Part 3 (2/2)

Some might deny, perhaps properly, that any normative notion is to be built into an account of the state, even the right to enforce rights and to prohibit dangerous private enforcement of justice provided compensation is made to those prohibited. But since this does not grant to the state or any of its agents any rights not possessed by each and every person, it seems a harmless inclusion. It gives the state no special special rights and certainly does not entail that all acts of rule by the state are presumptively right. Nor does it entail that persons acting as agents of the state possess any special immunity from punishment, if they violate another's rights. The public whose agents they are may provide them with liability insurance, or guarantee to cover their liability. But it may not rights and certainly does not entail that all acts of rule by the state are presumptively right. Nor does it entail that persons acting as agents of the state possess any special immunity from punishment, if they violate another's rights. The public whose agents they are may provide them with liability insurance, or guarantee to cover their liability. But it may not diminish diminish their liability as compared to that of other persons. Also, protective agencies will not have limited liability, nor will any other corporations. Those voluntarily dealing with a corporation (customers, creditors, workers, and others) will do so by contracts explicitly limiting the corporation's liability, if that is the way the corporation chooses to do business. A corporation's liability to those involuntarily intertwined with it will be unlimited, and it presumably will choose to cover this liability with insurance policies. their liability as compared to that of other persons. Also, protective agencies will not have limited liability, nor will any other corporations. Those voluntarily dealing with a corporation (customers, creditors, workers, and others) will do so by contracts explicitly limiting the corporation's liability, if that is the way the corporation chooses to do business. A corporation's liability to those involuntarily intertwined with it will be unlimited, and it presumably will choose to cover this liability with insurance policies.

Does the state we have described have legitimacy, does it legitimately rule? The dominant protective agency has de facto de facto power; it acquired this power and reached its position of dominance without violating anyone's rights; it wields this power as well as anyone would expect. Do these facts add up to its being the legitimate wielder of the power? As ”legitimacy” is used in political theory, those legitimately wielding power are ent.i.tled, are power; it acquired this power and reached its position of dominance without violating anyone's rights; it wields this power as well as anyone would expect. Do these facts add up to its being the legitimate wielder of the power? As ”legitimacy” is used in political theory, those legitimately wielding power are ent.i.tled, are specially specially ent.i.tled, to wield it. ent.i.tled, to wield it.ag Does the dominant protective agency have any special ent.i.tlement? A dominant agency and another tiny one, or a dominant agency and an unaffiliated individual person, are on a par in the nature of their rights to enforce other rights. How might they have differential ent.i.tlements? Does the dominant protective agency have any special ent.i.tlement? A dominant agency and another tiny one, or a dominant agency and an unaffiliated individual person, are on a par in the nature of their rights to enforce other rights. How might they have differential ent.i.tlements?

Consider whether the dominant protective agency is ent.i.tled to be the one which is dominant. Is a restaurant you choose to go to on a given evening ent.i.tled to your patronage? Perhaps one is tempted to say, in some circ.u.mstances, they merit it or deserve it; they serve better food, less expensively, and in nicer surroundings, and they work long and hard to do so; still, they are not ent.i.tled to your patronage.10 You do not violate any ent.i.tlement of theirs if you choose to go elsewhere. By choosing to go there, though, you do authorize them to serve and bill you. They have no ent.i.tlement You do not violate any ent.i.tlement of theirs if you choose to go elsewhere. By choosing to go there, though, you do authorize them to serve and bill you. They have no ent.i.tlement to be the one to be the one which serves you, but they are ent.i.tled to serve you. Similarly, we must distinguish between an agency's being ent.i.tled to be the one wielding certain power from its being ent.i.tled to wield that power. which serves you, but they are ent.i.tled to serve you. Similarly, we must distinguish between an agency's being ent.i.tled to be the one wielding certain power from its being ent.i.tled to wield that power.11 Is the dominant agency's only ent.i.tlement, then, its being ent.i.tled to wield the power? We can reach questions of ent.i.tlement by another route that illuminates further the situation of persons in a state of nature. Is the dominant agency's only ent.i.tlement, then, its being ent.i.tled to wield the power? We can reach questions of ent.i.tlement by another route that illuminates further the situation of persons in a state of nature.

