Part 28 (1/2)

”The Garibaldians were numerous about Monte-Rotondo. But the terrain like all that around Italian villages was covered with trees, hedges, etc. Under these conditions, I believe that the fire of sharpshooters would have been more effective than volleys, where the men estimate distances badly and do not aim.”

NOTES

[Footnote 1: General Daumas (Manners and Customs of Algeria). Nocturnal Surprise and Extermination of a Camp.]

[Footnote 2: Among the Romans, mechanics and morale are so admirably united, that the one always comes to the aid of the other and never injures it.]

[Footnote 3: The Romans did not make light of the influence of a poet like Tyrtaeus. They did not despise any effective means. But they knew the value of each.]

[Footnote 4: Also their common sense led them to recognize immediately and appropriate arms better than their own.]

[Footnote 5: This is an excuse. The maniple was of perfect n.o.bility and, without the least difficulty, could face in any direction.]

[Footnote 6: This was an enveloping attack of an army and not of men or groups.

The Roman army formed a wedge and was attacked at the point and sides of the wedge; there was not a separate flank attack. That very day the maniple presented more depth than front.]

[Footnote 7: They had been sent to attack Hannibal's camp; they were repulsed and taken prisoner in their own camp after the battle.]

[Footnote 8: This extract is taken from the translation of Dom Thuillier. Livy does not state the precise number of Roman combatants. He says nothing had been neglected in order to render the Roman army the strongest possible, and from what he was told by some it numbered eighty-seven thousand two hundred men. That is the figure of Polybius. His account has killed, forty-five thousand; taken or escaped after the action, nineteen thousand. Total sixty-four thousand. What can have become of the twenty-three thousand remaining?]

[Footnote 9: The Numidian hors.e.m.e.n were a light irregular cavalry, excellent for skirmis.h.i.+ng, hara.s.sing, terrifying, by their extraordinary shouts and their unbridled gallop. They were not able to hold out against a regular disciplined cavalry provided with bits and substantial arms. They were but a swarm of flies that always hara.s.ses and kills at the least mistake; elusive and perfect for a long pursuit and the ma.s.sacre of the vanquished to whom the Numidians gave neither rest nor truce. They were like Arab cavalry, badly armed for the combat, but sufficiently armed for butchering, as results show. The Arabian knife, the Kabyle knife, the Indian knife of our days, which is the favorite of the barbarian or savage, must play its part.]

[Footnote 10: They formed the third Roman line according to the order of battle of the Legion. The contraction of the first line into a point would naturally hem them in.]

[Footnote 11: Brought back by Hannibal who had reserved to himself the command of the center.]

[Footnote 12: The triarians, the third Roman line.]

[Footnote 13: What effect this might have, was shown in the battle of Alisia, where Caesar's men, forewarned by him, were nevertheless troubled by war-whoops behind them. The din of battle in rear has always demoralized troops.]

[Footnote 14: His cavalry consisted of seven thousand horse, of which five hundred were Gauls or Germans, the best hors.e.m.e.n of that time, nine hundred Galicians, five hundred Thracians, and Thessalians, Macedonians and Italians in various numbers.]

[Footnote 15: Caesar's legions in battle order were in three lines: four cohorts in the first line, two in the second, and three in the third. In this way the cohorts of a legion were, in battle, always supported by cohorts of the same legion.]

[Footnote 16: Caesar stated that in order to make up the numerical inferiority of his cavalry, he had chosen four hundred of the most alert young men, from among those marching ahead of the standards, and by daily exercise had them accustomed to fighting between his hors.e.m.e.n. He had in this way obtained such results that his thousand riders dared, in open field, to cope with Pompey's seven thousand cavalry without becoming frightened at their number.]