Part 23 (1/2)
Section 3. The Objects Of Merit
After defining the existence of merit the Tridentine Council enumerates its objects as follows: ”If anyone saith that the justified, by the good works which he performs, ... does not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life,-if it be so, however, that he depart in grace,-and also an increase of glory: let him be anathema.”(1320) Hence merit calls for a threefold reward: (1) an increase of sanctifying grace; (2) heavenly glory; and (3) an increase of that glory. The expression ”_vere mereri_” shows that all three of these objects can be merited in the true and strict sense of the term (_de condigno_). This is, however, no more than a theologically certain conclusion.
1. INCREASE OF SANCTIFYING GRACE.-The first grace of justification (_gratia prima_) can never be merited;(1321) hence the meaning of the above-quoted conciliar definition is that it can be increased by good works. This increase is technically called _gratia secunda_. All Scriptural texts which a.s.sert that sanctifying grace is unequal in different individuals, also prove that it can be increased or augmented by the performance of meritorious works.(1322)
a) No adult person can merit the first grace of a.s.sistance (_gratia prima actualis_), nor any one of the series of actual graces which follow it, and by which justification ultimately comes to pa.s.s. They are all purely gratuitous. Similarly, too, the first grace of justification (_gratia prima habitualis_) cannot be strictly merited by the sinner preparing for justification. This is the express teaching of Trent: ”But we are therefore said to be justified freely, because that none of those things which precede justification-whether faith or works-merit the grace itself of justification; for, if it be a grace, it is not now by works; otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no more grace.”(1323) To deny this would not only imperil the dogma of the gratuity of grace (because if the first grace given before active justification could be strictly merited, this would necessarily involve the _gratia prima actualis_), but it would also start a vicious circle (because the _gratia prima habitualis_ is an indispensable condition of merit). This explains why St. Paul and St. Augustine again and again insist on the gratuity both of the first grace of a.s.sistance and the grace of justification proper.(1324) ”This grace of Christ,” says St. Augustine, ”without which neither infants nor adults can be saved, is not bestowed for any merits, but is given freely, on account of which it is also called grace. 'Being justified,' says the Apostle, 'freely through His blood.' ”(1325)
In the light of this teaching it is easy to decide the question, raised by Vasquez, whether perfect contrition justifies the sinner merely _per modum dispositionis_ or _per modum causae formalis_. Both contrition and charity, be they perfect or imperfect, are essentially acts that dispose the soul for justification.(1326) Hence, no matter how perfect, neither is capable of effecting justification itself by way of merit (_merendo_), nay, of entering even partially, as Vasquez would have it, into the formal cause of justification, because, according to the Tridentine Council, sanctifying grace and not perfect contrition is the _unica causa formalis_ of justification.(1327)
b) In connection with the dogma just explained theologians discuss the question whether a just man may strictly (_de condigno_) merit the actual graces which G.o.d bestows on him. We must carefully distinguish between merely sufficient and efficacious graces. Theologians commonly hold(1328) that merely sufficient graces may be merited _de condigno_, not so efficacious graces, because the right to efficacious graces would necessarily include a strict right to final perseverance (_donum perseverantiae_), which lies outside the sphere of condign merit. a.s.suming that the justified could by good works strictly merit the _prima gratia efficax_ (an impossible hypothesis, because merit presupposes efficacious grace), this would involve a similar claim to a second, third, fourth grace-and ultimately to the final grace of perseverance, which, in matter of fact, no man can merit. Not even heroic acts of virtue give a strict right to infallibly efficacious graces, or to final perseverance. Even the greatest saint is obliged to watch, pray, and tremble, lest he lapse from righteousness.(1329) For this reason the Tridentine Council mentions neither final perseverance nor efficacious graces among the objects of merit.(1330)
2. ETERNAL LIFE OR HEAVENLY GLORY.-The second object of merit is eternal life. The dogmatic proof for this a.s.sertion has been given above.(1331) Eternal life is described by the Tridentine Council(1332) both as a grace and as a reward.
