Part 2 (2/2)

On Aug. 2d the Const.i.tution made sail from Boston [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 28, 1812.] and stood to the eastward, in hopes of falling in with some of the British cruisers. She was unsuccessful, however, and met nothing. Then she ran down to the Bay of Fundy, steered along the coast of Nova Scotia, and thence toward Newfoundland, and finally took her station off Cape Race in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where she took and burned two brigs of little value. On the 15th she recaptured an American brig from the British s.h.i.+p-sloop Avenger, though the latter escaped; Capt. Hull manned his prize and sent her in. He then sailed southward, and on the night of the 18th spoke a Salem privateer which gave him news of a British frigate to the south; thither he stood, and at 2 P. M. on the 19th, in lat. 41 30' N. and 55 W., made out a large sail bearing E. S. E. and to leeward, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 30, 1812.] which proved to be his old acquaintance, the frigate Guerriere, Captain Dacres. It was a cloudy day and the wind was blowing fresh from the northwest. The Guerriere was standing by the wind on the starboard tack, under easy canvas; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. James R. Dacres, Sept. 7, 1812.] she hauled up her courses, took in her top-gallant sails, and at 4.30 backed her main-top sail. Hull then very deliberately began to shorten sail, taking in top-gallant sails, stay-sails, and flying jib, sending down the royal yards and putting another reef in the top-sails. Soon the Englishman hoisted three ensigns, when the American also set his colors, one at each mast-head, and one at the mizzen peak.

The Const.i.tution now ran down with the wind nearly aft. The Guerriere was on the starboard tack, and at five o'clock opened with her weather-guns, [Footnote: Log of Guerriere.] the shot falling short, then wore round and fired her port broadside, of which two shot struck her opponent, the rest pa.s.sing over and through her rigging. [Footnote: See in the Naval Archives (Bureau of Navigation) the Const.i.tution's Log-Book (vol. ii, from Feb. 1, 1812, to Dec. 13, 1813). The point is of some little importance because Hull, in his letter, speaks as if both the first broadsides fell short, whereas the log distinctly says that the second went over the s.h.i.+p, except two shot, which came home. The hypothesis of the Guerriere having damaged powder was founded purely on this supposed falling short of the first two broadsides.] As the British frigate again wore to open with her starboard battery, the Const.i.tution yawed a little and fired two or three of her port bow-guns. Three or four times the Guerriere repeated this manoeuvre, wearing and firing alternate broadsides, but with little or no effect, while the Const.i.tution yawed as often to avoid being raked, and occasionally fired one of her bow guns. This continued nearly an hour, as the vessels were very far apart when the action began, hardly any loss or damage being inflicted by either party. At 6.00 the Guerriere bore up and ran off under her top-sails and jib, with the wind almost astern, a little on her port quarter; when the Const.i.tution set her main-top gallant sail and foresail, and at 6.05 closed within half pistol-shot distance on her adversary's port beam. [Footnote: ”Autobiography of Commodore Morris” (Annapolis, 1880), p. 164.] Immediately a furious cannonade opened, each s.h.i.+p firing as the guns bore. By the time the s.h.i.+ps were fairly abreast, at 6.20, the Const.i.tution shot away the Guerriere's mizzen-mast, which fell over the starboard quarter, knocking a large hole in the counter, and bringing the s.h.i.+p round against her helm. Hitherto she had suffered very greatly and the Const.i.tution hardly at all. The latter, finding that she was ranging ahead, put her helm aport and then luffed short round her enemy's bows, [Footnote: Log of Const.i.tution.] delivering a heavy raking fire with the starboard guns and shooting away the Guerriere's main-yard. Then she wore and again pa.s.sed her adversary's bows, raking with her port guns. The mizzen-mast of the Guerriere, dragging in the water, had by this time pulled her bow round till the wind came on her starboard quarter; and so near were the two s.h.i.+ps that the Englishman's bowsprit pa.s.sed diagonally over the Const.i.tution's quarter-deck, and as the latter s.h.i.+p fell off it got foul of her mizzen-rigging, and the vessels then lay with the Guerriere's starboard bow against the Const.i.tution's port, or lee quarter-gallery. [Footnote: Cooper, in ”Putnam's Magazine.” i. 475.] The Englishman's bow guns played havoc with Captain Hull's cabin, setting fire to it; but the flames were soon extinguished by Lieutenant Hoffmann. On both sides the boarders were called away; the British ran forward, but Captain Dacres relinquished the idea of attacking [Footnote: Address of Captain Dacres to the court-martial at Halifax.] when he saw the crowds of men on the American's decks. Meanwhile, on the Const.i.tution, the boarders and marines gathered aft, but such a heavy sea was running that they could not get on the Guerriere. Both sides suffered heavily from the closeness of the musketry fire; indeed, almost the entire loss on the Const.i.tution occurred at this juncture. As Lieutenant Bush, of the marines, sprang upon the taffrail to leap on the enemy's decks, a British marine shot him dead; Mr. Morris, the first Lieutenant, and Mr. Alwyn, the master, had also both leaped on the taffrail, and both were at the same moment wounded by the musketry fire. On the Guerriere the loss was far heavier, almost all the men on the forecastle being picked off. Captain Dacres himself was shot in the back and severely wounded by one of the American mizzen topmen, while he was standing on the starboard forecastle hammocks cheering on his crew [Footnote: James, vi, 144.]; two of the lieutenants and the master were also shot down. The s.h.i.+ps gradually worked round till the wind was again on the port quarter, when they separated, and the Guerriere's foremast and main-mast at once went by the board, and fell over on the starboard side, leaving her a defenseless hulk, rolling her main-deck guns into the water. [Footnote: Brenton, v, 51.] At 6.30 the Const.i.tution hauled aboard her tacks, ran off a little distance to the eastward, and lay to. Her braces and standing and running rigging were much cut up and some of the spars wounded, but a few minutes sufficed to repair damages, when Captain Hull stood under his adversary's lee, and the latter at once struck, at 7.00 P. M., [Footnote: Log of the Const.i.tution.] just two hours after she had fired the first shot. On the part of the Const.i.tution, however, the actual fighting, exclusive of six or eight guns fired during the first hour, while closing, occupied less than 30 minutes.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Const.i.tution vs. Guerriere (1): ”The Engagement” is the original t.i.tle of this, the first in a series of four paintings of the action done for Captain Hull by Michele F. Corne. (Courtesy US. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Ill.u.s.tration: Const.i.tution vs. Guerriere (2): ”In Action.”

