Part 37 (1/2)

Several good roads led from the quarters specified in the direction of Dijon; to Vesoul, on the contrary, there were only bad tracks deep in snow over the southern slope of the wild plateau of Langres. The Commander-in-Chief, nevertheless, chose this direction, that he might as soon as possible afford General von Werder at least indirect a.s.sistance by approaching in the rear of the enemy threatening his brother-officer.

The march had to pa.s.s midway between the towns of Dijon and Langres, both points strongly occupied by the French. Wooded heights and deep ravines separated the columns and precluded mutual support; each body had to provide for its individual safety in every direction. The troops had previously undergone severe fatigues, and badly as they needed rest not one halt-day could be granted, nor could the evil plight of their boots and the horses' shoes be in any way remedied. On January 14th the march was begun in a thick fog and bitter cold, along roads frozen as smooth as gla.s.s.

The maintenance of supplies required special attention, and at first the 8th Brigade had to be left behind to secure the all-important railway-line Tonnerre--Nuits--Chatillon, until connections could be established by way of Epinal.

On the very first day's march the advanced guard of the VIIth Corps had a fight before Langres. A force from the garrison of 15,000 men was driven in on the fortress with the loss of a flag, and a detachment had to be left behind in observation of the place. Under cover of it the VIIth Corps marched past the fortress next day, while the IInd advanced to the Ignon Brook.

The weather changed during the night of the 15th. As a change from fourteen degrees of frost there came storm and rain. The water lay on the frozen roads, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the VIIth Corps reached Prauthoy, and the IInd Moloy, closing in to the left.

On the 18th the left wing advanced South-East on Frettes and Champlitte, the right a.s.sembled at Is sur Tille, and its advanced guard, after a march of thirty-one miles, reached the bridges at Gray. On the flank and rear of the Corps there had been some trivial fighting, but the cruel march across the mountains had been accomplished, and the cultivated valley of the Saone was reached.

General von Manteuffel had already received news of the satisfactory course of the first day's fighting on the Lisaine. Later telegrams from General von Werder reported that the French Army of the East would probably be obliged to retire under difficulties, and the German commander at once determined to cut off its retreat by advancing to the Doubs below Besancon.

The defeated French army was still numerically greatly superior to the German force. The troops had to be again called upon for severe exertions. They were required once more to cross a thinly-populated mountainous region, where it would be a matter of great difficulty to procure food and the shelter needful during the bitter winter nights.

Strong hostile forces had to be left in the rear at Langres, Dijon, and Auxonne, and that under very insufficient observation. However, in spite of every obstacle the advance in this new direction was begun on the 19th.

The first difficulty would have been the crossing of the Saone, here very deep and about sixty-six yards wide, and full of drifting ice, had not the advanced guard of the IInd Corps found Gray abandoned by the French and both the bridges uninjured; whereupon it occupied the town.

The head of the VIIth Corps crossed the river by the intact railway-bridge at Savayeux, and by a pontoon bridge thrown across by the pioneers higher up.

On the following day both Corps advanced in a southerly direction, the VIIth to Gy, the IInd to Pesmes. Here the latter also now crossed the Ognon after driving off by artillery fire a French detachment which tried to oppose the construction of the bridges.

On the 21st, at half past two, the advanced guard of the IInd Corps found Dole occupied by the enemy. General von Koblinski (commanding 5th Infantry Brigade) attacked at once. In spite of a violent street-fight in which the townspeople took part, the Grenadiers of the 2nd Regiment made their way through the town and on the further side seized a train of 230 waggons of provisions and military necessaries, intended for Besancon and left standing in the railway-station.

While the Doubs was thus crossed by the IInd Corps at this point, so the VIIth Corps opened itself a pa.s.sage across the Ognon at Marmay and Pin.

General von Werder had been instructed to follow close on the heels of the retreating enemy, and while the latter still maintained his position on the front of the XIVth Corps, the 2nd Baden Brigade on the right wing had advanced to Etobon, while Colonel von Willisen with his twelve squadrons had moved out beyond Lure. On the left, Colonel von Zimmermann with the East-Prussian Landwehr had driven the French out of Ste. Marie.

These detachments everywhere found cast-away arms and portions of equipment, and hundreds willingly gave themselves up as prisoners.

During the next few days General von Werder effected a general left-wheel to the south. The right wing held Villers.e.xel, and it was the left wing only that met the enemy in great ma.s.ses at L'Isle sur le Doubs, and afterwards at Clerval and Baume les Dames.

General Bourbaki had withdrawn from the Lisaine on the 18th. The XXIVth Corps only was left on the left bank of the Doubs, with orders to defend toward the north the defiles in the steep mountain-paths of the Lomont range eastward of Clerval; all the other troops withdrew between the Doubs and the Ognon, with the Division Cremer as rearguard. The Ognon might have formed a natural protection for the right flank of the French army, and orders had been given for the destruction of all the bridges over it; but we have seen how little they had been obeyed.

