upset the patterning (various exchanges or transfers of ent.i.tlement), but rather prevent them from being done, by nullifying them. Oppression will be less noticeable if the background inst.i.tutions do not prohibit certain actions that upset the patterning (various exchanges or transfers of ent.i.tlement), but rather prevent them from being done, by nullifying them.

9 See Gregory Vlastos, ”The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato” in his See Gregory Vlastos, ”The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato” in his Platonic Studies Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 3-34. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 3-34.

10 Further details which this statement should include are contained in my essay ”Coercion,” in Further details which this statement should include are contained in my essay ”Coercion,” in Philosophy, Science, and Method, Philosophy, Science, and Method, ed. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, and M. White (New York: St. Martin, 1969). ed. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, and M. White (New York: St. Martin, 1969).

11 On the themes in this and the next paragraph, see the writings of Armen Alchian On the themes in this and the next paragraph, see the writings of Armen Alchian 12 Compare this with Robert Paul Wolff's ”A Refutation of Rawls' Theorem on Justice,” Compare this with Robert Paul Wolff's ”A Refutation of Rawls' Theorem on Justice,” Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy, March 31, 1966, sect. 2. Wolff's criticism does not apply to Rawls' conception under which the baseline is fixed by the difference principle. March 31, 1966, sect. 2. Wolff's criticism does not apply to Rawls' conception under which the baseline is fixed by the difference principle.

13 I discuss overriding and its moral traces in ”Moral Complications and Moral Structures,” I discuss overriding and its moral traces in ”Moral Complications and Moral Structures,” Natural Law Forum, Natural Law Forum, 1968, pp. 1-50. 1968, pp. 1-50.

14 Does the principle of compensation (Chapter 4) introduce patterning considerations? Though it requires compensation for the disadvantages imposed by those seeking security from risks, it is not a patterned principle. For it seeks to remove only those disadvantages which prohibitions inflict or. those who might present risks to others, not all disadvantages. It specifies an obligation on those who impose the prohibition, which stems from their own particular acts, to remove a particular complaint those prohibited may make against them. Does the principle of compensation (Chapter 4) introduce patterning considerations? Though it requires compensation for the disadvantages imposed by those seeking security from risks, it is not a patterned principle. For it seeks to remove only those disadvantages which prohibitions inflict or. those who might present risks to others, not all disadvantages. It specifies an obligation on those who impose the prohibition, which stems from their own particular acts, to remove a particular complaint those prohibited may make against them.

15 Cambridge, Ma.s.s.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Cambridge, Ma.s.s.: Harvard University Press, 1971.

16 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p. 4. p. 4.

17 See Milton Friedman, See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 165. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 165.

18 On the question of why the economy contains firms (of more than one person), and why each individual does not contract and recontract with others, see Ronald H. Coase, ”The Nature of the Firm,” in On the question of why the economy contains firms (of more than one person), and why each individual does not contract and recontract with others, see Ronald H. Coase, ”The Nature of the Firm,” in Readings in Price Theory. Readings in Price Theory. ed. George Stigler and Kenneth Boulding (Homewood, III.: Irwin, 1952); and Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ”Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization,” ed. George Stigler and Kenneth Boulding (Homewood, III.: Irwin, 1952); and Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ”Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization,” American Economic Review, American Economic Review, 1972, 777-795. 1972, 777-795.

19 We do not, however, a.s.sume here or elsewhere the satisfaction of those conditions specified in economists' artificial model of so-called ”perfect compet.i.tion.” One appropriate mode of a.n.a.lysis is presented in Israel M. Kirzner, We do not, however, a.s.sume here or elsewhere the satisfaction of those conditions specified in economists' artificial model of so-called ”perfect compet.i.tion.” One appropriate mode of a.n.a.lysis is presented in Israel M. Kirzner, Market Theory and the Price System Market Theory and the Price System (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1963); see also his (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1963); see also his Compet.i.tion and Entrepreneurs.h.i.+p Compet.i.tion and Entrepreneurs.h.i.+p (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973). (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).