The Guerriere's mizzenmast goes down. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Ill.u.s.tration: Const.i.tution vs. Guerriere (3): ”Dropping Astern.” The Guerriere's mainmast and foremast follow. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Ill.u.s.tration: Const.i.tution vs. Guerriere (4): ”She Fell in the Sea, A Perfect Wreck.” The puff of smoke over the Guerriere's bow is from a gun being fired to leeward to signal her surrender, the customary practice when a vessel no longer had a flag to strike. (Courtesy New Haven Historical Society)]

The tonnage and metal of the combatants have already been referred to. The Const.i.tution had, as already said, about 456 men aboard, while of the Guerriere's crew, 267 prisoners were received aboard the Const.i.tution; deducting 10 who were Americans and would not fight, and adding the 15 killed outright, we get 272; 28 men were absent in prizes.

COMPARATIVE FORCE Comparative Broad- Comparative loss Tons Guns side Men Loss Force Inflicted Const.i.tution 1576 27 684 456 14 1.00 1.00 Guerriere 1338 25 556 272 79 .70 .18

The loss of the Const.i.tution included Lieutenant William S. Bush, of the marines, and six seamen killed, and her first lieutenant, Charles Morris, Master, John C. Alwyn, four seamen, and one marine, wounded. Total, seven killed and seven wounded. Almost all this loss occurred when the s.h.i.+ps came foul, and was due to the Guerriere's musketry and the two guns in her bridle-ports.

The Guerriere lost 23 killed and mortally wounded, including her second lieutenant, Henry Ready, and 56 wounded severely and slightly, including Captain Dacres himself, the first lieutenant, Bartholomew Kent, Master, Robert Scott, two master's mates, and one mids.h.i.+pman.

The third lieutenant of the Const.i.tution, Mr. George Campbell Read, was sent on board the prize, and the Const.i.tution remained by her during the night; but at daylight it was found that she was in danger of sinking. Captain Hull at once began removing the prisoners, and at three o'clock in the afternoon set the Guerriere on fire, and in a quarter of an hour she blew up. He then set sail for Boston, where he arrived on August 30th. ”Captain Hull and his officers,” writes Captain Dacres in his official letter, ”have treated us like brave and generous enemies; the greatest care has been taken that we should not lose the smallest trifle.”

