Part 4 (2/2)
_Sect._ 3. Touching the second, it is certain that human laws, as they come from men, and in respect of any force or authority which men can give them, have no power to bind the conscience. _Neque enim c.u.m hominibus, sed c.u.m uno Deo negotium est conscientis nostris_, saith Calvin.(95) Over our souls and consciences, _nemini quicquam juris nisi Deo_, saith Tilen.(96) From Jerome's distinction, that a king _praeest nolentibus_ but a bishop _volentibus_, Marcus Antonius de Dominis well concludeth: _Volentibus gregi praeesso, excludit omnem jurisdictionem et potestatem imperativam ac coactivam et solam significat directivam, ubi, viz., in libertate subditi est et parere et non parere, ita ut qui praeest nihil habeat quo nolentem parere adigat ad parendum._(97) This point he proveth in that chapter at length, where he disputeth both against temporal and spiritual coactive jurisdiction in the church. If it be demanded to what purpose serveth then the enacting of ecclesiastical laws, since they have not in them any power to bind the conscience, I answer, The use and end for which ecclesiastical laws do serve is, 1. For the plain discovery of such things as the law of G.o.d or nature do require of us, so that law which of itself hath power to bind, cometh from the priests and ministers of the Lord neither ??t???at?????? nor ????et????, but _declarative_, Mal. ii. 7. 2. For declaring to us what is fittest in such things as are, in their own nature, indifferent, and neither enforced by the law of G.o.d nor nature, and which part should be followed in these things as most convenient. The laws of the church, then, are appointed to let us see the necessity of the first kind of things, and what is expedient in the other kind of things, and therefore they are more properly called directions, instructions, admonitions, than laws. For I speak of ecclesiastical laws _qua tales_, that is, as they are the const.i.tutions of men who are set over us; thus considered, they have only _vim dirigendi et monendi_.(98) It is said of the apostles, that they were const.i.tuted _doctrinae Christi testes, non novae doctrinae legist tores_.(99) And the same may be said of all the ministers of the gospel, when discipline is taken in with doctrine. He is no nonconformist who holdeth _ecclesiam in terris agere partes oratoris, seu legati obsecrantis et suadentis_.(100) And we may hitherto apply that which Gerson, the chancellor of Paris, saith:(101) ”The wisest and best among the guides of G.o.d's church had not so ill a meaning as to have all their const.i.tutions and ordinances taken for laws properly so named, much less strictly binding the conscience, but for threatenings, admonitions, counsels, and directions only, and when there groweth a general neglect, they seem to consent to the abolis.h.i.+ng of them again;” for seeing, _lex inst.i.tuitur, c.u.m promulgatur, vigorem habet, c.u.m moribus utentium approbatur._
_Sect._ 4. But as we have seen in what respect the laws of the church do not bind, let us now see how they may be said to bind. That which bindeth is not the authority of the church, nor any force which the church can give to her laws. It must be then somewhat else which maketh them able to bind, when they bind at all, and that is _ratio legis_, ”the reason of the law,” without which the law itself cannot bind, and which hath the chiefest and most princ.i.p.al power of binding. An ecclesiastical law, saith Junius,(102) d?ata??? _sive depositio, non vere lex est, sed_ d?at?p?s??
