Part 14 (2/2)

The Trend of Events.-Whatever difficulties Madison had in making up his mind on war and peace were settled by events beyond his own control. In the spring of 1811, a British frigate held up an American s.h.i.+p near the harbor of New York and impressed a seaman alleged to be an American citizen. Burning with resentment, the captain of the President, an American wars.h.i.+p, acting under orders, poured several broadsides into the Little Belt, a British sloop, suspected of being the guilty party. The British also encouraged the Indian chief Tec.u.mseh, who welded together the Indians of the Northwest under British protection and gave signs of restlessness presaging a revolt. This sent a note of alarm along the frontier that was not checked even when, in November, Tec.u.mseh's men were badly beaten at Tippecanoe by William Henry Harrison. The Indians stood in the way of the advancing frontier, and it seemed to the pioneers that, without support from the British in Canada, the Red Men would soon be subdued.

Clay and Calhoun.-While events were moving swiftly and rumors were flying thick and fast, the mastery of the government pa.s.sed from the uncertain hands of Madison to a party of ardent young men in Congress, dubbed ”Young Republicans,” under the leaders.h.i.+p of two members destined to be mighty figures in American history: Henry Clay of Kentucky and John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. The former contended, in a flair of folly, that ”the militia of Kentucky alone are competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet.” The latter with a light heart spoke of conquering Canada in a four weeks' campaign. ”It must not be inferred,” says Channing, ”that in advocating conquest, the Westerners were actuated merely by desire for land; they welcomed war because they thought it would be the easiest way to abate Indian troubles. The savages were supported by the fur-trading interests that centred at Quebec and London.... The Southerners on their part wished for Florida and they thought that the conquest of Canada would obviate some Northern opposition to this acquisition of slave territory.” While Clay and Calhoun, spokesmen of the West and South, were not unmindful of what Napoleon had done to American commerce, they knew that their followers still remembered with deep grat.i.tude the aid of the French in the war for independence and that the embers of the old hatred for George III, still on the throne, could be readily blown into flame.

Madison Accepts War as Inevitable.-The conduct of the British ministers with whom Madison had to deal did little to encourage him in adhering to the policy of ”watchful waiting.” One of them, a high Tory, believed that all Americans were alike ”except that a few are less knaves than others” and his methods were colored by his belief. On the recall of this minister the British government selected another no less high and mighty in his principles and opinions. So Madison became thoroughly discouraged about the outcome of pacific measures. When the pressure from Congress upon him became too heavy, he gave way, signing on June 18, 1812, the declaration of war on Great Britain. In proclaiming hostilities, the administration set forth the causes which justified the declaration; namely, the British had been encouraging the Indians to attack American citizens on the frontier; they had ruined American trade by blockades; they had insulted the American flag by stopping and searching our s.h.i.+ps; they had illegally seized American sailors and driven them into the British navy.

The Course of the War.-The war lasted for nearly three years without bringing victory to either side. The surrender of Detroit by General Hull to the British and the failure of the American invasion of Canada were offset by Perry's victory on Lake Erie and a decisive blow administered to British designs for an invasion of New York by way of Plattsburgh. The triumph of Jackson at New Orleans helped to atone for the humiliation suffered in the burning of the Capitol by the British. The stirring deeds of the Const.i.tution, the United States, and the Argus on the seas, the heroic death of Lawrence and the victories of a hundred privateers furnished consolation for those who suffered from the iron blockade finally established by the British government when it came to appreciate the gravity of the situation. While men love the annals of the sea, they will turn to the running battles, the narrow escapes, and the reckless daring of American sailors in that naval contest with Great Britain.

All this was exciting but it was inconclusive. In fact, never was a government less prepared than was that of the United States in 1812. It had neither the disciplined troops, the s.h.i.+ps of war, nor the supplies required by the magnitude of the military task. It was fortune that favored the American cause. Great Britain, hara.s.sed, worn, and financially embarra.s.sed by nearly twenty years of fighting in Europe, was in no mood to gather her forces for a t.i.tanic effort in America even after Napoleon was overthrown and sent into exile at Elba in the spring of 1814. War clouds still hung on the European horizon and the conflict temporarily halted did again break out. To be rid of American anxieties and free for European eventualities, England was ready to settle with the United States, especially as that could be done without conceding anything or surrendering any claims.

