Part 5 (1/2)
The Droop quota, therefore, gives, not proportional, but disproportional representation.
+Election by Each Party of its Most Popular Candidates.+--Still keeping in mind the six-seat electorate for the Federal Senate, we may note that there are two rival systems in the field--the _scrutin de liste_ or Block Vote, in which each elector votes for any six of the candidates, and the Hare system, which allows each elector an effective vote for one candidate only. The adoption of either of these systems would be unfortunate. To force each elector to vote for six candidates is probably to require him to vote for more than he is inclined to support, and certainly for more than his party is ent.i.tled to return; and, also, to put it in the power of the majority to return all six senators. To allow him to vote for one candidate only, on the other hand, is to break up both parties into factions by allowing the favourites of sections within the parties to be elected, instead of those most in general favour with all sections composing each party. An intermediate position is therefore best. No elector should be required to vote for more than three candidates, and no elector should be allowed to vote for less.
Because in the first place it is evident that each party will, on the average, return three senators, and, secondly, it may be taken for granted that even the minority will nominate at least three candidates.
Two alternative proposals may be submitted as fulfilling these conditions:--
_1. Each elector should vote for any three candidates, or
2. Each elector should have six votes, and have the option of giving two votes to individual candidates._
The first plan is the simpler, but the second is probably the better, as it allows more discrimination without sacrificing any of the advantages.
Either proposal is practically equivalent to applying the Block Vote to each party separately; and whatever may be the objections to applying the Block Vote to two or more parties it is the simplest and best system to elect the candidates most in general favour when one party only is concerned. It is true that the majority will return rather more than one-half of the representatives and the minority rather less than one-half, so that the minority will have more votes in proportion to its strength. But with two parties of fairly equal but fluctuating strength the fairest way is to require each elector to vote for at least one-half of the number of representatives. Besides, apart from the fact that it is not known before the election how many seats each party will obtain, it is absolutely necessary that each elector shall have the same number of votes in order that each party be allotted its just share of representation. Moreover it is not proposed to limit the elector's freedom of choice in the slightest by confining him to the candidates of one party. The great majority of electors will vote on party lines, because every vote given to a candidate of the opposing party tells against the representation of their own party. The reason of this is that every vote counts individually for the candidate and collectively for the whole party. Any elector, therefore, who divides his voting power equally between the two parties practically wastes it as far as the party representation is concerned. But it is neither necessary nor desirable to bring about such a rigid party division as prevails in America, for instance, where a man is born, lives, and dies Republican or Democrat. If electors were confined to the candidates of one party, an elector who wished to vote for an individual candidate of the opposing party would be placed in the dilemma of deserting either his favourite or his party. The division into parties is really required in the elected body, and not in the const.i.tuent body.
+Rules for the Reform.+--We are now in a position to draw up a list of rules for the proposed reform, applicable to all legislatures in which party government prevails:--
1. Electorates to be grouped so as to contain at least three seats, and preferably not less than five seats nor more than twenty seats.
2. Candidates to declare when nominating, or a few days before the election, whether they are in favour of or opposed to the party in power, and to be cla.s.sified accordingly as Ministerialists or Oppositionists.
3. Ballot papers to contain the names of all candidates nominated, arranged in two parallel columns, one headed Ministerialists, and the other Oppositionists. The list of candidates under each heading to be arranged in alphabetical order.
4. Each elector to have as many votes as there are seats, and to be allowed to give either one or two votes to any candidate. The votes to be distributed as he pleases among all the candidates of both lists.
5. The total number of valid votes cast at the election to be divided by the number of seats; the quotient to be known as the ”unit of representation.”
6. Each party to be allowed one seat for every whole unit of representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its candidates, and the last seat to go to the party which has the larger remainder.
7. The candidates of each party having the highest number of votes to be declared elected to the number of seats to which each party is ent.i.tled in accordance with the preceding rule.
8. In case of a tie between candidates or parties the lot decides.
The alternative plan for rule 4, which is somewhat simpler, would read as follows:--
4. Each elector to vote for half the number of candidates that there are seats, _i.e._, three votes in a five or six-seat electorate, four votes in a seven or eight-seat electorate, &c. The votes to be distributed as he pleases among all the candidates of both lists.
It is unnecessary to dwell on the absolute simplicity of these rules.
They involve no radical departure from existing methods of voting or of counting votes. Once the totals are added up, the calculations necessary to decide the successful candidates are within the reach of a school child.
EXAMPLE.--Take as an example 13 candidates in a six-seat electorate who poll as follows:--
MINISTERIALISTS. OPPOSITIONISTS.
BROWN 83,000 YOUNG 53,000 RYAN 74,000 BELL 51,000 c.o.x 44,000 HUME 47,000 WHITE 42,000 JONES 45,000 PEEL 38,000 BLACK 34,000 ADAMS 35,000 ------- GREY 33,000 230,000 SWIFT 21,000 ------- 370,000
Total votes = 370,000 + 230,000 = 600,000.
Unit of representation = 600,000/6 = 100,000.
Ministerialists: 3 units + 70,000 remainder = 4 seats.
Oppositionists: 2 units + 30,000 remainder = 2 seats.
The Ministerialists, having the larger remainder, secure the last seat.
The successful candidates are Brown, Ryan, c.o.x, and White (M.), Young and Bell (O.)
It will be noted that without the proportional principle the Ministerialists would have returned two members only, and the Oppositionists four.
It is to be distinctly understood that the simpler plan of voting for half the number of candidates that there are seats is practically as good as the other. In order to show, however, that the plan we have favoured may be simplified, we ill.u.s.trate by a sample ballot paper a method which has been used in Belgium. Two white spots are printed opposite each candidate's name. An ink pad and stamp are then provided at each polling booth, and the elector stamps out a white spot for each vote he wishes to give. In the paper ill.u.s.trated two votes are given to Brown, two to Jones, one to Grey, and one to Swift. This elector has, therefore, given two-thirds of his voting power to the Ministerial party, and one-third to the Opposition, and has thus directly influenced both policies. A further advantage of the proposal is the ease with which such a paper can be read by the returning officer.
BALLOT PAPER
Ministerialists. Oppositionists.
+---------------+ +---------------+
o o
ADAMS
o o
BELL
+---------------+ +---------------+
x x
BROWN
o o
BLACK