The British laid very great stress on the rotten and decayed condition of the Guerriere; mentioning in particular that the mainmast fell solely because of the weight of the falling foremast. But it must be remembered that until the action occurred she was considered a very fine s.h.i.+p. Thus, in Brighton's ”Memoir of Admiral Broke,” it is declared that Dacres freely expressed the opinion that she could take a s.h.i.+p in half the time the Shannon could. The fall of the main-mast occurred when the fight was practically over; it had no influence whatever on the conflict. It was also a.s.serted that her powder was bad, but on no authority; her first broadside fell short, but so, under similar circ.u.mstances, did the first broadside of the United States. None of these causes account for the fact that her shot did not hit. Her opponent was of such superior force-nearly in the proportion of 3 to 2-that success would have been very difficult in any event, and no one can doubt the gallantry and pluck with which the British s.h.i.+p was fought; but the execution was very greatly disproportioned to the force. The gunnery of the Guerriere was very poor, and that of the Const.i.tution excellent; during the few minutes the s.h.i.+ps were yard-arm and yard-arm; the latter was not hulled once, while no less than 30 shot took effect on the former's engaged side, [Footnote: Captain Dacres' address to the court-martial.] five sheets of copper beneath the bends. The Guerriere, moreover, was out-manoeuvred; ”in wearing several times and exchanging broadsides in such rapid and continual changes of position, her fire was much more harmless than it would have been if she had kept more steady.” [Footnote: Lord Howard Dougla.s.s, ”Treatise on Naval Gunnery” (London, 1851), p. 454.] The Const.i.tution was handled faultlessly; Captain Hull displayed the coolness and skill of a veteran in the way in which he managed, first to avoid being raked, and then to improve the advantage which the precision and rapidity of his fire had gained. ”After making every allowance claimed by the enemy, the character of this victory is not essentially altered. Its peculiarities were a fine display of seamans.h.i.+p in the approach, extraordinary efficiency in the attack, and great readiness in repairing damages; all of which denote cool and capable officers, with an expert and trained crew; in a word, a disciplined man-of-war.” [Footnote: Cooper, ii. 173.] The disparity of force, 10 to 7, is not enough to account for the disparity of execution, 10 to 2. Of course, something must be allowed for the decayed state of the Englishman's masts, although I really do not think it had any influence on the battle, for he was beaten when the main mast fell; and it must be remembered, on the other hand, that the American crew was absolutely new, while the Guerriere was manned by old hands. So that, while admitting and admiring the gallantry, and, on the whole, the seamans.h.i.+p of Captain Dacres and his crew, and acknowledging that he fought at a great disadvantage, especially in being short-handed, yet all must acknowledge that the combat showed a marked superiority, particularly in gunnery, on the part of the Americans. Had the s.h.i.+ps not come foul, Captain Hull would probably not have lost more than three or four men; as it was, he suffered but slightly. That the Guerriere was not so weak as she was represented to be can be gathered from the fact that she mounted two more main-deck guns than the rest of her cla.s.s; thus carrying on her main-deck 30 long 18-pounders in battery, to oppose to the 30 long 24's, or rather (allowing for the short weight of shot) long 22's, of the Const.i.tution. Characteristically enough, James, though he carefully reckons in the long bow-chasers in the bridle-ports of the Argus and Enterprise, yet refuses to count the two long eighteens mounted through the bridle-ports on the Guerriere's main-deck. Now, as it turned out, these two bow guns were used very effectively, when the s.h.i.+ps got foul, and caused more damage and loss than all of the other main-deck guns put together.

[Ill.u.s.tration: This diagram is taken from Commodore Morris' autobiography and the log of the Guerriere: the official accounts apparently consider ”larboard” and ”starboard” as interchangeable terms.]

Captain Dacres, very much to his credit, allowed the ten Americans on board to go below, so as not to fight against their flag; and in his address to the court-martial mentions, among the reasons for his defeat, ”that he was very much weakened by permitting the Americans on board to quit their quarters.” Coupling this with the a.s.sertion made by James and most other British writers that the Const.i.tution was largely manned by Englishmen, we reach the somewhat remarkable conclusion, that the British s.h.i.+p was defeated because the Americans on board would not fight against their country, and that the American was victorious because the British on board would. However, as I have shown, in reality there were probably not a score of British on board the Const.i.tution.

