Part 19 (1/2)

An extract from Folard: ”Only a capable officer is needed to get the best results from a cavalry which has confidence in its movement, which is known to be good and vigorous, and also is equipped with excellent weapons. Such cavalry will break the strongest battalions, if its leader has sense enough to know its power and courage enough to use this power.”

Breaking is not enough, and is a feat that costs more than it is worth if the whole battalion is not killed or taken prisoner, or at least if the cavalry is not immediately followed by other troops, charged with this task.

At Waterloo our cavalry was exhausted fruitlessly, because it acted without artillery or infantry support.

At Krasno, August 14, 1812, Murat, at the head of his cavalry could not break an isolated body of ten thousand Russian infantry which continually held him off by its fire, and retired tranquilly across the plain.

The 72nd was upset by cavalry at Solferino.

From ancient days the lone infantryman has always had the advantage over the lone cavalryman. There is no shadow of a doubt about this in ancient narrations. The cavalryman only fought the cavalryman. He threatened, hara.s.sed, troubled the infantryman in the rear, but he did not fight him. He slaughtered him when put to flight by other infantry, or at least he scattered him and the light infantry slaughtered him.

Cavalry is a terrible weapon in the hands of one who knows how to use it. Who can say that Epaminondas could have defeated the Spartans twice without his Thessalonian cavalry.

Eventually rifle and artillery fire deafen the soldier; fatigue overpowers him; he becomes inert; he hears commands no longer. If cavalry unexpectedly appears, he is lost. Cavalry conquers merely by its appearance. (Bismarck or Decker).

Modern cavalry, like ancient cavalry, has a real effect only on troops already broken, on infantry engaged with infantry, on cavalry disorganized by artillery fire or by a frontal demonstration. But against such troops its action is decisive. In such cases its action is certain and gives enormous results. You might fight all day and lose ten thousand men, the enemy might lose as many, but if your cavalry pursues him, it will take thirty thousand prisoners. Its role is less knightly than its reputation and appearance, less so than the role of infantry. It always loses much less than infantry. Its greatest effect is the effect of surprise, and it is thereby that it gets such astonis.h.i.+ng results.

What formation should infantry, armed with modern weapons, take to guard against flank attacks by cavalry? If one fires four times as fast, if the fire is better sustained, one needs only a quarter as many men to guard a point against cavalry. Protection might be secured by using small groups, placed the range of a rifle shot apart and flanking each other, left on the flank of the advance. But they must be dependable troops, who will not be worried by what goes on behind them.

4. Armor and Armament

An armored cavalry is clearly required for moral reasons.

Note this with reference to the influence of cuira.s.siers (armored cavalrymen) on morale. At the battle of Renty, in 1554, Tavannes, a marshal, had with him his company armored in steel. It was the first time that such armor had been seen. Supported by some hundreds of fugitives who had rallied, he threw himself at the head of his company, on a column of two thousand German cavalry who had just thrown both infantry and cavalry into disorder. He chose his time so well that he broke and carried away these two thousand Germans, who fell back and broke the twelve hundred light hors.e.m.e.n who were supporting them. There followed a general flight, and the battle was won.

General Renard says ”The decadence of cavalry caused the disappearance of their square formations in battle, which were characteristic in the seventeenth century.” It was not the decadence of the cavalry but the abandonment of the cuira.s.s and the perfecting of the infantry weapon to give more rapid fire. When cuira.s.siers break through they serve as examples, and emulation extends to others, who another time try to break through as they did.

Why cuira.s.siers? Because they alone, in all history, have charged and do charge to the end.

To charge to the end the cuira.s.siers need only half the courage of the dragoons, as their armor raises their morale one half. But since the cuira.s.siers have as much natural courage as the dragoons, for they are all the same men, it is proper to count the more on their action.

Shall we have only one kind of cavalry? Which? If all our cavalry could wear the cuira.s.s and at the same time do the fatiguing work of light cavalry, if all our horses could in addition carry the cuira.s.s through such work, I say that there should be only cuira.s.siers. But I do not understand why the morale given by the cuira.s.s should be lightly done away with, merely to have one cavalry without the cuira.s.s.

A cavalryman armored completely and his horse partially, can charge only at a trot.

On the appearance of fire arms, cavalry, according to General Ambert, an author of the past, covered itself with ma.s.ses of armor resembling anvils rather than with cuira.s.ses. It was at that time the essential arm. Later as infantry progressed the tactics changed, it needed more mobility. Permanent armies began to be organized by the State. The State thought less of the skin of the individual than of economy and mobility and almost did away with cuira.s.siers. The cuira.s.s has always given, and today more than ever it will give, confidence to the cavalryman. Courage, dash, and speed have a value beyond that of mere ma.s.s. I leave aside mathematical discussions which seem to me to have nothing in common with battle conditions. I would pick to wear the cuira.s.s the best men in the army, big chested, red-blooded, strong limbed, the foot cha.s.seurs. I would organize a regiment of light cuira.s.siers for each of our divisions. Men and horses, such a cavalry would be much more robust and active than our present cuira.s.siers. If our armored cavalry is worth more than any other arm by its dash in battle, this cavalry would be worth twice as much. But how would these men of small stature get into the saddle? To this serious objection I answer, ”They will arrange it.” And this objection, which I do not admit, is the only one that can be made against the organization of a light armored cavalry, an organization that is made imperative by the improvement in weapons. The remainder of those cha.s.seur battalions which furnish cuira.s.siers, should return to the infantry, which has long demanded them, and hussars and dragoons, dismounted in the necessary number will also be welcomed by the infantry.

As for the thrust, the thrust is deadlier than the cut. You do not have to worry about lifting your arm; you thrust. But it is necessary that the cavalryman be convinced that to parry a vertical cut is folly. This can be done by his officers, by those who have had experience, if there are any such in peace times. This is not easy.

But in this respect, as in all others, the advantage lies with the brave. A cavalry charge is a matter of morale above all. It is identical in its methods, its effects, with the infantry charge. All the conditions to be fulfilled in the charge (walk, trot, gallop, charge, etc.) have a reason bearing on morale. These reasons have already been touched on.

Roman discipline and character demand tenacity. The hardening of the men to fatigue, and a good organization, giving mutual support, produced that tenacity, against which the bravest could not stand. The exhausting method of powerful strokes used by the Gauls could not last long against the skillful, terrible and less fatiguing method of fighting by the thrust.

The Sikh cavalrymen of M. Nolan armed with dragoon sabers sharpened by themselves, liked the cut. They knew nothing about methods of swordsmans.h.i.+p; they did not practice. They said ”A good saber and a willingness to use it are enough.” True, True!

There is always discussion as to the lance or the saber. The lance requires skillful vigorous cavalrymen, good hors.e.m.e.n, very well drilled, very adroit, for the use of the lance is more difficult than that of the straight sword, especially if the sword is not too heavy.

Is not this an answer to the question? No matter what is done, no matter what methods are adopted, it must always be remembered that our recruits in war time are sent into squadrons as into battalions, with a hasty and incomplete training. If you give them lances, most of them will just have sticks in their hands, while a straight sword at the end of a strong arm is at the same time simple and terrible. A short trident spear, with three short points just long enough to kill but not only enough to go through the body, would remain in the body of the man and carry him along. It would recoil on the cavalryman who delivered the blow, he would be upset by the blow himself. But the dragoon must be supported by the saddle, and as he had kept hold of the shaft he would be able to disengage the fork which had pierced the body some six inches. No cavalry of equal morale could stand against a cavalry armed with such forked spears.