A protective agency may act against or for a particular person. It acts against him if it enforces someone's rights against him, punishes him, exacts compensation from him, and so forth. It acts for him if it defends him against others, punishes others for violating his rights, forces other to compensate him, and so forth. Theorists of the state of nature hold that there are certain rights residing in the victim of wrong that others may exercise only only if authorized by him; and there are other rights that others may exercise, whether or not the victim authorized them to do so. The right to exact compensation is of the first sort; the right to punish of the second. If the victim chooses not to be compensated, no one else may exact compensation for him or for themselves in his place. But if the victim does wish to be compensated, why may only those whom he has authorized to act for him exact compensation? Clearly, if several different persons each exact full compensation from the offender, this would do him an injustice. How then is it to be determined which person acts? Is the one who may act the one who acts first to exact sufficient compensation for the victim? But allowing many to compete to be the first successfully to exact compensation will embroil prudent wrongdoers and victims alike in many independent time- and energy-consuming hearing processes, only one of which actually will result in a compensation payment. Alternatively, perhaps the person who first begins the attempt to exact compensation preempts the field; no others may also engage in the process. But this would allow the wrongdoer himself to have a confederate be the first to start compensation proceedings (which would be long, complicated, and perhaps inconclusive) in order to stop others from exacting compensation from him. if authorized by him; and there are other rights that others may exercise, whether or not the victim authorized them to do so. The right to exact compensation is of the first sort; the right to punish of the second. If the victim chooses not to be compensated, no one else may exact compensation for him or for themselves in his place. But if the victim does wish to be compensated, why may only those whom he has authorized to act for him exact compensation? Clearly, if several different persons each exact full compensation from the offender, this would do him an injustice. How then is it to be determined which person acts? Is the one who may act the one who acts first to exact sufficient compensation for the victim? But allowing many to compete to be the first successfully to exact compensation will embroil prudent wrongdoers and victims alike in many independent time- and energy-consuming hearing processes, only one of which actually will result in a compensation payment. Alternatively, perhaps the person who first begins the attempt to exact compensation preempts the field; no others may also engage in the process. But this would allow the wrongdoer himself to have a confederate be the first to start compensation proceedings (which would be long, complicated, and perhaps inconclusive) in order to stop others from exacting compensation from him.

