Part 11 (1/2)

FOOTNOTES:

[28] The IInd and IIIrd Army.

[29] The wording of Bazaine's order dispenses with any speculation on this point. He wrote, ”In the event of failure, we shall maintain our positions, strengthen ourselves therein, _and retire in the evening under Forts St. Julien and Queuleu_.”

[30] The estimate of the total strength of the Army of the Rhine on the 22nd August is given at 137,728 men in the German Staff History. It deducts for garrison and normal outpost duty details amounting to over 17,000 men; and reckons the marching out strength for the battle of 31st August--1st September at ”about 120,000 men.”

CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN PARIS.

When, in the night of the 4th of September, the news of the disaster of Sedan and the Emperor's surrender became known in Paris, the Legislative Body met in a rapidly successive series of sittings for the purpose of selecting an Administrative Committee. The mob cut those deliberations short by forcing its way into the Chamber and proclaiming the Republic there and at the Hotel de Ville, amidst the acclamations of the people.

Though the troops were under arms in their barracks, the Government till now in power offered no resistance; the Empress left Paris; General Trochu and several members of the Minority in the Chamber combined to form a Government, which they styled ”The Government of National Defence and War.” ”War to the bitter end” was its motto, and the entire nation was to be called to arms. Not an inch of territory, not a stone of the fortresses was to be yielded up to the enemy.

Such a Government, devoid of any legitimate foundation, necessarily thirsted for results, and could be little disposed to allow the war to end in peace.

Notwithstanding all the early reverses of the war, France was too rich in resources to find herself as yet by any means defenceless. General Vinoy was still in the field. All the scattered Corps, the Marine troops and the Gendarmerie could gather to him. There was, too, the ”Territorial Militia,” numbering 468,000 men, an inst.i.tution which the country owed to Marshal Niel, whose far-seeing work of reorganization had been cut short only too soon. Further, there was available to be called up the falling-due contingent of 100,000 conscripts, as well as the National Guard. It followed that France was thus able to put into the field a million of men, without reckoning Franctireurs and Volunteer Corps. The reserve store of 2000 guns and 400,000 Cha.s.sepots a.s.sured the means of armament, and the workshops of neutral England were ready and willing to fulfil commissions. Such resources for war, backed by the active patriotism of the nation, could maintain a prolonged resistance if a master will should inspire it with energy.

And such a will was disclosed in the person of Gambetta.

Minister of War, he had at the same time, by the French system of government, the direction of military operations, and certainly he was not the man to loosen his grasp of the chief command. For in a Republic, a victorious general at the head of the Army would at once have become Dictator in his stead. M. de Freycinet, another civilian, served under Gambetta as a sort of Chief of the General Staff, and the energetic, but dilettante, commanders.h.i.+p exercised by these gentlemen cost France very dear. Gambetta's rare energy and unrelenting determination availed, indeed, to induce the entire population to take up arms, but not to direct these hasty levies with comprehensive unity of purpose. Without giving them time to be trained into fitness for the field, with ruthless severity he despatched them into the field in utter inefficiency as they were called out, to attempt the execution of ill-digested plans against an enemy on whose firm solidity all their courage and devotion was inevitably wrecked. He prolonged the struggle at the cost of heavy sacrifices on both sides, without turning the balance in favour of France.

In any event the German chiefs had still great difficulties to overcome.

The battles already won had cost heavy losses; in officers especially the losses were irreparable. Half the army was detained before Metz and Strasburg. The transport and guarding of already more than 200,000 prisoners required the services of a large part of the new levies being formed at home. The numerous fortresses had not indeed hindered the invasion of the German army, but they had to be invested or kept under observation to secure the rearward communications, and to safeguard the forwarding and victualling of troops; and each further advance into the enemy's country involved increased drafts of armed men. After the battle of Sedan only 150,000 men were available for further operations in the field. There could be no doubt that the new objective must be Paris, as the seat of the new Government and the centre of gravity, so to speak, of the whole country. On the very day of the capitulation of Sedan, all the dispositions were made for the renewal of the advance.