20 See Marc Blaug, See Marc Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect Economic Theory in Retrospect (Homewood, III.: Irwin, 1968), chap. II, and the references cited therein. For a recent survey of issues about the marginal productivity of capital, see G. C. Harcourt, ”Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital,” (Homewood, III.: Irwin, 1968), chap. II, and the references cited therein. For a recent survey of issues about the marginal productivity of capital, see G. C. Harcourt, ”Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital,” Journal of Economic Literature, Journal of Economic Literature, 7, no. 2 (June 1969), 369-405 7, no. 2 (June 1969), 369-405 21 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p. 12. p. 12.

22 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, pp. 14-15. pp. 14-15.

23 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, sect. 16, especially p. 98. sect. 16, especially p. 98.

24 Here we simplify the content of 5, but not to the detriment of our present discussion. Also, of course, beliefs other than 5, when conjoined with 3 would justify the inference to 4; for example belief in the material conditional ”If 3, then 4.” It is something like 5, though, that is relevant to our discussion here. Here we simplify the content of 5, but not to the detriment of our present discussion. Also, of course, beliefs other than 5, when conjoined with 3 would justify the inference to 4; for example belief in the material conditional ”If 3, then 4.” It is something like 5, though, that is relevant to our discussion here.

25 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p. 15. p. 15.

26 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p. 103. p. 103.

27 But recall the reasons why using magnitudes of ent.i.tlement does not capture accurately the ent.i.tlement principle (note on p. 157, this chapter). But recall the reasons why using magnitudes of ent.i.tlement does not capture accurately the ent.i.tlement principle (note on p. 157, this chapter).

28 Some years ago, Hayek argued Some years ago, Hayek argued (The Const.i.tution of Liberty, (The Const.i.tution of Liberty, chap. 3) that a free capitalist society, over time, raises the position of those worst off more than any alternative inst.i.tutional structure; to use present terminology, he argued that chap. 3) that a free capitalist society, over time, raises the position of those worst off more than any alternative inst.i.tutional structure; to use present terminology, he argued that it it best satisfies the end-state principle of justice formulated by the difference principle. best satisfies the end-state principle of justice formulated by the difference principle.

29 This is especially serious in view of the weakness of Rawls' reasons (sect. 82) for placing the liberty principle prior to the difference principle in a lexicographic ordering. This is especially serious in view of the weakness of Rawls' reasons (sect. 82) for placing the liberty principle prior to the difference principle in a lexicographic ordering.

30 ”The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principle agreed to will be just. The aim is to use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis for theory.” Rawls, ”The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principle agreed to will be just. The aim is to use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis for theory.” Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p. 136. p. 136.

31 Thomas Scanlon, Jr. , ”Rawls' Theory of Justice,” Thomas Scanlon, Jr. , ”Rawls' Theory of Justice,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 121, No. 5, May 1973, p. 1064. 121, No. 5, May 1973, p. 1064.

32 See my ”Moral Complications and Moral Structures,” See my ”Moral Complications and Moral Structures,” Natural Law Forum, Natural Law Forum, 13, 1968, especially pp. 11-21. 13, 1968, especially pp. 11-21.

33 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p, 72. Rawls goes on to discuss what he calls a liberal interpretation of his two principles of justice, which is designed to eliminate the influence of social contingencies, but which ”intuitively, still appears defective ... [for] it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents ... distributive shares are decided by the outcome of the natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective. There is no more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural a.s.sets than by historical and social fortune” (pp 73-74). p, 72. Rawls goes on to discuss what he calls a liberal interpretation of his two principles of justice, which is designed to eliminate the influence of social contingencies, but which ”intuitively, still appears defective ... [for] it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents ... distributive shares are decided by the outcome of the natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective. There is no more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural a.s.sets than by historical and social fortune” (pp 73-74).

34 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p. 104. p. 104.

35 Rawls. Rawls. Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, pp. 311-312. pp. 311-312.

36 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p. 15. p. 15.

37 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice. Theory of Justice. pp. 538-541. pp. 538-541.

38 ”In order to show that the principles of justice are based in part on envy it would have to be established that one or more of the conditions of the original position arose from this propensity ”In order to show that the principles of justice are based in part on envy it would have to be established that one or more of the conditions of the original position arose from this propensity ”Theory of Justice ”Theory of Justice. p. 538.

