Part 11 (2/2)

The difficulty of describing in detail the ultimate ends of the real social will has led some writers to speak in terms of exaggerated vagueness. The mere idea in a man ”of something, he knows not what, which he may and should become” can give little guidance to action; nor can one aim with much confidence at a goal of which ”we can only speak or think in negatives.” [Footnote: _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Sec Sec 192, 172, 180. But GREEN is not always so indefinite. He is on the right track. He reverences the social will and the historical development of the social order.]

But it is not necessary to speak in this way. We may form some conception of the real, rational social will, without being compelled to know all that man is capable of becoming and without being able to forecast the details of his environment in the distant future.

We may attain to our conception by determining clearly the nature of the aims man sets before himself in proportion to his growing rationality. We can see in what direction man moves as he develops and becomes enlightened. From this standpoint, the aims of the rational social will appear to be as follows:

(1) The harmonious satisfaction of the impulses and desires of man.

(2) Such an unfolding of his powers as will increase their range and variety, broaden man's horizon, and give him an increased control over erratic impulses.

(3) The bringing about of a social state in which the will of each individual within a community counts for something, and not merely the will of a chosen few.

(4) The broadening of the conception of what const.i.tutes a community, so that ever increasing numbers are regarded as having claims that must be recognized.

(5) The taking into consideration of the whole of life; the whole life of individuals and of communities, so that the insistent present shall not be given undue weight, as against the future.

85. THE ETHICS OF REASON.--The doctrine of the Rational Social Will might very properly be called the Ethics of Reason. It is not to be confounded with the so-called ”tribal” or ”group” ethics. To be sure, it has to do with man as a social being; but this is characteristic of ethical systems generally. Man is a social being; he is one essentially, and not accidentally. That he should be a member of a tribe, or of any lesser group than the whole body of sentient and reasonable beings, may not unjustly be regarded as an historical accident, as a function of his position in the scale of development.

In judging the doctrine of the rational social will, bear in mind the following:

(1) It rests upon the basis of the impulsive and volitional nature of man.

(2) It recognizes reason in the individual, and declares that only so far as he is rational is he the proper subject of ethics at all. Erratic and uncontrolled impulse knows no moral law.

(3) It sees reason in the customs, laws and public opinion of the tribe or the state, while recognizing a higher tribunal before the bar of which all these are summoned.

(4) It appeals to the reason of the race--the reason appropriate to the race as enlightened and freed from the shackles of local prejudice and restricted sympathy.

(5) It recognizes that man can give expression to his nature, can satisfy his desires and exercise his reason, only as aided by his physical and social environment. It emphasizes the necessity of a certain reverence for the actual historical development of human societies, with their inst.i.tutions. Such inst.i.tutions are the embodiment of reason--not pure reason, but reason struggling to get itself expressed as it can. He who would legislate for man independently of such inst.i.tutions has left the solid earth and man far behind. He is suspended in the void.

86. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIZATION.--Civilizations differ; some are more material, laying stress upon man's conquest of his material environment.

Others exhibit a greater appreciation of idealistic elements, the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, the cultivation of the fine arts, the development of humanitarian sentiment. For civilization in general it is not necessary to advance an argument. But there are elements in many civilizations which the thoughtful man may feel called upon to defend.

Civilization, taken generally, scarcely needs a labored justification because it is only in a civilization of some kind or other that we can look for a guarantee of the broad social will, for the reign of reason.

Undeveloped man is at the mercy of nature; he is the sport of history.

Where developed man can raise his voice, man possessed of power and capable of taking broad views of things, the rule of reason may be set up. A deliberate attempt may be made to recognize many wills, harmonize discords. Order may be brought out of chaos, and the limits of the realm within the borders of which order reigns may be indefinitely extended.

Such is the general ethical justification for the rise of a civilization.

It is an expression of, and an instrument for the realization of, the broader social will. That a given civilization may be imperfect in both respects has been made clear in the last chapter. In the light of the general justification for civilization many questions may be raised touching this or that element in civilizations as we observe them.

Thus, it may be pointed out that as man progresses in civilization he calls into being a mult.i.tude of new wants, many of which may have to remain unsatisfied. [Footnote: Compare chapter x.x.x, Sec 142.] It may be a.s.serted that literature, art and science are, in fact, cherished as though they were ends in themselves, and not means called into existence to serve the interests of man. Absorbing as it may be to him, how can the philologist prove that his science is useful to humanity either present or prospective? How shall the astronomer, who may frankly admit that he cannot conceive that nine tenths of the work with which he occupies himself can ever be of any actual use to anyone, justify himself in devoting his life to it? Shall a curiosity, which seems to lead nowhere, be satisfied? And if so, on what ground?

Moreover, every civilization recognizes that some wills are to be given a more unequivocal recognition than others. Inequality is the rule. A man does not put his own children upon a level with those of his neighbor.

Even in the most democratic of states men do not stand upon the same level. In dealing with our own fellows we do not employ the same weights and measures as in dealing with foreigners. Who loses his appet.i.te for his breakfast when he reads that there have been inundations in China or that an African tribe has come under the ”protection” of a race of another color? The white man has added to his burden--the burden of economic advantage present or prospective--and we find it as it should be. Finally, when we bring within our horizon the ”interests” of humbler sentient creatures, we see that they are unhesitatingly subordinated to our own. Some attention is paid to them in civilized communities. They are recognized, not merely by custom and public opinion, but, to some degree, even by law. Men are punished for treating certain animals in certain ways. But why? Have the animals rights? There is no topic within the sphere of morals upon which moralists speak with more wavering and uncertain accents. [Footnote: See chapter x.x.x, Sec 141.]

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