The Treaty of Peace.-Both countries were in truth sick of a war that offered neither glory nor profit. Having indulged in the usual diplomatic skirmis.h.i.+ng, they sent representatives to Ghent to discuss terms of peace. After long negotiations an agreement was reached on Christmas eve, 1814, a few days before Jackson's victory at New Orleans. When the treaty reached America the people were surprised to find that it said nothing about the seizure of American sailors, the destruction of American trade, the searching of American s.h.i.+ps, or the support of Indians on the frontier. Nevertheless, we are told, the people ”pa.s.sed from gloom to glory” when the news of peace arrived. The bells were rung; schools were closed; flags were displayed; and many a rousing toast was drunk in tavern and private home. The rejoicing could continue. With Napoleon definitely beaten at Waterloo in June, 1815, Great Britain had no need to impress sailors, search s.h.i.+ps, and confiscate American goods bound to the Continent. Once more the terrible sea power sank into the background and the ocean was again white with the sails of merchantmen.

The Republicans Nationalized

The Federalists Discredited.-By a strange turn of fortune's wheel, the party of Hamilton, Was.h.i.+ngton, Adams, the party of the grand nation, became the party of provincialism and nullification. New England, finding its s.h.i.+pping interests crippled in the European conflict and then penalized by embargoes, opposed the declaration of war on Great Britain, which meant the completion of the ruin already begun. In the course of the struggle, the Federalist leaders came perilously near to treason in their efforts to hamper the government of the United States; and in their desperation they fell back upon the doctrine of nullification so recently condemned by them when it came from Kentucky. The Senate of Ma.s.sachusetts, while the war was in progress, resolved that it was waged ”without justifiable cause,” and refused to approve military and naval projects not connected with ”the defense of our seacoast and soil.” A Boston newspaper declared that the union was nothing but a treaty among sovereign states, that states could decide for themselves the question of obeying federal law, and that armed resistance under the banner of a state would not be rebellion or treason. The general a.s.sembly of Connecticut reminded the administration at Was.h.i.+ngton that ”the state of Connecticut is a free, sovereign, and independent state.” Gouverneur Morris, a member of the convention which had drafted the Const.i.tution, suggested the holding of another conference to consider whether the Northern states should remain in the union.

From an old cartoon New England Jumping into the Hands of George III In October, 1814, a convention of delegates from Connecticut, Ma.s.sachusetts, Rhode Island, and certain counties of New Hamps.h.i.+re and Vermont was held at Hartford, on the call of Ma.s.sachusetts. The counsels of the extremists were rejected but the convention solemnly went on record to the effect that acts of Congress in violation of the Const.i.tution are void; that in cases of deliberate, dangerous, and palpable infractions the state is duty bound to interpose its authority for the protection of its citizens; and that when emergencies occur the states must be their own judges and execute their own decisions. Thus New England answered the challenge of Calhoun and Clay. Fortunately its actions were not as rash as its words. The Hartford convention merely proposed certain amendments to the Const.i.tution and adjourned. At the close of the war, its proposals vanished harmlessly; but the men who made them were hopelessly discredited.

The Second United States Bank.-In driving the Federalists towards nullification and waging a national war themselves, the Republicans lost all their old taint of provincialism. Moreover, in turning to measures of reconstruction called forth by the war, they resorted to the national devices of the Federalists. In 1816, they chartered for a period of twenty years a second United States Bank-the inst.i.tution which Jefferson and Madison once had condemned as unsound and unconst.i.tutional. The Const.i.tution remained unchanged; times and circ.u.mstances had changed. Calhoun dismissed the vexed question of const.i.tutionality with a scant reference to an ancient dispute, while Madison set aside his scruples and signed the bill.

The Protective Tariff of 1816.-The Republicans supplemented the Bank by another Federalist measure-a high protective tariff. Clay viewed it as the beginning of his ”American system” of protection. Calhoun defended it on national principles. For this sudden reversal of policy the young Republicans were taunted by some of their older party colleagues with betraying the ”agricultural interest” that Jefferson had fostered; but Calhoun refused to listen to their criticisms. ”When the seas are open,” he said, ”the produce of the South may pour anywhere into the markets of the Old World.... What are the effects of a war with a maritime power-with England? Our commerce annihilated ... our agriculture cut off from its accustomed markets, the surplus of the farmer perishes on his hands.... The recent war fell with peculiar pressure on the growers of cotton and tobacco and the other great staples of the country; and the same state of things will recur in the event of another war unless prevented by the foresight of this body.... When our manufactures are grown to a certain perfection, as they soon will be under the fostering care of the government, we shall no longer experience these evils.” With the Republicans nationalized, the Federalist party, as an organization, disappeared after a crus.h.i.+ng defeat in the presidential campaign of 1816.

