Part 22 (1/2)
DIGRESSION III.
OF THE JUDGING OF CONTROVERSIES AND QUESTIONS OF FAITH.
There is a twofold judgment which discerneth and judgeth of faith. The one absolute, whereby the Most High G.o.d, whose supreme authority alone bindeth us to believe whatsoever he propoundeth to be believed by us, hath in his written word p.r.o.nounced, declared, and established, what he would have us to believe concerning himself or his wors.h.i.+p; the other limited and subordinate, which is either public or private. That which is public is either ordinary or extraordinary. The ministerial or subordinate public judgment, which I call ordinary, is the judgment of every pastor or doctor, who, by reason of his public vocation and office, ought by his public ministry to direct and instruct the judgments of other men in matters of faith, which judgment of pastors and doctors is limited and restricted to the plain warrants and testimonies of Holy Scripture, they themselves being only the amba.s.sadors(1056) of the Judge to preach and publish the sentence which he hath established, so that a pastor is not properly _judex_ but _index_. The subordinate public judgment, which is extraordinary, is the judgment of a council a.s.sembled for the more public and effectual establishment and declaration of one or more points of faith and heads of Christian doctrine, and that in opposition to all contrary heresy or error, which is broached and set a-foot in the church. From which council,(1057) no Christian man who is learned in the Scriptures may be excluded, but ought to be admitted to utter his judgment in the same; for in the indagation or searching out of a matter of faith, they are not the persons of men which give authority to their sayings, but the reasons and doc.u.ments which every one bringeth for his judgment. The subordinate judgment, which I call private, is the judgment of discretion whereby every Christian,(1058) for the certain information of his own mind, and the satisfaction of his own conscience, may and ought to try and examine, as well the decrees of councils as the doctrines of particular pastors, and in so far to receive and believe the same, as he understandeth them to agree with the Scriptures.
Besides these, there is no other kind of judgment which G.o.d hath allowed to men in matters of faith, which being first observed, we say next, concerning the part of princes, that when questions and controversies of faith are tossed in the church, that which pertaineth to them is, to convocate a council for the decision of the matter, civilly to moderate the same, by causing such an orderly and peaceable proceeding as is alike necessary in every grave a.s.sembly, whether of the church or of the commonwealth; and, finally, by their coactive temporal power to urge and procure that the decrees of the council be received, and the faith therein contained professed, by their subjects.
But neither may they, by their own authority and without a council, decide any controverted matter of faith, nor yet having convocated a council, may they take upon them to command, rule, order, and dispose the disputes and deliberations according to their arbitrement; nor, lastly, may they, by virtue of their regal dignity, claim any power to examine the decrees concluded in the council, otherwise than by the judgment of private discretion which is common to every Christian.
First, I say, they may not by themselves presume, publicly and judicially, to decide and define any matter of faith, which is questioned in the church; but this definition they ought to remit unto a lawful and free council. Ambrose would not come to the court to be questioned and judged by the emperor Valentinian in a matter of faith, whenever he heard that emperors judged bishops in matters of faith, seeing, if that were granted, it would follow that laymen should dispute and debate matters, and bishops hear, yea, that bishops should learn of laymen.
The true ground of which refusal (clear enough in itself) is darkened by Dr Field,(1059) who allegeth, 1. That the thing which Valentinian took on him was, to judge of a thing already resolved in a general council called by Constantine, as if it had been free, and not yet judged of at all. 2.
That Valentinian was known to be partial; that he was but a novice; and the other judges which he meant to a.s.sociate himself suspected; but howsoever these circ.u.mstances might serve the more to justify Ambrose's not compearing to be judged in a matter of faith by Valentinian, yet the Doctor toucheth not that which is most considerable, namely, the reason which he alleged for his not compearing, because it hath been at no time heard of that emperors judged bishops in matters of faith, and if that were granted, it would follow that bishops should learn of laymen; which reason holdeth ever good, even though the thing hath not been formerly judged by a council.
And, furthermore, if those (which the Doctor mentioneth) were the true reasons of his refusing to be judged by Valentinian, then why did he pretend another reason (whereof we have heard), and not rather defend himself with the real and true reason? Wherefore we gather, that the reason which made Ambrose refuse to be judged by him was no other than this, because he considered that princes, neither by themselves, nor by any whom they please to choose, may, without a lawfully a.s.sembled and free council, usurp a public judgment and decisive sentence in controversies of faith, which, if they arrogate to themselves, they far exceed the bounds of their vocation; for it is not said of princes, but of priests, that their lips should preserve knowledge, and that they should seek the law from their mouths, Mal. ii. 7. And the priests did Jehoshaphat set in ”Jerusalem, for the judgment of the Lord, and for controversies,” 2 Chron.
xix. 8, 10, and for judging betwixt law and commandment, statutes and judgments.
In the meanwhile we deny not but that in extraordinary cases, when lawful councils cannot be had, and when the clergy is universally corrupted through gross ignorance, perverse affections, and incorrigible negligence, in such a case the prince, notwithstanding the defect of the ordinary and regular judges, may yet, by the power of the civil sword, repress and punish so many as publish and spread such doctrines as both he and other Christians, by the judgment of discretion, plainly understand from Scripture to be heretical.
