Part 12 (1/2)
Writing from Palapswi, on March 26th, he says: ”I got back the day before yesterday from Matabeleland and leave to-morrow for Kimberley. I am the bearer of a message from Lobengula to Mr.
Cecil Rhodes. He promises to come to an understanding with Mr.
Rhodes as to the opening up of Mashunaland if Rhodes will go up to Bulawayo and arrange with him personally. I am going to try and persuade Mr. Rhodes to accompany me back to Bulawayo immediately. I hope he will be able to go, and trust some satisfactory arrangement may be come to. Still, I distrust Lobengula and his people. Things are in such a condition just now regarding Matabeleland and Mashunaland that it is quite impossible to tell what may happen. Everything may be settled peaceably (or forcibly) this year. Or again, the High Commissioner may forbid any expedition to be made this year against the wish of Lobengula. The question is a very strange one. The Charter was granted to the South African Company on the strength of their having obtained a concession from Lobengula for the mineral rights in Matabele- and Mashunaland. These rights were really bought, and a lot of money was paid to Lobengula directly, and to his people indirectly, by the agents of the Company. Now it seems as if Lobengula was inclined to disallow Europeans to work for gold, either in Matabele- or Mashunaland.
In order to avoid trouble, the Company now wish to waive their rights in Matabeleland proper, where they would necessarily come in contact with the Matabele people, and to exploit and develop Mashunaland, a country to which the Matabele have no just t.i.tle.
In order to do this without coming into contact with Lobengula and his people, the Company now wish to make a road to Mashunaland that shall not touch Matabeleland at all, but pa.s.s to the south of that country, and it is quite possible that Lobengula and his people, fearing to let whites get beyond him and establish themselves in Mashunaland, will try and prevent this road being made. At present the political situation in England is a most ridiculous one as regards Mashunaland. Lord Salisbury has warned the Portuguese out of it, saying that it is to him the sphere of British influence, and now Lobengula will not allow British subjects or any white men to enter his country as long as he can keep them out. I abhor the Matabele, yet I would not have them interfered with or their country invaded without a _casus belli_; but that they should keep Europeans out of Mashunaland is preposterous.”
In March, 1890, Selous was sent up to Palapswi with instructions to get men from Khama to cut a waggon-road to the eastern border of his country. He was, moreover, to be a.s.sisted by some Matabele in this critical work, and so visited Lobengula at Bulawayo to explain the objects in view. Lobengula, however, denied having ever given Dr.
Jameson any promise about a.s.sisting in the making of the road, and firmly a.s.serted that he would not allow it to be made. He said that he would not discuss matters with any of Rhodes' emissaries, and that if there was to be any talk the ”Big White Chief” himself must come to visit him. Wherefore Selous returned to Kimberley and saw Mr. Rhodes, who sent Dr. Jameson, and with him Selous then returned to Tati.
Meanwhile a considerable force, about four hundred white men, had been gathered at the Macloutsie with the intention of occupying Mashunaland, whether the Matabele liked it or not. Selous himself was sent eastward to pick out a good line for a waggon-road as far as the Shas.h.i.+ and Tuli rivers--which survey he concluded by May. It was during one of these journeys he was lucky enough to find and kill the best koodoo bull he ever saw, a magnificent specimen, 60 inches long on the curve and 45-3/8 straight. By the 10th of June the waggon-track to Tuli was open.
[Ill.u.s.tration: ON THE MASHUNA PLATEAU.]
The pioneer expedition now moved, with the scouts in front; the Matabele threatened to attack, but did not do so, and Selous, with his scouting parties in advance and covered by Khama's mounted men, commenced cutting the long road from the Macloutsie to Mount Hampden, a distance of four hundred and sixty miles. As each section of the road was cut the main expeditionary force followed after. About the worst section was between the Umzingwane and the Umshabetse rivers, a desolate thirst-land; but this was pa.s.sed in three days. This territory, which I visited in 1893, was claimed by the Matabele, and includes the King's private hunting-ground, and the pioneers expected every moment to be attacked; so every precaution was taken, the mounted men keeping a sharp watch and the axe-men doing the cutting.