In this, as well as the two succeeding frigate actions, every one must admit that there was a great superiority in force on the side of the victors, and British historians have insisted that this superiority was so great as to preclude any hopes of a successful resistance. That this was not true, and that the disparity between the combatants was not as great as had been the case in a number of encounters in which English frigates had taken French ones, can be best shown by a few accounts taken from the French historian Troude, who would certainly not exaggerate the difference. Thus on March 1, 1799, the English 38-gun 18-pounder frigate Sybille, captured the French 44-gun 24-pounder frigate Forte, after an action of two hours and ten minutes. [Footnote: ”Batailles Navales de la France.” O. Troude (Paris, 1868), iv, 171.] In actual weight the shot thrown by one of the main-deck guns of the defeated Forte was over six pounds heavier than the shot thrown by one of the main-deck guns of the victorious Const.i.tution or United States. [Footnote: See Appendix B, for actual weight of French shot.]

There are later examples than this. But a very few years before the declaration of war by the United States, and in the same struggle that was then still raging, there had been at least two victories gained by English frigates over French foes as superior to themselves as the American 44's were to the British s.h.i.+ps they captured. On Aug. 10, 1805, the Phoenix, 36, captured the Didon, 40, after 3 1/2 hours' fighting, the comparative broadside force being: [Footnote: Ibid., lii, 425.]

PHOENIX DIDON 1318 1418 2 9 2 8 632 736 --------- --------- 21 guns, 444 lbs. 23 guns, 522 lbs.

(nominal; about 600, real) On March 8, 1808, the San Florenzo, 36, captured the Piedmontaise, 40, the force being exactly what it was in the case of the Phoenix and Didon.[Footnote: Ibid., in, 499.] Comparing the real, not the nominal weight of metal, we find that the Didon and Piedmontaise were proportionately of greater force compared to the Phoenix and San Florenzo, than the Const.i.tution was compared to the Guerriere or Java. The French 18's threw each a shot weighing but about two pounds less than that thrown by an American 24 of 1812, while their 36-pound carronades each threw a shot over 10 pounds heavier than that thrown by one of the Const.i.tution's spar-deck 32's.

That a 24-pounder can not always whip an 18-pounder frigate is shown by the action of the British frigate Eurotas with the French frigate Chlorinde, on Feb. 25, 1814. [Footnote: James, vi, 391.] The first with a crew of 329 men threw 625 pounds of shot at a broadside, the latter carrying 344 men and throwing 463 pounds; yet the result was indecisive. The French lost 90 and the British 60 men. The action showed that heavy metal was not of much use unless used well.

To appreciate rightly the exultation Hull's victory caused in the United States, and the intense annoyance it created in England, it must be remembered that during the past twenty years the Island Power had been at war with almost every state in Europe, at one time or another, and in the course of about two hundred single conflicts between s.h.i.+ps of approximately equal force (that is, where the difference was less than one half), waged against French, Spanish, Italian, Turkish, Algerine, Russian, Danish, and Dutch antagonists, her s.h.i.+ps had been beaten and captured in but five instances. Then war broke out with America, and in eight months five single-s.h.i.+p actions occurred, in every one of which the British vessel was captured. Even had the victories been due solely to superior force this would have been no mean triumph for the United States.