In theory, an arbitrary rule could be used to select anyone as the one to exact (or to authorize another to exact) compensation-for example, ”the exacter of compensation is to be that person whose name comes immediately after that of the victim in an alphabetical listing of the names of everyone in the territory.” (Would this lead to people victimizing their immediate alphabetical predecessors?) That it be the victim who selects the exacter of compensation ensures, at least, that he will be committed to rest content with the upshot of the process and will not continue to attempt to get further compensation. The victim will not believe he selected a process by nature unfair to himself; or if he comes to believe this, he will have only himself to blame. It is to the advantage of the wrongdoer that the victim be involved in, and committed to, the process, for otherwise the victim will initiate a second process to obtain the remainder of what he believes he deserves. The victim can be expected to accede to a restriction against double jeopardy only if the initial process is one he is committed to and has some confidence in, as would not be the case if a confederate of the wrongdoer made the initial judgment. But what is wrong with double jeopardy, given that if its its upshot is unjust the person punished can act himself? And, why cannot a victim place his wrongdoer under double jeopardy, even though the first process was one that he himself had authorized? Cannot the victim say that he had authorized another to exact his just compensation, and that since the agent failed to do this fully, he himself is within his rights to authorize yet another to act? If the first person he sends against a wrongdoer fails to reach him, he may send another; if he reaches him but is bought off, the victim may send another; why may he not send another if his first agent fails to perform his task adequately? To be sure, if he does send another to exact something above and beyond what his first agent attempted to take, he runs the risk that others will think his added exaction unjust and so will oppose him. But are there other than prudential grounds for his not doing so? There is reason against double jeopardy in a civic legal system as it is usually imagined. Since all it takes is one conviction, it is unfair to allow the prosecution to keep trying and trying until it succeeds. This would not apply in the state of nature, where the matter is not settled absolutely and is not binding upon all when the victim's agent or agency reaches a judgment. It is unfair to give the prosecutor in a civic system many chances at a final and binding judgment, for if he is lucky one time there will be little recourse for the person found guilty. However, in a state of nature there is recourse for someone who holds the decision against himself unjust. upshot is unjust the person punished can act himself? And, why cannot a victim place his wrongdoer under double jeopardy, even though the first process was one that he himself had authorized? Cannot the victim say that he had authorized another to exact his just compensation, and that since the agent failed to do this fully, he himself is within his rights to authorize yet another to act? If the first person he sends against a wrongdoer fails to reach him, he may send another; if he reaches him but is bought off, the victim may send another; why may he not send another if his first agent fails to perform his task adequately? To be sure, if he does send another to exact something above and beyond what his first agent attempted to take, he runs the risk that others will think his added exaction unjust and so will oppose him. But are there other than prudential grounds for his not doing so? There is reason against double jeopardy in a civic legal system as it is usually imagined. Since all it takes is one conviction, it is unfair to allow the prosecution to keep trying and trying until it succeeds. This would not apply in the state of nature, where the matter is not settled absolutely and is not binding upon all when the victim's agent or agency reaches a judgment. It is unfair to give the prosecutor in a civic system many chances at a final and binding judgment, for if he is lucky one time there will be little recourse for the person found guilty. However, in a state of nature there is recourse for someone who holds the decision against himself unjust.12 But even though there is no guarantee that a victim will regard his agent's decision as acceptable, it is more likely than his so regarding that of some unknown third party; and so his selecting the exacter of compensation is a step toward ending the affair. (His antagonist also might agree to accept the result.) There is yet another reason, perhaps the major one, for the victim's being the appropriate locus of action to exact compensation. The victim is the one to whom compensation is owed, not only in the sense that the money goes to him, but also in that the other is under an obligation But even though there is no guarantee that a victim will regard his agent's decision as acceptable, it is more likely than his so regarding that of some unknown third party; and so his selecting the exacter of compensation is a step toward ending the affair. (His antagonist also might agree to accept the result.) There is yet another reason, perhaps the major one, for the victim's being the appropriate locus of action to exact compensation. The victim is the one to whom compensation is owed, not only in the sense that the money goes to him, but also in that the other is under an obligation to him to him to pay it. (These are distinct: I may be under an obligation to you to pay another person money, having promised to you that I would pay him.) As the person to whom this enforceable obligation is owed, the victim seems the appropriate party to determine precisely how it is to be enforced. to pay it. (These are distinct: I may be under an obligation to you to pay another person money, having promised to you that I would pay him.) As the person to whom this enforceable obligation is owed, the victim seems the appropriate party to determine precisely how it is to be enforced.

THE RIGHT OF ALL TO PUNISH.

In contrast to exaction of compensation, which it views as something done appropriately only by the victim or his authorized agent, state-of-nature theory usually views punishment as a function that anyone may perform. Locke realizes that this ”will seem a very strange doctrine to some men” (sect. 9). He defends it by saying that the law of nature would be in vain if no one in a state of nature had a power to execute it, and since all in the state of nature have equal rights, if any one person may execute it then everyone has that right (sect. 7); he says also that an offender becomes dangerous to mankind in general, and so everyone may punish him (sect. 8), and he challenges the reader to find some other ground for a country's punis.h.i.+ng aliens for crimes they commit within it. Is the general right to punish so counterintuitive? If some great wrong were committed in another country which refuses to punish it (perhaps the government is in league with, or is itself, the wrongdoer), wouldn't it be all right for you to punish the wrongdoer, to inflict some harm on him for his act? Furthermore, one might try to derive the right to punish from other moral considerations: from the right to protect, combined with the view that a wrongdoer's moral boundaries change. One might take a contract-like view of moral prohibitions and hold that those who themselves violate another's boundaries forfeit the right to have certain of their own boundaries respected. On this view, one is not morally prohibited from doing certain sorts of things to others who have already violated certain moral prohibitions (and gone unpunished for this). Certain wrongdoing gives others a liberty liberty to cross certain boundaries (an absence of a duty not to do it); the details might be those of some retributive view. to cross certain boundaries (an absence of a duty not to do it); the details might be those of some retributive view.13 Talk of a right to punish may seem strange if we interpret it strongly as a right which others must not happen to interfere with or themselves exercise, rather than as a liberty to do it, which liberty others also may have. The stronger interpretation of right is unnecessary ; the liberty to punish would give Locke much of what he needs, perhaps all if we add the duty of the wrongdoer not to resist his punishment. We may add to these reasons which make more plausible the claim that there is a general right to punish the consideration that, unlike compensation, punishment is not owed to the victim (though he may be the person most greatly interested in its being carried out), and so it is not something he has special authority over. Talk of a right to punish may seem strange if we interpret it strongly as a right which others must not happen to interfere with or themselves exercise, rather than as a liberty to do it, which liberty others also may have. The stronger interpretation of right is unnecessary ; the liberty to punish would give Locke much of what he needs, perhaps all if we add the duty of the wrongdoer not to resist his punishment. We may add to these reasons which make more plausible the claim that there is a general right to punish the consideration that, unlike compensation, punishment is not owed to the victim (though he may be the person most greatly interested in its being carried out), and so it is not something he has special authority over.