From the Umshabetse river Selous wrote to his mother (July 13th, 1890): ”I am here with an advanced party of the pioneer force--forty men--all mounted. We have already cut nearly 120 miles of road from the B.S.A. Company's camp on the Macloutsie river, and are now on the borders of the Banyai country. We are already far to the east of all the inhabited part of Matabeleland and are now going north-east, always keeping more than 150 miles as the crow flies from Bulawayo. So far we have seen nothing of the Matabele. We are, however, taking every precaution against surprise, and always have scouts out in front and several miles behind us on the road who do not come in till after dark. We keep watch all night, too, with relays of guards.
Should a large impi come down to attack us, we shall simply abandon our waggons and retire on the main body, which is now coming on, on the road we have made. Our main body is composed of four hundred good men, besides fifty native mounted scouts supplied by Khama. If we can get two hours' notice of the approach of the Matabele, just sufficient time to have all the waggons put into 'laager' on the old Boer plan, Lobengula's men can do nothing to us. If they attack us in 'laager' they must suffer fearful loss. The young men want to fight, but Lobengula and the older men want peace. However, do not be downhearted, dearest mother. Personally, I hope there will be no fighting.”
On July 18th the main column caught up the roadmakers at the Umshabetse river, and on August 1st the Lunti river was reached. Selous now scouted ahead and found an easy road to the plateau ahead, and by ”Providential Pa.s.s” the expedition eventually emerged from the forest into the open country.
Whilst they were cutting the road from the Lunti to Fort Victoria an ultimatum was received from Lobengula by Colonel Pennefather that he must turn back at once, unless he ”thought he was strong enough to go on,” and warning him to expect trouble if he did so.
By this time, however, Lobengula had lost his best chance of attacking the expeditionary force, for they had now emerged on the open downs; yet it is a wonder he managed to keep his young men in check. Had he attacked in the bush country it is doubtful if our forces, even if they had not met with a reverse, would have been able to proceed. At any rate intense excitement prevailed in Matabeleland, and many new impis of warriors were formed ready to take action.
On September 1st the expedition reached the source of the Umgezi, where Fort Charter was established; so that by September 30th the Company had a continuous chain of forts and posts over eight hundred miles from Tuli to Fort Salisbury. Here Selous left the expedition, as he was the only man who knew the surrounding country, and it was essential for him to go with Mr. A. R. Colquhoun to confer with Umtasa, the chief of Manica. On September 14th a treaty was agreed to by which the British South Africa Company acquired and took possession of a large area of auriferous country--much to the annoyance of the Portuguese, who claimed it.
Treaties were concluded with all the other chiefs except Motoko, whom Selous visited early in November. The Portuguese, however, did not give up their claims without some show of force, for when Major Forbes went down to take over parts of Manica he had trouble with the Portuguese, and had to arrest Colonel d'Andrada and others, to avoid bloodshed; and for safety sent his prisoners to Fort Salisbury.
Before reaching Salisbury at the end of November, Selous spent three months altogether in travelling through the northern and eastern districts of Mashunaland and concluding treaties of amity with all the native chiefs. This, besides mapping and literary work--describing the country--occupied his time till the middle of December, when he again visited Motoko, chief of the Mabudja, to obtain a treaty of friends.h.i.+p, as well as a mineral concession, in which he was quite successful. In October he wrote home from Mangwendi's kraal praising the climate of Eastern Mashunaland, and evidently in high spirits at the great success of the pioneer expedition. ”The opening up of Mashunaland seems like a dream, and I have played a not unimportant part in it all, I am proud to say. The road to Mashunaland is now being called the 'Selous Road,' and I hope the name will endure, though I don't suppose it will. At any rate, the making of the road was entrusted _entirely_ to me and I did my work to everyone's satisfaction. An old Boer officer said to me, just before the expedition started, 'I think that the expedition without Mr.
Selous would be like a swarm of bees that has lost its Queen and does not know where to go to.' Yet it is too bad of me to sing my own praises, but I do feel most proud at the share I had in putting it through, _the whole idea, too, of making the road at all and thus circ.u.mventing the Matabele and gaining possession of Mashunaland was my own_. I proposed it to Rhodes in Kimberley on my return from the Zambesi last December. At first he did not like the idea; but after thinking it over, resolved to try and carry it out, with the result that Mashunaland is now practically a British province.
”Before the rainy season is over, the Company will probably have come to some definite understanding with Lobengula, who, by the by, recognized my importance in the expedition by sending down a message to Sir Henry Loch, the High Commissioner, that 'Selous had turned his oxen and his horses into his (Lobengula's) cornfields.'”