On October 13, 1812, the American 18-gun s.h.i.+p-sloop Wasp, Captain Jacob Jones, with 137 men aboard, sailed from the Delaware and ran off southeast to get into the track of the West India vessels; on the 16th a heavy gale began to blow, causing the loss of the jib-boom and two men who were on it. The next day the weather moderated somewhat, and at 11.30 P.M., in lat.i.tude 37 N., longitude 65 W., several sail were descried. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' official letter, Nov. 24, 1812.] These were part of a convoy of 14 merchant-men which had quitted the bay of Honduras on September 12th, bound for England, [Footnote: James' History, vi, 158.] under the convoy of the British 18-gun brig-sloop Frolic, of 19 guns and 110 men, Captain Thomas Whinyates. They had been dispersed by the gale of the 16th, during which the Frolic's main-yard was carried away and both her top-sails torn to pieces [Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' official letter, Oct. 18, 1812.]; next day she spent in repairing damages, and by dark six of the missing s.h.i.+ps had joined her. The day broke almost cloudless on the 18th (Sunday), showing the convoy, ahead and to leeward of the American s.h.i.+p, still some distance off, as Captain Jones had not thought it prudent to close during the night, while he was ignorant of the force of his antagonists. The Wasp now sent down to her top-gallant yards, close reefed her top-sails, and bore down under short fighting canvas; while the Frolic removed her main-yard from the casks, lashed it on deck, and then hauled to the wind under her boom main-sail and close-reefed foretop-sail, hoisting Spanish colors to decoy the stranger under her guns, and permit the convoy to escape. At 11.32 the action began-the two s.h.i.+ps running parallel on the starboard tack, not 60 yards apart, the Wasp, firing her port, and the Frolic her starboard, guns. The latter fired very rapidly, delivering three broadsides to the Wasp's two, [Footnote: Cooper, 182.] both crews cheering loudly as the s.h.i.+ps wallowed through the water. There was a very heavy sea running, which caused the vessels to pitch and roll heavily. The Americans fired as the engaged side of their s.h.i.+p was going down, aiming at their opponent's hull [Footnote: Miles' Register, in, p. 324.]; while the British delivered their broadsides while on the crests of the seas, the shot going high. The water dashed in clouds of spray over both crews, and the vessels rolled so that the muzzles of the guns went under. [Footnote: Do.] But in spite of the rough weather, the firing was not only spirited but well directed. At 11.36 the Wasp's maintop-mast was shot away and fell, with its yard, across the port fore and foretop-sail braces, rendering the head yards unmanageable; at 11.46 the gaff and mizzentop-gallant mast came down, and by 11.52 every brace and most of the rigging was shot away. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.] It would now have been very difficult to brace any of the yards. But meanwhile the Frolic suffered dreadfully in her hull and lower masts, and had her gaff and head braces shot away.[Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' letter.] The slaughter among her crew was very great, but the survivors kept at their work with the dogged courage of their race. At first the two vessels ran side by side, but the American gradually forged ahead, throwing in her fire from a position in which she herself received little injury; by degrees the vessels got so close that the Americans struck the Frolic's side with their rammers in loading, [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.] and the British brig was raked with dreadful effect. The Frolic then fell aboard her antagonist, her jib-boom coming in between the main- and mizzen-rigging of the Wasp and pa.s.sing over the heads of Captain Jones and Lieutenant Biddle, who were standing near the capstan. This forced the Wasp up in the wind, and she again raked her antagonist, Captain Jones trying to restrain his men from boarding till he could put in another broadside. But they could no longer be held back, and Jack Lang, a New Jersey seaman, leaped on the Frolic's bowsprit. Lieutenant Biddle then mounted on the hammock cloth to board, but his feet got entangled in the rigging, and one of the mids.h.i.+pmen seizing his coat-tails to help himself up, the lieutenant tumbled back on the deck. At the next swell he succeeded in getting on the bowsprit, on which there were already two seamen whom he pa.s.sed on the forecastle. But there was no one to oppose him; not twenty Englishmen were left unhurt. [Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' letter.] The man at the wheel was still at his post, grim and undaunted, and two or three more were on deck, including Captain Whinyates and Lieutenant Wintle, both so severely wounded that they could not stand without support. [Footnote: James, vi, 161.] There could be no more resistance, and Lieutenant Biddle lowered the flag at 12.15-just 43 minutes after the beginning of the fight. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.] A minute or two afterward both the Frolic's masts went by the board-the foremast about fifteen feet above the deck, the other short off. Of her crew, as already said, not twenty men had escaped unhurt. Every officer was wounded; two of them, the first lieutenant, Charles McKay, and master, John Stephens, soon died. Her total loss was thus over 90 [Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' official letter thus states it, and is, of course, to be taken as authority; the Bermuda account makes it 69, and James only 62;] about 30 of whom were killed outright or died later. The Wasp suffered very severely in her rigging and aloft generally, but only two or three shots struck her hull; five of her men were killed-two in her mizzen-top and one in her maintop-mast rigging-and five wounded, [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.] chiefly while aloft.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Wasp vs. Frolic: a contemporary painting by Thomas Birch, believed to have been done for the Wasp's captain, James Biddle. (Courtesy Peabody Museum of Salem)]

The two vessels were practically of equal force. The loss of the Frolic's main-yard had merely converted her into a brigantine, and, as the roughness of the sea made it necessary to fight under very short canvas, her inferiority in men was fully compensated for by her superiority in metal. She had been desperately defended; no men could have fought more bravely than Captain Whinyates and his crew. On the other hand, the Americans had done their work with a coolness and skill that could not be surpa.s.sed; the contest had been mainly one of gunnery, and had been decided by the greatly superior judgment and accuracy with which they fired. Both officers and crew had behaved well; Captain Jones particularly mentions Lieutenant Claxton, who, though too ill to be of any service, persisted in remaining on deck throughout the engagement.

The Wasp was armed with 2 long 12's and 16 32-pound carronades; the Frolic with 2 long 6's, 16 32-pound carronades, and 1 s.h.i.+fting 12-pound carronade.

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