Part 6 (2/2)

Most studies devoted to Malcolm X ignore or do not examine the connections between the NOI and the American n.a.z.i Party. Even the scholar Claude Andrew Clegg, who is highly critical of Muhammad's decision to allow Rockwell to speak in 1962, argues that the n.a.z.i leader ”was a sort of bugbear that Muhammad used to scare blacks into the NOI. This underestimates the common ground involved. In the April 1962 issue of Muhammad Speaks Muhammad Speaks, Muhammad praised Rockwell as a man who had ”endorsed the stand for self that you and I are taking. Why should not you applaud?” The n.a.z.is ”have taken a stand to see that you be separated to get justice and freedom.” For several years, Rockwell continued to endorse the NOIs program. At an address in October 1962, for example, he stated: ”[Elijah Muhammad] is a black supremacist and I'm a white supremacist: that doesn't necessarily mean we gotta kill each other.”

Dining with the devil requires more than a long spoon. Like the tete-a-tete with the Klan, the NOIs public identification with the n.a.z.is undermined Malcolm's efforts to reach out to moderate audiences, people who might have agreed with his critique of American racism but rejected his solutions. This was the challenge he faced when he again confronted Bayard Rustin, on January 23, 1962. The debate was held at Manhattan's Community Church, a liberal east side congregation. The topic-”Separation or Integration?”-should have favored Rustin. The audience consisted largely of white liberals who strongly supported civil rights. However, Malcolm astutely did not condemn all whites as ”devils,” emphasizing instead the negative effects of inst.i.tutional racism on the black community. His arguments were persuasive to many whites in the audience. Rustin was forced to complain that too many whites in the gallery, including some of his own friends, were applauding Malcolm's statements more vigorously than the Negroes in the audience: ”May I explain the process. . . . It is, my friends, that many white people love to hear their kind d.a.m.ned to high water while they sit saying, 'Isn't it wonderful that that nice black man gives those those white people h.e.l.l? But he couldn't be talking about white people h.e.l.l? But he couldn't be talking about me me-Im the liberal.'”

Malcolm's lectures and sermons in early 1962 rarely mentioned the core values of the Nation's theology, and increasingly he was pulled into larger debates over the political future of black America. Probably to silence his critics within the NOI, he tried to give more attention to organizational matters. In January, both he and Joseph visited Mosque No. 23 in Buffalo, New York. And at the end of the same month he supervised the NOIs sponsors.h.i.+p of an African-Asian Bazaar at Harlem's Rockland Palace. He also continued to use his speeches to build up the cult around Elijah Muhammad. The Messenger appreciated such labors on his behalf; yet before long, Muhammad's opinion began to s.h.i.+ft. He read the transcripts and recordings from Malcolm's speeches and could see the political direction of his increasingly famous ministers mind. He decided to tighten the reins.

On February 14, Muhammad wrote Malcolm formally about his schedule. [W]hen you go to these Colleges and Universities to represent the Teachings that Allah has revealed to me for our people, do not go too much into the details of the political side; nor into the subject of a separate state here for us.” Muhammad instructed him to ”speak only what you know they have heard me say or that which you yourself have heard me say.” Malcolm was forbidden to express his independent opinions, even on questions that had no relations.h.i.+p with the NOI. The aging patriarch sought to reclaim his right to be the sole interpreter of Muslim teachings. ”Make the public seek me for the answers,” he wrote. ”Do not you see how I reject the devils on such subjects, by telling them I will say WHERE when the Government shows interest?” The NOI was a religious movement, not a political cause; Malcolm no longer had the authority to address issues like a separate black state or to speak about current events of a political nature, unless Muhammad gave his permission. Yet, of course, any discussion of black Americans' affairs inevitably centered on the struggle for civil rights; Muhammad was making Malcolm's position untenable.

