Part 18 (1/2)

The dispatch of the 21st August seems to me to have been wholly unnecessary, unless something happened between the 19th and 21st which led the Transvaal Government to think they had yielded too much. I have heard it said that between those dates a cablegram from Dr. Leyds gave hopes of European intervention....”

Does this telegram exist? It is indeed likely. At any rate the responsibility of the war rests upon those who--be they diplomatists or journalists--have deluded Dr. Leyds to that extent. And the blood which is now shed is on the head of those who still try and persuade the Boers that Russia, Germany, or France is going to interfere.

In _Le Siecle_ of the 3rd September, extracts from the ”Blue Book” have been printed. We also find there letters from the 11th of March, 1898, up to the 8th of May, 1899, written by Mr. J.X. Merriman, the Cape Treasurer during the Schreiner Ministry. As he is one of the leaders of the irreconcilable Afrikander group he cannot be suspected of undue sympathy towards England. In his first letter to Mr. Steyn a year before the Uitlanders had pet.i.tioned for a redress, fourteen months before the Bloemfontein Conference, eighteen months before the declaration of war, the following pa.s.sage is to be found:--

”Yet one cannot conceal the fact that the greatest danger to the future lies in the att.i.tude of President Kruger and his vain hope of building up a State on a foundation of a narrow unenlightened minority, and his obstinate rejection of all prospect of using the materials which lie ready to his hand to establish a true Republic on a broad liberal basis. The report of recent discussions in the Volksraad on his finances and their mismanagement fill one with apprehension. Such a state of affairs cannot last, it must break down from inherent rottenness, and it will be well if the fall does not sweep away the freedom of all of us.

”I write in no hostility to the Republics: my own feelings are all in the opposite direction; but the foes of that form of government are too often those of their own household. I am quite sure that you have done what you can in modifying the att.i.tude at Pretoria; but I entreat you, for the welfare of South Africa, to persevere, however unsatisfactory it may be to see your advice flouted and your motives so cruelly misrepresented by a section of colonists.

”Humanly speaking, the advice and good will of the Free State is the only thing that stands between the South African Republic and a catastrophe.”

Alluding to the Kotze incident, the upshot of which was that Kruger and the Volksraad claimed the right to overrun judicial decisions, he writes:

”The radical fault is the utter incapacity of the body that affects to issue its mandates to the Courts. In England it is a Parliament, but then it represents the intelligence of the country, and in Switzerland the same; in the Transvaal it is a narrow oligarchy.”

In a letter dated 1st January, 1899, President Kruger is depicted as follows:

”I had the opportunity the other day of a long talk, or rather several talks, with Lippert about the Transvaal. He takes a very sane view of matters there, and is very hopeless. He represents Kruger--as others describe him--as more dogged and bigoted than ever, and surrounded by a crew of self-seekers who prevent him from seeing straight. He has no one to whom he turns for advice, and he is so inflated as to have the crazy belief that he (Kruger) is born to bring about peace between Germany and France!”

Mr. Merriman is confident that the Orange Free State will interfere (Mr.

Steyn was alas, so blind as to fall in with Mr. Kruger's temper instead of smoothing it down), and says:

”Is there no opportunity of bringing about a _rapprochement_ between us, in which the Free State might play the part of honest broker?”

”_Us_” here means Cape Colony and Orange Free State.

Having spoken of matters of general interest for South Africa, of uniform custom duties, etc., he ends by saying:

”The deplorable confusion and maladministration of his financial arrangements still continue, and are a standing menace to the peace of South Africa. Yet, judging from the utterances of the leading men from the Rand who come down here, a very moderate reform would satisfy all except those who do not want to be satisfied, and, I believe, there is very little sympathy for the mischievous agitation that, rightly or wrongly, is attributed to the designs of Rhodes and Beit.”

On the 26th of May, 1899, on the eve of the Bloemfontein Conference, he writes to Mr. Fischer, prompter and organiser of the Conference, foreseeing the results of the policy advocated by Dr. Leyds:

” ... but there is, of course, an even worse prospect, namely, that misrepresentation may goad Great Britain into a position where, _with the concurrence and invitation of the other powers_, she might feel obliged, even at the risk of enormous military outlay, to cut the Gordian knot. You will probably say, as I certainly say, 'where is the _casus belli_,' and refuse to believe it possible to imagine such a contingency. Unfortunately, you and I, who keep our heads, must not ignore the fact that an immense number of people seem to have lost theirs and are ready, without reflection or examination, to accept the highly-coloured statements of a partisan press.”

He mentions the maladministration in the Transvaal several months before he had written to Mr. s.m.u.ts, asking for detailed account of the money granted by the Boer Government to Johannesburg but without getting an answer.

”Of course I know from previous correspondence that you and the President are not disposed to minimize the blots on the administration of the South African Republic, the weak points in the Const.i.tution, and the ignorance and laxity that prevails in financial matters. To do so would be to fatally complicate the situation.

”I am sure that you will, and I most strongly urge you to use your utmost influence to bear on President Kruger to concede some colourable measure of reform, not so much in the interests of outsiders as in those of his own State.

”Granted that he does nothing. What is the future? His Boers, the backbone of the country, are peris.h.i.+ng off the land; hundreds have become impoverished loafers, landless hangers-on of the town population. In his own interests he should recruit his Republic with new blood--and the sands are running out. I say this irrespective of agitation about Uitlanders. The fabric will go to pieces of its own accord unless something is done.”

Such is the opinion of Mr. Merriman, a friend of the Transvaal, yet every day in Europe one is told that its misfortunes are due to the Uitlanders.

Mr. Merriman thought on the contrary that it was necessary to ask them to come forward and help the State out of its ruinous course.

”Surely it would be better to come forward now and earn the grat.i.tude of South Africa by a comprehensive and liberal measure than to have the State torn and distracted by constant irritation and bad blood. A moderate franchise reform and munic.i.p.al privileges would go far to satisfy any reasonable people, while a maintenance of the oath ought to be a sufficient safeguard against the swamping of the old population.