aut canon, ac proindedirigit quidem ut canon agentem voluntarie: non autem necessitate cogit, ut lex etiam involuntarium quod si forte ante accedit coactio, ea non est de natura canonis sed altunde pervenit. An ecclesiastical canon, saith Tilen,(103) _ducit volentem, non trahit nolentem: quod si accedat coactio, ea ecclesiastici canonis natura est prorsus aliena_, Calvin's judgment is,(104) that an ecclesiastical canon binds, when _manifestam utilitatem prae se fert_, and when either _tu prepon_ or _charitatis ratio_ doth require, that we impose a necessity on our liberty. It binds not, then, by its own authority in his mind. And what saith the canon law itself?(105) _Sed sciendum est quod ecclesiasticae prohibitiones proprias habent causas quibus cessantibus, cessant et ipsae._ Hence Junius saith,(106) that the law binds not _per se_, but only _propter ordinem charitatem, et cautionem scandali_. Hence Ames,(107) _quamvis ad justas leges humanas, justo modo observandas, obligentur homines in conscientiis suis a Deo; ipsae tamen leges humanae, qua sunt leges hominum, non obligant conscientiam._ Hence Alsted:(108) ”Laws made by men of things indifferent, whether they be civil or ecclesiastical, do bind the conscience, in so far as they agree with G.o.d's word, serve for the public good, maintain order, and finally, take not away liberty of conscience.” Hence the professors of Leyden say,(109) that laws bind not _primo et per se, sed secundario, et per accidens_; that is,(110) _quatenus in illis lex aliqua Dei violator_. Hence I may compare the const.i.tutions of the church with _responsa juris consultorum_ among the Romans, which obliged no man, _nisi ex aequo et bono_, saith Daneus.(111) Hence it may be said, that the laws of the church do not only bind _scandali et contemptus ratione_, as Hospinian,(112) and in case _libertas fiat c.u.m scandalo_, as Parcus;(113) for it were scandal not to give obedience to the laws of the church, when they prescribe things necessary or expedient for the eschewing of scandal, and it were contempt to refuse obedience to them, when we are not certainly persuaded of the unlawfulness or inexpediency of the things prescribed.
_Sect._ 5. But out of the case of scandal or contempt, divines teach that conscience is not bound by the canon of the church made about order and policy. _Extra casum scandali et destinatae rebellionis, propter commune bonum, non peccat qui contra const.i.tutiones istas fecerit_, saith Junius.(114) ”If a law (saith Perkins)(115) concerning some external right or thing indifferent, be at some time or upon some occasion omitted, no offence given, nor contempt showed to ecclesiastical authority, there is no breach made in the conscience.” Alsted's rule is,(116) _Leges humanae non obligant quando omitti possunt sine impedimento finis ob quem feruntur sine scandalo aliorum, et sine contemptu legislatoris._ And Tilen teacheth us,(117) that when the church hath determined the mutable circ.u.mstances, in the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d, for public edification, _privatorum conscientiis liberum est quandoque ista omittere, modo offendicula vitentur, nihil que ex contemptu ecclesiae ac ministerii publici petulanti ?a???t??a vel ?e??d???a facere videantur._
_Sect._ 6. We deny not, then, that the church's canons about rites, which serve for public order and edification, do bind. We say only, that it is not the authority of the church framing the canon that binds, but the matter of the canon chiefly warranted by G.o.d's word.(118) _Scimus enim quaecunque ad decorum et ordinem pertinent, non habenda esse pro humanis placitas, quia divinitus approbantur._ Therefore we think concerning such canons, ”that they are necessary to be observed so far forth only, as the keeping of them maintaineth decent order, and preventeth open offence.”(119)
_Sect._ 7. If any say that I derogate much from the authority of the church when I do nothing which she prescribeth, except I see it lawful and expedient, because I should do this much for the exhortation and admonition of a brother. _Ans._ 1. I give far more reverence to the direction of the church than to the admonition of a brother, because that is ministerial, this fraternal, that comes from authority, this only from charity, that is public, this private, that is given by many, this by one.
And, finally, the church hath a calling to direct me in some things wherein a brother hath not. 2. If it be still instanced that, in the point of obedience, I do no more for the church than for any brother, because I am bound to do that which is made evident to be lawful and expedient, though a private Christian do but exhort me to it, or whether I be exhorted to it or not. For answer to this I say, that I will obey the directions of the church in many things rather than the directions of a brother; for in two things which are in themselves indifferent, and none of them inexpedient, I will do that which the church requireth, though my brother should exhort me to the contrary. But always I hold me at this sure ground, that I am never bound in conscience to obey the ordinances of the church, except they be evidently lawful and expedient. This is that, _sine quo non obligant_, and also that which doth chiefly bind, though it be not the only thing which bindeth. Now, for making the matter more plain, we must consider that the const.i.tutions of the church are either lawful or unlawful. If unlawful, they bind not at all; if lawful, they are either concerning things necessary, as Acts xv. 28, and then the necessity of the things doth bind, whether the church ordain them or not; or else concerning things indifferent, as when the church ordaineth, that in great towns there shall be sermon on such a day of the week, and public prayers every day at such an hour. Here it is not the bare authority of the church that bindeth, without respect to the lawfulness or expediency of the thing itself which is ordained (else we were bound to do every thing which the church ordains, were it never so unlawful, for _quod compet.i.t alicui qua tali, compet.i.t omni tali_: we behold the authority of the church making laws, as well in unlawful ordinances as in lawful), nor yet is it the lawfulness or expediency of the thing itself, without respect to the ordinance of the church (for possibly other times and diets were as lawful, and expedient too, for such exercises, as those ordained by the church); but it is the authority of the church prescribing a thing lawful or expedient. In such a case, then neither doth the authority of the church bind, except the thing be lawful and expedient, nor doth the lawfulness and expediency of the thing bind, except the church ordain it; but both these jointly do bind.