How would a system of open punishment operate? All of our previous difficulties in imagining how open exaction of compensation would work apply as well to a system of open punis.h.i.+ng. And there are other difficulties. Is it to be a system of the first actor's preempting the field? Will s.a.d.i.s.ts compete to be first to get their licks in? This would greatly magnify the problem of keeping the punishers from exceeding the bounds of the deserved punishment and would be undesirable, the opportunities it offers for cheerful and unalienated labor notwithstanding. In a system of open punishment would anyone be in a position to decide upon mercy; and would another be permitted to negate this decision by punis.h.i.+ng additionally so long as the sum did not exceed the amount deserved? Could the offender have a confederate punish him only lightly? Would there be any likelihood that the victim would feel that justice had been done? And so on.

If a system that leaves punishment to whomever happens to do it is defective, how is it to be decided who, among all those willing and perhaps eager, punishes? It might be thought that, as before, it should be the victim or his authorized agent. Yet though the victim occupies the unhappy special position of victim and is owed compensation, he is not owed punishment. (That is ”owed” to the person who deserves to be punished.) The offender is not under an obligation to the victim to be punished; he doesn't deserve to be punished ”to the victim.” So why should the victim have a special right to punish or to be the punisher? If he has no special right to punish, does he have any special right to choose that the punishment not not be carried out at all, or that mercy be granted? May someone punish an offender even against the wishes of the offended party who morally objects to the mode of punishment? If a Gandhian is attacked, may others defend him by means he morally rejects? Others too are affected; they are made fearful and less secure if such crimes go unpunished. Should the fact that the victim was the one most affected by the crime give him a special status with regard to punis.h.i.+ng the offender? (Are the others affected by the crime, or only by its going unpunished?) If the victim was killed does the special status devolve upon the closest kin? If there are two victims of a murderer, do each of the next of kin have a right to punish him with death, with a compet.i.tion for who will be the first to act? Perhaps then, rather than its being the case that anyone may punish or that the victim alone has authority to punish, the solution is that all concerned (namely, everyone) jointly act to punish or to empower someone to punish. But this would require some inst.i.tutional apparatus or mode of decision within the state of nature itself. And, if we specify this as everyone's having a right to a say in the ultimate determination of punishment, this would be the only right of this sort which people possessed in a state of nature; it would add up to a right (the right to determine the punishment) possessed by people jointly rather than individually. There seems to be no neat way to understand how the right to punish would operate within a state of nature. From this discussion of who may exact compensation and who may punish emerges another avenue to the question of a dominant protective a.s.sociation's ent.i.tlement. be carried out at all, or that mercy be granted? May someone punish an offender even against the wishes of the offended party who morally objects to the mode of punishment? If a Gandhian is attacked, may others defend him by means he morally rejects? Others too are affected; they are made fearful and less secure if such crimes go unpunished. Should the fact that the victim was the one most affected by the crime give him a special status with regard to punis.h.i.+ng the offender? (Are the others affected by the crime, or only by its going unpunished?) If the victim was killed does the special status devolve upon the closest kin? If there are two victims of a murderer, do each of the next of kin have a right to punish him with death, with a compet.i.tion for who will be the first to act? Perhaps then, rather than its being the case that anyone may punish or that the victim alone has authority to punish, the solution is that all concerned (namely, everyone) jointly act to punish or to empower someone to punish. But this would require some inst.i.tutional apparatus or mode of decision within the state of nature itself. And, if we specify this as everyone's having a right to a say in the ultimate determination of punishment, this would be the only right of this sort which people possessed in a state of nature; it would add up to a right (the right to determine the punishment) possessed by people jointly rather than individually. There seems to be no neat way to understand how the right to punish would operate within a state of nature. From this discussion of who may exact compensation and who may punish emerges another avenue to the question of a dominant protective a.s.sociation's ent.i.tlement.