An opportunity soon arose to test Muhammad's boundaries. On March 7, Cornell University invited Malcolm and CORE executive director James Farmer to debate the theme ”Segregation or Integration?” During the previous year, Farmers Freedom Riders had grabbed national headlines with their challenges to segregated bus systems in the South, and the promise of real gains to be made through concerted activism gave him a strong chip to play against Malcolm. In his opening remarks, Malcolm emphasized that black Americans were part of the ”non-white world.” And just as ”our African and Asian brothers wanted to have their own land, wanted to have their own country, wanted to exercise control over themselves,” it was reasonable for black Americans to desire the same. ”It is not integration that Negroes in America want, it is human dignity.” Once more, he attacked integration as a scheme benefiting only the black bourgeoisie: We who are black in the black belt, or black community, or black neighborhood can easily see that our people who settle for integration are usually the middle-cla.s.s so-called Negroes, who are in the minority. Why? Because they have confidence in the white man . . . they believe that there is still hope in the American dream. But what to them is an American dream to us is an American nightmare, and we don't think that it is possible for the American white man in sincerity to take the action necessary to correct the unjust conditions that 20 million black people are made to suffer, morning, noon and night.

But Farmer, like Rustin, was not intimidated, aggressively going after the conservatism and weaknesses in the NOIs program. ”We are seeking an open society . . . where people will be accepted for what they are worth, will be able to contribute fully to the total culture and the total life of the nation,” he declared. Racism was America's greatest problem. Turning to Malcolm, he asked, ”We know the disease, physician, what is your cure? What is your program and how do you hope to bring it into effect?” Malcolm had been long on rhetoric but short on details. ”We need to have it spelled out,” Farmer pressed him. ”Is it a separate Negro society in each city? As a Harlem [or] a South Side Chicago?” He also effectively countered Malcolm's claim that only the black middle cla.s.s favored integration by pointing out that the majority of student Freedom Riders were from working-cla.s.s and low-income families. In fact, Farmer argued, the opposite was true: black entrepreneurial capitalists favored Jim Crow, because it created a self-segregated black consumer market without white compet.i.tion; it was usually the black middle cla.s.s that opposed desegregation. Malcolm sensed that he was losing the debate and, to score points, resorted to mentioning that Farmer was married to a white woman.

Unlike the NAACP representatives that Malcolm had previously debated, Farmer was able to explain the tactics of the Black Freedom Movement in clear, everyday terms. To Malcolm's claim that desegregated lunch counters were unimportant, for instance, he had a sensible response: ”Are we not to travel? Picket lines and boycotts brought Woolworth's to its knees.” COREs Freedom Riders had ”helped to create desegregation in cities throughout the South.” What Malcolm undoubtedly grasped that night was that COREs approach to desegregation was fundamentally different from that of the older civil rights establishment, which relied on litigation and legislation. CORE was actively committed to building ma.s.s protests in the streets-in Farmer's words, ”The picketing and the nationwide demonstrations are the reason that the walls came down in the South, because people were in motion with their own bodies marching with picket signs, sitting in, boycotting, withholding their patronage.” Ironically, the net result of the Farmer-Malcolm debate, which was widely discussed among movement activists, was to give greater legitimacy to the Black Muslim leader. Even integrationists who sharply rejected black nationalism found Malcolm's argument persuasive. Within two years, entire branch organizations of CORE, especially in Cleveland, Detroit, Brooklyn, and Harlem, would become oriented toward Malcolm X.

Perhaps Malcolm's most important public address during the first half of 1962 was at Harlem's Abyssinian Baptist Church, where Congressman Powell had invited him as part of a lecture series on the theme ”Which Way the Negro?” Abyssinian church administrators informed the press that the overwhelming response they had received was larger ”than all the previous Harlem 'leaders' combined.” To an audience of two thousand, Malcolm repeated his thesis. ”We don't think it is within the nature of the white man to change in his att.i.tude toward the black man,” he argued, while also responding to charges that, although the NOI talked a militant line, it didn't involve itself in the black community's politics. ”Just because a man doesn't throw a punch doesn't mean he can't do so whenever he gets ready, so don't play the Muslims and the [black] nationalists cheap.” Wisely, he praised Powell as a model of independent leaders.h.i.+p. ”Adam Clayton Powell is the only black politician who has been able to come off the white man's political plantation, buck against the white political machine downtown, and still hold his seat in Congress.” Malcolm's comments set the stage for what would become a much closer partners.h.i.+p between the two men in the year to come.