_Sect._ 8. I come now to examine what is the judgment of formalists touching the binding of the conscience by ecclesiastical laws. Dr Field saith, that the question should not be proposed, whether human laws do bind the conscience, but ”whether binding the outward man to the performance of outward things by force and fear of outward punishment to be inflicted by men, the non-performance of such things, or the non-performance of them with such affections as were fit, be not a sin against G.o.d, of which the conscience will accuse us,”(120) &c. Unto this question thus proposed and understood of human laws, and where no more is considered as giving them power to bind, but only the authority of those who make them; some formalists do give (as I will show), and all of them (being well advised) must give an affirmative answer. And, I pray, what did Bellarmine say more,(121) when, expressing how conscience is subject to human authority, he taught that conscience belongeth _ad humanum forum, quatenus h.o.m.o ex praecepto ita obligator ad opus externum faciendum, ut si non faciat, judicat ipse in conscientia sua se male facere, et hoc sufficit ad conscientiam obligandam?_ But to proceed particularly.
_Sect._ 9. I begin with Field himself, whose resolution of the question proposed is,(122) that we are bound only to give obedience to such human laws as prescribe things profitable, not for that human laws have power to bind the conscience, but because the things they command are of that nature, that not to perform them is contrary to justice or charity.
Whereupon he concludeth out of Stapleton, that we are bound to the performance of things prescribed by human laws, in such sort, that the non-performance of them is sin, not _ex sola legislatoris voluntate, sed ex ipsa legum utilitate_. Let all such as be of this man's mind not blame us for denying of obedience to the const.i.tutions about the ceremonies, since we find (for certain) no utility, but, by the contrary, much inconveniency in them. If they say that we must think those laws to be profitable or convenient, which they, who are set over us, think to be so, then they know not what they say. For, exempting conscience from being bound by human laws in one thing, they would have it bound by them in another thing. If conscience must needs judge that to be profitable, which seemeth so to those that are set over us, then, sure, is power given to them for binding the conscience so straitly, that it may not judge otherwise than they judge, and force is placed in their bare authority for necessitating and constraining the a.s.senting judgment of conscience.
_Sect._ 10. Some man perhaps will say that we are bound to obey the laws made about the ceremonies, though not for the sole will of the law-makers, nor yet for any utility of the laws themselves, yet for this reason, that scandal and contempt would follow in case we do otherwise. _Ans._ We know that human laws do bind in the case of scandal or contempt. But that nonconformity is neither scandal nor contempt, Parker hath made it most evident.(123) For, as touching contempt, he showeth out of fathers, councils, canon law, schoolmen, and modern divines, that _non obedire_ is not contempt, but _nolle obedire_, or _superbiendo repugnare_. Yea, out of Formalists themselves, he showeth the difference betwixt subjection and obedience. Thereafter he pleadeth thus, and we with him: ”What signs see men in us of pride and contempt? What be our _cetera opera_ that bewray such an humour? Let it be named wherein we go not two miles, when we are commanded to go but one, yea, wherein we go not as many miles as any shoe of the preparation of the gospel will bear us. What payment, what pain, what labour, what taxation made us ever to murmur? Survey our charges where we have laboured, if they be not found to be of the faithfulest subjects that be in the Lord, we deserve no favour. Nay, there is wherein we stretch our consciences to the utmost to conform and to obey in divers matters. Are we refractory in other things, as Balaam's a.s.s said to his master? Have I used to serve thee so at other times?” And as touching scandal, he showeth first, that by our not conforming, we do not scandalise superiors, but edify them, although it may be we displease them, of which we are sorry, even as Joab displeased David when he contested against the numbering of the people, yet did he not scandalise David, but edify him. And, secondly, whereas it might be alleged, that nonconformity doth scandalise the people, before whom it soundeth as it were an alarm of disobedience, we reply with him, ”Daniel will not omit the ceremony of looking out at the window towards Jerusalem. Mordecai omitteth the ceremony of bowing the knee to Haman; Christ will not use the ceremony of was.h.i.+ng hands, though a tradition of the elders and governors of the church then being. The authority of the magistrate was violated by these, and an incitement to disobedience was in their ceremonial breach, as much as there is now in ours.”