Writing from Motoko's kraal on November 16th, he says: ”Before coming here, I have had no difficulty with any of the other chiefs, but here I have had a lot of worry and trouble. My great difficulty is that the whole country is really ruled, not by the chief (Motoko) but by one whom they call the 'Lion-G.o.d.' This appears to be a hereditary office, and the holder of it lives away by himself in the mountains, and is looked upon with superst.i.tious dread and reverence by the Chief and his people.
However, I have now got things on a friendly footing, but I shall have to go back to Fort Salisbury, in order to get certain articles to appease the 'Lion-G.o.d,' and then return here before I shall finally be able to conclude the treaty with Motoko. I am under engagement to the Company till the end of next August, and do not think I shall take a fresh engagement, as I am anxious to get home. Having pa.s.sed the best part of my life in the wilderness and amongst savages, I should now like to see something of civilized countries, with perhaps an occasional short trip into an out-of-the-way place. If I live to be an old man, I should like to re-visit this country, thirty or forty years hence, by railroad.”
In January, 1891, he returned to Umtali, where he received orders to cut a road from that place to Lower Revui, and afterwards to lay a new road from the Odzi river to Salisbury. February was the wet season, so it was with some difficulty that he set about his task on the Odzi in company with Mr. W. L. Armstrong. On May 3rd, however, he had made one hundred and fifty miles of road to Salisbury, riding three strong horses to a standstill in his numerous peregrinations. Then news reached him of further trouble with the Portuguese, and he was asked by Mr. Colquhoun to take two waggon-loads of stores and ammunition to the small British garrison isolated at Manica, where there was an imminent prospect of fighting. Whereat he expresses his views clearly as to his own inclinations as regards soldiering. ”Now I am not a fighting man, and neither look forward with enthusiasm to the prospect of being shot, nor feel any strong desire to shoot anyone else.”
However, he regarded the matter, as he always did when called upon, as a duty, and left at once for Manica with Lieutenant Campbell and twenty ex-pioneers. On May 13th the party reached Umtali, where they heard that the Portuguese had made a sortie from Ma.s.si-Kessi, and had attacked Captain Heyman's camp near Chua. The Portuguese troops, numbering one hundred whites and blacks from Angola, however, had shot so badly that no one was. .h.i.t and soon lost heart and bolted back to Ma.s.si-Kessi, which was soon after occupied by our forces. To his mother he wrote from Umtali, May 20th, 1891:--
”I got down here on the 13th by the new road I have made for the Company, with about twenty men and two waggon-loads of provisions, and we were astonished to hear that a fight had already taken place near Ma.s.si-Kessi on the afternoon of the 11th, and I will now tell you what has actually taken place. It appears that on the 5th of this month the Portuguese reoccupied Ma.s.si-Kessi, with a force consisting of about one hundred white soldiers and three or four hundred black troops. Thereupon Captain Heyman went over from here (Umtali Camp) to near Ma.s.si-Kessi with fifty men and a seven-pounder cannon, and a lot of Umtasa's men, to protest against the invasion of Umtasa's country. Two days later, Captain Heyman and Lieutenant Morier (a son of Sir Robert Morier, British Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg) went down to Ma.s.si-Kessi with a flag of truce, to interview Ferreira, the Commander of the Portuguese forces, and the Governor of Manica. Ferreira told him that he was at Ma.s.si-Kessi, in accordance with the terms of the _modus vivendi_ which the Company's forces were breaking, by being at Umtali, and said that he would drive the Company's men out of the country. Captain Heyman then said that he had better not do anything before the expiration of the _modus vivendi_, to which he replied that he would attack him whenever he thought fit to do so. Captain Heyman's position was on a hill about five miles from Ma.s.si-Kessi. On the 10th, I think, one of the Portuguese officers came up with a flag of truce, evidently to see what number of men Captain Heyman had with him. He only saw about fifteen, as all the rest were lying down in the long gra.s.s, and it must have been from his report that an attack was resolved upon. Captain Heyman told me that he was immensely surprised to see the Portuguese troops swarming out of Ma.s.si-Kessi at about 2 p.m. on the 11th. They advanced in two bodies, led by the Portuguese officers. Captain Heyman first fired a blank charge with the cannon to which they paid no attention, and then seeing that they meant business the firing commenced in earnest. The firing lasted two hours. The Portuguese officers did all they could to get their men on, and behaved very well indeed; but their men evidently did not relish the business, and after making two attempts to reach a hill which would have commanded Captain Heyman's position, broke and fled back to Ma.s.si-Kessi.