Next, I say, that the prince, having a.s.sembled a council, may not take so much upon him as imperiously to command what he thinketh good in the disputes and deliberations, and to have everything ordered, disposed, and handled according to his mind. ”To debate and define theological controversies, and to teach what is orthodoxal, what heretical, is the office of divines, yet, by a coactive authority, to judge this orthodox faith to be received by all, and heretical pravity to be rejected, is the office of kings, or the supreme magistrates, in every commonwealth,” saith the Bishop of Salisbury.(1060) And, again,(1061) ”In searching, directing, teaching, divines ordinarily, and by reason of their calling, ought to go before kings themselves; but in commanding, establis.h.i.+ng, compelling, kings do far excel:” where he showeth how, in defining of the controversies of religion, in one respect ecclesiastical persons, and in another respect kings, have the first place.
In the debating of a question of faith, kings have not, by virtue of their princely vocation, any precedency or chief place, the action being merely ecclesiastical. For howbeit kings may convocate a council, preside also and govern the same as concerning the human and political order, yet, saith Junius,(1062) _Actiones, deliberationes, et definitiones, ad substantiam rei ecclesiasticae pertinentes, a sacerdotio sunt, a caetu servoram Dei, quibus rei suoe administrationem mandavit Deus._ And, with him, the Archbishop of Spalato saith, in like manner,(1063) that howbeit Christian princes have convocated councils, and civilly governed the same, yet they had no power nor authority in the very discussing, handling and deciding of matters of faith.
What then? In the handling of controversies of faith, have princes no place nor power at all beside that of political government only? Surely, by virtue of their princely authority, they have no other place in the handling of these matters. Yet, what if they be men of singular learning and understanding in the Scriptures? Then let them propound their own suffrage, with the grounds and reasons of it, even as other learned men in the council do. But neither as princes, nor as men singularly learned, may they require that others in the council shall dispute and debate matters, and that they themselves shall sit as judges having judicial power of a negative voice; for in a council no man's voice hath any greater strength than his reasons and probation have. _Non enim admitto_, &c: ”For I admit not in a council (saith the same prelate(1064)) some as judges, others as disputators, for I have showed that a conciliary judgment consisteth in the approbation of that sentence which, above others, hath been showed to have most weight, and to which no man could enough oppose. Wherefore no man in the council ought to have a judiciary voice, unless he be withal a disputator, and a.s.signs a reason wherefore he a.s.signs to that judgment and repels another, and that reason such a one as is drawn from the Scripture only, and from antiquity.”
Lastly, I hold, that, after the definition and decision of a council, princes may not take upon them, by any judicial power or public vocation, to examine the same, as if they had authority to p.r.o.nounce yet another decisive sentence, either ratifying or reversing what the council hath decreed. Most certain it is, that, before princes give their royal a.s.sent unto the decrees of any council whatsoever, and compel men to receive and acknowledge the same, they ought, first of all, carefully to try and examine them whether they agree with the Scriptures or not; and, if they find them not to agree with the Scriptures, then to deny their a.s.sent and authority thereto. But all the princes do not by any judicial power or public authority, but only by the judgment of private discretion, which they have as Christians, and which, together with them, is common also to their subjects; for neither may a master of a family commend to his children and servants the profession of that faith which is published by the decrees of a council, except, in like manner, he examine the same by the Scriptures.
DIGRESSION IV.
OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS, AND ECCLESIASTICAL CENSURES.
Ecclesiastical censures and punishments, wherewith delinquents are bound, and from which, when they turn penitents, they are loosed, are of two sorts: either such as are common, and agree unto all, as excommunication and absolution; or such as are peculiar, and agree only to men of ecclesiastical order, as suspension, deprivation, &c.
As touching the power of the keys, to bind and loose, excommunicate and absolve; first of all, princes are to remember, that neither they may, by themselves, exercise this power (for _regum est corporalem irrogare paenam; sacerdotum spiritualem inferre vindictam_(1065)), nor yet by their deputies or commissioners in their name, and with authority from them; because, as they have not themselves the power of the keys, so neither can they communicate the same unto others. Secondly, Forasmuch as princes are the wardens, defenders, and revengers of both the Tables, they ought, therefore, to provide and take course that neither laymen be permitted to have and exercise, the power of excommunication, nor yet that the prelates themselves be suffered, in their particular dioceses, to appropriate this power and external jurisdiction, as peculiar to themselves; but that it remain in their hands to whom it pertaineth by divine inst.i.tution. What a woeful abuse is it, that, in our neighbour churches of England and Ireland, the bishop's vicar-general, or official, or commissary, being oftentimes such a one as hath never entered into any holy orders, shall sit in his courts to use (I should have said abuse) the power of excommunication and absolution? And what though some silly presbyter be present in the court? Doth not the bishop's subst.i.tute, being a layman, examine and judge the whole matter, decree, and give sentence what is to be done? Hath he not the presbyter's tongue tied to his belt? And what doth the presbyter more but only p.r.o.nounce the sentence according to that which he who sitteth judge in the court hath decreed and decerned? As touching the prelates themselves, I pray, by what warrant have they appropriated to themselves the whole external jurisdiction of binding and loosing, excommunicating and absolving? But that we may a little scan this their usurpation, and discover the iniquity thereof to the view of the princes, whose part it is to cause the same to be reformed, let us consider to whom Christ himself, who hath the key of David (Rev. iii. 7), who openeth and no man shutteth, and shutteth and no man openeth, hath committed this power of the keys to be used on earth. And, first, Let us distinguish betwixt the power itself, and the execution of it.