Still, the divergence between his own views and those at the core of the NOI continued to trouble him, and he increasingly solicited the advice of those he trusted, though at times he found this circ.u.mstantially difficult. In Boston, a natural confidant would have been Louis X. However, throughout most of 1962, Louis was preoccupied with his fierce power struggle with Clarence 2X Gill over demands for selling bulk copies of Muhammad Speaks Muhammad Speaks. Although Ella was no longer a member of the Boston mosque, Malcolm continued to be in touch, and may have reached out to her. She had also become interested in orthodox Islam during these years, which helped to draw them closer after their falling out over the power struggle in Boston.

Despite the continuing tensions in their marriage, Malcolm also occasionally consulted Betty, who worried about their stability. Over the years she had become comfortable with many of the perks that were bestowed on her as the wife of the mosque's minister. Her grocery shopping, done by others, was dutifully boxed and dropped off at her kitchen; Thomas 15X Johnson or other FOI members chauffeured her to NOI events. At official occasions Betty enjoyed front-row seats, and the applause of the adoring crowd. And occasionally, when the Messenger visited New York City, it was at Betty and Malcolm's house that the honor of hosting him was extended. As James 67X later observed, ”Every woman would have liked to [have been] in her position.”

Unlike Malcolm, however, Betty was growing increasingly suspicious of the NOI leaders.h.i.+p. Because of her husband's high position in the hierarchy, she had ample opportunity to observe for herself the greedy behavior of Muhammad's family and entourage. By comparison, she and Malcolm lived almost in poverty, owning virtually nothing beyond a small amount of household furniture, their clothing, and personal items. His Oldsmobile belonged to the NOI; likewise, the t.i.tle to his home was not in his name, but the mosque's. Through the early 1960s Malcolm received around three thousand dollars every month to cover his transportation, overnight accommodations, and meals when traveling. He kept meticulous records, collecting receipts for every expenditure to justify his account. The NOI forbade ministers from purchasing life insurance, Betty claimed, perhaps to make their representatives totally dependent on the sect. Quietly at first, then more forcefully, she pleaded with her husband to take appropriate measures to protect his family financially. She tried him with the Garveyite argument that black families should at least own their own homes. Malcolm's stern response was that if anything should happen to him, the Nation would certainly provide for Betty and their children.

Malcolm may have publicly commanded his followers to obey the law, but this did little to lessen suspicion of the Muslims by law enforcement in major cities. Nowhere did tensions run hotter than in Los Angeles, where Malcolm had established Temple No. 27 in 1957. For most whites who migrated to the city, Los Angeles was the quintessential city of dreams. For black migrants, the city of endless possibilities offered some of the same Jim Crow restrictions they had sought to escape by moving west. As early as 1915, black Los Angeles residents were protesting against racially restrictive housing covenants; such racial covenants as well as blatant discrimination by real estate firms continued to be a problem well into the 1960s. The real growth of the black community in Southern California only began to take place during the two decades after 1945. During this twenty-year period, when the black population of New York City increased by nearly 250 percent, the black population of Los Angeles jumped 800 percent. Blacks were also increasingly important in local trade unions, and in the economy generally. For example, between 1940 and 1960, the percentage of black males in LA working as factory operatives increased from 15 percent to 24 percent; the proportion of African-American men employed in crafts during the same period rose from 7 percent to 14 percent. By 1960, 468,000 blacks resided in Los Angeles County, approximately 20 percent of the county's population.

These were some of the reasons that Malcolm had invested so much energy and effort to build the NOIs presence in Southern California, and especially the development of Mosque No. 27. Having recruited the mosque's leaders, he flew out to settle a local factional dispute in October 1961. Such activities were noticed and monitored by the California Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, which feared that the NOI had ”Communist affiliations.” The state committee concluded that there was an ”interesting parallel between the Negro Muslim movement and the Communist Party, and that is the advocacy of the overthrow of a hated regime by force, violence or any other means.” On September 2, 1961, several Muslims selling Muhammad Speaks Muhammad Speaks in a South Central Los Angeles grocery store parking lot were hara.s.sed by two white store detectives. The detectives later claimed that when they had attempted to stop the Muslims from selling the paper, they were ”stomped and beaten.” The version of this incident described in in a South Central Los Angeles grocery store parking lot were hara.s.sed by two white store detectives. The detectives later claimed that when they had attempted to stop the Muslims from selling the paper, they were ”stomped and beaten.” The version of this incident described in Muhammad Speaks Muhammad Speaks was strikingly different, with the paper claiming that ”the two 'detectives' produced guns, and attempted to make a 'citizen's arrest.' Grocery packers rushed out to help the detectives . . . and black residents of the area who had gathered also became involved. For 45 minutes bedlam reigned.” About forty Los Angeles Police Department officers were dispatched to the scene to restore order. Five Muslims were arrested. At their subsequent trial, the store's owner and manager confirmed that the NOI had been given permission to peddle their newspapers in the parking lot. An all-white jury acquitted the Muslims on all charges. was strikingly different, with the paper claiming that ”the two 'detectives' produced guns, and attempted to make a 'citizen's arrest.' Grocery packers rushed out to help the detectives . . . and black residents of the area who had gathered also became involved. For 45 minutes bedlam reigned.” About forty Los Angeles Police Department officers were dispatched to the scene to restore order. Five Muslims were arrested. At their subsequent trial, the store's owner and manager confirmed that the NOI had been given permission to peddle their newspapers in the parking lot. An all-white jury acquitted the Muslims on all charges.