Not a single man of the Company's force was. .h.i.t, but the Portuguese lost an officer (Captain Bettencourt), and it is believed about twenty men. Early next morning Captain Heyman sent a man down to Ma.s.si-Kessi with a flag of truce, offering the services of the doctor, and when he got there he found the place deserted. For some unaccountable reason the Portuguese had deserted the place, leaving nine machine-guns, ammunition, and stores and provisions of all kinds behind them. It is thought that a panic set in amongst the black troops, and the white Portuguese were afraid to remain behind without them. The whole affair is very inglorious to the Portuguese arms, and will have a great effect on their prestige with the natives. Of course Ma.s.si-Kessi was seized and looted by the northern barbarians, and has now been blown up and destroyed. Everybody is longing for another Portuguese expedition to come up, as then there will be a chance of more loot. What will happen now it is impossible to say, but I think that the British Government must step in, and either order the Company to leave Manica, or else support it against the Portuguese, in which case they will be unable to do anything of importance. They will now, I think, have great difficulty in getting up here, as the natives are all hostile to them and all their carriers will have to be brought from other parts. The country, too, is a very difficult one to travel through. I shall be very glad when things are settled, as Mashunaland will be kept back until they are. I have been down with Colonel Pennefather, as I told you, on a reconnaissance about thirty miles beyond Ma.s.si-Kessi, on the track of the Portuguese, and they have evidently beaten a hasty retreat.”
Immediately after this fiasco Selous went down to Umliwan's kraal, situated between the Pungwi and the Busi rivers, to fetch away the abandoned waggons. One night, whilst on the return journey, the camp was attacked by five lions and an ox killed. Next morning Selous, of course, went after them, but failed to get a shot. The following night he made a small hut close to the carcase of the ox, and into this Selous and Armstrong crept at sunset, and the night's adventure as described by Selous[41] is one of the best stories he ever wrote. The lions kept continually returning to the carcase. Several shots were fired and two lionesses and a hyena killed, but one wounded lion succeeded in escaping.
Although he says little of it at the time, Selous did an immense amount of tramping to and fro, all footwork because of the ”fly,” in the unhealthy country, both contiguous to and in the Portuguese territory about the Pungwi and Busi rivers in 1891 and 1892, in the hope of finding a road to the East Coast that would be free from the tsetse fly and where waggons could pa.s.s. In this he was unsuccessful, and he was reluctantly forced to admit that a railway would be the only method of transport to the coast, and that until this was made no progress was possible. However, his journeys carried him for the first time into the last great haunt of game south of the Zambesi, for at this time the whole of the territory in the neighbourhood of these rivers was one huge game reserve which, owing to its unhealthiness, was seldom visited by sportsmen or even meat-hunters. And so it continued till 1896, when the rinderpest swept off nine-tenths of the koodoos, elands and buffalo.
Since that day the game recovered in a measure, and even to-day there is more game there than anywhere south of the Zambesi, but it contains a shadow of its former abundance at the time when Selous first visited it.
Practically Selous was the first white man to see this great a.s.sembly of game and to hunt them, for the Portuguese were not hunters and never left the footpaths. He found vast herds of buffaloes in the reed-beds, bushbucks as tame as in the Garden of Eden stood gazing at a few yards and did not fly at the approach of man, whilst out on the plains there was a constant procession of Liechtenstein's hartebeest, blue wildebeests, tsessebes, water-bucks, zebras, and here and there were always scattered parties of reedbucks, oribis, and the smaller antelopes. Wart-hogs and bush-pigs were equally tame and confiding, and hippopotami disported in the rivers and lagoons in broad daylight, and there was not a night that several troops of lions were not heard roaring. Yet curiously enough, in spite of the abundance of the last-named, Selous only saw three individuals, one of which he killed after it had charged twice. This, he says, was the last of ”thirty-one lions I have shot.”[42] This number does not tally with the statement, ”I have only shot twenty-five lions when entirely by myself,”[43] but the discrepancy is accounted for by the fact that he killed six lions between 1893 and 1896.
The opening up of the new country proceeded rapidly till June, 1892, when Selous wrote to his mother from Salisbury:--