39 For example: For example: 1. Differences between any two persons' holdings should be morally deserved; morally undeserved differences should not exist.2. Differences between persons in natural a.s.sets are morally undeserved.3. Differences between persons partially determined by other differences that are undeserved are themselves undeserved.Therefore,4. Differences between persons' holdings shouldn't be partially determined by differences in their natural a.s.sets.

40 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice. Theory of Justice. p. 310. In the remainder of this section, Rawls goes on to criticize the conception of distribution according to moral desert. p. 310. In the remainder of this section, Rawls goes on to criticize the conception of distribution according to moral desert.

41 ”No reason need be given for ... an equal distribution of benefits-for that is natural'-self-evidently right and just, and needs no justification, since it is in some sense conceived as being self-justified.... The a.s.sumption is that equality needs no reasons, only inequality does so; that uniformity, regularity, similarity, symmetry, ... need not be specially accounted for, whereas differences, unsystematic behavior, changes in conduct, need explanation and, as a rule, justification. If I have a cake and there are ten persons among whom I wish to divide it, then if I give exactly one-tenth to each, this will not, at any rate automatically, call for justification; whereas if I depart from this principle of equal division I am expected to produce a special reason. It is some sense of this, however latent, that makes equality an idea which has never seemed intrinsically eccentric...” Isaiah Berlin, ”Equality,” reprinted in Frederick A. Olafson, ed. ”No reason need be given for ... an equal distribution of benefits-for that is natural'-self-evidently right and just, and needs no justification, since it is in some sense conceived as being self-justified.... The a.s.sumption is that equality needs no reasons, only inequality does so; that uniformity, regularity, similarity, symmetry, ... need not be specially accounted for, whereas differences, unsystematic behavior, changes in conduct, need explanation and, as a rule, justification. If I have a cake and there are ten persons among whom I wish to divide it, then if I give exactly one-tenth to each, this will not, at any rate automatically, call for justification; whereas if I depart from this principle of equal division I am expected to produce a special reason. It is some sense of this, however latent, that makes equality an idea which has never seemed intrinsically eccentric...” Isaiah Berlin, ”Equality,” reprinted in Frederick A. Olafson, ed. Justice and Social Policy Justice and Social Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prenuce-Hall, 1961). p. 131. To pursue the a.n.a.logy with mechanics further, note that it is a substantive theoretical position which specifies a particular state or situation as one which requires no explanation whereas deviations from it are to be explained in terms of external forces. See Ernest Nagel's discussion of D'Alembert's attempt to provide an (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prenuce-Hall, 1961). p. 131. To pursue the a.n.a.logy with mechanics further, note that it is a substantive theoretical position which specifies a particular state or situation as one which requires no explanation whereas deviations from it are to be explained in terms of external forces. See Ernest Nagel's discussion of D'Alembert's attempt to provide an a priori a priori argument for Newton's first law of motion. argument for Newton's first law of motion. [The Structure of Science. [The Structure of Science. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), pp. 175-177.] (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), pp. 175-177.]

42 But see also our discussion below of Rawls' view of natural abilities as a collective a.s.set. But see also our discussion below of Rawls' view of natural abilities as a collective a.s.set.

43 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p. 179. p. 179.

44 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p. 102. p. 102.

45 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p. 27. p. 27.

46 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p. 183. p. 183.

47 Rawls, Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, p. 102. p. 102.

48 ”But isn't justice to be tempered with compa.s.sion?” Not by the guns of the state. When private persons choose to transfer resources to help others, this fits within the ent.i.tlement conception of justice. ”But isn't justice to be tempered with compa.s.sion?” Not by the guns of the state. When private persons choose to transfer resources to help others, this fits within the ent.i.tlement conception of justice.

CHAPTER 8 / Equality, Envy, Exploitation, Etc.

1 For a useful consideration of various arguments for equality which are not at the most fundamental level, see Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., For a useful consideration of various arguments for equality which are not at the most fundamental level, see Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963). 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

2 Bernard Williams, ”The Idea of Equality,” in Bernard Williams, ”The Idea of Equality,” in Philosophy, Politics, and Society, Philosophy, Politics, and Society, 2nd ser., ed. Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), pp. 110-131; reprinted in Joel Feinberg, ed., 2nd ser., ed. Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), pp. 110-131; reprinted in Joel Feinberg, ed., Moral Concepts Moral Concepts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

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