Following the parking lot melee, the LAPD was primed for retaliation against the local NOI. The city's police commissioner, William H. Parker, had even read Lincoln's The Black Muslims in America The Black Muslims in America, and viewed the sect as subversive and dangerous, capable of producing widespread unrest. He instructed his officers to closely monitor the mosque's activities, which is why, just after midnight on April 27, 1962, when two officers observed what looked to them like men taking clothes out of the back of a car outside the mosque, they approached with suspicion. What happened next is a matter of dispute, yet whether the police were jumped, as they claimed, or the Muslim men were shoved and beaten without provocation, as seems likely, the commotion brought a stream of angry Muslims out of the mosque. The police threatened to respond with deadly force, but when one officer attempted to intimidate the growing crowd of bystanders, he was disarmed by the crowd. Somehow one officers revolver went off, shooting and wounding his partner in the elbow. Backup squad cars soon arrived ferrying more than seventy officers, and a full-scale battle ensued. Within minutes dozens of cops raided the mosque itself, randomly beating NOI members. It took fifteen minutes for the fighting to die down. In the end, seven Muslims were shot, including NOI member William X Rogers, who was shot in the back and paralyzed for life. NOI officer Ronald Stokes, a Korean War veteran, had attempted to surrender to the police by raising his hands over his head. Police responded by shooting him from the rear; a bullet pierced his heart, killing him. A coroner's inquest determined that Stokes's death was ”justifiable.” A number of Muslims were indicted.

News of the raid shattered Malcolm; he wept for the reliable and trustworthy Stokes, whom he had known well from his many trips to the West Coast. The desecration of the mosque and the violence brought upon its members pushed Malcolm to a dark place. He was finally ready for the Nation to throw a punch. Malcolm told Mosque No. 7's Fruit of Islam that the time had come for retribution, an eye for an eye, and he began to recruit members for an a.s.sa.s.sination team to target LAPD officers. Charles 37X, who attended one of these meetings, recalled him in a rage, shouting to the a.s.sembled Fruit, ”What are you here for? What the h.e.l.l h.e.l.l are you here for?” As Louis Farrakhan related, ”Brother Malcolm had a gangsterlike past. And coming into the Nation, and especially in New York, he had a tremendous sway over men that came out of the street with gangster leanings.” It was especially from these hardened men that Malcolm demanded action, and they rose to his cry. Mosque No. 7 intended to ”send somebody to Los Angeles to kill [the police] as sure as G.o.d made green apples,” said James 67X. ”Brothers volunteered for it.” are you here for?” As Louis Farrakhan related, ”Brother Malcolm had a gangsterlike past. And coming into the Nation, and especially in New York, he had a tremendous sway over men that came out of the street with gangster leanings.” It was especially from these hardened men that Malcolm demanded action, and they rose to his cry. Mosque No. 7 intended to ”send somebody to Los Angeles to kill [the police] as sure as G.o.d made green apples,” said James 67X. ”Brothers volunteered for it.”