To spare the troops, the movement was to be carried out on a very broad front, which involved no risk, for of the French Corps, the XIIIth alone could possibly cause any detention. And, indeed, only Blanchard's Division of that Corps was now at Mezieres; its other two Divisions had but just begun their march when they received orders to halt preparatory to returning (to Paris).

RETREAT OF GENERAL VINOY.

General Vinoy's most urgent anxiety was--very rightly--to reach Paris with the least possible loss. This was not very easy to accomplish, since the VIth Prussian Corps, which had taken no part in the battle of Sedan, was at Attigny in such a position that as a matter of distance, as far as to Laon, it could reach any point of any line of the enemy's retreat before, or as soon as the latter. General von Tumpling, commanding that Corps, had already taken possession of Rethel with the 12th Division by the evening of September 1st, thus closing the high-road to Paris. Only extraordinary forced marching and a succession of fortunate circ.u.mstances could save from destruction Blanchard's Division, which had already wasted its ammunition in small conflicts.

General Vinoy supplied the troops with several days' rations, enjoined the strictest discipline on the march, and during the night between 1st and 2nd September set out on the road to Rethel, where he expected to find Exea's Division; which, however, availing itself of the section of railway still undestroyed, had already gone back to Soissons.

It was still early morning (of 2nd) when the French column of march came in contact with the 5th and presently with the 6th Prussian Cavalry Divisions, without, however, being seriously attacked. It was not till about ten o'clock, and within about seven miles of Rethel, that the French general learnt that place was in hostile possession, whereupon he decided on turning westward to Novion Porcien. He sent his rear-guard against the enemy's horse-artillery, but seeing hardly anything but cavalry in its front, it soon resumed the march. At about four in the afternoon the Division reached Novion, where it went into bivouac.

General von Hoffmann (commanding the 12th Prussian Division) had taken up a position at Rethel, and was awaiting the enemy, of whose approach he had been warned. Having ridden out in person, he became aware of Vinoy's deviation from the Rethel road, and at four in the afternoon marched to Ecly, where he arrived late in the evening. Part of his troops scouted forward toward Chateau Porcien.

General Vinoy, on learning that this road, too, was closed to him, quited his bivouac again at half-past one on the morning (of 3rd), leaving his fires burning, and set out on a second night-march in pouring rain and total darkness.

At first he took a northerly direction, to reach Laon at worst by the byways. By tracks fathomless in mud, and with frequent alarms, but without being reached by the enemy, he trudged into Chateau Porcien at half-past seven on the morning of the 3rd, and there halted for a couple of hours. The trend of the roads now compelled him again to take a southerly direction, and when the head of his column reached Seraincourt, the sound of firing told him that his rear had been attacked by the Germans.

The Prussian cavalry had, early the same morning, discovered the French departure, but this important information found General von Hoffmann no longer in Ecly. He had already started thence to search for the enemy at Novion-Porcien, where he might well be expected to be after his first night-march, but at half-past nine the Prussian general found the place empty. Thus, that morning, the German and French Divisions had marched past each other in different directions at a distance apart of little more than four miles. The thick weather had prevented them seeing each other. General Vinoy this day reached Montcornet, in what plight may be imagined. The 12th Division continued its pursuit in the westerly direction, but came up only with the rear stragglers of the fast-retreating enemy, and took up alarm-quarters in Chaumont Porcien.

This march of the enemy ought not indeed to have remained un.o.bserved and unchecked under the eye of two Cavalry Divisions, but it has to be said that these were called off at an unfortunate moment.

It was, in fact, in consequence of a report that the French forces were a.s.sembled at Rheims, that the Headquarter of the IIIrd Army had ordered the immediate return of the VIth Corps and the two Divisions of cavalry.