Part 17 (1/2)
_Sect._ 1. We have proved that the ceremonies cannot be warranted by the law of G.o.d. It followeth to examine whether any law of man, or power upon earth, can make them lawful or warrantable unto us.
We will begin with laws ecclesiastical, where, first of all, it must be considered well what power the church hath to make laws about things pertaining to religion and the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d, and how far the same doth extend itself. Dr Field's resolution touching this question is as followeth: ”Thus (saith he(876)) we see our adversaries cannot prove that the church hath power to annex unto such ceremonies and observations as she deviseth, the remission of sins, and the working of other spiritual and supernatural effects, which is the only thing questioned between them and us about the power of the church. So that all the power the church hath, more than by her power to publish the commandments of Christ the Son of G.o.d, and by her censures to punish the offenders against the same, is only in prescribing things that pertain to comeliness and order.
Comeliness requireth that not only that gravity and modesty do appear in the performance of the works of G.o.d's service that beseemeth actions of that nature, but also that such rites and ceremonies be used as may cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the things performed, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion.”
And after: Order requireth that there be set hours for prayer, preaching, and ministering the sacraments; that there be silence and attention when the things are performed; that women be silent in the church; that all things be administered according to the rules of discipline.
This his discourse is but a bundle of incongruities. For, 1. He saith, that the church's power to annex unto the ceremonies which she deviseth the working of spiritual and supernatural effects, is the only thing questioned between our adversaries and us about the power of the church.
Now, our adversaries contend with us also about the power of the church to make new articles of faith, and her power to make laws binding the conscience, both which controversies are touched by himself.(877)
2. He saith, that comeliness requireth the use of such ceremonies as may cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the works of G.o.d's service, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion. But it hath been already showed(878) that the comeliness which the Apostle requireth in the church and service of G.o.d cannot comprehend such ceremonies under it, and that it is no other than that very common external decency which is beseeming for all the a.s.semblies of men, as well civil as sacred.
3. Whilst he is discoursing of the church's power to prescribe things pertaining to order, contra-distinguished from her power which she hath to publish the commandments of Christ, he reckons forth among his other examples, women's silence in the church, as if the church did prescribe this as a matter of order left to her determination, and not publish it as the commandment of Christ in his word.
4. Whereas he saith that the church hath power to prescribe such rites and ceremonies as may cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the works of G.o.d's service, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion, by his own words shall he be condemned: for a little before he reprehendeth the Romanists for maintaining that the church hath power to annex unto the ceremonies which she deviseth the working of spiritual and supernatural effects. And a little after he saith, that the church hath no power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to signify, a.s.sure, and convey unto men such benefits of saving grace as G.o.d in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Now, to cause a regard of, and a respect unto the works of G.o.d's service, and thereby to stir up men to fervour and devotion, what is it but the working of a spiritual and supernatural effect, and the conveying unto men such a benefit of saving grace as G.o.d in Christ is pleased to bestow on them? In like manner, whereas he holdeth that the church hath power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to express those spiritual and heavenly affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, which are or should be in men, in the very same place he confuteth himself, whilst he affirmeth that the church hath no power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to signify unto men those benefits of saving grace which G.o.d in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Now, to express such heavenly and spiritual affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, as should be in men, is (I suppose) to signify unto men such benefits of saving grace, as G.o.d in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Who dare deny it?
_Sect._ 2. Bishop Lindsey's opinion touching the power of the church,(879) whereof we dispute, is, that power is given unto her to ”determine the circ.u.mstances which are in the general necessary to be used in divine wors.h.i.+p, but not defined particularly in the word.”
I know the church can determine nothing which is not of this kind and quality. But the Prelate's meaning (as may be seen in that same epistle of his) is, that whatsoever the church determineth, if it be such a circ.u.mstance as is in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word, then we cannot say that the church had no power to determine and enjoin the same, nor be led by the judgment of our own consciences, judging it not expedient, but that in this case we must take the church's law to be the rule of our consciences. Now, by this ground which the Prelate holdeth, the church may prescribe to the ministers of the gospel the whole habit and apparel of the Levitical high-priest (which were to Judaize). For apparel is a circ.u.mstance in the general necessary, yet it is not particularly defined in the word. By this ground, the church may determine that I should ever pray with my face to the east, preach kneeling on my knees, sing the psalms lying on my back, and hear sermons standing only upon one foot. For in all these actions a gesture is necessary; but there is no gesture particularly defined in the word to which we are adstricted in any of these exercises.
And further, because _uno absurdo dato, mille sequuntur_, by this ground the Prelate must say, that the church hath power to ordain three or four holidays every week (which ordinance, as he himself hath told us, could not stand with charity, the inseparable companion of piety), for time is a circ.u.mstance in the general necessary in divine wors.h.i.+p, yet in his judgment we are not bound by the word to any particular time for the performance of the duties of G.o.d's wors.h.i.+p.
By this ground we were to say, that Pope Innocent III. held him within the bounds of ecclesiastical power, when in the great _Lateran_ council, anno 1215, he made a decree, that all the faithful of both s.e.xes should once in the year at least, to wit, upon Easter-day, receive the sacrament of the eucharist. From whence it hath come to pa.s.s, that the common people in the church of Rome receive the sacrament only upon Easter. Now, the time of receiving the sacrament is a circ.u.mstance in the general necessary, for a time it must have, but it is not particularly defined in the word. It is left indefinite, 1 Cor. xi. 26, yet the church hath no power to determine Easter-day, either as the only time, or as the fittest time, for all the faithful of both s.e.xes to receive the eucharist. What if faithful men and women cannot have time to prepare themselves as becometh, being avocated and distracted by the no less necessary than honest adoes of their particular callings?