On the 21st the XVth and XXth Corps arrived in the neighbourhood of Baume les Dames, the XVIIIth at Marchaux; and here, having the stronghold of Besancon close at his back, General Bourbaki desired to await for the present the further movements of the enemy. In order that his forces should still muster in full strength, the commandant of Besancon was instructed to send forward to Blamont all the battalions of Mobiles-Guards he could spare so as to relieve the XXIVth Corps. Nine battalions of mobilized National Guards had actually previously reached Besancon, which might have been subst.i.tuted as desired, but they came armed with Enfield rifles, for which there was no ammunition in the fortress. Thus they would there only have added to the mouths to be filled, and General Rolland had simply sent them back again. The Intendant-General declared it impossible any longer to bring up the supplies ordered by him for the maintenance of the army; but what proved decisive was the news received this day that not only was the line of the Ognon lost, but that the Germans had already crossed the Doubs.

Under these circ.u.mstances the French Commander-in-Chief determined to continue his retreat on Besancon and there cross to the southern bank of the Doubs, so as not to be compelled to give battle with the river in his rear. The trains were sent off during the night, but above all things the XVth Corps was ordered at once to occupy Quingey with a whole division, and defend that position to extremity, in order to keep open the communications of the Corps with the interior. All the other Corps were to concentrate round Besancon, even the XXIVth, which consequently gave up the defence of the Lomont pa.s.ses.

General Bourbaki reported his situation to the Minister of War, who held out hopes of supporting him with the portion of the XVth Corps still remaining on the Loire. a.s.sistance could have been more quickly and effectually given from Dijon.

The Government had a.s.sembled there a very considerable force to replace the Division Cremer gone to join the Army of the East, for the defence of the ancient capital of Burgundy and to const.i.tute a point of support to the operations of General Bourbaki. A Corps of 20,000 men was a.s.signed to the local defence; a very inappropriately-named Army of the Vosges, more than 40,000 strong, was to do duty in the field. But this was of little effect in hindering the toilsome advance of the Germans over the mountains. The detachments in observation allowed themselves to be driven in by General von Kettler (commanding 8th Infantry Brigade), who followed the movement of both Corps on the right flank; and they retired on Dijon. Colonel Bombonnel, stationed at Gray, urgently begged for reinforcements to enable him to defend the pa.s.sages of the Saone; his applications were refused because Dijon was in too great peril, and it was not till the Prussians had already crossed the river that ”General” Garibaldi began to move.

He set out on the 19th in three columns in the direction of Is sur Tille, where there still remained only part of the (German) 4th Infantry Division. But he advanced little more than four miles. Garibaldi subsequently confined himself to watching reconnoitring parties which advanced to meet him from the heights of Messigny, and he then retired on Dijon with his troops marching to the strains of the Ma.r.s.eillaise.

Nevertheless, the enemy was held in too small estimation in General Manteuffel's headquarter, when General von Kettler was simply ordered to go and take Dijon.

The greatest care had been bestowed in strengthening the place. Numerous earthworks, and other erections specially constructed for defence protected it to the northward; more especially had Talant and Fontaine les Dijon been transformed into two detached forts and armed with heavy guns which commanded all the approaches on that side. The whole const.i.tuted a position which could be held against a much larger force than the five and a half battalions of the 8th Brigade with which General Kettler advanced to the attack.

FIGHTING AT DIJON, JANUARY 21ST AND 22ND.--This force had reached Turcey and St. Seine, and on the 21st advanced in two columns from the west on Dijon, still distant some fourteen miles. Major von Conta from Is sur Tille on the north was approaching with a small reinforcement. The ”Franctireurs de la Mort,” the ”Compagnie de la Revanche,” and other volunteer bands as well as Mobiles-Guards were without much difficulty driven out of the villages on the way, and beyond the deep ravine of the Suzon; the village of Plombieres on the right, which was defended with spirit, was stormed, and Daix was carried on the left; but in front of the fortified position of the French, and within reach of the fire of their heavy batteries, the bold advance was forced to come to a stand.

Major von Conta had also pushed on with continuous fighting, but failed to effect a junction with the brigade before dark. General von Kettler, recognizing the overwhelming superiority of the French, finally restricted himself to repulsing their sorties.

The French lost seven officers and 430 men in prisoners alone; but the fighting also cost the brigade nineteen officers and 322 men. The troops had performed a severe march in bad weather along heavy roads, and had not been able to cook either before or after the fight; the ammunition could only be replenished from a convoy which was expected next day.

Nevertheless General von Kettler did not hesitate to remain for the night in the positions he had gained immediately in front of the enemy, and then to seek shelter-quarters in the nearest villages.