As he made plans to bring his killers to Los Angeles, Malcolm sought the approval of Elijah Muhammad, in what he a.s.sumed would be a formality. The time had come for action, and surely Muhammad would see the necessity in summoning the Nation's strength for the battle. But the Messenger denied him. ”Brother, you don't go to war over a provocation,” he told Malcolm. ”They could kill a few of my followers, but I'm not going to go out and do something silly.” He ordered the entire FOI to stand down. Malcolm was stunned; he acquiesced, but with bitter disappointment. Farrakhan believes Malcolm concluded that Muhammad was trying ”to protect the wealth that he had acquired, rather than go out with the struggle of our people.”

A few days later Malcolm flew to Los Angeles, and on May 4 he held a press conference about the shootings at the Statler Hilton. The next day he presided over Stokes's funeral. More than two thousand people attended the service, and an estimated one thousand joined in the automobile procession to the cemetery. Yet the matter was far from resolved. If Malcolm could not kill the officers involved, he was determined that both the police and the political establishment in Los Angeles should be forced to acknowledge their responsibility. The only way to accomplish this, he believed, was for the NOI to work with civil rights organizations, local black politicians, and religious groups. On May 20, Malcolm partic.i.p.ated in a major rally against police brutality that attracted the support of many white liberals, as well as communists. ”You're brutalized because you're black,” he declared at the demonstration. ”And when they lay a club on the side of your head, they do not ask your religion. You're black-that's enough.”

He threw himself into organizing a black united front against the police in Southern California, but once more Elijah Muhammad stepped in, ordering his stubborn lieutenant to halt all efforts. ”Brother, stay where I put you,” ran his edict, ”because they [civil rights organizations] have no place to go. Hold your position.” Muhammad was convinced that integration could not be achieved; the civil rights groups would ultimately gravitate toward the Nation of Islam. When desegregation failed, he explained to Malcolm (and later to Farrakhan), ”they will have no place to go but what you and I represent.” Consequently, he vetoed any cooperation with civil rights groups even on a matter as contentious as Stokes's murder. Louis X saw this as an important turning point in the deteriorating relations.h.i.+p between Malcolm and Muhammad. By 1962, Malcolm was ”speaking less and less about the teachings [of Muhammad],” recalled Farrakhan. ”And he was fascinated by the civil rights movement, the action of the civil rights partic.i.p.ants, and the lack of action of the followers of the Honorable Elijah.”

At heart, the disagreement between Malcolm X and Elijah Muhammad went deeper than the practical question of how to respond to the Los Angeles police a.s.sault. Almost from the moment Muhammad had been informed about the raid and Stokes's death, he viewed the tragedy as stemming from a lack of courage by Mosque No. 27's members. ”Every one of the Muslims should have died,” he was reported to have said, ”before they allowed an aggressor to come into their mosque.” Muhammad believed Stokes had died from weakness, because he had attempted to surrender to the police. Malcolm could hardly stomach such an idea, but having submitted to the Messengers authority, he repeated the arguments as his own inside Mosque No. 7. James 67X listened as Malcolm told the congregation, ”We are not Christian(s). We are not to turn the other cheek, but the laborers [NOI members] have gotten so comfortable that in dealing with the devil they will submit to him. . . . If a blow is struck against you, fight back.” The brothers in the Los Angeles mosque who resisted had lived. Roland Stokes submitted and was killed.

Some of Malcolm's closest a.s.sociates were persuaded that Elijah Muhammad had made the correct decision, at least on the issue of retaliation. Benjamin 2X Goodman, for one, would later declare, ”Mr. Muhammad said, 'All in good time' . . . and he was right. The police were ready. It would have been a trap.” But Malcolm himself was humiliated by the NOIs failure to defend its own members. Everything that he had experienced over the previous years-from mobilizing thousands in the streets around Hinton's beating in 1957 to working with Philip Randolph to build a local black united front in 1961-62-told him that the Nation could protect its members only through joint action with civil rights organizations and other religious groups. One could not simply leave everything to Allah.

The Stokes murder brought to a close the first phase of Malcolm's career within the NOI. He had become convinced that Elijah Muhammad's pa.s.sive position could not be justified. Malcolm had spent almost a decade in the Nation, and for all his speeches, he could point to no progress on the creation of a separate black state. Meanwhile, in the state that existed, the black men and women who looked to him for leaders.h.i.+p were suffering and dying. Political agitation and public protests, along the lines of CORE and SNCC, were essential to challenging inst.i.tutional racism. Malcolm hoped that, at least within the confines of Mosque No. 7, he would be allowed to pursue a more aggressive strategy, in concert with independent black leaders like Powell and Randolph. In doing so, he speculated, perhaps the entire Nation of Islam could be reborn.