_Sect._ 11. But some of our opposites go about to derive the obligatory power of the church's laws, not so much from the utility of the laws themselves, or from any scandal which should follow upon the not obeying of them, as from the church's own authority which maketh them. Camero speaketh of two sorts of ecclesiastical laws:(124) 1. Such as prescribe things frivolous or unjust, meaning such things as (though they neither detract anything from the glory of G.o.d, nor cause any damage to our neighbour, yet) bring some detriment to ourselves. 2. Such as prescribe things belonging to order and shunning of scandal. Touching the former, he teacheth rightly, that conscience is never bound to the obedience of such laws, except only in the case of scandal and contempt, and that if at any time such laws may be neglected and not observed, without scandal given, or contempt shown, no man's conscience is holden with them. But touching the other sort of the church's laws, he saith, that they bind the conscience indirectly, not only _respectu materiae praecepti_ (which doth not at all oblige, except in respect of the end whereunto it is referred, namely, the conserving of order, and the not giving of scandal), but also _respectu praecipientis_, because G.o.d will not have those who are set over us in the church to be contemned. He foresaw (belike), that whereas it is pretended in behalf of those ecclesiastical laws which enjoin the controverted ceremonies, that the things which they prescribe pertain to order and to the shunning of scandal, and so bind the conscience indirectly in respect of the end, one might answer, I am persuaded upon evident grounds that those prescribed ceremonies pertain not to order, and to the shunning of scandal, but to misorder, and to the giving of scandal; therefore he laboured to bind such an one's conscience with another tie, which is the authority of the law-makers. And this authority he would have one to take as ground enough to believe, that that which the church prescribeth doth belong to order and the shunning of scandal, and in that persuasion to do it. But, 1. How doth this doctrine differ from that which himself setteth down as the opinion of Papists,(125) _Posse los qui praesunt ecclesiae, cogere fideles ut id credant vel faciant, quod ipsi judicaverint?_ 2. It is well observed by our writers,(126) that the apostles never made things indifferent to be necessary, except only in respect of scandal, and that out of the case of scandal they still left the consciences of men free, which observation they gather from Acts XV.
and 1 Cor. x. Camero himself noteth,(127) that though the church prescribed abstinence from things sacrificed to idols, yet the Apostle would not have the faithful to abstain for conscience' sake: why then holdeth he, that beside the end of shunning scandal and keeping order, conscience is bound even by the church's own authority? 3. As for the reason whereby he would prove that the church's laws do bind, even _respectu praecipientis_, his form of speaking is very bad. _Deus_ (saith he) _non vult contemni praepositos ecclesiae, nisi justa et necessaria de causa._ Where falsely he supposeth, not only that there may occur a just and necessary cause of contemning those whom G.o.d hath set over us in the church, but, also, that the not obeying of them inferreth the contemning of them. Now, the not obeying of their laws inferreth not the contemning of themselves (which were not allowable), but only the contemning of their laws. And as Jerome,(128) speaketh of Daniel, _Et nunc Daniel regis jussa contemnens_, &c.; so we say of all superiors in general, that we may sometimes have just reasons for contemning their commandments, yet are we not to contemn, but to honour themselves. But, 4. Let us take Camero's meaning to be, that G.o.d will not have us to refuse obedience unto those who are set over us in the church: none of our opposites dare say, that G.o.d will have us to obey those who are set over us in the church in any other things than such as may be done both lawfully and conveniently for the shunning of scandal; and if so, then the church's precept cannot bind, except as it is grounded upon such or such reasons.