The power and authority of binding and loosing Christ hath delivered to the whole church, that is, to every particular church collectively taken.
”The authority of excommunication pertaineth to the whole church,” saith Dr Fulk.(1066) _Jus excommunicandi_, saith Balduine,(1067) _non est penes quamvis privatum, sive ex ordine sit ecclesiastico, sive politico_, &c.
_Sed hoc jus pertiner ad totam ecclesiam._ So say Zanchius (in 4 Praec., col. 756), Pola.n.u.s (_Synt._, lib. 7, cap. 18), Pareus (in 1 Cor. v., _De Excom._), Cartwright (on 1 Cor. v. 4), Perkins (on Jude 3): and, generally, all our sound writers. The Magdeburgians(1068) cite, for the same judgment, Augustine and Primatius. Gerhard(1069) citeth also some popish writers a.s.senting hereunto. The reasons which we give for confirmation hereof are these:-
1. It pertaineth to the whole church, collectively taken, to deny her Christian communion to such wicked persons as add contumacy to their disobedience: therefore, it pertaineth to the whole church to excommunicate them. Again, it pertaineth to the whole church to admit and receive one into her communion and familiar fellows.h.i.+p: therefore, to the whole church it likewise pertaineth to cast one out of her communion.
Sure, the sentence of excommunication is p.r.o.nounced in vain, except the whole church cut off the person thus judged from all communion with her: and the sentence of absolution is to as little purpose p.r.o.nounced, except the whole church admit one again to have communion with her. Shortly, the whole church hath the power of punis.h.i.+ng a man, by denying her communion unto him: therefore, the whole church hath the power of judging that he ought to be so punished. The whole church hath the power of remitting this punishment again: therefore, the whole church hath the power of judging that it ought to be remitted.
2. The Apostle, in 1 Cor. v., showeth that the Israelites' purging away of leaven out of their dwellings in the time of the pa.s.sover, was a figure of excommunication, whereby disobedient and obstinate sinners, who are as leaven to infect other men, are to be avoided and thrust out of the church. Now, as the purging away of the leaven did not peculiarly belong unto any one, or some few, among the Israelites, but unto the whole congregation of Israel; so the Apostle, writing to the whole church of Corinth, even to as many as should take care to have the whole lump kept unleavened, saith to them all, ”Know ye not that a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump? Purge out, therefore, the old leaven. Put away from among yourselves that wicked person,” 1 Cor. v. 6, 7, 13.
3. Christ hath delivered the power of binding and loosing to every particular church or congregation, collectively taken, which thus we demonstrate:-If our brother who trespa.s.seth against us will neither be reclaimed by private admonition, nor yet by a rebuke given him before some more witnesses, then, saith Christ, ”Tell it unto the church; but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. Verily, I say unto you, whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven,” Matt. xviii. 17, 18: where he showeth, that, in the Christian church (which he was to plant by the ministry of the apostles), excommunication was to be used as the last remedy for curing of the most deadly and desperate evils; which excommunication he setteth forth by allusion unto the order and custom of the Jews in his time, among whom they who were cast out, and excommunicate from the synagogue, were accounted as heathens and publicans. And so when he saith, ”Let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican,” he presupposeth that the church hath excommunicated him for his contumacy, which he hath added to his disobedience. For, as Pareus saith,(1070) ”If by me, and thee, and every one, he is to be accounted for such a man, it must needs be that the judgment of the church be, by public declaration, made known to me, and thee, and every one. And this meaning is thoroughly drawn out of the following verse-'For whatsoever ye shall bind on earth,' &c.; therefore, the church ought first to bind him before he ought to be accounted by me or thee for one bound, that is, excommunicate.” Now, what meaneth Christ by the church, to which he giveth the power of binding and loosing? Not the church universal, sure; for I cannot tell the church universal (whether it be understood _collective_ or _representative_) whensoever my brother trespa.s.seth against me, and will not be reformed. He meaneth, therefore, the particular church, whereof, for the time, it shall happen one to be a member. ”The power of the keys (saith Perkins(1071)) is given to all ministers, churches, and congregations.” Neither could there, otherwise, an ordinary, perpetual, and ready course be had, for the correcting of all public contumacy and scandal, by the means of ecclesiastical discipline. But it will be said, when he biddeth us tell that particular church whereof we are members, he meaneth not that we should tell the whole body of that church _collective_, but that we should tell the governors of the church, who are the church _representative_.
How, then, is this place alleged to prove that the whole church _collective_ hath power and authority to bind and loose?