What if they cannot have the sacrament upon that day administered according to our Lord's inst.i.tution? What if they see Papists confirming themselves in their Easter superst.i.tion by our unnecessary practice? Shall they swallow these and such-like soul-destroying camels, and all for straining out the gnat of communicating precisely upon Easter-day? But since time is a necessary circ.u.mstance, and no time is particularly defined, the Bishop must say more also, that the church may determine Easter-day for the only day whereupon we may receive the Lord's supper.
Last of all, if the church have power to determine all circ.u.mstances in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word, what could be said against that ancient order of solemn baptizing only at the holidays of Easter and Pentecost (whereby it came to pa.s.s that very many died unbaptized, as Socrates writeth(880))? Or, what shall be said against Tertullian's opinion,(881) which alloweth lay men, yea, women, to baptize.
May the church's determination make all this good, forasmuch as these circ.u.mstances of the time when, and the persons by whom, baptism should be ministered, are in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word? _Ite leves nugae._
_Sect._ 3. Camero,(882) as learned a Formalist as any of the former, expresseth his judgment copiously touching our present question. He saith, that there are two sorts of things which the church commandeth, to wit, either such as belong to faith and manners, or such as conduce to faith and manners; that both are in G.o.d's word prescribed _exserte_, plainly, but not one way, because such things that pertain unto faith and manners, are in the word of G.o.d particularly commanded, whereas those things which conduce to faith and manners are but generally commended unto us. Of things that pertain to faith and manners, he saith, that they are most constant and certain, and such as can admit no change; but as for things conducing to faith and manners, he saith, that they depend upon the circ.u.mstances of persons, place, and time, which being almost infinite, there could not be particular precepts delivered unto us concerning such things. Only this is from G.o.d commended unto the church, that whatsoever is done publicly be done with order, and what privately be decent.
These things he so applieth to his purpose, that he determineth, in neither of these kinds the church hath power to make laws, because in things pertaining to faith and manners the law of our Lord Jesus Christ is plainly expressed; and in those things, wherein neither faith nor manners are placed, but which conduce to faith and manners, we have indeed a general law, not having further any particular law, for that reason alleged, namely, because this depends upon the circ.u.mstances.
Thereafter he addeth, _Quid sit fides, quid sit pietas, quid sit charitas, verbo Dei demonstratur. Quid ad haec conducat, seu reputando rem in universum, seu reputando rem quatenus singulis compet.i.t, pendet ex cognitione circ.u.mstantiarum. Jam id definire Deus voluit esse penes ecclesiam, hae tamen lege, ut quod definit ecclesia, conveniat generali definitioni Dei._
The matter he ill.u.s.trates with this one example: G.o.d's word doth define in the general that we are to fast, and that publicly; but, in the particular, we could not have the definition of the word, because there are infinite occasions of a public fast, as it is said in the schools, _individua esse infinita_; so that it is the church's part to look to the occasion, and this depends upon the consideration of the circ.u.mstances.
This discourse of his cannot satisfy the attentive reader, but deserveth certain animadversions.
_Sect_. 4. First, then, it is to be observed how he is drawn into a manifest contradiction; for whereas he saith, that G.o.d's word doth _exserte_ and _diserte_ commend unto us _generatim_, such things as conduce to faith and manners, and that concerning things of this nature we have a general law in Scripture, how can this stand with that which he addeth, namely, that it is in the church's power to define what things conduce to faith, piety, and charity, even _reputando rem in universum_?
2. Whereas he saith that the church hath no power to make laws, neither in things belonging to faith and manners, nor in things conducing to the same; I would also see how this agreeth with that other position, namely, that it is in the power of the church to define what things do conduce to faith, piety and charity.
3. What means he by his application of order to public, and decency to private actions, as if the Apostle did not require both these in the public words of G.o.d's service performed in the church?
4. Whereas he saith that such things as conduce to faith and manners do depend upon the circ.u.mstances, and so could not be particularly defined in the word, either he speaks of those things as they are defined in the general, or as they are defined in the particular. Not the first; for as they are defined in the general, they cannot depend upon changeable circ.u.mstances, and that because, according to his own tenet, the word defines them in the general, and this definition of the word is most certain and constant, neither can any change happen unto it. Wherefore (without doubt) he must p.r.o.nounce this of the definition of such things in the particular. Now, to say that things conducing to faith and manners, as they are particularly defined, do depend upon circ.u.mstances, is as much as to say that circ.u.mstances depend upon circ.u.mstances. For things conducing to faith and manners, which the church hath power to determine particularly, what are they other than circ.u.mstances? Surely he who taketh not Camero's judgment to be, that the church hath power to determine somewhat more than the circ.u.mstances (and by consequence a part of the substance) of G.o.d's wors.h.i.+p, shall give no sense to his words. Yet, if one would take his meaning so, I see not how he can be saved from contradicting himself; forasmuch as he holdeth that such things as pertain to faith and manners are particularly defined in the word. To say no more, I smell such things in Camero's opinion as can neither stand with reason nor with himself.
5. G.o.d's word doth not only define things pertaining to faith and manners, but also things conducing to the same, and that not only generally, but in some respects, and sometimes, particularly. And we take for example his own instance of fasting. For the Scripture defineth very many occasions of fasting; Ezra viii. 21; 2 Chron. xx.; Jonah iii.; Joel ii.; Acts xiii. 3; Josh. vii. 6; Judg. xx. 16; Esth. iv. 16; Ezra ix. x.; Zech. vii. From which places we gather that the Scripture defineth fasting to be used,
1. For supplication, when we want some necessary or expedient good thing.