_Sect._ 12. Bishop Spotswood and Bishop Lindsey, in those words which I have heretofore alleged out of them, are likewise of opinion, that the sole will and authority of the church doth bind the conscience to obedience. Spotswood will have us, without more ado, to esteem that to be best and most seemly, which seemeth so in the eye of public authority. Is not this to bind the conscience by the church's bare will and authority, when I must needs constrain the judgment of my conscience to be conformed to the church's judgment, having no other reason to move me hereunto but the sole will and authority of the church? Further, he will have us to obey even such things as authority prescribeth not rightly (that is, such rites as do not set forward G.o.dliness), and that because they have the force of a const.i.tution. He saith that we should be directed by the sentence of superiors, and take it as a sufficient ground to our consciences for obeying. Bellarmine speaketh more reasonably:(129) _Legesae human non obligant sub pna mortis aeternae, nisi quatenus violatione legis humanae offenditur Deus._ Lindsey thinketh that the will of the law must be the rule of our consciences; he saith not the _reason_ of the law, but the _will_ of the law. And when we talk with the chief of our opposites, they would bind us by sole authority, because they cannot do it by any reason.
But we answer out of Pareus,(130) that the particular laws of the church bind not _per se_, or _propter ipsum speciale mandatum ecclesiae. Ratio: quia ecclesia res adiaphoras non jubet facere vel omittere propter suum mandatum, sed tantum propter justas mandandi causas, ut sunt conservatio ordinis, vitatio scandali: quae quamdiu non violantur, conscientias liberas relinquit._
_Sect._ 13. Thus we have found what power they give to their canons about the ceremonies for binding of our consciences, and that a necessity not of practice only upon the outward man, but of opinion also upon the conscience is imposed by the sole will of the law-makers. Wherefore, we pray G.o.d to open their eyes, that they may see their ceremonial laws to be substantial tyrannies over the consciences of G.o.d's people. And for ourselves, we stand to the judgment of sounder divines, and we hold with Luther,(131) that _unum Dominum habemus qui animas nostras gubernat._ With Hemmingius,(132) that we are free _ab omnibus humanis ritibus, quantum quidem ad conscientiam attinet._ With the Professors of Leyden,(133) that this is a part of the liberty of all the faithful, that in things pertaining to G.o.d's wors.h.i.+p, _ab omni traditionum humanarum jugo liberas habeant conscientias, c.u.m solius Dei sit, res ad religionem pertinentes praescribere_.
CHAPTER V.
THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY CHRISTIAN LIBERTY, PROVED BY A THIRD REASON, VIZ., BECAUSE THEY ARE URGED UPON SUCH AS, IN THEIR CONSCIENCES, DO CONDEMN THEM.
_Sect._ 1. If Christian liberty be taken away, by adstricting conscience in any, much more by adstricting it in them who are fully persuaded of the unlawfulness of the thing enjoined; yet thus are we dealt with. Bishop Lindsay gives us to understand, that after the making and publication of an ecclesiastical canon, about things of this nature, albeit a man in his own private judgment think another thing more expedient than that which the canon prescribeth, yet in that case his conscience must be ruled by the will of the law, and not by his own judgment. And Bishop Spotswood, to such as object, that their conscience will not suffer them to obey, because they are persuaded that such things are not right, answereth; that the sentence of their superiors ought to direct them, and make their conscience yield to obedience. Their words I have before transcribed. By which it doth manifestly appear, that they would bear dominion over our consciences, not as lords only, by requiring the willing and ready a.s.sent of our consciences to those things which are urged upon us by their sole will and authority, but even as tyrants, not caring if they get so much as constrained obedience, and if by their authority they can compel conscience to that which is contrary to the p????f???a and full persuasion which it hath conceived.
