Part 3 (1/2)
On January 14, 1922, _The Times_ published the following in a telegram from its Peking correspondent:
It is curious to reflect that this country (China) could be rendered completely solvent and the Government provided with a substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy, pure and simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the Customs revenue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all records by 1,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the Was.h.i.+ngton Conference will provide sufficient revenue to liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unenc.u.mbered for the Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a Government to which to entrust it. Nor is there any visible prospect of the removal of this difficulty.
I venture to think _The Times_ would regard the difficulty as removed if the Manchu Empire were restored.
As to the ”splendid salt surplus,” there are two telegrams from the Peking correspondent to _The Times_ (of January 12th and 23rd, respectively) showing what we gain by making the Peking Government artificially bankrupt. The first telegram (sent on January 10th) is as follows:--
Present conditions in China are aptly ill.u.s.trated by what is happening in one of the great salt revenue stations on the Yangtsze, near c.h.i.n.kiang. That portion of the Chinese fleet faithful to the Central Government--the better half went over to the Canton Government long ago--has dispatched a squadron of gunboats to the salt station and notified Peking that if $3,000,000 (about 400,000) arrears of pay were not immediately forthcoming the amount would be forcibly recovered from the revenue. Meanwhile the immense salt traffic on the Yangtsze has been suspended. The Legations concerned have now sent an Identic Note to the Government warning it of the necessity for immediately securing the removal of the obstruction to the traffic and to the operations of the foreign collectorate.
The second telegram is equally interesting. It is as follows:--
The question of interference with the Salt Gabelle is a.s.suming a serious aspect. The Chinese squadron of gunboats referred to in my message of the 10th is still blocking the salt traffic near Chingkiang, while a new intruder in the shape of an agent of Wu-Pei-Fu [the Liberal military leader] has installed himself in the collectorate at Hankow, and is endeavouring to appropriate the receipts for his powerful master. The British, French, and j.a.panese Ministers accordingly have again addressed the Government, giving notice that if these irregular proceedings do not cease they will be compelled to take independent action. The Reorganization Loan of 25,000,000 is secured on the salt revenues, and interference with the foreign control of the department const.i.tutes an infringement of the loan agreement. In various parts of China, some independent of Peking, others not, the local _Tuchuns_ (military governors) impound the collections and materially diminish the total coming under the control of the foreign inspectorate, but the balance remaining has been so large, and protest so useless, that hitherto all concerned have considered it expedient to acquiesce. But interference at points on the Yangtsze, where naval force can be brought to bear, is another matter. The situation is interesting in view of the amiable resolutions adopted at Was.h.i.+ngton, by which the Powers would seem to have debarred themselves, in the future, from any active form of intervention in this country. In view of the extensive opposition to the Liang s.h.i.+h-yi Cabinet and the present interference with the salt negotiations, the $90,000,000 (11,000,000) loan to be secured on the salt surplus has been dropped. The problem of how to weather the new year settlement on January 28th remains unsolved.
It is a pretty game: creating artificial bankruptcy, and then inflicting punishment for the resulting anarchy. How regrettable that the Was.h.i.+ngton Conference should attempt to interfere!
It is useless to deny that the Chinese have brought these troubles upon themselves, by their inability to produce capable and honest officials.
This inability has its roots in Chinese ethics, which lay stress upon a man's duty to his family rather than to the public. An official is expected to keep all his relations supplied with funds, and therefore can only be honest at the expense of filial piety. The decay of the family system is a vital condition of progress in China. All Young China realizes this, and one may hope that twenty years hence the level of honesty among officials may be not lower in China than in Europe--no very extravagant hope. But for this purpose friendly contact with Western nations is essential. If we insist upon rousing Chinese nationalism as we have roused that of India and j.a.pan, the Chinese will begin to think that wherever they differ from Europe, they differ for the better. There is more truth in this than Europeans like to think, but it is not wholly true, and if it comes to be believed our power for good in China will be at an end.
I have described briefly in this chapter what the Christian Powers did to China while they were able to act independently of j.a.pan. But in modern China it is j.a.panese aggression that is the most urgent problem.
Before considering this, however, we must deal briefly with the rise of modern j.a.pan--a quite peculiar blend of East and West, which I hope is not prophetic of the blend to be ultimately achieved in China. But before pa.s.sing to j.a.pan, I will give a brief description of the social and political condition of modern China, without which j.a.pan's action in China would be unintelligible.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 24: In 1691 the Emperor Kang Hsi issued an edict explaining his att.i.tude towards various religions. Of Roman Catholicism he says: ”As to the western doctrine which glorifies _Tien Chu_, the Lord of the Sky, that, too, is heterodox; but because its priests are thoroughly conversant with mathematics, the Government makes use of them--a point which you soldiers and people should understand.” (Giles, op. cit. p.