The dominant protective a.s.sociation is authorized by many persons to act as their agent in exacting compensation for them. It is ent.i.tled to act for them, whereas a small agency is ent.i.tled to act for fewer persons, and an individual is ent.i.tled to act only for himself. In this sense of having a greater number of individual ent.i.tlements, but a kind that others have as well, the dominant protective agency has a greater ent.i.tlement. Something more can be said, given the unclarity about how rights to punish operate in a state of nature. To the extent To the extent that it is plausible that all who have some claim to a right to punish have to act jointly, then the dominant agency will be viewed as having the greatest ent.i.tlement to exact punishment, since almost all authorize it to act in their place. In exacting punishment it displaces and preempts the actions to punish of the fewest others. Any private individual who acts will exclude the actions and ent.i.tlements of all the others; whereas very many people will feel their ent.i.tlement is being exercised when their agent, the dominant protective agency, acts. This would account for thinking that the dominant protective agency or a state has some special legitimacy. Having more ent.i.tlements to act, it is more ent.i.tled to act. But it is not ent.i.tled to be the dominant agency, nor is anyone else. that it is plausible that all who have some claim to a right to punish have to act jointly, then the dominant agency will be viewed as having the greatest ent.i.tlement to exact punishment, since almost all authorize it to act in their place. In exacting punishment it displaces and preempts the actions to punish of the fewest others. Any private individual who acts will exclude the actions and ent.i.tlements of all the others; whereas very many people will feel their ent.i.tlement is being exercised when their agent, the dominant protective agency, acts. This would account for thinking that the dominant protective agency or a state has some special legitimacy. Having more ent.i.tlements to act, it is more ent.i.tled to act. But it is not ent.i.tled to be the dominant agency, nor is anyone else.

