Part 3 (1/2)
WAR DEPARTMENT, WAs.h.i.+NGTON, May 30, 1898.
_Major-General William R. Shafter, Tampa, Florida:_
With the approval of the Secretary of War you are directed to take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the navy, and move it on to the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor, or into the interior, as shall best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there and cover the navy as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or, with the aid of the navy, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago harbor.
You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the government relies upon your good judgment as to the most judicious use of your command, but desires to impress upon you the importance of accomplis.h.i.+ng this object with the least possible delay....
[Signed] H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.
In view of the fact that General Shafter had been nearly a month at Tampa, and of the further fact that his command was composed wholly, or almost wholly, of regular troops, who were completely equipped for service when they left their stations, he should have been able, it seems to me, to comply with this order at once; but, apparently, he was not ready. Day after day pa.s.sed without any noticeable change in the situation, and on June 7 the army at Tampa was apparently no nearer an advance than it had been when Cervera's fleet entered Santiago harbor on May 19.
Admiral Sampson, who was anxious to strike a decisive blow before the enemy should have time to concentrate and intrench, then telegraphed Secretary Long as follows:
MOLE, HAITI, June 7, 1898.
_Secretary of Navy, Was.h.i.+ngton_:
Bombarded forts at Santiago 7:30 A. M. to 10 A. M. to-day, June 6.
Have silenced works quickly without injury of any kind, though stationary within two thousand yards. If ten thousand men were here[1] city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours.
Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet.
[Signed] SAMPSON.
When this despatch reached Was.h.i.+ngton, the Secretary of War sent General Shafter two peremptory telegrams, as follows:
WAR DEPARTMENT, June 7.
_Major-General Shafter, Port Tampa, Florida:_
You will sail immediately, as you are needed at destination at once. Answer.
[Signed] R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WAs.h.i.+NGTON, June 7, 1898, 8:50 P.M.
_Major-General Shafter, Port Tampa, Florida:_
Since telegraphing you an hour since, the President directs you to sail at once with what force you have ready.
[Signed] R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
Upon receipt of these ”rush” orders, General Shafter hastily embarked his army, amid great confusion and disorder, and telegraphed the Secretary of War that he would be ready to sail, with about seventeen thousand officers and men, on the morning of June 8. Before the expedition could get away, however, Commodore Remey cabled the Secretary of the Navy from Key West that two Spanish war-s.h.i.+ps--an armored cruiser and a torpedo-boat destroyer--had been seen in Nicholas Channel, off the northern coast of Cuba, on the night of June 7, by Lieutenant W. H. H.
Southerland of the United States gunboat _Eagle_. Fearing that these Spanish vessels would intercept the fleet of transports and perhaps destroy some of them, Secretary Alger telegraphed General Shafter not to leave Tampa Bay until he should receive further orders.
Scouting-vessels of the navy, which were promptly sent to Nicholas Channel in search of the enemy, failed to locate or discover the two war-s.h.i.+ps reported by the commander of the _Eagle_, and on June 14 General Shafter's army, after having been held a week on board the transports in Tampa Bay, sailed for Santiago by way of Cape Maysi and the Windward Pa.s.sage. The Spanish fleet under command of Admiral Cervera had then been in Santiago harbor almost four weeks.
It is hard to say exactly where the responsibility should lie for the long delay in the embarkation and despatch of General Shafter's expedition. When I pa.s.sed through Tampa on my way south in June, the two railroad companies there were blaming each other, as well as the quartermaster's department, for the existing blockade of unloaded cars, while army officers declared that the railroad companies were unable to handle promptly and satisfactorily the large quant.i.ty of supplies brought there for the expedition. Naval authorities said that they had to wait for the army, while army officers maintained that they were all ready to start, but were stopped and delayed by reports of Spanish war-s.h.i.+ps brought in by scouting-vessels of the navy.
That there was unnecessary delay, as well as great confusion and disorder, there seems to be no doubt. As one competent army officer said to me, in terse but slangy English, ”The fact of the matter is, they simply got all balled up, and although they worked hard, they worked without any definite, well-understood plan of operations.”