252.)]
[Footnote 25: _Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking_, pp. 322 ff.]
[Footnote 26: The Summer Palace now shown to tourists is modern, chiefly built by the Empress Dowager.]
[Footnote 27: There is an admirable account of this question in Chap.
vii. of Sih-Gung Cheng's _Modern China_, Clarendon Press, 1919.]
[Footnote 28: A new revision has been decided upon by the Was.h.i.+ngton Conference.]
[Footnote 29: If you lived in a town where the burglars had obtained possession of the Town Council, they would very likely insist upon the policy of the Open Door, but you might not consider it wholly satisfactory. Such is China's situation among the Great Powers.]
[Footnote 30: _The Times_ of November 26, 1921, had a leading article on Mr. Wellington Koo's suggestion, at Was.h.i.+ngton, that China ought to be allowed to recover fiscal autonomy as regards the tariff. Mr. Koo did not deal with the Customs _administration_, nevertheless _The Times_ a.s.sumed that his purpose was to get the administration into the hands of the Chinese on account of the opportunities of lucrative corruption which it would afford. I wrote to _The Times_ pointing out that they had confused the administration with the tariff, and that Mr. Koo was dealing only with the tariff. In view of the fact that they did not print either my letter or any other to the same effect, are we to conclude that their misrepresentation was deliberate and intentional?]
CHAPTER IV
MODERN CHINA
The position of China among the nations of the world is quite peculiar, because in population and potential strength China is the greatest nation in the world, while in actual strength at the moment it is one of the least. The international problems raised by this situation have been brought into the forefront of world-politics by the Was.h.i.+ngton Conference. What settlement, if any, will ultimately be arrived at, it is as yet impossible to foresee. There are, however, certain broad facts and principles which no wise solution can ignore, for which I shall try to give the evidence in the course of the following chapters, but which it may be as well to state briefly at the outset. First, the Chinese, though as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economic development, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good as our own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which we shall destroy at our peril. Secondly, the Powers have inflicted upon China a mult.i.tude of humiliations and disabilities, for which excuses have been found in China's misdeeds, but for which the sole real reason has been China's military and naval weakness. Thirdly, the best of the Great Powers at present, in relation to China, is America, and the worst is j.a.pan; in the interests of China, as well as in our own larger interests, it is an immense advance that we have ceased to support j.a.pan and have ranged ourselves on the side of America, in so far as America stands for Chinese freedom, but not when j.a.panese freedom is threatened.
Fourthly, in the long run, the Chinese cannot escape economic domination by foreign Powers unless China becomes military or the foreign Powers become Socialistic, because the capitalist system involves in its very essence a predatory relation of the strong towards the weak, internationally as well as nationally. A strong military China would be a disaster; therefore Socialism in Europe and America affords the only ultimate solution.
After these preliminary remarks, I come to the theme of this chapter, namely, the present internal condition of China.
As everyone knows, China, after having an Emperor for forty centuries, decided, eleven years ago, to become a modern democratic republic. Many causes led up to this result. Pa.s.sing over the first 3,700 years of Chinese history, we arrive at the Manchu conquest in 1644, when a warlike invader from the north succeeded in establis.h.i.+ng himself upon the Dragon Throne. He set to work to induce Chinese men to wear pigtails and Chinese women to have big feet. After a time a statesmanlike compromise was arranged: pigtails were adopted but big feet were rejected; the new absurdity was accepted and the old one retained. This characteristic compromise shows how much England and China have in common.
The Manchu Emperors soon became almost completely Chinese, but differences of dress and manners kept the Manchus distinct from the more civilized people whom they had conquered, and the Chinese remained inwardly hostile to them. From 1840 to 1900, a series of disastrous foreign wars, culminating in the humiliation of the Boxer time, destroyed the prestige of the Imperial Family and showed all thoughtful people the need of learning from Europeans. The Taiping rebellion, which lasted for 15 years (1849-64), is thought by Putnam Weale to have diminished the population by 150 millions,[31] and was almost as terrible a business as the Great War. For a long time it seemed doubtful whether the Manchus could suppress it, and when at last they succeeded (by the help of Gordon) their energy was exhausted. The defeat of China by j.a.pan (1894-5) and the vengeance of the Powers after the Boxer rising (1900) finally opened the eyes of all thoughtful Chinese to the need for a better and more modern government than that of the Imperial Family.