We should note one further possible source of viewing something as the legitimate locus of the exercise of enforcing power. To the extent that individuals view choosing a protective agency as a coordination game, with advantages to their quickly converging upon the same one, though it doesn't matter very much which one, they may think the one that happened to be settled upon is the appropriate or proper one now to look to for protection. Consider a neighborhood meeting place for teenagers. It may not matter very much where the place is, so long as everyone knows the place where others will congregate, depending upon others to go there if anywhere. That place becomes ”the place to go” to meet others. It is not only that you will be more likely to be unsuccessful if you look elsewhere; it is that others benefit from, and count upon, your converging upon that place, and similarly you benefit from, and count upon, their congregating there. It is not ent.i.tled to be the meeting place; if it is a store its owner is not ent.i.tled to have his store be the one at which people congregate. It is not that individuals must meet there. It's just the place to meet. Similarly, one might imagine a given protective agency's becoming the one to be protected by. To the extent that people attempt to coordinate their actions and converge upon a protective agency which will have all as clients, the process is, to that extent, not fully an invisible-hand one. And there will be intermediate cases, where some view it as a coordination game, and others, oblivious of this, merely react to local signals.14 When only one agency actually exercises the right to prohibit others from using their unreliable procedures for enforcing justice, that makes it the de facto de facto state. Our rationale for this prohibition rests on the ignorance, uncertainty, and lack of knowledge of people. In some situations, it is not known whether a particular person performed a certain action, and procedures for finding this out differ in reliability or fairness. We may ask whether, in a world of perfect factual knowledge and information, anyone could legitimately claim the right (without claiming to be its sole possessor) to prohibit another from punis.h.i.+ng a guilty party. Even given factual agreement, there might be disagreement about what amount of punishment a particular act deserved, and about which acts deserved punishment. I have proceeded in this essay (as much as possible) without questioning or focusing upon the a.s.sumption common to much utopian and anarchist theorizing, that there is some set of principles obvious enough to be accepted by all men of good will, precise enough to give unambiguous guidance in particular situations, clear enough so that all will realize its dictates, and complete enough to cover all problems that actually will arise. To have rested the case for the state on the denial of such an a.s.sumption would have left the hope that the future progress of humanity (and moral philosophy) might yield such agreement, and so might undercut the rationale for the state. Not only does the day seem distant when all men of good will shall agree to libertarian principles; these principles have not been completely stated, nor is there now one unique set of principles agreed to by all libertarians. Consider for example, the issue of whether full-blooded copyright is legitimate. Some libertarians argue it isn't legitimate, but claim that its effect can be obtained if authors and publishers include in the contract when they sell books a provision prohibiting its unauthorized printing, and then sue any book pirate for breach of contract; apparently they forget that some people sometimes lose books and others find them. Other libertarians disagree. state. Our rationale for this prohibition rests on the ignorance, uncertainty, and lack of knowledge of people. In some situations, it is not known whether a particular person performed a certain action, and procedures for finding this out differ in reliability or fairness. We may ask whether, in a world of perfect factual knowledge and information, anyone could legitimately claim the right (without claiming to be its sole possessor) to prohibit another from punis.h.i.+ng a guilty party. Even given factual agreement, there might be disagreement about what amount of punishment a particular act deserved, and about which acts deserved punishment. I have proceeded in this essay (as much as possible) without questioning or focusing upon the a.s.sumption common to much utopian and anarchist theorizing, that there is some set of principles obvious enough to be accepted by all men of good will, precise enough to give unambiguous guidance in particular situations, clear enough so that all will realize its dictates, and complete enough to cover all problems that actually will arise. To have rested the case for the state on the denial of such an a.s.sumption would have left the hope that the future progress of humanity (and moral philosophy) might yield such agreement, and so might undercut the rationale for the state. Not only does the day seem distant when all men of good will shall agree to libertarian principles; these principles have not been completely stated, nor is there now one unique set of principles agreed to by all libertarians. Consider for example, the issue of whether full-blooded copyright is legitimate. Some libertarians argue it isn't legitimate, but claim that its effect can be obtained if authors and publishers include in the contract when they sell books a provision prohibiting its unauthorized printing, and then sue any book pirate for breach of contract; apparently they forget that some people sometimes lose books and others find them. Other libertarians disagree.15 Similarly for patents. If persons so close in general theory can disagree over a point so fundamental, two libertarian protective agencies might manage to do battle over it. One agency might attempt to enforce a prohibition upon a person's publis.h.i.+ng a particular book (because this violates the author's property right) or reproducing a certain invention he has not invented independently, while the other agency fights this prohibition as a violation of individual rights. Disagreements about what is to be enforced, argue the unreluctant archists, provide yet another reason (in addition to lack of factual knowledge) for the apparatus of the state; as also does the need for sometimes changing the content of what is to be enforced. People who prefer peace to the enforcement of their view of right will unite together in Similarly for patents. If persons so close in general theory can disagree over a point so fundamental, two libertarian protective agencies might manage to do battle over it. One agency might attempt to enforce a prohibition upon a person's publis.h.i.+ng a particular book (because this violates the author's property right) or reproducing a certain invention he has not invented independently, while the other agency fights this prohibition as a violation of individual rights. Disagreements about what is to be enforced, argue the unreluctant archists, provide yet another reason (in addition to lack of factual knowledge) for the apparatus of the state; as also does the need for sometimes changing the content of what is to be enforced. People who prefer peace to the enforcement of their view of right will unite together in one one state. But of course, if people genuinely state. But of course, if people genuinely do do hold this preference, their protective agencies will not do battle either. hold this preference, their protective agencies will not do battle either.

PREVENTIVE RESTRAINT.

Finally, let us notice how the issue of ”preventive detention” or ”preventive restraint” is related to the principle of compensation (Chapter 4) and to our discussion in Chapter 5 of the extensive protection it requires the ultraminimal state to provide, even for those who do not pay. The notion should be widened to include all restrictions on individuals in order to lessen the risk that they they will violate others' rights; call this widened notion ”preventive restraint.” Included under this would be requiring some individuals to report to an official once a week (as if they were on parole), forbidding some individuals from being in certain places at certain hours, gun control laws, and so on (but not laws forbidding the publication of the plans of bank alarm systems). Preventive detention would encompa.s.s imprisoning someone, not for any crime he has committed, but because it is predicted of him that the probability is significantly higher than normal that he will commit a crime. (His previous crimes may be part of the data on the basis of which the predictions are made.) will violate others' rights; call this widened notion ”preventive restraint.” Included under this would be requiring some individuals to report to an official once a week (as if they were on parole), forbidding some individuals from being in certain places at certain hours, gun control laws, and so on (but not laws forbidding the publication of the plans of bank alarm systems). Preventive detention would encompa.s.s imprisoning someone, not for any crime he has committed, but because it is predicted of him that the probability is significantly higher than normal that he will commit a crime. (His previous crimes may be part of the data on

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