_Sect._ 2. It will be said, that our consciences are in an error, and therefore ought to be corrected by the sentence of superiors, whose authority and will doth bind us to receive and embrace the ceremonies, though our consciences do condemn them. _Ans._ Giving, and not granting, that our consciences do err in condemning the ceremonies, yet, so long as they cannot be otherwise persuaded, the ceremonies ought not to be urged upon us; for if we be made to do that which our consciences do condemn, we are made to sin, Rom. xiv. 23. It is an audacious contempt, in Calvin's judgment,(134) to do anything _repugnante conscientia_. The learned Casuists teach us, that an erring conscience, though _non obligat_, yet _ligat_; though we be not obliged to do that which it prescribeth, yet are we bound not to do that which it condemneth. _Quicquid fit repugnante et reclamante conscientia, peccatum est, etiamsi repugnantia ista gravem errorem includat_, saith Alsted.(135) _Conscientia erronca obligat, sic intelligendo, quod faciens contra peccet_, saith Hemmingius.(136) This holds ever true of an erring conscience about matters of fact, and especially about things indifferent. If any say, that hereby a necessity of sinning is laid on them whose consciences are in an error, I answer, that so long as a man keeps an erroneous conscience, a necessity of sinning lies on him, and that through his own fault. This necessity ariseth from this supposition, that he retain his erring conscience, and so is not absolute, because he should inform his conscience rightly, so that he may both do that which he ought to do, and do it so from the approbation of his conscience. If it be said again, What should be done to them who have not laid down the error of conscience, but do still retain the same? I answer, _eligatur id quod tutius et melius est_.(137) If therefore the error of conscience be about weighty and necessary matters, then it is better to urge men to the doing of a necessary duty in the service of G.o.d, than to permit them to neglect the same, because their erring conscience disapproveth it; for example, it is better to urge a profane man to come and hear G.o.d's word than to suffer him to neglect the hearing of the same, because his conscience alloweth him not to hear. But if the error of conscience be about unnecessary things, or such as are in themselves indifferent, then it is _pars tutior_, the surest and safest part not to urge men to do that which in their consciences they condemn.
Wherefore, since the ceremonies are not among the number of such necessary things as may not be omitted without the peril of salvation, the invincible disallowance of our consciences should make our opposites not press them upon us, because by practising them we could not but sin, in that our consciences judge them unlawful. If any of our weak brethren think that he must and should abstain from the eating of flesh upon some certain day, though this thing be in itself indifferent, and not necessary, yet, saith Baldwin,(138) ”he who is thus persuaded in his conscience, if he should do the contrary, sinneth.”
_Sect._ 3. Conscience, then, though erring, doth ever bind in such sort, that he who doth against his conscience sinneth against G.o.d. Which is also the doctrine of Thomas.(139) But, without any more ado, it is sufficiently confirmed from Scripture. For, was not their conscience in an error who thought they might not lawfully eat all sorts of meat? Yet the Apostle showeth that their conscience, as erring as it was, did so bind, that they were d.a.m.ned if they should eat such meat as they judged to be unclean, Rom. xiv. 14, 23. The reason wherefore an erring conscience bindeth in this kind is, _quoniam agens_, &c.(140) ”Because he who doth any thing against his conscience doth it against the will of G.o.d, though not materially and truly, yet formally and by way of interpretation, forsomuch as that which conscience counselleth or prescribeth, it counselleth it under the respect and account of the will of G.o.d. He who reproacheth some private man, taking him to be the king, is thought to have hurt not the private man, but the king himself. So he that contemneth his conscience contemneth G.o.d himself, because that which conscience counselleth or adviseth is taken to be G.o.d's will.” If I go with certain men upon such a course as I judge and esteem to be a treasonable conspiracy against the king (though it be not so indeed), would not his Majesty (if he knew so much), and might he not, justly condemn me as a wicked traitor? But how much more will the King of kings condemn me if I practice the ceremonies which I judge in my conscience to be contrary to the will of G.o.d, and to rob him of his royal prerogative?
CHAPTER VI.
THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY CHRISTIAN LIBERTY PROVED BY A FOURTH REASON, VIZ., BECAUSE THEY ARE PRESSED UPON US BY NAKED WILL AND AUTHORITY, WITHOUT GIVING ANY REASON TO SATISFY OUR CONSCIENCES.
<script>