Monroe and the Florida Purchase.-To the victor in that political contest, James Monroe of Virginia, fell two tasks of national importance, adding to the prestige of the whole country and deepening the sense of patriotism that weaned men away from mere allegiance to states. The first of these was the purchase of Florida from Spain. The acquisition of Louisiana let the Mississippi flow ”unvexed to the sea”; but it left all the states east of the river cut off from the Gulf, affording them ground for discontent akin to that which had moved the pioneers of Kentucky to action a generation earlier. The uncertainty as to the boundaries of Louisiana gave the United States a claim to West Florida, setting on foot a movement for occupation. The Florida swamps were a basis for Indian marauders who periodically swept into the frontier settlements, and hiding places for runaway slaves. Thus the sanction of international law was given to punitive expeditions into alien territory.

The pioneer leaders stood waiting for the signal. It came. President Monroe, on the occasion of an Indian outbreak, ordered General Jackson to seize the offenders, in the Floridas, if necessary. The high-spirited warrior, taking this as a hint that he was to occupy the coveted region, replied that, if possession was the object of the invasion, he could occupy the Floridas within sixty days. Without waiting for an answer to this letter, he launched his expedition, and in the spring of 1818 was master of the Spanish king's domain to the south.

There was nothing for the king to do but to make the best of the inevitable by ceding the Floridas to the United States in return for five million dollars to be paid to American citizens having claims against Spain. On Was.h.i.+ngton's birthday, 1819, the treaty was signed. It ceded the Floridas to the United States and defined the boundary between Mexico and the United States by drawing a line from the mouth of the Sabine River in a northwesterly direction to the Pacific. On this occasion even Monroe, former opponent of the Const.i.tution, forgot to inquire whether new territory could be const.i.tutionally acquired and incorporated into the American union. The Republicans seemed far away from the days of ”strict construction.” And Jefferson still lived!

The Monroe Doctrine.-Even more effective in fas.h.i.+oning the national idea was Monroe's enunciation of the famous doctrine that bears his name. The occasion was another European crisis. During the Napoleonic upheaval and the years of dissolution that ensued, the Spanish colonies in America, following the example set by their English neighbors in 1776, declared their independence. Unable to conquer them alone, the king of Spain turned for help to the friendly powers of Europe that looked upon revolution and republics with undisguised horror.

The Holy Alliance.-He found them prepared to view his case with sympathy. Three of them, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, under the leaders.h.i.+p of the Czar, Alexander I, in the autumn of 1815, had entered into a Holy Alliance to sustain by reciprocal service the autocratic principle in government. Although the effusive, almost maudlin, language of the treaty did not express their purpose explicitly, the Alliance was later regarded as a mere union of monarchs to prevent the rise and growth of popular government.

The American people thought their worst fears confirmed when, in 1822, a conference of delegates from Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France met at Verona to consider, among other things, revolutions that had just broken out in Spain and Italy. The spirit of the conference is reflected in the first article of the agreement reached by the delegates: ”The high contracting powers, being convinced that the system of representative government is equally incompatible with the monarchical principle and the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, mutually engage in the most solemn manner to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative government in whatever country it may exist in Europe and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known.” The Czar, who incidentally coveted the west coast of North America, proposed to send an army to aid the king of Spain in his troubles at home, thus preparing the way for intervention in Spanish America. It was material weakness not want of spirit, that prevented the grand union of monarchs from making open war on popular government.

The Position of England.-Unfortunately, too, for the Holy Alliance, England refused to cooperate. English merchants had built up a large trade with the independent Latin-American colonies and they protested against the restoration of Spanish sovereignty, which meant a renewal of Spain's former trade monopoly. Moreover, divine right doctrines had been laid to rest in England and the representative principle thoroughly established. Already there were signs of the coming democratic flood which was soon to carry the first reform bill of 1832, extending the suffrage, and sweep on to even greater achievements. British statesmen, therefore, had to be cautious. In such circ.u.mstances, instead of cooperating with the autocrats of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, they turned to the minister of the United States in London. The British prime minister, Canning, proposed that the two countries join in declaring their unwillingness to see the Spanish colonies transferred to any other power.