a) In the canon quoted in the introduction of this Section the same Council(1333) enumerates four apparently separate and distinct objects of merit, _viz._: increase of grace, eternal life, the attainment of eternal life, and increase of glory. Why the distinction between ”eternal life”
and the ”attainment of eternal life”? Does this imply a twofold reward, and consequently a twofold object of merit? Theologians deny that such was the intention of the Council, because the right to a reward evidently coincides with the right to the payment of the same. An unattainable eternal life would be a chimera.(1334) Nevertheless, the distinction is not superfluous, since the attainment of eternal life does not coincide with the gaining of merit but must be put off until death, and even then depends upon the condition of the soul: ”_si tamen in gratia decesserit_”
(provided he depart in grace). With this last condition the holy Synod also wished to inculcate the salutary truth that the loss of sanctifying grace _ipso facto_ entails the forfeiture of all previously acquired merits. Even the greatest saint, were he to die in the state of mortal sin, would enter eternity with empty hands and as an enemy of G.o.d. All his former merits would be cancelled. To revive them would require a new justification.(1335)
b) A close a.n.a.lysis of the Tridentine canon under review gives rise to another difficulty. Can the _gloria prima_ be merited? In defining the _gratia secunda_ as an object of strict merit, the Council expressly excludes the _gratia prima_. It makes no such distinction in regard to glory, but names both ”eternal life” (_gloria prima_) and ”increase of glory” (_gloria secunda_) as objects of merit. This naturally suggests the query: Why and to what extent can the just man merit the _gloria prima_, seeing that he is unable to merit the _gratia prima_? Some theologians(1336) contend that the justified are ent.i.tled to the _gloria prima_ only as a heritage (_t.i.tulo haereditatis_), never as a reward (_t.i.tulo mercedis_). Because of its intimate causal connection with the _gratia prima_, which is beyond the reach of merit, the _gloria prima_, they argue, cannot be regarded as an object of merit except on the a.s.sumption that the merits which precede justification confer a claim to the _gloria prima_. This a.s.sumption is false, because without sanctifying grace no condign merits can be acquired.(1337) In spite of this difficulty, however, most theologians(1338) hold that, unlike the _gratia prima_, the _gloria prima_ may under certain conditions be an object of strict merit. The main reason is that, as the state of glory is not a necessary requisite of the meritoriousness of good works, while the state of grace is, the former may _positis ponendis_ be an effect of the _meritum de congruo_, though the latter may not. A mere statement of the problem shows that it cannot be satisfactorily solved unless we distinguish between and enter into a detailed examination of two distinct hypotheses. It is generally agreed that infants dying in the state of baptismal grace owe that grace, and the state of glory which they enjoy in Heaven, solely to G.o.d's mercy and have no claim to beat.i.tude other than that of heredity (_t.i.tulus hereditatis_). Adults who preserve their baptismal innocence until death, manifestly cannot merit the _gloria prima_ by their good works, because they already possess a legal t.i.tle to it through Baptism.(1339) It follows that their good works increase, but do not merit, the _gloria prima_, to which these souls are already ent.i.tled _t.i.tulo haereditatis_. The case is quite different with catechumens and Christians guilty of mortal sin, who are justified by an act of perfect contrition before the reception of Baptism or the Sacrament of Penance. Of them it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that they merit for themselves _de condigno_, not indeed the first grace of justification, but the _gloria prima_, because perfect contrition, being an _opus operans_, at the very moment of its infusion becomes an _opus meritorium_ ent.i.tled to eternal glory.(1340) As regards the great majority of adult Catholics who, because of defective preparation, never get beyond imperfect contrition (_attritio_), and therefore are not justified until they actually receive the Sacrament, it is certain that they owe whatever grace they possess and whatever glory they have a claim to, entirely to the _opus operatum_ of the Sacrament.(1341)
3. INCREASE OF HEAVENLY GLORY.-The third object of merit, according to the Tridentine Council, is ”increase of glory.” This must evidently correspond to an increase of grace, which in its turn is conditioned upon the performance of additional good works. That there is a causal connection between meritorious works performed on earth and the glory enjoyed in Heaven is clearly taught by Holy Scripture. Cfr. Matth. XVI, 27: ”For the Son of man shall ... render to every man according to his works.”(1342) 1 Cor. III, 8: ”And every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labor.”(1343) A further argument may be derived from the unequal apportionment of glory to the elect in Heaven.(1344) This inequality is based on inequality of grace, which in turn is owing to the fact that grace can be augmented by good works. Consequently, the inequality of glory depends ultimately on good works.(1345)
4. NOTE ON THE MERITUM DE CONGRUO.-Congruous, as distinguished from condign merit, gives no real claim to a reward, but only a quasi-claim based on equity (_ex quadam aequitate_, _congruentia_, _decentia_).
Hence congruous merit and condign merit are not species of the same genus, but merely a.n.a.logous terms. Because of the ambiguity of the word ”equity”
Dominicus Soto, Beca.n.u.s, and a few other Scholastics rejected the use of the term _meritum de congruo_ in theology. But this was a mistake. The Fathers engaged in the Semipelagian controversy, notably St.
Augustine,(1346) did not a.s.sert that the justifying faith of the sinner is entirely without merit. The requisites of congruous merit are identical with those of condign merit(1347) in all respects except one,-the _meritum de congruo_ does not require the state of grace.
a) According to the common opinion, from which but few theologians dissent,(1348) a Christian in the state of mortal sin can, from the moment he begins to cooperate with supernatural grace, merit _de congruo_ by good works, and obtain by prayer the dispositions necessary for justification, and ultimately justification itself.