CHAPTER 8.

From Prayer to Protest May 1962-March 1963

Within days of his return from Los Angeles, Malcolm began to quietly pursue a strategy of limited political engagement. His muzzling by Elijah Muhammad continued to rankle, as did Muhammad's belittling theory about Ronald X Stokes's death resulting from his submission to the authorities. Before leaving Los Angeles on May 22, Malcolm had told an electrified crowd that Stokes ”displayed the highest form of morals of any black person anywhere on this earth,” and he arrived in New York a few days later feeling charged with purpose. Though Muhammad had restrained him from coalition building with non-Muslim moderates in Los Angeles, on Malcolm's home turf he held much greater lat.i.tude. On May 26, Mosque No. 7 organized a rally in front of the Hotel Theresa. The press release advertising this event linked the ”cold-blooded murder of Ronald T. Stokes and the shooting of seven other innocent, unarmed Negroes” in Los Angeles with the Freedom Riders in Alabama and the then current ma.s.s desegregation campaign led by King in Georgia. Malcolm invited the two candidates competing for Harlem's congressional seat to attend, Powell and attorney Paul Zuber, and he called for all Harlem leaders to support a coalition against police brutality. He was challenging Elijah Muhammad and his Chicago superiors by carrying out in New York the civil rights approach he had planned for Southern California.

Malcolm's critics in the Nation of Islam took this as proof that he had become mesmerized by the media, diverting his attention from religious matters into the dangerous realm of politics. Even Los Angeles minister John Shabazz, whose mosque stood at the center of the political maelstrom and who was presently a defendant in the LAPDs criminal suit against the Muslims, kept to the party line. In a June 1962 letter addressed to ”Brother Minister” and copied to Malcolm, Shabazz argued that excessive force by the police could not be ended primarily through politics: The letter declared that ”a religious religious solution will fit the problem of Police Brutality.” solution will fit the problem of Police Brutality.”

Undaunted, Malcolm's frustration pushed him forward, yet it soon led him to make a misstep that put him sharply on the defensive. On June 3 an airplane crashed in Paris, killing 121 well-to-do white citizens of Atlanta; given its timing, Malcolm found the tragedy too tempting a target. Before an audience of fifteen hundred in Los Angeles, he described the disaster as ”a very beautiful thing,” proof that G.o.d answers prayers. ”We call on our G.o.d-He gets rid of 120 of them.” The following month, the press picked up the statement, and many prominent Negroes wasted little time in denouncing both Malcolm and the NOI. Dr. Rufus Clement, president of Atlanta's University Center, described Malcolm's remarks as ”unchristian and inhuman,” while NAACP leader Roy Wilkins referred to the crash as ”a ma.s.s tragedy,” adding in bewilderment, ”Even when Negroes had their most violent [white] enemies against them, they did not descend to any glad feelings over death.” But the most eloquent-and d.a.m.ning-statement came from Martin Luther King, Jr., who sought to rea.s.sure white Americans ”that the hatred expressed toward whites by Malcolm X [was not] shared by the vast majority of Negroes in the United States. While there is a great deal of legitimate discontent and righteous indignation in the Negro community, it has never developed into a large-scale hatred of whites.” Above all, Malcolm's statement was a public relations disaster. It made it much easier for Negro moderates in groups like the NAACP and National Urban League to refuse to cooperate with the NOI, and it almost certainly increased the level of FBI infiltration. It was probably even what prompted the Bureau to discredit him in France; shortly thereafter, J. Edgar Hoover contacted the French government's legal attache in Paris, warning that a French film director, Pierre-Dominique Gaisseau, had recently been in contact with Malcolm, leader of a ”fanatical” and ”anti-white organization.”

Even more than the 1959 television series The Hate That Hate Produced The Hate That Hate Produced, Malcolm's comments on the crash reinforced his reputation as a demagogue. He may have considered his remark as part of a polemical jihad of words, designed to place Christian whites on the defensive, but it reinforced the Lomax-Wallace thesis that the NOI was the product of black hate. For Malcolm's critics in the civil rights movement, the statement, and others like it, marked him as representative of white society's failure to integrate. Yet in retrospect, many of Malcolm's most outrageous statements about the necessity of extremism in the achievement of political freedom and liberty were not unlike the views expressed by the 1964 Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, who declared that ”extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice, and moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.” Nearly two years before, in 1962, Malcolm argued, ”Death is the price of liberty. If you're not ready to die for it, put the word 'freedom' out of your vocabulary.”