Jefferson's Advice.-The proposal was rejected; but President Monroe took up the suggestion with Madison and Jefferson as well as with his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. They favored the plan. Jefferson said: ”One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit [of freedom]; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government and emanc.i.p.ate a continent at one stroke.... With her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her then we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friends.h.i.+p.”

Monroe's Statement of the Doctrine.-Acting on the advice of trusted friends, President Monroe embodied in his message to Congress, on December 2, 1823, a statement of principles now famous throughout the world as the Monroe Doctrine. To the autocrats of Europe he announced that he would regard ”any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.” While he did not propose to interfere with existing colonies dependent on European powers, he ranged himself squarely on the side of those that had declared their independence. Any attempt by a European power to oppress them or control their destiny in any manner he characterized as ”a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.” Referring in another part of his message to a recent claim which the Czar had made to the Pacific coast, President Monroe warned the Old World that ”the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have a.s.sumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” The effect of this declaration was immediate and profound. Men whose political horizon had been limited to a community or state were led to consider their nation as a great power among the sovereignties of the earth, taking its part in shaping their international relations.

The Missouri Compromise.-Respecting one other important measure of this period, the Republicans also took a broad view of their obligations under the Const.i.tution; namely, the Missouri Compromise. It is true, they insisted on the admission of Missouri as a slave state, balanced against the free state of Maine; but at the same time they a.s.sented to the prohibition of slavery in the Louisiana territory north of the line 36 30'. During the debate on the subject an extreme view had been presented, to the effect that Congress had no const.i.tutional warrant for abolis.h.i.+ng slavery in the territories. The precedent of the Northwest Ordinance, ratified by Congress in 1789, seemed a conclusive answer from practice to this contention; but Monroe submitted the issue to his cabinet, which included Calhoun of South Carolina, Crawford of Georgia, and Wirt of Virginia, all presumably adherents to the Jeffersonian principle of strict construction. He received in reply a unanimous verdict to the effect that Congress did have the power to prohibit slavery in the territories governed by it. Acting on this advice he approved, on March 6, 1820, the bill establis.h.i.+ng freedom north of the compromise line. This generous interpretation of the powers of Congress stood for nearly forty years, until repudiated by the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case.

The National Decisions of Chief Justice Marshall

John Marshall, the Nationalist.-The Republicans in the lower ranges of state politics, who did not catch the grand national style of their leaders charged with responsibilities in the national field, were a.s.sisted in their education by a Federalist from the Old Dominion, John Marshall, who, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1801 to 1835, lost no occasion to exalt the Const.i.tution above the claims of the provinces. No differences of opinion as to his political views have ever led even his warmest opponents to deny his superb abilities or his sincere devotion to the national idea. All will likewise agree that for talents, native and acquired, he was an ornament to the humble democracy that brought him forth. His whole career was American. Born on the frontier of Virginia, reared in a log cabin, granted only the barest rudiments of education, inured to hards.h.i.+p and rough life, he rose by masterly efforts to the highest judicial honor America can bestow.

John Marshall On him the bitter experience of the Revolution and of later days made a lasting impression. He was no ”summer patriot.” He had been a soldier in the Revolutionary army. He had suffered with Was.h.i.+ngton at Valley Forge. He had seen his comrades in arms starving and freezing because the Continental Congress had neither the power nor the inclination to force the states to do their full duty. To him the Articles of Confederation were the symbol of futility. Into the struggle for the formation of the Const.i.tution and its ratification in Virginia he had thrown himself with the ardor of a soldier. Later, as a member of Congress, a representative to France, and Secretary of State, he had aided the Federalists in establis.h.i.+ng the new government. When at length they were driven from power in the executive and legislative branches of the government, he was chosen for their last stronghold, the Supreme Court. By historic irony he administered the oath of office to his bitterest enemy, Thomas Jefferson; and, long after the author of the Declaration of Independence had retired to private life, the stern Chief Justice continued to announce the old Federalist principles from the Supreme Bench.

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