For a few weeks Malcolm avoided speaking to the press while attempting to smooth things over within the NOI. On June 9 he attended a two-day rally featuring Elijah Muhammad at Detroit's Olympia Stadium. After the end of the second public event, all NOI members were ordered to stay. Malcolm had the unpleasant responsibility of reading to the crowd a letter from Raymond Sharrieff that had already been sent to all FOI captains, ordering ”every Muslim to begin obtaining no less than two new subscriptions to Muhammad Speaks Muhammad Speaks per day.” The subscription drive would continue for three months. The letter ended noting that ”those who failed to comply would be eliminated from the mosque.” This new edict showed Chicago's determination to turn the budding success of its newspaper into a cash cow. Members were already t.i.thing from their wages to their mosques as well as voluntarily donating funds to Muhammad and his family; now they were expected to generate even more money. per day.” The subscription drive would continue for three months. The letter ended noting that ”those who failed to comply would be eliminated from the mosque.” This new edict showed Chicago's determination to turn the budding success of its newspaper into a cash cow. Members were already t.i.thing from their wages to their mosques as well as voluntarily donating funds to Muhammad and his family; now they were expected to generate even more money.

The Nation's craven financial squeeze began to cause unrest at mosques throughout the country, and tensions in Boston rattled the organization. By 1962, Louis X was earning about $110 weekly serving as minister, yet as former Boston NOI official Aubrey Barnette would later note, ”Each member was supposed to donate $2.95 a week toward Louis's upkeep, which means that if 100 members were contributing regularly he was receiving another $15,000 a year in expense money.” Technically, none of the other mosque officials drew salaries, but in practice the FOI captain received eighty-five dollars weekly and the mosque secretary another thirty-five dollars each week, plus ”frequent contributions from the members.h.i.+p.” During the three-year period that Barnette and his wife, Ruth, belonged to the mosque, they donated one thousand dollars, about one-fifth of Barnette's income, which was itself slightly above average for NOI members at the time. Moreover, a cult of violence and intimidation began to grow around FOI captain Clarence 2X Gill. Barnette recalled Captain Clarence as ”a stocky man of medium height” who looked ”like an ex-middleweight boxer . . . and is arrogant, suspicious, dictatorial.” Members could not speak to Clarence directly, but were forced instead to communicate through intermediaries. At his Monday night FOI sessions, he put Fruit members through a two-hour-long ”mishmash of drill, hygiene lectures, current events briefings, pep talks, physical exercise and miscellaneous instruction.” His legendary paranoia infected the ranks, as members were constantly instructed to look out for possible FBI informants. When Barnette urged him to dial down the rants, Clarence immediately accused him of being an ”FBI spy.”

The push to increase sales of Muhammad Speaks Muhammad Speaks sparked an already disgruntled Boston members.h.i.+p to open revolt. About fifty black businessmen-small merchants and entrepreneurs mostly-had joined the mosque in part for their enthusiasm for Louis X. They didn't mind the weekly payments to sustain officials' salaries and to cover administrative costs. But they balked when told they were each to sell two hundred copies of sparked an already disgruntled Boston members.h.i.+p to open revolt. About fifty black businessmen-small merchants and entrepreneurs mostly-had joined the mosque in part for their enthusiasm for Louis X. They didn't mind the weekly payments to sustain officials' salaries and to cover administrative costs. But they balked when told they were each to sell two hundred copies of Muhammad Speaks Muhammad Speaks at fifteen cents per issue, and that they'd be responsible for a full financial account whether or not the papers were sold. Elijah Muhammad, Jr., by then the FOIs a.s.sistant supreme captain, flew to Boston to quell potential dissent, warning Boston's Fruit that ”if you don't want to sell the paper, then don't even bother to come in here. I'm the judge tonight, and you are guilty.” He even reminded members ”that in the old days recalcitrant brothers were killed.” at fifteen cents per issue, and that they'd be responsible for a full financial

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